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424

EASTERN PAPERS.

PART VIII.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

17

November 1855—March 1856.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

(EASTERN QUESTION.)

PART VIII.

No. 1.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(Secret.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 14, 1855.

YOUR Lordship is already acquainted with the language held by Count Buol to M. de Bourqueney, on the day of the departure of the latter for Paris, in which the disposition of the Austrian Government to adopt towards Russia a more decided line of policy than they have hitherto pursued, was plainly indicated.

During his stay at Paris, M. de Bourqueney was made thoroughly aware of the views and opinions of His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon and of Count Walewski; on his return here, therefore, a fortnight ago, he informed Count Buol that he was authorised, unofficially, to resume the conversation which had been commenced at the moment of his leaving Vienna. Count Buol expressed his willingness to do so, but said that, although these communications would be of an unofficial and strictly confidential nature, he considered it essential, and due to Her Majesty's Government, that I should be informed of everything that passed between them. I need not say how entirely M. de Bourqueney coincided in this view; but I must bear testimony to the complete and unreserved confidence with which he has regularly kept me acquainted with all that was passing. Count Buol likewise alluded to these conversations, but left it to Baron de Bourqueney to inform me of the details of them.

It is unnecessary for me to detain your Lordship by going minutely into these details, or to describe the gradual development of Count Buol's views, till they finally took the form of a proposal, that the Austrian Government should send to St. Petersburgh an ultimatum, on the rejection of which, or on its non-acceptation within a determined number of days, the immediate rupture of relations between the two countries should take place.

As, under the Treaty of the 2nd of December, no step of this nature can be taken by Austria without having previously consulted the Governments of Great Britain and France, the labours of Count Buol and of M. de Bourqueney have been directed to the object of making the proposed ultimatum as acceptable to them as possible.

A memorandum embodying this proposal has been drawn up, and will probably be signed by Count Buol, and "paraphé" by Baron de Bourqueney

to-night or to-morrow morning, and will be forthwith transmitted to Paris. As it will be immediately communicated to your Lordship, it will be in your hands within a few hours after you receive this despatch; I will therefore confine myself to stating that it is proposed there should be concluded between Great Britain, Austria, and France, a Treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, and establishing, as a *casus belli*, any attempt upon them by Russia, or any infraction of the other terms on which the peace is to be concluded, and which comprise—

1. The abandonment by Russia of her Protectorate over the Principalities, whose military position is to be secured by a change of the frontier of the Pruth, and according to which, in exchange for the territory now occupied by the allied armies, Russia will be required to give up a considerable portion of Bessarabia.

2. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube, which will be regulated by the rules established at the Congress of Vienna with respect to navigable rivers.

3. The entire neutralisation of the Black Sea, where neither ships of war nor military establishments are to be permitted.

4. The maintenance of the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Porte, all due regard being paid to the sovereignty of the Sultan; and deliberations being held upon the means of accomplishing this object, Russia will be admitted to her share in them on her acceptation of these terms of peace.

The Austrian Government are to be empowered to signify to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh that if, within the prescribed delay, the present proposal is accepted without change or alteration, the allied Governments are prepared immediately to sign preliminaries of peace, to be followed by a general armistice, and the negotiation of the permanent Treaty.

If, on the contrary, this unconditional acceptance should not be made, the complete and immediate rupture of all relations between the two countries will take place, and means considered for compelling Russia to make peace. The cooperation of the whole of Europe would be invited to this end, and Prussia would be informed that upon her breaking off all relations with Russia she would be admitted to the deliberations to be held.

Such are the main features of the proposal for which it is my duty to prepare your Lordship, and which is now so far matured that there is little prospect of any material change being made in it. The strictest secrecy has been preserved with regard to it, and Count Buol attaches the greatest importance to its continuance.

He intends, if the acquiescence of the Cabinets of London and Paris is given to the plan, that not a day shall be lost in the transmission of it to St. Petersburgh.

A communication of it would also be made at the same time to the King of Prussia, with an invitation to afford it his support.

The policy of the Austrian Government has hitherto been so cautious, not to say pusillanimous, that the attitude now suddenly adopted is almost calculated in the first instance to awaken distrust, and a suspicion that some secret motive must be at the bottom of so great a change; but I fully believe the cause of it may safely be attributed to the success of the allied armies before Sebastopol.

Nobody can have had intimate communication with Count Buol without becoming convinced that his own wishes would long ago have led him to follow a more worthy line of policy, and that he was at times painfully conscious of the smallness of the part borne by Austria on a question in which she should have taken a leading position.

He has had especially to contend against the influence of persons who had constant access to the Emperor, who, while they would rather persuade His Majesty to identify himself with the cause of Russia than ally himself closer to England and France, never ceased urging upon him the hopelessness of the undertaking of the allies in the Crimea; and an opinion so confidently given by those who were considered on military matters the highest authorities of the Empire, not unnaturally had its weight with the Emperor.

The influence of this party was entirely shaken by the news of the capture of Sebastopol, and on the arrival of Count Buol at Ischl, he found the Emperor animated by the best dispositions towards the allies, and his own ascendancy firmly established.

He lost no time in availing himself of his improved position, and two days

after his return to Vienna, he held to Baron de Bourqueney the language which gave the first intimation of the possible adoption of a new line of policy. M. de Bourqueney remained absent a month, but on his return found that there had been not only no relapse to past timidity, but that Count Buol's views had become strengthened and matured in the interval, and that the Emperor had adopted unreservedly the policy of his Minister, and was cordial in his desire to see it carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

P.S.—I have just received a message from Baron de Bourqueney informing me that the memorandum has been signed, and will be forwarded to Paris to-morrow morning.

H. E.

No. 2.

Count Walewski to Count de Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count de Persigny, November 19.)

(Très Confidentielle.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 18 Novembre, 1855.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-jointes trois dépêches avec leurs annexes que j'ai reçues de Vienne hier au soir. Je vous prie de mettre sans délai ces trois importants documents sous les yeux du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

L'Autriche offre de porter, pour son propre compte, à St. Pétersbourg un ultimatum, en déclarant à la Russie que si, dans un délai de quinze jours, cet ultimatum n'était pas accepté, le Ministre de Sa Majesté Impériale Apostolique aurait ordre de quitter Pétersbourg, et les relations diplomatiques entre les deux Empires seraient rompues. Aussitôt la rupture consommée, le Cabinet de Vienne se concerterait avec nous sur les meilleurs moyens à employer en vue d'atteindre le but de l'alliance. La Prusse serait invitée à participer au concert des trois Puissances, mais à la condition absolue de rompre également, au préalable, ses relations avec la Russie.

L'ultimatum de l'Autriche est fondé, comme vous le verrez, M. le Comte, sur le programme revu et très augmenté qui a servi de bases aux dernières négociations de Vienne; mais la nouvelle définition donnée aux quatre garanties par M. le Comte de Buol en élève considérablement la portée.

Je ne m'étendrai pas longuement à cet égard, car les dépêches de M. le Baron de Bourqueney rendent superflus tous les développements dans lesquels je pourrais entrer. Je crois cependant devoir faire remarquer qu'il était impossible d'établir des bases pour la définition de la première garantie qui répondissent plus complétement au but que nous nous proposons par l'organisation nouvelle à donner aux trois Principautés Danubiennes; on ne saurait trouver une rédaction plus large et se prêtant mieux à nos vues que celle de M. le Comte de Buol.

Quant au deuxième paragraphe, qui concerne une rectification des frontières de la Russie du côté des Principautés, cette rectification qui comme limite, substituerait, à une petite rivière, une chaine de montagnes difficile à franchir et qui enleverait à la Russie toutes les bouches du Danube, il serait plus que superflu d'en faire ressortir toute l'importance.

Le problême de la troisième garantie résolu par le systême auquel la Russie s'est montrée jusqu'à ce jour le plus contraire, et dont le Gouvernement Britannique apprécie toute la portée ainsi que nous-mêmes, permettrait certainement d'affirmer que la question qui a fait entreprendre la guerre est nettement résolue.

On ne saurait perdre de vue enfin que les questions délicates que soulève la réalisation de la quatrième garantie devraient être discutées et tranchées sans le concours de la Russie, et que cette Puissance aurait à souscrire aux décisions prises sur un sujet qui a servi de prétexte, si non de motif réel, à la guerre

actuelle, sans que ses Plénipotentiaires eussent même été admis à en discuter la valeur.

Du reste, M. le Comte, à quelque point de vue que l'on se place pour envisager l'ultimatum proposé par M. le Comte de Buol, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître que c'est un grand pas fait par l'Autriche vers nous, et qui l'éloigne autant de la Russie qu'il la rapproche des Puissances Occidentales. L'Empereur envisage l'offre qui nous est faite comme une chance heureuse et inespérée que nous devons saisir avec empressement sans laisser le temps au Cabinet de Vienne de revenir sur une ouverture dont il n'a peut-être pas bien mesuré lui-même toute l'étendue ni bien approfondi toutes les conséquences.

Sa Majesté Impériale pense que, comme il ne s'agit pas ici de la rédaction définitive du Traité de Paix, et comme le texte de l'ultimatum de M. le Comte Buol ne constitue pas la définition précise des conditions sur lesquelles la paix doit reposer, nous ne devons pas nous arrêter trop scrupuleusement à des subtilités de forme, et qu'il suffit, au contraire, de nous en tenir à l'ensemble, en réservant, pour la négociation définitive, la discussion approfondie du détail et des idées complémentaires que nous aurions à faire prévaloir.

L'opinion de Sa Majesté Impériale serait d'envoyer à Vienne une réponse prompte, et l'Empereur trouve que, dans ce but, aussi bien que pour ne pas nous lier d'une façon trop absolue au texte même des propositions de M. le Comte de Buol, il est désirable que nous acceptions l'offre du Cabinet de Vienne sans trop épiloguer sur le sens des mots et sans chercher à introduire des amendements ou des modifications dont la nécessité ne serait pas absolument démontrée.

Je désire vivement, M. le Comte, que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique envisage les choses au même point de vue que nous, et en tire des conséquences identiques.

Si la Russie rejette l'ultimatum de l'Autriche, l'attitude que prendrait cette dernière Puissance serait, on ne peut le contester, aussi favorable à notre politique qu'à notre situation militaire. Une fois ses relations rompues avec Vienne la Russie ne pourra pas se dispenser de garnir sa frontière depuis le Danube jusqu'à la Gallicie, car sur toute cette ligne elle devra s'attendre à être attaquée à chaque instant; il n'est même pas improbable que cette menace incessante ne détermine l'armée Russe à évacuer la Crimée, pour venir prendre position le long des frontières de l'Autriche en Bessarabie, en Volhynie et en Podolie.

Sous plus d'un point de vue, M. le Comte, cette attitude de l'Autriche qui constituerait une menace permanente contre plusieurs points du territoire Russe sans que la Russie pût faire cesser cet état d'incertitude en engageant elle-même le conflit sur le point qui lui conviendrait, cette attitude, dis-je, serait plus encore au détriment de la Russie qu'une déclaration de guerre immédiate. En effet, le jour où cette déclaration de guerre aurait été formulée, la Russie aurait le choix de son terrain et rien ne l'empêcherait d'envahir le territoire Autrichien et de marcher sur Vienne bien avant que les armées Française et Anglaise eussent eu le temps de venir au secours de leur nouvel allié, dont la capitale, comme vous le savez, n'est protégée, du côté de la frontière Russe, par aucune forteresse ni par aucun obstacle naturel. Dans le cas contraire, c'est-à-dire, s'il n'y a pas de déclaration de guerre formulée, la Russie se gardera bien d'envahir le territoire Autrichien, car elle n'ignore pas qu'elle attirerait par là sur elle la Prusse et toute l'Allemagne, qui se sont engagées à venir au secours de l'Autriche, si cette Puissance était attaqué chez elle ou même dans les Principautés.

Pour me résumer donc, la rupture des relations avec la Russie placerait le Cabinet de Vienne sur une pente rapide où il ne lui serait plus loisible de s'arrêter, et elle mettrait l'Autriche dans cette position avantageuse de pouvoir choisir, à son gré, son heure et son terrain pour attaquer la Russie sans que la Russie, de son côté, fût en mesure d'user des mêmes avantages.

Je vous invite, M. le Comte, à donner lecture de la présente dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et à lui en laisser copie en lui demandant de soumettre, sans délai, à la mûre délibération du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, l'offre de l'Autriche, ainsi que les dépêches de M. le Baron de Bourqueney qui en déterminent bien explicitement le caractère et la portée.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Baron Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 14 Novembre*, 1855.

EN arrêtant le plan de conduite à suivre par le Gouvernement Autrichien, de concert avec les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, pour amener le rétablissement de la paix sur des bases fixées en commun par les trois Cours alliées, M. le Comte de Buol s'est montré, non moins que moi, convaincu de la nécessité de prévenir la reproduction des équivoques qui, dans le passé, ont, à diverses reprises, menacé de compromettre si gravement les rapports de l'Autriche avec les Puissances Occidentales.

A cet effet, au moment de parapher avec moi le memorandum de ce jour, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a cru devoir compléter verbalement les dispositions écrites de cet Acte, en m'exposant les diverses obligations qui incomberaient à l'Autriche dans le cas où la Russie rejetterait les conditions posées dans l'ultimatum Autrichien. Pour donner, de mon côté, à ces définitions toute l'authenticité désirable, je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, M. le Comte, que de les consigner textuellement dans la présente dépêche, dont la substance a été communiquée par moi à M. le Comte de Buol.

Aux termes du memorandum paraphé ce matin, le rejet par la Russie de l'ultimatum Autrichien entraînerait immédiatement, et de plein droit, les conséquences suivantes:—

1. La rupture des relations diplomatiques entre les Cours de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg;

2. La conclusion d'un accord entre les trois Puissances alliées sur les moyens de contraindre la Russie à souscrire aux conditions posées dans l'ultimatum;

3. La coopération de ces mêmes Puissances à l'effet d'amener les autres Etats Européens à s'associer à l'action commune contre la Russie.

Reprenant successivement ces trois points, M. le Comte de Buol en a précisé le sens par les explications qui suivent.

La rupture des relations diplomatiques devra être immédiate et complète: immédiate, puisqu'elle suivra *ipso facto* le rejet de l'ultimatum en tout ou en partie; complète, en ce qu'elle entraînera la cessation absolue de toutes relations diplomatiques, et, par conséquent, le retrait en totalité des deux Missions respectives. Elle impliquera naturellement, de la part de l'Autriche, l'adoption des mesures nécessaires pour repousser la force par la force. Ce sera la guerre moins l'aggression.

L'accord à intervenir sur les moyens de contrainte n'entraînera pas nécessairement l'entrée actuelle de l'Autriche en campagne. Sauf les modifications que les événements ultérieurs pourront apporter, sous ce rapport, aux vues de l'Autriche et même de ses alliées, M. le Comte de Buol établit l'inopportunité d'une déclaration de guerre de la part du Gouvernement Autrichien suivant immédiatement la rupture diplomatique avec la Russie. Attaquée par l'Autriche, la Russie, dit en effet M. de Buol, se défendrait avec l'énergie du désespoir; attirant l'ennemie chez elle, et évoquant contre lui les souvenirs de 1812, elle ranimerait le courage de ses populations, et imposerait peut-être aux Puissances alliées d'immenses sacrifices en hommes et en argent qui ne les rapprocheraient pas du but de leurs efforts, le rétablissement de la paix. Des questions presqu'insolubles seraient infailliblement soulevées par la guerre portée au sein même de l'Europe; et ces questions, M. de Buol avoue franchement vouloir les écarter le plus longtemps qu'il sera possible.

Mais si l'entente à intervenir n'entraîne pas, selon M. de Buol, dans l'intérêt même de la cause commune, l'entrée effective de l'Autriche en campagne, elle implique forcément la combinaison des rôles de chacune des trois Puissances dans l'action commune contre la Russie, ainsi que la correlation préétablie des opérations militaires respectives.

En ce qui concerne l'Autriche (et M. de Buol voit dans sa proposition un moyen de faire taire tous les soupçons, de détruire toutes les méfiances dont la politique de son Gouvernement a été l'objet depuis dix-huit mois) elle serait prête à déterminer par Traité les conditions de l'occupation prolongée des Princi-

pautés par les troupes Autrichiennes; elle assurera, de la même manière, la défense effective de toute la frontière Danubienne de l'Empire Ottoman jusqu'à la mer; et comme, en ce qui concerne les Puissances Occidentales, l'entente dont il s'agit ne saurait préjudicier en rien à la liberté complète que conserveraient toujours ces mêmes Puissances quant au choix du terrain de leurs opérations futures, tous les rôles seraient définis dans le présent, toutes les conduites reliées pour l'avenir, dans une pensée commune et vers un but commun.

La coopération enfin des trois Cours alliées dans le but de rallier à leur action les autres Etats Européens est considérée par M. le Comte de Buol comme le moyen le plus efficace d'accélérer le rétablissement de la paix. La Russie persistant dans son aveugle résistance doit être mise au ban de l'Europe; c'est son châtiment, c'est la chance presque certaine de son retour à la raison. A cette fin, l'Autriche donnera aux Puissances Occidentales son concours absolu et ne négligera rien pour déterminer les autres Cours à s'associer activement et sans délai aux moyens de contrainte dont l'adoption sera le fruit des délibérations des trois Puissances.

Je viens de mettre, M. le Comte, à reproduire les idées de M. Buol, le même scrupule de conscience que celui qui l'a poussé à les développer devant moi. En n'enchaînant pas dès aujourd'hui, à l'Acte qui les contient, des conséquences plus fortes selon moi que la volonté même des hommes, M. de Buol songe au passé et ne vent plus exposer la politique de sa Cour à l'apparence d'une hésitation dans l'accomplissement de ses engagements; je l'ai écouté sans le combattre. Si j'ai toujours pensé que l'Autriche ne devait être poussée que pas à pas dans les voies de l'alliance active, quand, par l'acte le plus significatif de la politique internationale, la rupture des rapports entre pays limitrophes, elle franchit, d'un seul bond, presque toute la distance qui la séparait de nous, je crois qu'arrivés au but avant elle, nous pouvons maintenant l'y attendre avec certitude.

Je n'oublie pas d'ailleurs, M. le Comte, que le rétablissement de la paix solide et glorieuse est le couronnement avoué de nos triomphes; et nous nous en sommes peut-être assez rapprochés aujourd'hui pour ne pas y mêler d'autres idées qui, si nos espérances étaient trompées, trouveraient bien d'elles-mêmes la date de leur application.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Baron Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

Vienne, le 14 *Novembre*, 1855.

M. le Comte,

JE dois compte au Gouvernement de l'Empereur de l'esprit dans lequel, à la suite de mes pourparlers avec M. le Comte Buol, ont été introduites dans l'ultimatum Autrichien les modifications que votre Excellence y aura remarquées en le comparant aux notes que j'avais eu l'honneur de déposer entre ses mains. Ces modifications me semblent toutes avoir donné plus de force et d'unité aux conditions générales que l'Autriche vient de s'approprier, et sur lesquelles elle n'attend plus que l'opinion des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres pour en faire l'usage qui sera convenu entre les trois Cours.

Nous nous sommes d'abord arrêtés, le Comte Buol et moi, à cette pensée générale, qu'il ne s'agissait dans notre travail que d'énumérer les sacrifices à imposer à la Russie, que de la dépouiller, en quelque sorte, des titres sur lesquels elle pourrait appuyer plus tard sa résistance à l'application des principes que nous avions fait prévaloir. Nous avons donc élagué tout ce qui ne la concernait pas directement et nous ne lui avons laissé que sa place à la paix, soit dans les conseils, soit dans les institutions où elle aura plus tard à exercer un cinquième de surveillance, de contrôle ou de garantie.

Ainsi, dans l'Article des Principautés Danubiennes nous n'avons pas seulement frappé le protectorat exclusif, nous avons annulé tout droit particulier d'ingérence dans leurs affaires intérieures. Nous avons laissé aussi libre que possible l'avenir de l'organisation de ces provinces, en ne réservant que trois conditions également irréprochables: l'assentiment des Puissances garantes et le vœu des populations.

Nous avons posé le principe fondamental du développement du système défensif des Principautés; nous l'avons dégagé de toutes les entraves que lui opposaient les Traités et usages. Notre but était de faire de ces provinces un premier boulevard de l'intégrité de l'Empire, et comme les plus étranges revivements dans la politique générale veulent être prévus dans les actes qui embrassent un long avenir, il n'échappera pas à votre Excellence que notre rédaction s'applique au danger qui menacerait un jour la frontière de l'est et du nord. Les mots "contre toute agression étrangère" répondent à cette préoccupation, et le Comte Buol en les acceptant s'est parfaitement rendu compte d'une désignation indirecte qui atteignait sans exception les deux Puissances limitrophes.

La rectification de frontière est à vrai dire pour la Russie la perte de la moitié de la Bessarabie. C'est l'annulation des Traités de Jassy et d'Andrinople: c'est la Porte vengée de revers de 1828 et 1829; c'est l'Angleterre, c'est la France, l'accès d'un souvenir qui a si longtemps pesé sur la situation politique en Orient; et, appliquée aux circonstances actuelles, cette nouvelle délimitation territoriale contient une des plus hautes leçons de morale politique dont l'histoire ait gardé la mémoire. C'est en franchissant le Pruth au mois de Juin 1853, que l'Empereur Nicolas a violé le droit public de l'Europe; le Pruth cessera d'être la frontière de la Russie. Le châtiment a lieu où le crime a été commis.

L'affranchissement du Danube continue à trouver sa garantie dans l'institution d'une Commission Européenne, et dans la présence de stationnaires des diverses Puissances maritimes devant ses embouchures; mais la rectification territoriale, en dépossédant la Russie de la rive gauche du fleuve et des îles comprises entre les divers bras, assure d'une manière bien autrement efficace la libre navigation du fleuve contre les obstacles créés ou maintenus sous la juridiction territoriale Russe, et l'institution Européenne préposée à l'exécution de règlements de l'Acte de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale devient, à son tour, une garantie contre tous au profit de tous.

La neutralisation de la Mer Noire une fois admise par le Comte Buol comme base des préliminaires de la paix, ne comportait pas, dans l'Article qui la concerne, des modifications de forme; toutefois, elle me semble mieux définie et plus solennellement proclamée dans la nouvelle rédaction. Sous la forme de quelques principes généraux, elle embrasse plus d'application et précise mieux la seule exception admise à la règle de la clôture des Détroits, dans la présence des stationnaires étrangers devant les embouchures du Danube—stationnaires dont la force et le nombre balanceront certainement, s'ils ne la surpassent pas, la force qui sera accordée à la Russie pour le service de ses côtes.

L'Article relatif à l'amélioration du sort des populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte, a à peine été modifié; il stipule néanmoins d'une manière plus explicite que les Conférences ouvertes à Constantinople devront avoir achevé leur travail avant la paix; et c'est une salutaire pensée que de le mener à terme avant que la Russie ait acquis par ses sacrifices le droit d'y prendre part. Elle ne reparaîtra que comme garante, et la reconnaissance des sujets du Sultan rencontrera naturellement vers le Souverain et les alliés au lieu de s'égarer en allant droit à l'ennemi commun.

Le memorandum enfin contient l'engagement de l'Autriche de signer avec la France et l'Angleterre, au moment de la conclusion de la paix générale, un Traité d'Alliance qui posera le *casus belli* sur toute infraction commis par la Russie contre les stipulations de la dite paix. C'est le cadre d'Avril, immensément élargi, puisqu'il ne fesait pour l'Autriche un cas de guerre que de l'augmentation du nombre des vaisseaux Russes au delà d'un chiffre déterminé.

Telles sont, M. le Comte, les considérations que mon devoir était de placer sous les yeux de votre Excellence. Elle examinera ainsi et appréciera le travail qui lui est soumis dans l'esprit qui a présidé à sa rédaction.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Annex (A).

LE Comte Buol avait entretenu le Baron de Bourqueney à son départ pour Paris, des conditions qui pourraient éventuellement servir de base au rétablissement de la paix.

Les idées émises par M. le Comte Buol ayant été exposées à Paris par M. le Baron de Bourqueney ont fixé toute l'attention du Gouvernement Français. Elles ont été communiquées confidentiellement au Gouvernement Anglais, qui les a reconnues dignes d'être sérieusement examinées, les deux Cabinets constatant à la fois que l'initiative des ouvertures pacifiques n'émanait pas d'eux, mais admettant que leur inébranlable résolution d'obtenir par la guerre une paix qui répondit au but de cette guerre, n'excluait ni l'examen ni l'acceptation des conditions qui réaliseraient dès aujourd'hui l'objet de leur alliance.

M. de Bourqueney a été autorisé à reprendre avec le Comte de Buol, dès son retour à Vienne, la conversation qui avait précédé son départ pour Paris.

En conséquence, M. le Comte de Buol et M. le Baron de Bourqueney se sont réunis à diverses reprises. Développant d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe et aux résultats de la guerre actuelle les quatre points déjà acceptés en principe par la Russie, sous réserve du droit qui appartient aux Puissances belligérantes de produire des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties, mais avec l'espoir exprimé par le Comte de Buol que ces conditions n'offriraient pas un obstacle insurmontable au rétablissement de la paix, M. le Comte Buol et M. le Baron Bourqueney se sont arrêté à la rédaction ci-annexée, que M. le Baron Bourqueney s'est réservé la faculté de soumettre à l'approbation de sa Cour.

Les stipulations de la paix seraient complétées par un Traité d'Alliance entre l'Autriche, la France et la Grande Bretagne, garantissant l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman et établissant comme *casus belli* toute infraction portée par la Russie aux stipulations de la dite paix.

La Cour Impériale d'Autriche se chargerait de présenter le programme développé des quatre garanties à l'acceptation de la Cour de Russie, autorisée par ses alliés à déclarer qu'une acceptation pure et simple serait suivie de la signature des préliminaires de la paix. On passerait alors aux négociations définitives après s'être entendu sur les conditions d'un armistice général.

L'Autriche accorderait un délai de à la Cour de Pétersbourg pour faire connaître sa réponse.

Le délai expiré sans acceptation, il y aurait rupture des relations diplomatiques et retrait des deux Missions.

Au moment de la transmission des conditions précitées à St. Pétersbourg, la Prusse serait invitée par l'Autriche à les y appuyer. Le degré d'appui que la Cour de Berlin leur prêterait par ses démarches pourrait lui rendre une place dans les négociations générales.

Le refus du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg attestant au monde que le rétablissement de la paix est devenu impossible du fait de la Russie, les Puissances alliées se réuniraient sans rétard pour se concerter sur les moyens de l'y contraindre, en s'assurant, autant que faire se pourrait, le concours général de l'Europe.

La Prusse serait admise à ces délibérations dès qu'elle aurait rompu elle-même ses rapports avec la Russie.

Paraphé: B. B.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Annex (B).

Principautés Danubiennes.

ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe. La Russie ne pourra exercer dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes aucun droit particulier d'ingérence, ni prétendre à autre chose qu'à sa part dans la garantie collective sous laquelle les Principautés seront placées à la paix.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le développement de leur organisation nationale se poursuivra librement avec l'initiative du Sultan, l'assentiment des Puissances garantes et en ayant égard aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.

D'accord avec la Puissance suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent réclamé par leur situation géographique. Aucun entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est et aboutirait au lac Salgyk.

Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains, qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve destinés à assurer l'exécution des règlements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée. Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes, à n'y conserver ou à n'y créer aucun arsénal militaire. La Convention qui sera passée entr'elles à cet effet sera annexée au Traité Général et aura même force et valeur que si elle en ferait partie.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnées dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Les délibérations étant déjà entamées entre les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne et les Ministres de Sa Hautesse sur les moyens les plus propres à amener l'amélioration du sort des Chrétiens de l'Empire, la Russie retrouvera à la paix la place qui lui sera faite en commun avec les Puissances signataires dans la surveillance des intérêts garantis par le présent Article.

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire dans un intérêt Européen des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

Paraphé: B. B.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Baron Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

M. le Comte,

AINSI que je l'annonçais à votre Excellence dans les derniers numéros de ma correspondance, nous n'attendions plus que la réponse télégraphique de l'Empereur François Joseph au rapport qui lui avait été adressé par le Comte Buol à Trieste, pour procéder au paraphe de l'ultimatum Autrichien et du memorandum qui résume la substance des pourparlers échangés entre le Comte Buol et moi depuis mon retour à Vienne.

Sa Majesté ayant abrégé le temps présumé de son séjour à Trieste, est rentrée hier dans sa capitale.

Le Comte Buol, immédiatement appelé chez l'Empereur, a remis à Sa Majesté les rédactions sur lesquelles nous étions tombés d'accord. L'Empereur les a scrupuleusement examinées et s'est encore réservé vingt-quatre heures de réflexion avant d'autoriser son Ministre à procéder avec moi aux dernières formalités.

Ce matin, le Comte Buol m'a annoncée par un billet que l'Empereur avait entièrement accepté notre travail: il ne proposait que deux ou trois modifications de rédactions contre lesquelles je n'avais aucune objection à élever.

Nous nous sommes donné rendezvous pour ce soir afin d'échapper aux regards indiscrets. Je sors de la Chancellerie de l'Etat, où nous venons de parapher les documents que je charge M. le Vicomte de Serre de remettre entre les mains de votre Excellence. Initié par mon intime confiance à toutes les phases de cette dernière négociation, personne ne saurait être plus à même de répondre aux questions qui ne se trouveraient pas d'avance résolues par ma correspondance.

Nous avons, d'un commun accord, adopté la forme du paraphe comme plus approprié que la signature à la situation; je devais, en effet, sur tous les points réserver l'approbation du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, tandis que le Comte Buol agissait avec celle de son Souverain. La signature m'eut fait faire un pas au delà de ma sphère d'action; le paraphe ne constate que la différence de ces deux positions, sans effleurer la valeur des engagements du Cabinet de Vienne.

Votre Excellence sait déjà avec quelle scrupuleuse exactitude je me suis conformé à ses directions dans le cours de mes pourparlers avec le Comte Buol. Elle retrouvera, constatées dans le memorandum, les précautions que j'ai dû prendre pour enlever au rôle des Puissances belligérantes tout caractère d'initiative, pour n'établir que leur disposition à examiner et à accepter, si elles venaient à leur être dès aujourd'hui présentées, les conditions de paix qu'elles étaient irrévocablement déterminées à obtenir par les armes.

J'ai tenu le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre, Mr. Elliot, heure par heure au courant des communications échangées entre le Comte Buol et moi; non seulement le Comte Buol le savait, mais il avait, dès le premier, désiré et demandé qu'il en fut ainsi. J'ai trouvé dans Mr. Elliot cette loyauté et cette rectitude de jugement qui lui ont fait, tout d'abord, comprendre et accepter deux rôles différents dans la conduite d'une négociation qui intéressait également nos deux Cours, mais dans laquelle le hasard nous avait fait une situation particulière. C'est dans cet esprit, je n'en doute pas, qu'il en aura entretenu son Gouvernement, et il aura pu ajouter, témoin qu'il en était, que je me suis montré aussi soucieux d'éviter au Cabinet Anglais qu'au mien propre, les embarras ou les périls qui eussent pu sortir de mes démarches.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a maintenant sous les yeux le résultat de mes efforts.

L'Autriche s'approprie les conditions de paix contenues dans l'Annexe (B). Si la France et l'Angleterre consentent à y reconnaître une base de préliminaires, l'Autriche les porte à St. Pétersbourg comme son propre ultimatum, et met leur acceptation au prix de sa rupture.

Le terme du délai accordé par le Cabinet de Vienne à la Cour de Russie est resté en blanc. Le Comte Buol avait proposé trois semaines; sur mes observations, il était disposé à la reduire à quinze jours; mais l'Empereur a exprimé ce matin le désir que le terme de trois semaines fut maintenu, s'il était possible, avec l'assentiment des Cours de Paris et de Londres. Sa Majesté motive ainsi son objection contre le délai de quinze jours: en même temps que l'ultimatum Autrichien partira pour St. Pétersbourg, le Roi de Prusse sera invité par l'Autriche à l'y appuyer par ses démarches; ce sera la première initiation du Cabinet de Berlin au plan arrêté entre l'Autriche et les alliés; toute confidence antérieure eût trahi le secret qu'il a été et qu'il est encore si important de maintenir. Le Roi de Prusse ne prendra pas son parti en vingt-quatre heures, et le fond est assez sévère pour ne pas rendre la forme encore plus dure; or, il se pourrait qu'il arrivât à St. Pétersbourg, si le délai de quinze jours était adopté, pour y trouver déjà une décision négative signifiée à la Mission Autrichienne.

Loin de moi la pensée, en soumettant à votre Excellence les documents joints à ma dépêche, de les lui présenter comme un texte irreprochable, qui ne puisse admettre d'utiles modifications; je me permettrai seulement d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement de l'Empereur sur la faculté qui reste bien acquise aux Puissances belligérantes de remanier les questions secondaires dans la négociation générale, avec la certitude de trouver l'Autriche à leur côté dans les Conférences définitives de la paix, et j'ajouterai avec une entière conviction que la Russie, après avoir accepté de pareils préliminaires, ne fera pas échouer la paix, sur des conditions qui, naturellement, resteraient par leur importance au dessus d'un sacrifice territorial et de la perte absolu de la Mer Noire.

Je redouterais, je l'avoue, en ce moment, toute marche qui impliquera une controverse de rédaction et qui userait en discussions contradictoires un temps aussi précieux peut-être pour préparer la guerre avec la nouvelle attitude de l'Autriche, que pour amener la paix, si la paix doit sortir de cette nouvelle phase.

Les situations tendues, comme celle à laquelle nous avons amené le Cabinet de Vienne, ne se maintiennent pas impunément dans un *status quo* parfait. L'Autriche vient de franchir un abîme dont elle connaît, mais dont je ne voudrais pas lui voir, dans l'action, mesurer trop longtemps le profondeur.

Jamais négociation n'a été tenue plus secrète. Non seulement personne ne sait rien de ce que s'est passé, mais tout le monde est convaincu que rien n'a pu se passer. Les Russes se reposent dans une quiétude diplomatique parfait. Les entretiens du Prince Gortchakoff avec le Comte Buol ne roulent, depuis trois semaines, que sur des généralités sans application, et, bien qu'il se dise toujours l'homme de la paix, il n'est pas encore sorti de sa bouche un mot qui révélât la résignation aux véritables sacrifices qui la rendraient possible. Toujours disposé aux illusions, il croit à la persistance de l'Autriche dans un rôle ambigu qui a compromis les relations du Cabinet de Vienne avec la France et l'Angleterre. Quand la vérité sortira du nuage, pour le Prince Gortchakoff ce sera la foudre; espérons qu'à St. Pétersbourg ce sera la lumière.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,356. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 24*, 1855.

ON the 19th instant the French Ambassador communicated to me a despatch from Count Walewski, together with some despatches from the French Minister at Vienna to Count Walewski, and I lose no time in informing your

Excellency of the contents of those despatches, and stating the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the important matters to which they relate.

Count Walewski announces that Austria offers to send, on her own account, an ultimatum to St. Petersburgh, and to declare to Russia that if in fifteen days that ultimatum is not accepted, the Austrian Minister would be ordered to quit St. Petersburgh, and the diplomatic relations between the two Empires would be broken off. As soon as the rupture was effected, the Cabinet of Vienna would concert with those of London and Paris upon the means that could be best employed in order to attain the object of the alliance. Prussia would be invited to take part in this concert between the three Powers, but upon the absolute condition of having, like Austria, previously broken off her relations with Russia.

Count Walewski states that the ultimatum of Austria is founded upon the scheme, revised and greatly extended, which formed the basis of the last negotiations at Vienna, and his Excellency is of opinion that it would be impossible, with respect to the first guarantee, to frame a larger or better basis, nor one that would more completely answer the object that England and France have in view for the new organization of the three Danubian Principalities. With regard to the second point, which concerns the establishment of a Russian frontier on the side of the Principalities, and which, instead of a small river, substitutes a chain of mountains difficult of access, and which takes away from Russia all the mouths of the Danube, Count Walewski considers that it would be superfluous to point out the great importance of such an arrangement.

The problem of the third guarantee being solved by the system to which Russia has hitherto offered the most determined resistance, Count Walewski does not hesitate to affirm that the question for which the war was undertaken is thereby effectually settled.

His Excellency further gives his entire approbation to the plan by which the delicate questions involved in the fourth guarantee are to be discussed and settled without the concurrence of Russia; and he states that that Power would then have to adopt the decisions taken upon a subject which has served as the pretext, if it was not the real motive, of the present war, without her Plenipotentiaries having been even admitted to the discussion.

Count Walewski then proceeds to remark, that in whatever point of view the ultimatum proposed by Austria is regarded, it is impossible not to admit that she makes a great advance towards the Western Powers, and in the same degree recedes from Russia; and his Excellency states that, in the opinion of the Emperor of the French, the offer of the Cabinet of Vienna should at once be accepted. His Imperial Majesty also thinks that as, at present, there is no question of framing definitively a Treaty of Peace, and as the text of Count Buol's ultimatum does not attempt to define precisely the conditions upon which peace shall be concluded, it would be advisable not to attempt the introduction of amendments or modifications of which the necessity was not clearly demonstrated, but that, on the contrary, it would be expedient to adopt the ultimatum in its entirety, reserving for the definitive negotiation the mature discussion of details, and the additions upon which it might then be necessary to insist.

Count Walewski remarks that in the event of the ultimatum being rejected by Russia, the attitude that Austria would then assume would be favourable alike to the policy and to the military position of the allies; for Russia, when once her relations with Vienna are broken off, will be compelled to guard her frontier from the Danube to Galicia, as upon the whole of that line she may at any moment expect to be attacked; and it is not improbable that this constant menace may determine the evacuation of the Crimea, in order that the Russian army might take its positions along the frontiers of Austria, in Bessarabia, Volhynia, and Podolia. This attitude of Austria menacing various points of the Russian territory, to which Russia would be unable to put an end by entering into a conflict at the point which best suited her, would be more detrimental to Russia than an immediate declaration of war. In fact, the day that war was declared, Russia might choose her own ground, and nothing need prevent her from invading the Austrian territory; but Russia, if war is not declared, will cautiously abstain from invading the territory of Austria, as she well knows that she would then draw down upon herself Prussia and the whole of Germany, who are bound to come to the aid of Austria if she is attacked in her own dominions, or even in the Principalities.

Finally, Count Walewski expresses an earnest hope that the views contained in his despatch may meet with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, and he strongly recommends the adoption of the Austrian ultimatum.

M. de Bourqueney states that, in discussing the conduct which the Austrian Government would adopt in concert with the Cabinets of Paris and London for the re-establishment of peace upon bases agreed upon between the three allied Powers, Count Buol had expressed his determination to avoid the renewal of the misunderstandings which have hitherto at various times threatened to compromise the relations of Austria with the Western Powers, while M. de Bourqueney on his part, throughout these discussions, established with scrupulous care that the belligerent Powers refused to take the initiative in this matter, and that they would confine themselves to examining and accepting, if they were offered to them, the conditions of peace which they were irrevocably determined to obtain by force of arms.

Austria accordingly, M. de Bourqueney says, appropriates to herself the proposed conditions of peace, if France and England consent to recognise in them a basis of preliminaries. Austria will send them to St. Petersburgh as her own ultimatum, and will make the rupture of her relations depend on their acceptance. At the same time that the ultimatum leaves Vienna for St. Petersburgh, the King of Prussia will be invited by Austria to support it.

I herewith inclose a copy of the conditions which form the Austrian ultimatum. M. de Bourqueney enters at considerable length upon an explanation of these conditions, and the consequences to which they would lead in the event of their being either accepted or rejected by Russia; but I do not think it necessary to place his statements on record, as they are accurately summed up in the despatch of Count Walewski to the French Ambassador.

It is right, however, for me to state that Count Buol declared to M. de Bourqueney that the rupture of diplomatic relations would be immediate and complete: immediate, because it would *ipso facto* follow the rejection of the ultimatum in whole or in part; complete, because it would be the absolute cessation of all diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of the whole of the respective Missions. It will naturally imply on the part of Austria the adoption of measures for repelling force by force; it will be war without aggression.

Austria would, moreover, be prepared to determine by a Treaty the conditions on which the Austrian troops should continue to occupy the Principalities; and she would undertake the effective defence of the whole Danubian frontier of the Ottoman Empire to the sea, with the understanding, however, that such arrangements should in no way interfere with the Western Powers nor affect their complete liberty to select the field of their future operations.

Count Buol lastly considers that the cooperation of the three allied Powers in order to bring the other States of Europe to join them, will be an effectual means of accelerating the reestablishment of peace, for Russia, if she still perseveres in her blind resistance, would then be placed to the ban of Europe.

These proposals, in the framing of which Her Majesty's Government have had no part (although Mr. Elliot was duly informed by the Baron de Bourqueney of what is passing), have been considered with the anxious care that their gravity and importance demanded.

Her Majesty's Government have no wish to extend the war to objects different from those for which it was undertaken; they deeply feel the responsibility which would weigh upon them if they continued the war longer than might be necessary for obtaining a safe and honourable peace; they admit that it is their duty to entertain and frankly to express their opinion upon any proposals, from whatsoever quarter they may come, by which such a peace may be obtained; but it is also their duty to reject all propositions for peace which will not effect the objects for which the war was undertaken and England has made such vast sacrifices, and for the attainment of which the honour of the British nation is pledged. Her Majesty's Government are moreover determined not again to enter upon negotiations for peace which do not afford a fair prospect of being carried to a successful issue, nor rashly to incur the danger of creating false hopes, and of postponing indefinitely the restoration of peace, by a second failure of negotiation.

With a full sense of these obligations Her Majesty's Government have

considered the Austrian proposals, and I need hardly assure your Excellency that the earnest opinions of the Emperor in favour of these propositions, which were conveyed in the despatch of Count Walewski and were expressed to me by the French Ambassador, have had great weight with Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government concur with that of the Emperor in thinking that Austria has voluntarily made an important step towards the Western Powers, and they observe with satisfaction that the ultimatum consists of certain distinct and definite conditions which admit of no modifications, and which Russia is to be called upon to accept or to reject, and that consequently in the event of their being accepted, negotiations for peace would be resumed upon the admission of demands exceeding those which Russia has already refused, and her rejection of which led to the rupture of the former negotiations.

Her Majesty's Government do not hesitate to recognise the value of the engagement taken by Austria to break off diplomatic relations with Russia if her ultimatum should be wholly or in part rejected by that Power; and for the reasons assigned by Count Walewski, they are disposed to think that an immediate declaration of war on the part of Austria as a consequence of that rupture would be impolitic, but that immediate preparations for war must be the necessary result of the position which Austria will then assume. That position will restore to Austria the influence she is entitled to exercise in Germany, and it is hardly to be doubted that the German Powers, who must now be aware that they have little to fear, and still less to hope, from Russia, will then be prepared to cooperate against the common enemy of that peace which Europe anxiously desires.

Upon a careful review of these different considerations, Her Majesty's Government feel bound to give their assent to the ultimatum, provided that certain modifications are agreed to which appear necessary for giving full effect to the intentions of the Powers concerned.

I will then, in the first place, inform your Excellency that although Her Majesty's Government do not propose to make any material change in the wording of the Austrian ultimatum, which must be regarded as chiefly laying down general principles, yet they cannot hold themselves bound by that wording, and must reserve to themselves the right to propose such amendments as may appear necessary to guard the great interests affected by the ultimatum.

Austria proposes that the stipulations with reference to the Black Sea should be the subject of a separate Treaty between Russia and the Porte, which Treaty should then be annexed to the General Treaty, and be considered to have equal force and value with it. But to this mode of settling the most important question at issue, and of establishing the guarantee upon which the safety of Turkey and the peace of Europe must in future depend, Her Majesty's Government entertain an insuperable objection.

We know by experience that such separate arrangements are held to concern only the Contracting Parties, and that their annexation to General Treaties is contended to be only a registration of the act and a record of the sanction given to it by other Powers, and that when war or private arrangement annuls that separate Act between the Contracting Parties, the Powers who signed the General Treaty to which the Separate Treaty is annexed, are not called upon to interfere, and their right to do so has even been disputed. This doctrine has been held by Austria, Russia, and Prussia; and although it has never been admitted by England, yet Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to a form to which such an interpretation has been given by some of the Powers who would be parties to the arrangement.

Now, it is not difficult to imagine the various causes which hereafter might lead to the abrogation of a separate Treaty between Russia and the Porte, and if Austria, England, and France were under no obligation, and had no right, to interfere, and to maintain that Treaty inviolate, Europe might again be exposed to a renewal of the dangers against which it is the object of the allies to guard. It is manifest, therefore, that no separate arrangement should take place between Russia and the Porte, and that all stipulations concerning the Black Sea should form an integral part of the General Treaty.

A stipulation will be necessary for the reception of Consuls in the Russian ports of the Black Sea.

Military arsenals must be understood to comprehend naval arsenals.

The Austrian Government very properly suggests that the belligerents should reserve to themselves the right of proposing any further conditions that they may think necessary; but Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not be just as regards Austria, nor honourable towards Russia, if they abstained from indicating such conditions as at the present moment they are clearly of opinion must be proposed, though without engaging that it will not be their duty to insist upon others.

The first is, that no military or naval establishments shall be restored or created in the Aland Islands.

Secondly. The right to consider the state of the territories on the east of the Black Sea.

In the consideration of these various matters, the gravity of which cannot be exaggerated, Her Majesty's Government, although they found themselves unable to agree to the recommendation of Count Walewski that the Austrian proposals should be adopted in their entirety, yet they trust that the modifications which they have suggested for the sole purpose of rendering these proposals more clear and effective, will meet with the concurrence of the French Government, and be accepted by the Cabinet of Vienna.

It only remains for me to state that Her Majesty's Government do entire justice to the motives which induce the Austrian Government to appropriate to itself the ultimatum, and on its own account to transmit it to St. Petersburgh; but Her Majesty's Government conceive that this course can hardly be adopted with correctness, and with reference to the real state of things. It is perfectly true that Her Majesty's Government had no part in framing the ultimatum, and that they had no wish that any communication on the part of England should be made to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; but the ultimatum has been submitted to them as well as to the French Government, and they have in general terms agreed to it. The sanction of England and France has, therefore, been obtained by Austria, and it is in fact by their authority that Austria will transmit her ultimatum to St. Petersburgh. Any disguise upon this matter would, therefore, be useless and unbecoming. It may indeed be said that it does not become the dignity of England and France to make proposals to Russia, but the dignity of England and France, and the position which they occupy, are not to be impaired by a frank avowal of the conditions on which they will consent to lay down their arms, and a manifestation of the good faith with which they will treat for the restoration of peace.

As the Austrian Government propose to make the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia depend upon the rejection of the ultimation in whole or in part by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, Her Majesty's Government trust that there will be no difficulty in obtaining from the Austrian Government a positive declaration that they will receive no counter propositions from Russia, nor consent to any modification whatever of the terms to which England and France have given their adherence. Your Excellency is instructed to read and give a copy of this despatch to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 4.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,357.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 24, 1855.*

SINCE my despatch No. 1,356 of this day was written, the French Ambassador has informed me that among the conditions that the allies reserve to themselves the right of bringing forward, and which might previously be communicated to the Austrian Government, Count Walewski was desirous of proposing a Treaty of Commerce with Russia. I told M. de Persigny that I would undertake, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, to agree to the proposal of Count Walewski; as the adoption of a more liberal system of commerce by Russia, which would enable her to extend her intercourse with

other nations at the same time that it developed the vast resources of that country, would assuredly offer an additional guarantee to Europe for the maintenance of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 5.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 1,522. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 22, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI stated to me yesterday afternoon that he had received from M. de Persigny an account of his conversation with your Lordships, after the Cabinet had had under their consideration the propositions made to the French Government by Austria. M. de Persigny reports the decision of Her Majesty's Government to be as follows:—

Her Majesty's Government regret that the propositions should have been made at all; they see no safe issue to negotiations based upon them, and were it not for the strong desire evinced by the Emperor that the propositions should be favourably considered by Her Majesty's advisers, the Government would, in all probability, have declined entertaining them. But taking into their consideration the decided wishes of the Emperor, and desirous of thus showing their deference for His Majesty's opinions, they are willing to agree to Austria pursuing the course which she proposes; but they desire that the following conditions and observations should accompany their expression of adherence:—

They demand that the stipulations concerning the neutralisation of the Black Sea shall form an integral part of the Treaty of Peace to be signed between the allies and Russia, and that they shall not be made the object of a separate Convention between the Porte and Russia, to be annexed to the General Treaty.

They require that the words "military arsenals," should be made to comprise naval arsenals.

They understand that the Sea of Azoff is included in the Treaty arrangements respecting the Black Sea.

They consider that it would not be fair to leave Austria in doubt as to the intentions of the allies in regard to any further conditions they may ask, and that Austria should be told that an engagement may be demanded of Russia not to reconstruct fortifications on the Aland Islands, and that the general position of the territories east of the Black Sea may have to be considered according to the events of the war.

Her Majesty's Government insist, further, that Austria should, in sending the ultimatum to St. Petersburgh, represent that she has no authority from France or England to make these proposals, though Her Majesty's Government will not object to her stating that she has reason to believe that the terms, if accepted by Russia, will be agreed to by the allies.

Her Majesty's Government declare, further, that they cannot enter into negotiations without the consent of the Porte, and they require that Austria should be informed that Sardinia will take part in those negotiations.

M. de Persigny stated that he considered that these alterations were reasonable, and did not change the character of the proposals. I regret to add that his opinion is not partaken by Count Walewski, nor, as the sequel of this despatch will show, by the Emperor.

After thus communicating to me the substance of M. de Persigny's despatches, Count Walewski said that he did not know whether he was to consider them as containing the official answer of Her Majesty's Government, but that he should proceed to reason upon the different points adverted to by your Lordship, as if it was an official communication, though he could only be considered as giving his own opinions, not having been able as yet to show M. de Persigny's despatches to the Emperor.

He must begin by saying that he did not consider that the proposed Austrian ultimatum required the explanations or additions asked for by

Her Majesty's Government, and he must take this opportunity of stating that it was not because France wanted peace that the Emperor and his Government desired that these terms should be accepted, but because they held that the terms were good and acceptable in themselves. Moreover, he could not understand what was meant by accepting these terms as a deference to the Emperor's opinions, when their nature was changed by the alterations and additions which were demanded.

Count Walewski then proceeded to examine your Lordship's observations one by one.

He agreed, he said, that the neutralisation of the Black Sea, should be one of the conditions inserted in the General Treaty of Peace, and he considered that Count Buol intended that the first and last paragraphs under the head of that part of his ultimatum entitled "La Mer Noire," should be included in the General Treaty. It was only the stipulations for carrying into effect the principle of neutralisation, that were to form the subject of a Separate Convention between Russia and the Porte.

Count Walewski agreed that the word "arsenal" should be defined as relating to maritime as well as to military armaments.

His Excellency objected to the Sea of Azoff being considered as subject to such arrangements as might be made for the Black Sea. Moreover, he thought the stipulation superfluous, because the Sea of Azoff was not navigable for large ships; at the same time the condition would be most humiliating to Russia, for the Sea of Azoff was an inland sea, watering Russian territory only, and an attempt to impose conditions there would be met with an obstinate refusal.

Count Walewski considered it quite unnecessary to apprize Austria of the nature of any other demands which the allies might have to make; and with respect to the particular conditions put forward by Her Majesty's Government, not to permit the reconstruction of fortifications on the Islands of Aland, and to reserve, for consideration, the future conditions of the countries to the east of the Black Sea, he observed, in regard to the first, that although he should be very glad if Russia could be brought to agree to such a condition, he should not be inclined to make it a *sine qua non* to the signature of peace. We had objected to the Polish question being brought forward; he should place that of the Aland Islands in the same category, to be determined upon by events. With regard to the fate of the countries to the east of the Black Sea, Her Majesty's Government, he observed, had felt the difficulty of making any definite proposition, and the expressions made use of by your Lordship were too vague to render a discussion of them possible.

It was already understood, his Excellency continued, that Austria was to absolve the allies from having taken the initiative in the proposed proceedings. He assented to the course which Her Majesty's Government desired to follow in this part of the matter.

He was also of opinion, with your Lordship, that the Porte must be consulted as to the terms of peace, but this need not interfere with the action of Austria at St. Petersburgh.

Lastly, there could be no doubt that Sardinia would take part in any negotiations for peace within the limits already assigned to her.

Having listened to Count Walewski's observations, I proceeded to remark upon those which expressed a different opinion from that of Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to the stipulations to effect the neutralisation of the Black Sea being made matter of separate negotiation between Russia and the Porte, I observed, that to consign the guarantees for the future safety of Turkey, to obtain which France and England had mainly gone to war, to an act in the negotiation of which they were not, ostensibly at least, to take any part, was not a proceeding very honourable to the allies. I called Count Walewski's recollection also to the fate of more than one of the Separate Conventions which had been annexed to the Treaty of Vienna. The doctrine had been held by two of the Powers who would participate in the negotiations respecting Turkey, that such Conventions were only binding so long as the parties more immediately interested in them did not modify or annul them, but that their annexation to the General Treaty of 1815 did not give a right to Powers who

signed that Treaty, but who had not signed the Separate Conventions, to interfere to prevent alterations in, or even the complete abrogation of, the latter.

Count Walewski, after feebly combatting my arguments, said that since it was probable that Austria had preferred this form in order to show the greatest forbearance towards Russia (who, in the Vienna Conferences, had expressed an inclination for a direct understanding with the Porte in all matters concerning the Black Sea), in the hopes that this forbearance would ensure the support of Prussia and Germany, it was to be apprehended that Count Buol would wish to adhere to his own programme. In this case, and in order to obviate the dangerous precedents to which I had called his attention, Count Walewski thought that a stipulation might be added to the General Treaty, binding Russia and the Porte never to modify or annul the Separate Convention without the assent of the Powers signing the General Treaty. I remarked, that if Austria was acting with good faith in the interests of the allies, she could not object to such a reasonable modification of her proposals as that pressed by Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to the Sea of Azoff, I observed that we ought not to be deterred from asking conditions that we thought necessary for the future because they would be considered humiliating to Russia; that unless the Sea of Azoff was subjected to the same restrictions as were imposed upon Russia in the Black Sea, Russia might build there any number of ships to be launched, floated out into the Black Sea, and there armed, whenever favourable circumstances arose, to enable Russia to free herself from the trammels now sought to be imposed upon her. Besides, I added, nothing is too difficult for the science of these times. Might it not be possible for engineers to render the Straits of Kertch passable for large ships, in which case the Sea of Azoff would become a formidable naval and military port?

To the objections raised by Count Walewski to apprizing Austria of the nature of the conditions we might think it necessary to ask beyond those contained in her ultimatum, I said that after the hope expressed by Count Buol, that those conditions would not render peace impossible, we owed it in good faith to him to explain, as far as circumstances would admit, the nature and extent of the additional terms we intended to ask.

Lastly, I remarked that in the memorandum to which Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney had placed their initials, the former assumes himself to be "authorized" to assure the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, that if the ultimatum offered by Austria was accepted by Russia it would be agreed to by the allies. This expression had no doubt led to the demand that Austria should appropriate the terms of the ultimatum to herself alone. Count Walewski was not averse to changing or suppressing the word "authorized" in the memorandum, nor to defining more strictly the limits to which Austria might be bound in speaking of the Western Powers.

To resume, I said that Count Walewski was totally mistaken if he supposed that, out of deference to the Emperor Her Majesty's Government could subscribe to terms which they could not justify to the country. The deference to the Emperor had been shown in not rejecting the Austrian propositions at once, and in agreeing to their being made use of by Austria, provided they were understood by her as Her Majesty's Government supposed they were understood by the allies. Unfortunately, it appeared that in many essential points the opinion of Count Walewski differed from that of Her Majesty's advisers. The first thing therefore to be done, was to settle these differences of opinion between the two Governments; for how could they run the risk of recommencing negotiations with such a wide divergence in their views? The ultimatum of Austria was good or bad as it was interpreted; and that it might be interpreted in different ways I could offer no better proof than the conversation which I had just had the honour to hold with his Excellency.

I had not left Count Walewski very long when he expressed the wish to see me again. Upon waiting upon him, I found that he had communicated M. de Persigny's despatches to the Emperor, and that he had received His Majesty's orders to answer M. de Persigny in the sense in which he had spoken to me, and above all to insist upon the abandonment, by Her Majesty's Government, of all stipulations respecting the Sea of Azoff; His Majesty considering that to put them forward would be unworthy of the two Governments, as offering a gratuitous affront to Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—I should add, that during my conversation with Count Walewski, I impressed upon him very strongly the necessity of requiring a positive declaration from Austria, in case that it was agreed that her ultimatum should be sent to St. Petersburgh, not to receive any counter propositions from the Russian Government, nor to consent to any modification whatever of the terms to which France and England had given their adherence. Count Walewski intimated his assent.

C.

No. 6.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 26.*)

(No. 1,525. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 23, 1855.*

I FOUND Count Walewski this morning in possession of M. de Persigny's answer to the despatch which I informed your Lordship, in my confidential despatch No. 1,522 of yesterday's date, his Excellency had received the Emperor's orders to address to that Ambassador.

M. de Persigny announces that in deference to the opinion expressed by the Emperor, Her Majesty's Government consent to abandon all mention of the Sea of Azoff, in the reply to be returned to the propositions of the Austrian Government.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government, M. de Persigny says, hold to their objections against the Separate Treaty to record their stipulations in regard to the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and adhere to the desire of communicating to Austria the nature of the additional terms which they may think it right to ask of Russia. They propose to consider the memorandum "paraphé" at Vienna (Annex A to M. de Bourqueney's despatch of the 14th instant) as "non avenu," and to make their answer upon the proposed ultimatum (Annex B) only.

Count Walewski expressed his satisfaction at the first part of this communication. He still hopes that Her Majesty's Government may be satisfied with a Separate Convention, and a declaration that it cannot be modified or abrogated without the consent of all the Powers who sign the Treaty of Peace. He will consent, if it is insisted on, to the communication to the Austrian Government of the further terms which Her Majesty's Government may think it expedient to demand, but he would infinitely prefer that no mention should be made of them. In case they are alluded to, he has the Emperor's orders to state, on the part of France, that as no indemnities are asked for the expenses of the war, it is expected that commercial advantages will be given by Russia to the allies, which may to some extent compensate them for the immense sacrifices which they have made.

As Count Walewski informed me that it was your Lordship's intention to embody this answer in a despatch to me, I made no remarks on his statement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 7.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 26.*)

(No. 210. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 21, 1855.*

ON Sunday afternoon Count Buol received a telegraphic despatch from Baron Hubner, announcing that the memorandum containing the proposed Austrian ultimatum, mentioned in my secret despatch of the 14th instant, had been approved by the French Government, and forwarded by them to London.

This memorandum had only arrived in Paris the evening before, and the necessary consequence of the precipitate expression of their approval of it by

the French Government will be that, if the proposal of Count Buol shall now be declined, the whole responsibility of its rejection will be thrown upon Her Majesty's Government, and the weight of any objections or modifications now suggested will be impaired by the belief that they do not represent the united opinion of the Governments of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 8.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1,536.)
Paris, November 26, 1855.

My Lord,

IT appears that Count Walewski has acquainted Count Buol, in confidence, with the modifications which Her Majesty's Government wish to see introduced into the ultimatum which the latter is desirous of sending to St. Petersburgh.

M. de Bourqueney announces by telegraph that Count Buol is willing to accept them, and to place in the General Treaty the guarantees for assuring the neutralisation of the Black Sea. All he begs is, that the number of "gardes-côtes" to be employed for purposes of police in that sea may be left to a separate arrangement between Russia and the Porte.

Count Buol engages most solemnly in no way to compromise the allies in the overtures he makes to Russia. He disclaims all intention of embarrassing Her Majesty's Government, and he is willing to omit or replace by some other word, as it may be desired, the word "autoriser" in the memorandum.

Count Buol makes no objection to the additional terms which may be put forward by the allies. He asks for time to reflect whether or not he will communicate them now to the Russian Government.

M. de Bourqueney adds that the Emperor Francis Joseph has no illusions as to the gravity of the situation. His Majesty is convinced that it is a rupture with Russia. Count Buol still doubts of the results. M. de Bourqueney is of opinion that Russia will refuse, and that a rupture, to be followed by acceptation of the ultimatum, will be the consequence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 9.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1,544.)
Paris, November 27, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated to Count Walewski your Lordship's despatch No. 1,357 of the 24th instant, containing your observations on the project of the French Government for making the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty with Russia, one of the conditions of peace.

His Excellency said that your Lordship had misunderstood the motives which he had in view in making this suggestion, and which, he must fairly own, pointed to advantages to be conceded by Russia to the allies to indemnify them, to a certain extent, for the immense sacrifices which they had made in the prosecution of the war, but, he added, that there was no use in discussing this matter at the present moment.

At Count Walewski's request, I have furnished him with a copy of your Lordship's despatch referred to above.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1,547. Confidential.)
Paris, November 27, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 1,356 of the 24th instant, informing me of the communication which had passed between M. de Persigny and yourself on the subject of the late Austrian propositions, and of the resolution to which Her Majesty's Government had come in consequence.

I lost no time in seeking an interview of Count Walewski, for the purpose of reading to him your Lordship's despatch, a copy of which, as desired by your Lordship, I subsequently placed in his hands.

Count Walewski said that before he could act further in this matter, he must ask what was the meaning to be attached to the paragraph which stated that "although Her Majesty's Government do not propose to make any material change in the wording of the Austrian ultimatum, which must be regarded as chiefly laying down general principles, yet they cannot hold themselves bound by that wording, and must reserve to themselves the right to propose such amendments as may appear necessary to guard the great interests affected by the ultimatum."

Did this passage refer, Count Walewski asked, simply to the observations which followed in the succeeding paragraphs, or was it intended to reserve the right of Her Majesty's Government to propose, before the recommencement of negotiations for peace, other amendments than those now mentioned?

The meaning of the paragraph, I replied, when taken in context with subsequent parts of the despatch appeared to me to be, that Her Majesty's Government required certain amendments in the ultimatum in order to render it more clear and effective before it was sent by the Austrian Government to St. Petersburgh. These amendments were afterwards detailed, and I did not conceive that Her Majesty's Government intended, if these amendments were agreed to by the French and Austrian Governments, to propose any further alterations in the present stage of the matter.

Count Walewski then asked whether Her Majesty's Government understood that the condition relating to the establishment of Consulates in the Black Sea, was to be inserted into the Austrian ultimatum, or whether it was alluded to for the information of Austria only at the present moment. He remarked that, in the spring, this was one of the stipulations which had been most firmly resisted, as derogatory to the Emperor of Russia's sovereign dignity.

I answered, that I could not doubt that your Lordship intended to demand the insertion of this clause into the ultimatum. At the same time, I said, that I would rather refer both this and the preceding question to your Lordship. This was agreed to by Count Walewski, who stated that he should take no further steps in the matter until I was in possession of your Lordship's answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 11.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,371.)
Foreign Office, November 29, 1855.

My Lord,

IN reply to the inquiry made by Count Walewski as to the meaning of a paragraph in my despatch No. 1,356 to your Excellency, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to reserve to themselves the right to propose such amendments in the Austrian ultimatum as might appear necessary, because the wording of the ultimatum is in part extremely vague, and a want of precision as to the true meaning of terms may lead to a failure of the negotia-

tions for peace, and because it is of the utmost importance that England and France should either beforehand clearly understand, or have the right hereafter to render clear, the engagements they are about to contract, and which will not only impose duties upon them, but will also affect the interests and welfare of others.

It is difficult, however, to arrive at any such understanding without entering into details which would seem to be premature, and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, preferred to regard the ultimatum as chiefly laying down general principles, or, as it was called by Count Buol, a basis of preliminaries, and they wish to avoid all modifications of that document that are not absolutely necessary; but they do consider it necessary to require that the nature and extent of guarantees, and the mode of exercising them, should be reserved for future consideration. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that the Government of the Emperor will agree with them in this matter, because the manner in which the Austrian proposal as to the future arrangements for the Principalities is worded, might, if taken literally, seem to imply that the arrangements which were proposed on that point at the Conferences at Vienna last spring should be adopted. But to those arrangements grave and valid objections have been urged, and they must at all events be a bar to a hasty and inconsiderate pledge on the part of England and France to adopt the arrangements to which those objections apply. It would, therefore, be very desirable that the proposition to be made to Russia in regard to the Danubian Principalities, should be confined to what has always been considered as the general and fundamental principle of the first point; namely, that Russia should not enjoy or exercise any exclusive or single right of protection or interference in regard to the Danubian Principalities, that the Sultan should by his own sovereign act grant or confirm to those Principalities a satisfactory internal organization, and that such arrangements as may upon full consideration be deemed sufficient, should be made for securing to the people of those Provinces the unmolested enjoyment of the institutions thus to be conferred upon them. By such a wording all questions of detail in regard to which the Porte and the people of the Provinces ought rightfully to be consulted, would be left open and reserved for future consideration, while the leading principles upon which, as Her Majesty's Government understand, Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia, are all agreed, would be formally recorded as consented to by the four Powers.

With respect to the fourth point I have to observe, that some ambiguity arises as to the meaning of the paragraph relating to it in the Austrian ultimatum, in consequence of the use of the expression "garanties par le présent Article." This expression might be understood as implying that there is to be some diplomatic Treaty guarantee entered into by the Contracting Powers as to the privileges and immunities of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. But such an arrangement would in fact be to establish, as against the Sultan, on the part of the other Contracting Parties, that very right of interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, which Prince Menchikoff demanded for Russia, and it was to enable the Sultan to resist such demands that the present war was undertaken. It would, then, be a strange conclusion of this war, that the Powers who have made great sacrifices and exertions to assist the Sultan in resisting certain demands, should combine with his enemy to impose them upon him as the result of a successful contest.

As the Austrian ultimatum will be proposed to Russia with the sanction of Great Britain and France, the wording of the fourth Article should be less ambiguous, and it is desirable that it should only state in general terms that arrangements should be made by England, France, Austria, and the Porte, for securing to the Christian subjects of the Sultan their proper civil and political rights, and that Russia should afterwards be invited to concur in the arrangements which would have been thus made.

With reference to the second inquiry of Count Walewski, as to whether the condition relating to the establishment of Consulates in the Black Sea was to be inserted in the Austrian ultimatum, I have to inform your Excellency that such is the wish of Her Majesty's Government. It is true that in the spring Russia objected to this condition, but she equally resisted every proposal that would have rendered peace honourable to the allies and safe for Europe.

If it is supposed that Russia will reject the ultimatum of Austria in the form in which it was transmitted to Paris from Vienna, there can be no

reasonable objection to rendering it as complete as possible, and thereby placing on record the conditions which are thought to be indispensable by the belligerent Powers; but if, on the other hand, the necessity of peace is so strongly felt by Russia, as to induce her to consent to the loss of half of Bessarabia and the mouths of the Danube, to the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and to relinquish her military and naval arsenals, it is idle to suppose she would resist the infinitely less onerous condition of admitting Consuls in her ports of the Black Sea, or that she would refuse to treat for peace if she were not allowed to make a separate arrangement with Turkey respecting the number of vessels that are to be established for purposes of police in the Black Sea.

Her Majesty's Government are clearly of opinion that it would be just and honourable towards Russia, and serve to avoid future embarrassments, if the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh were made aware by Austria of the several conditions that are not contained in the ultimatum, and which will be brought forward whenever negotiations are resumed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 12.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 1,551. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 28, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that after taking the Emperor's orders, he is about to send this evening to M. de Persigny an answer to your Lordship's confidential despatch No. 1,356, relating to the late Austrian propositions, of which I left a copy with him yesterday.

The answer will express in general terms the satisfaction of the French Government at finding their views so completely in unison with those of the Government of Her Majesty. Count Walewski will state that he considers all the amendments brought forward by your Lordship to be improvements on the original propositions, and he will promise the cooperation of the French Government to obtain their adoption by Count Buol. But supposing the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to maintain his present position in regard to a Separate Convention for the single purpose of determining the number of "gardes-côtes" to be employed by Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, and to make the transmission of the ultimatum to St. Petersburgh depend on this concession being made to him, Count Walewski will ask whether Her Majesty's Government will not in such case yield the point, provided that proper precautions are taken in the General Treaty to prevent the possible abuse of the Separate Convention.

Count Walewski supposes that your Lordship's declaration that "Her Majesty's Government cannot hold themselves bound by the wording of the ultimatum," means that Her Majesty's Government, while agreeing to the sense of the ultimatum, will not be bound to the exact letter of a wording upon which they were not consulted. He takes for granted also that the stipulation respecting Consuls is intended to be one of the reserved conditions, and that it is not sought to have it inserted in the ultimatum.

Upon this point, I said that such was not my understanding of your Lordship's despatch. It appeared to me that the object of Her Majesty's Government was to have this stipulation included in the ultimatum. Count Walewski replied that if such was the case, it was useless sending any reply to Vienna. Austria would never consent to peace such a condition in the ultimatum, although she might agree to its being a desirable measure, and one that might be discussed in future negotiations for peace. For himself, he must say that it was a very delicate question, nearly touching the right of sovereignty of the Emperor of Russia. He did not know how far he should be justified in putting it forward.

I rejoined that I was surprised to hear his observations, because this was no new question. It was one of the points on which both Governments had last

year made up their minds to insist, without entertaining a doubt of its propriety.

Count Walewski replied, that all that he desired was, to postpone the question. He had not made up his mind whether its refusal by Russia ought to be a bar to peace, if all the other points were arranged satisfactorily. He had never heard of such a condition being inserted in a Treaty of Peace. Admitting the measure to be desirable in itself, he observed, that a promise to receive Consuls in the Black Sea might be obtained from Russia in some other form.

Not knowing what might be the ultimate views of Her Majesty's Government on this matter, I pressed it no further, but I observed that in the Treaty of Peace signed with the Chinese Government, express stipulations were introduced for the reception of Consuls in certain ports of China.

Count Walewski then asked in what way your Lordship proposed that the answer of the British Government should be conveyed to Count Buol's knowledge. Was he to send to M. de Bourqueney a copy of your Lordship's despatch on the subject, or did you prefer charging Mr. Elliot with the communication? I said that I would ask your Lordship's intentions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 13.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 228. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 29, 1855.

SINCE I forwarded to your Lordship my telegraphic despatch of the 27th instant, Count Buol has again spoken to me on the subject of the wish which he understood was entertained by Her Majesty's Government, that the whole of the arrangements respecting the neutralization of the Black Sea should be comprised in the General Treaty.

I told him I was entirely unacquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, further than that they considered it indispensable that the neutralization should form a part of the provisions of the General Treaty.

This, he said, had already been agreed to, with the exception of what related to the small vessels to be employed in the coast-guard service, the numbers of which he persisted in thinking should be settled by a direct Treaty between Russia and Turkey, but which would be annexed to the General Treaty, and would therefore be as binding on those Powers which signed the latter, as if it had formed a part of it. As he looked upon it merely as a question of form, he could not consent to adopt a course which rendered certain the rejection by Russia of the ultimatum to be sent to her; for the only hope which he had of her acceptance—and that a very feeble one—was based upon the poor satisfaction she might profess to derive from being allowed to come to a direct understanding with the Porte upon this matter of maritime police, which, as he had said before, would be of no practical importance, as it would be annexed to the General Treaty.

Your Lordship will have already been informed by the French Government that, in addition to the introduction into the General Treaty of the prohibition of vessels of war in the Black Sea, Baron de Bourqueney has obtained the acquiescence of the Austrian Government to the proposal that the same prohibition should be applied to the "établissements militaires maritimes," which Count Walewski informed him was the form of words desired by Her Majesty's Government.

Instead of saying that the Imperial Government was "authorized" to inform the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh that preliminaries would be signed on their acceptance of the ultimatum, Count Buol has also consented to substitute any word that may be agreed upon by Her Majesty's and the French Governments.

These modifications having been admitted, Count Buol appears to await, with almost feverish impatience, the decision of the allied Cabinets on his proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 14.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December* 3.)

(Confidentielle.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le* 28 *Novembre*, 1855.

JE vous envoie ci-joint une dépêche de Lord Clarendon dont Lord Cowley m'a remis copie par ordre de son Gouvernement.

Le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique envisage les propositions du Cabinet de Vienne au même point de vue que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur. Il adhère à l'ultimatum en suggérant seulement certaines modifications dans le but unique de rendre ces propositions "plus claires and plus efficaces." Il espère d'ailleurs, que ces modifications rencontreront l'assentiment du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, et seront acceptées par le Cabinet de Vienne.

Ces modifications portent sur la forme à donner aux stipulations concernant la neutralisation de la Mer Noire; sur des arrangements en vue d'assurer la présence des Agents Consulaires dans les ports de l'Euxine; sur la convenance de substituer à "arsenaux militaires," "arsenaux militaires maritimes."

Le Cabinet Britannique d'ailleurs trouve désirable d'indiquer d'avance au Cabinet de Vienne, la nature des conditions particulières que les belligérents se réservent le droit de proposer en sus des quatre bases principales, sans cependant s'interdire absolument par là la faculté d'en proposer d'autres, postérieurement.

La première de ces conditions serait l'interdiction de créer ou de restaurer aux Iles d'Aland les établissements militaires ou maritimes.

La seconde impliquerait le droit de prendre en considération l'état des territoires au sud-est de la Mer Noire.

Le Cabinet Britannique, tout en rendant justice aux motifs qui ont induit le Gouvernement Autrichien à s'approprier l'ultimatum et à la transmettre, pour son propre compte, à St. Pétersbourg, et tout en rappelant que le Gouvernement de la Reine n'a ni pris part à la rédaction du dit ultimatum ni exprimé le désir qu'une communication soit faite à la Russie au nom de l'Angleterre, fait observer, cependant, que comme l'ultimatum a été soumis aux Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre et que ces deux Gouvernements y ont adhéré, il ne serait pas conforme à la réalité des choses de la représenter uniquement comme l'expression de l'opinion du Cabinet de Vienne. Le Cabinet Britannique ne croit donc pas qu'il soit compatible avec la dignité de la France et de l'Angleterre de se prêter à de vains détours, et il est d'avis que la position des Puissances alliées est assez forte pour leur permettre d'exposer franchement, sans y porter atteinte, les conditions auxquelles elles consentiraient à déposer les armes.

Le Gouvernement Britannique conclut, enfin, exprimant l'espoir que le Gouvernement Autrichien ne fera pas de difficulté à déclarer qu'il n'acceptera aucun contre-proposition de la Russie, ni aucune modification quelconque aux bases auxquelles la France et l'Angleterre ont adhéré.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, M. le Comte, rend pleine justice au sentiment de conciliation et à l'esprit d'équité qui ont inspiré les modifications proposées par le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique; il est donc tout disposé à s'y associer et à ne négliger aucun effort pour déterminer le Cabinet de Vienne à accepter des changements qui améliorent incontestablement l'œuvre commune.

Nous pensons, comme le Gouvernement Anglais, que les importantes stipulations qui sont destinées à établir la neutralisation de la Mer Noire doivent faire partie intégrante du Traité principal, et nous avons la ferme espérance que le Cabinet de Vienne partagera, à cet égard, notre manière de voir. Mais ce que demande l'Autriche, c'est de faire régler par une Convention Séparée entre riverains, ce qui est relatif aux bâtiments légers préposés à la police des côtes de la Mer Noire. Or, des quatre stipulations auxquelles doit donner lieu

la neutralisation de l'Euxin celle dont il s'agit est certainement la moins importante.

En effet, conformément aux termes de l'ultimatum—

La première stipulation établira que les eaux de la Mer Noire, ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, resteront interdites aux marines militaires;

La seconde sera relative à la clôture des Détroits;

La troisième interdira aux riverains de conserver ou de créer des arsenaux militaires maritimes;

La quatrième, aussi que je viens de l'énoncer, n'aura d'autre but que de déterminer le nombre et la nature des gardes-côtes.

Or, les trois principales stipulations faisant partie du Traité Général, y aurait-il un inconvénient réel à se prêter à une concession de forme en ce qui concerne la quatrième stipulation?

Je dis une concession de forme, car la question de fond est tout-à-fait en dehors du débat. En effet, conformément à l'opinion manifestée en tous temps par l'Angleterre et la France, une Convention particulière, annexée à un Traité Général, ne saurait être considérée comme un simple enregistrement et engage aussi bien tous les signataires du Traité Général que les signataires de la Convention annexée. Cette opinion a été victorieusement soutenue par les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, lors de la réunion de la République de Cracovie à l'Empire d'Autriche. Mais d'ailleurs, pour faire cesser toute équivoque, nous proposerions d'insérer dans le Protocole destiné à constater l'annexion de la Convention séparée au Traité lui-même ce qui suit:

"Il est bien entendu que la Convention Séparée sera considérée comme faisant partie intégrante du présent Traité; qu'elle aura, partant, la même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot à mot; et qu'en conséquence elle ne saurait être annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment de tous les signataires du Traité Général."

Dans ces données là, le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, sans doute, trouvera, comme le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, qu'il n'y aurait pas de motif assez grave pour s'opposer, d'une manière absolue, à régler par une Convention Séparée, une stipulation destinée à concerner le nombre des gardes-côtes.

La proposition Autrichienne ne mentionne pas les arrangements relatifs à la présence d'Agents Consulaires dans les ports de l'Euxin. Nous ne pensons pas que l'intention du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique soit d'introduire une stipulation expresse à ce sujet dans l'ultimatum lui-même. Cette question si délicate, parce qu'elle touche de si près au droit de souveraineté, doit nécessairement rentrer dans celles dont la discussion est réservée à la négociation. Il peut être utile que le Cabinet de Vienne soit informé, dès à présent, de notre intention de la résoudre; mais il nous paraîtrait anormal d'en faire une des conditions absolues de l'ultimatum.

Il ne me reste plus qu'à me féliciter de la complète coincidence, qui ressort de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon, entre les appréciations du Gouvernement Britannique et celles du Gouvernement de l'Empereur sur l'importance de la démarche faite par l'Autriche, sur la valeur réelle, pour notre politique, de la rupture des relations du Cabinet de Vienne avec celui de St. Pétersbourg, et enfin sur les motifs qui doivent faire préférer, en ce moment, cette rupture de relations même à une déclaration de guerre.

Il me paraît urgent, M. le Comte, d'informer, le plus promptement possible, l'Autriche de notre décision; et je vous prie de demander à Lord Clarendon s'il désire que je transmette à cet effet à M. de Bourqueney, pour être communiqué à M. le Comte de Buol, la dépêche dont le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique m'a fait remettre copie par Lord Cowley, ou, s'il préfère, que M. Elliot en porte lui-même le contenu à la connaissance du Cabinet de Vienne.

J'espère, je vous le répète, que les modifications suggérées par le Cabinet Britannique seront adoptées par le Gouvernement Autrichien, et je ne manquerai pas d'écrire à M. le Baron de Bourqueney pour l'inviter à user de tous ses efforts en vue d'y déterminer M. le Comte de Buol. Si, cependant, nous trouverons à Vienne une résistance insurmontable en ce qui concerne le mode à adopter pour le réglement des gardes-côtes et la disposition relative aux Consuls, j'ai la confiance que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique admettra, comme nous,

qu'on ne saurait, par des considérations après tout d'un ordre secondaire, compromettre un si grand résultat.

Je vous invite à donner lecture de la présente dépêche au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, et à lui en remettre copie.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 15.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December 3.)

(Confidentiello.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 1 Décembre*, 1855.

JE reçois la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, sous le No. 85, ainsi que la lettre de Lord Clarendon qui s'y trouve annexée.

Je constate avec satisfaction que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique sont bien près d'être d'accord, s'ils ne le sont même déjà complétement, sur la marche à suivre pour donner une solution satisfaisante aux propositions du Cabinet de Vienne.

Lord Clarendon trouve insuffisant de rattacher, par un simple Protocole, la Convention à intervenir entre les riverains dans le but de déterminer la nature et le nombre des bâtiments de guerre légers appelés à assurer la police des côtes de l'Euxin. Afin d'entrer complétement dans les intentions du Cabinet Britannique, et de donner à ses vues pleine satisfaction, nous proposons de procéder, en cette circonstance, comme il a été fait à Vienne en 1815.

L'Article CXVIII du Traité de Vienne stipule, "que les Conventions ou autres Actes particuliers seront considérés comme parties intégrantes des arrangements du Congrès, et auront même force et valeur que s'ils étaient insérés mot à mot dans le Traité Général."

Dans le cas présent, on pourrait de même convenir que le dernier Article du Traité contiendrait une stipulation analogue à l'Article CXVIII du Traité de Vienne et dans les termes suivants, énoncés dans ma dernière dépêche:

"Il est bien entendu que la Convention Séparée sera considérée comme partie intégrante du présent Traité; qu'elle aura, partant, la même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot à mot; et qu'en conséquence elle ne saurait être annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment de tous les signataires du Traité Général."

Il est présumable que l'Autriche, qui a eu soin de faire comprendre qu'en demandant la forme d'une Convention Séparée, elle n'avait nullement l'intention d'atténuer la force ni la valeur des obligations contractées par la Russie, ne fera aucune objection au mode proposé.

Quant à la question des Consuls, que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur envisage absolument comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, elle trouvera naturellement place dans la négociation, lorsqu'il s'agira de discuter et d'établir tout ce qui se rattache au système général de la neutralisation de la Mer Noire; et, ainsi que je vous l'ai mandé dans ma dernière dépêche, il est peut être opportun d'informer d'avance l'Autriche de notre intention bien arrêtée de résoudre cette question; mais en faire l'objet d'une des conditions de l'ultimatum, ce serait lui donner bénevolement une forme blessante et rendre son acceptation par la Russie à peu près impossible.

Je vois avec plaisir, je le répète, que Lord Clarendon envisage cette question au même point de vue que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et que son intention n'est nullement d'exiger que le Cabinet de Vienne ne lui donne place dans son ultimatum.

Lord Clarendon nous écrit, M. le Comte, que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique transmettra directement sa communication au Cabinet Autrichien, aussitôt que nous serons tombés entièrement d'accord. Il me semble que nous sommes très heureusement arrivés à ce point. Je vous prie donc d'insister auprès du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour qu'il expédie, sans délai, à Sir Hamilton Seymour la réponse que le Cabinet de Vienne attend avec une impatience bien concevable, si l'on se rend compte de la situation délicate où le place l'incertitude

de l'accueil fait à une proposition qui ne peut pas manquer de la compromettre gravement envers la Russie.

Je vous prie d'ailleurs de faire remarquer au Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique que, si le secret, jusqu'à présent très bien gardé, de cette négociation venait à être révélé, nous aurions à redouter les efforts de toute nature et partout (en Allemagne principalement) de nos adversaires pour la faire échouer, ou, du moins, pour en compromettre sérieusement les résultats par des complications nouvelles.

J'informe M. le Baron de Bourqueney des modifications suggérées par le Cabinet Britannique et auxquelles le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a donné sa pleine adhésion, et je l'invite à faire tous ses efforts pour les faire accepter par M. le Comte de Buol. Je préviens, toutefois, le Ministre de l'Empereur que, dans le cas d'une nécessité absolue, les deux Gouvernements alliés consentiraient à la concession de forme demandée par le Cabinet de Vienne, en stipulant explicitement que la Convention Séparée entre les riverains serait rattachée au Traité par le dernier Article du dit Traité, et avec la mention textuelle relatée ci-dessus.

Je vous prie, M. le Comte, de vouloir bien lire la présente dépêche à M. le Comte de Clarendon et de lui en remettre copie.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

P. S.—Mon courrier ne partira pour Vienne que lorsque vous m'aurez informé par le télégraphe que Lord Clarendon considère l'accord entre les deux Gouvernements comme entièrement accompli.

W.

No. 16.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,389.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1855.

My Lord,

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency the copy of a despatch* from Count Walewski, which has been placed in my hands by the French Ambassador.

I told the Count de Persigny that I was very glad to perceive that there appeared to be such a fair prospect of agreement between the two Governments, and that indeed there were only one or two points upon which there now existed any difference of opinion.

The first related to the armed vessels that were to be maintained for purposes of police, and upon that I begged to observe that if Russia engaged to keep no ships of war in the Black Sea, it stood to reason that she should not be allowed to make an exception to that engagement without the participation and consent of all the belligerent Powers.

But, I said, these coast-guard vessels are ships of war; they carry guns, they might be of any size, unless regulated by stipulation, and if we have not a controlling voice, they might be of any number, and we should thus run the risk of neutralizing the General Treaty by the Separate Treaty which we annexed to it, and of thereby rendering our whole proceedings absurd as regards the present, and our guarantees with respect to the future a delusion. We must then be parties to any exception that is made to the general rule of no ships of war in the Black Sea: if we were so, and if England and France sanctioned the arrangement that might be entered into between Russia and the Porte on this most important point, then some means might be found for embodying the arrangement in the General Treaty, and for making it binding on Russia and Turkey.

With respect to the Consuls, I said, that we could not impose upon Austria any *sine qua non* condition, on which she could make the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia depend, and if she did not think proper to make the Consular arrangement a part of her ultimatum, we ought not further to urge it

* No. 14.

upon her; but, on the other hand, Austria ought clearly to comprehend that we consider it a condition *sine qua non* of peace, and that England and France have a right to determine for themselves what shall be the conditions on which they will consent to make peace, and that with their determination Austria has no right to interfere.

With regard to Count Walewski's inquiry as to the mode in which the decision of Her Majesty's Government respecting the ultimatum should be made known to the Austrian Government, I said that Sir Hamilton Seymour, who was now on his way to Vienna, would be instructed to communicate to Count Buol the views of Her Majesty's Government, as soon as we arrived at a complete understanding with the French Government.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 17.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1,567.)

Paris, December 2, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 1,371, explaining certain passages of your despatch No. 1,356, relative to the late Austrian propositions, reached me on the 30th ultimo, and I lost no time in communicating it to Count Walewski. His Excellency after reading it said that he should make no observations upon it, as he hoped that the despatch which I informed your Lordship, in my confidential despatch No. 1,551 of the 28th ultimo, he was about to address to M. de Persigny, would alter the views of Her Majesty's Government, and incline them to withdraw their objections to the wording of the Austrian ultimatum. Upon pressing for some more definite answer to your Lordship's remarks, Count Walewski asked me whether I was directed to leave a copy of your despatch with him. I replied that I had not received positive directions so to do, but that I was authorised to do it. He then requested me to abstain from it, as he did not agree in several of your Lordship's observations contained in it, and if a copy was left with him he must reply to them, but that there was no use in beginning a polemic of the kind, particularly as his Excellency repeated, he expected your Lordship's views to be altered by his last despatch to M. de Persigny.

Your Lordship will understand from this that Count Walewski is not in possession of a copy of your despatch No. 1,371. It will be for your Lordship to determine whether he is still to be furnished with one.

This morning I saw his Excellency again. He read me some extracts from the despatch which he had been expecting from M. de Persigny when I last saw him, and communicated to me *in extenso* the answer which he had returned to it. As a copy of this latter document is to be left with your Lordship, I need not advert to it further; but I told Count Walewski that I thought he had drawn conclusions rather in unison with his own wishes than with your Lordship's intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 18.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,390. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 5, 1855.

My Lord

I INCLOSE the copy of a despatch* from Count Walewski which was read to me and placed in my hands on the 3rd instant by the Count de Persigny.

I observed to his Excellency that the mode of proceeding proposed by

* No. 15

Count Walewski left untouched the objection raised by Her Majesty's Government respecting the Separate Convention between Russia and the Porte: it provided for the annexation of that Convention to the General Treaty, but the seperate arrangement might still be made between Russia and Turkey without the concurrence and sanction of the other Powers, and might therefore, as I had before taken the liberty of pointing out to M. de Persigny, be so framed as entirely to neutralise the General Treaty, by which Russia would engage not to have any ships of war in the Black Sea.

As, however, Her Majesty's Government desired as far as possible to meet the views of the Government of the Emperor, and not to raise objections that were not absolutely necessary, I would suggest that in the paragraph beginning, "Il est bien entendu," there should be inserted after the words "Convention Séparée," the words "préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du présent Traité;" after the word "modifiée," that the words "par la Russie et la Turquie" should be inserted; and that "du présent Traité" should be substituted for "du Traité Général."

M. de Persigny promised to make this suggestion known to his Government, and he informed me last night that it had been adopted by Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 19.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 1,574.)

Paris, December 4, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI expressed a wish to see me this afternoon, and on waiting upon him he asked me whether I could give him any explanation of a telegraphic communication which he had received yesterday from M. de Persigny. His Excellency stated that since he had last seen me the French Government had come to an understanding with that of Her Majesty as to the tenour of the answer which should be transmitted to Vienna; that he had consequently sent off a messenger with it to M. de Bourqueney, and that since the messenger was gone, M. de Persigny had informed him by telegraph that Her Majesty's Government could not send instructions to Sir Hamilton Seymour until they knew whether the French Government accepted the reserves on the first and fourth points, which had been stated at length in a despatch sent to me; that he had replied he did not recollect my having communicated to him any despatch containing reserves, and that he had been informed, in reply, that I had been desired to give him a copy of the despatch in question. Count Walewski inquired of me whether I could give him any explanation of the further demands of Her Majesty's Government.

I reminded his Excellency of what had passed between us when I brought him your Lordship's despatch No. 1,371 of the 29th ultimo; that he had not only expressed a desire not to have a copy of it, but had declined to make any observations upon it, as he was expecting a communication from M. de Persigny which would render an answer unnecessary. Since then, I added, I had received no official instructions from your Lordship on this matter, the communications which had taken place between the two Governments having been carried on in London. I said, however, that my recollection of your Lordship's despatch enabled me to state that Her Majesty's Government were apprehensive that in accepting the wording of the Vienna ultimatum, as regarded the first point, they might be considered as agreeing to the arrangements which were proposed in the spring by the Plenipotentiaries who attended the Vienna Conferences; that Her Majesty's Government thought some of those arrangements objectionable, and did not wish to be bound by them; and that with regard to the fourth point, Her Majesty's Government thought the wording ambiguous, and that it might imply a real transfer to the four Powers of that protection over the Christian subjects of the Porte in general which had been claimed by Russia over the Sultan's Greek subjects.

Count Walewski said that if your Lordship intended to ask the French

Government to require of Austria to consent to an alteration in the wording of her ultimatum, he must decline to attempt the task. If, on the contrary, your object was only to reserve the right of discussion with the French Government, he was ready to pledge himself to enter into that discussion immediately. In respect, however, to the first point, he did not think that either Government was prepared for such a discussion; certainly he was not. With regard to the fourth point, he agreed entirely in the principle laid down by your Lordship, that it would never do to create, in the place of the protection claimed by Russia, the recognised protection of the guaranteeing Powers, one of whom would always have a preponderating influence, with a constant desire to make use of it. He thought, however, that every precaution had been taken in the wording of the ultimatum to prevent any danger of the kind.

It would be useless to trouble your Lordship with the details of a somewhat lengthened conversation which ensued. I endeavoured to point out to Count Walewski the advantage which might be taken of the present wording of the Austrian ultimatum to produce those evils which Her Majesty's Government sought to avoid. I could obtain no other answer than that although quite ready to come to a distinct understanding with Great Britain, a failure in which was not to be apprehended, Count Walewski, after having expressed to Count Buol his approval of the Austrian ultimatum, could not call for further changes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—It is now settled that I am to send Count Walewski a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 1,371.

C.

No. 20.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,404. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information copies of two despatches* from Count Walewski to the French Ambassador at this Court, which have been communicated to me by the Count de Persigny, relative to the Austrian propositions for an ultimatum to be sent to Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 21.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,405. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE to your Excellency the despatch which I have addressed to Sir H. Seymour.†

You will communicate this despatch and its inclosure to Count Walewski, as Her Majesty's Government will not take any step respecting the proposals which are to be made by Austria to Russia without the full knowledge of the Government of the Emperor.

I regret to learn by your despatch No. 1,574 of yesterday's date, that Count Walewski is unwilling to suggest that any alteration should be made in the Austrian ultimatum, although he has already assented to some changes which have been adopted by the Austrian Government; but when Count Walewski examines the further alterations now proposed, and convinces himself that they have solely for their object to render the ultimatum more clear without changing its character, and that if they are adopted the result will be to prevent the misunderstandings which occurred at the last Conferences, and which might

* Nos. 23 and 24. † No. 22.

lead to the failure of the negotiations for peace, Her Majesty's Government trust that his Excellency will see fit to instruct M. de Bourqueney to support Sir H. Seymour in the representations he will to make the Austrian Government.

A complete agreement would thus be established between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor, and I need not point out the necessity of such an agreement being come to in this preliminary stage of the important transactions in which the two Governments may be called upon to take part.

Your Excellency, after having communicated to Count Walewski my despatch to Sir H. Seymour, will forward it without delay to Vienna by the messenger who is the bearer of this despatch; but your Excellency will be at liberty to suspend his departure, if Count Walewski, contrary to the hope and expectation of Her Majesty's Government, should determine not to adopt the course which you will earnestly recommend to his favourable consideration, and will not send to M. de Bourqueney instructions similar to those which I have now addressed to Sir H. Seymour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 22.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 7.) *Foreign Office, December 6, 1855.*

Sir,

THE correspondence which has passed between this office and Her Majesty's Embassy at Paris, together with the copies of Count Walewski's despatches to Count de Persigny respecting the ultimatum which the Austrian Government proposes to address to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, have been transmitted to Mr. Elliot; I now inclose the copies of two further despatches* which I have addressed to Lord Cowley, and you will thus be in complete possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this important matter.

I regret that some delay has taken place in sending a definitive answer to Vienna, but this delay has been unavoidable, as Her Majesty's Government considered it their duty to come to an agreement with the French Government respecting the true interpretation and meaning of certain terms of the ultimatum, in order to guard against future misunderstandings which might endanger the success of the negotiations, upon which Her Majesty's Government will enter with the earnest hope and desire that they may lead to the restoration of peace.

You will express to Count Buol the regret of Her Majesty's Government at this delay, and you will assure his Excellency that the amendments and alterations suggested have had no other object than to render clear certain conditions in the ultimatum which appeared liable to misinterpretation, and to give more complete effect to the intentions of the three Governments to guard Europe against a renewal of the present complications.

For the purpose of more convenient reference, I inclose a copy of the ultimatum, and I have stated in a parallel column the Articles to which Her Majesty's Government agree, and those to which they suggest that some amendments should be made; the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to suggest them will be found in my despatches to Lord Cowley. You will communicate the amendments to Count Buol, and express to his Excellency the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government that he may see fit to adopt them.

Count Buol has already been made aware by the French Government that among the conditions which the belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right of proposing beyond those which are contained in the ultimatum, are that no fortifications shall be restored or erected in the Aland Islands; that Consuls shall be admitted at the Russian ports of the Black Sea; and that the future position of the territories on the east of the Black Sea shall be open to consideration.

Her Majesty's Government having no wish to put forward conditions which

* Nos. 16 and 18.

are not necessary in the permanent interests of peace, and having no motive for disguising their intentions, would have preferred that these terms should form part of the ultimatum, but they feel that they have no claim to press upon Austria the conditions on which the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia shall depend.

On the other hand, however, Austria will admit that the belligerent Powers have a clear and indisputable right to decide upon what conditions they will consent to make peace; and as Her Majesty's Government do not think it would be just or honourable towards Russia that she should be allowed to enter upon negotiations for peace in ignorance of the terms to which her assent will be required, Her Majesty's Government trust that Count Buol will see the propriety of making these terms known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, for it would be far better not to enter upon negotiations at all, than that they should be broken off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated, and that the real intentions of the belligerent Powers had been kept from her knowledge.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—You will read this despatch to Count Buol.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Ultimatum.

	Principautés Danubiennes.
SUBSTITUTE the following passage within brackets:—	ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe. [La Russie ne pourra exercer dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes aucun droit particulier d'ingérence, ni prétendre à autre chose qu'à sa part dans la garantie collective sous laquelle les Principautés seront placées à la paix.]
"La Russie n'exercera et ne jouira d'aucun droit exclusif ou particulier de protection ou d'ingérence dans les Principautés Danubiennes."	Les Principautés conserveront leurs priviléges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte [et le développement de leur organization nationale se poursuivra librement avec l'initiative du Sultan, l'assentiment des Puissances garantes, et en ayant égard aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.]
"Et le Sultan en outre accordera à ces Principautés, ou y confirmera, une organisation intérieure satisfaisante; et on fera les arrangements qui, après une mûre considération, seront jugés suffisants afin d'assurer aux dites Principautés la jouissance paisible de cette organisation."	D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent réclamé par leur situation géographique. Aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.
Agree.	En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne.
Agree.	Cette frontière ainsi rectifié d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn.

suivant la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est, et aboutirait au Lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

Agree.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Agree.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve, destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatif à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

Agree.
Add the following words:
"Aucun arsenal militaire maritime n'y sera conservé ni créé."

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée. Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes [à n'y conserver ou à n'y créer aucun arsenal militaire]. [La Convention qui sera passée entr'elles à cet effet sera annexée au Traité Général et aura même force et valeur que si elle en ferait partie.]

Omit the words within brackets.
Substitute the following passage for the passage within brackets:
"Il est bien entendu que la Convention Séparée à cet effet préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du présent Traité, sera considérée comme partie intégrante du présent Traité; qu'elle aura, partant, la même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot à mot; et qu'en conséquence elle ne saurait être annulée ni modifiée par la Russie et la Turquie sans l'assentiment de tous les signataires du présent Traité."
Agree.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnés dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Substitute the following passage for the passage within brackets:
"Des arrangements seront faits par l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs justes droits civils et politiques;

[Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrés sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Les délibérations étant déjà entamées

et la Russie sera ensuite invitée à adhérer aux arrangements qui seront ainsi faits."

entre les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne, et les Ministres de Sa Hautesse, sur les moyens les plus propres à amener l'amélioration du sort des Chrétiens de l'Empire, la Russie retrouvera à la paix la place qui lui sera faite en commun avec les Puissances signataires dans la surveillance des intérêts garanties par le présent Article.]

Conditions Particulières.

Agree.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient reproduire, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

Vienne, le 14 *Novembre*, 1855.
Paraphé: B. B.

No. 23.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December .)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le* 4 *Décembre*, 1855.

AINSI que je vous l'annonce par ma dépêche télégraphique de ce jour, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur adhère aux modifications de texte que Lord Clarendon propose, et que vous avez insérées dans votre dépêche télégraphique d'hier. Nous étant préoccupés avant tout du soin et de la nécessité d'établir préalablement entre le Gouvernement Britannique et nous un parfait accord sur tous les points, et partageant d'ailleurs sa sollicitude pour prévenir toute interprétation abusive des garanties que nous aurons à stipuler, il nous a semblé même qu'il pouvait être utile de donner à la rédaction de l'Article final du Traité Général le développement qui nous avait été suggéré. Cet Article, par conséquent, sera ainsi conçu:—

"Il est bien entendu que la Convention Séparée préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du présent Traité sera considérée comme si elle en était partie intégrante; qu'elle aura, partant, la même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot à mot; et qu'en conséquence, elle ne saurait être annulée ni modifiée par la Russie et la Turquie sans l'assentiment des signataires du présent Traité."

Ce dernier point étant définitivement réglé, et le concert entre les deux Gouvernements se trouvant ainsi parfaitement fixé, je me suis empressé d'en faire part au Ministre de l'Empereur à Vienne, en lui donnant les instructions nécessaires pour qu'il ait, avec Sir H. Seymour, à présenter à M. le Comte Buol les observations dont a été l'objet, de la part des deux Gouvernements, l'ultimatum qui nous a été communiqué.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale est toujours convaincu, M. le Comte, de l'importance de ne pas laisser plus longtemps le Cabinet de Vienne dans l'incertitude sur nos résolutions, et ce serait donc avec une extrême satisfaction que nous apprendrions que Lord Clarendon a donné, de son côté, au Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique en Autriche les directions dont il a besoin pour agir de concert avec M. de Bourqueney.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et lui en laisser copie.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 24.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December 6.)

Paris, le 5 Décembre, 1855.

M. le Comte,

VOTRE dépêche télégraphique d'hier et celle d'aujourd'hui me font supposer que Lord Clarendon subordonne notre entente définitive sur l'ultimatum Autrichien à notre accord préalable sur les développements qu'il y aura lieu de donner à la première et à la quatrième garanties; développements qu'il a consignés dans une dépêche qu'il a adressée à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Lord Cowley m'avait, en effet, il y a plusieurs jours, donné lecture de cette dépêche, sans, toutefois, m'en laisser copie, et il était résulté, pour moi, de notre entretien que l'examen de ces diverses questions était prématuré, et que nous envisagions, en outre, à un point de vue différent certains détails qui exigent d'être élaborés avec soin. Je n'avais nullement présumé, dans tous les cas, que nous dûssions en faire dépendre la réponse que nous devons faire parvenir au Cabinet de Vienne. J'ai néanmoins voulu en conférer de nouveau, aujourd'hui, avec Lord Cowley, et je ne puis que persister dans mon appréciation.

Nous ne saurions, en ce moment, aborder et résoudre des points de détail dont je suis loin de méconnaître l'importance, et pour la solution desquelles nous devons attendre, d'ailleurs, le travail préparatoire que nous avons demandé à nos Ambassadeurs à Constantinople. Dès que nous en posséderons les éléments, nous nous empresserons de chercher à établir, entre nous, un concert préalable; mais je cherche en vain les motifs qui détermineraient le Cabinet Anglais à en faire dépendre notre résolution sur les propositions actuelles de l'Autriche.

Quelque soit, en effet, notre avis ultérieur sur l'application de la première et de la quatrième garanties, Lord Clarendon ne peut avoir la pensée de faire subir à l'ultimatum de M. le Comte de Buol de nouvelles modifications, et je ne comprendrais pas, dès lors, qu'il voulut retarder plus longtemps l'expédition des instructions qu'il doit adresser à Sir Hamilton Seymour et qui sont attendues avec (une si vive) impatience.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 25.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1,578.)

Paris, December 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatches Nos. 1,389 and 1,390 of the 4th and 5th instant. I lost no time in communicating them to Count Walewski, and, at his request, I am about to furnish him with copies of both of them.

His Excellency said that he had already been informed by M. de Persigny of the modifications that your Lordship desired to have introduced into the Austrian ultimatum, and which are contained in the latter of the two despatches, and that he had signified the acquiescence of the French Government therein. He trusted, therefore, that your Lordship would have no difficulty in informing Sir Hamilton Seymour by telegraph that the two Governments were agreed ("d'accord"), and that he would shortly receive instructions in the sense of those sent to M. de Bourqueney.

Referring to the conversation which had taken place between us yesterday, the substance of which is given in my despatch No. 1,574, I said to Count Walewski that, although he had refused to ask of Count Buol any alteration in the wording of the ultimatum as regarded the first and fourth points, yet I presumed that he would not object to such alterations if Count Buol assented to them at the request of Her Majesty's Government. His Excellency replied, assuredly not. I then inquired whether, in that case, he would object to M. de Bourqueney's asking Sir Hamilton Seymour to obtain them. He answered,

no; but that he did not think that Count Buol would consent. I asked him, at all events, to authorize M. de Bourqueney by telegraph to make the trial. To this he assented, and wrote a telegraphic despatch while I was with him to the effect that Sir Hamilton Seymour would propose some slight alterations in the wording of the first and fourth points, that the French Government would be very glad if they could be obtained, and that M. de Bourqueney was to do all in his power to obtain them, but that if Count Buol evinced an invincible repugnance, he was not to press the matter ("passer outre").

Count Walewski again assured me that there was no real difference of opinion between the two Governments; that he considered the allies to be entirely unfettered by anything that had taken place at the spring conferences; that they had declared as much to Austria; and that there was nothing in the wording of the proposed ultimatum which changed that attitude.

I have already, in my despatch of yesterday, stated Count Walewski's agreement in the views of Her Majesty's Government concerning the fourth point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 26.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December .)

(Telegraphic.)

Compiègne, December 7, 1855.

I HAVE settled with Count Walewski as follows: The messenger to Sir Hamilton Seymour will go on. Baron de Bourqueney will have orders to support the amendments. To ask Count Buol's reasons, if the latter objects, or refer for further instructions. I write to Sir Hamilton Seymour in this sense. You can confirm or disavow by telegraph. I regret that I have no messenger here, to write to you fully.

No. 27.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 8, 10·45 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, December 7, 1855.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF yesterday verbally announced to Count Buol that he was authorized to make proposals for peace, based upon the exclusion from the Black Sea of ships of war, as according to the Treaty of 1841, with the exception of those of Russia and Turkey, who should agree entirely between themselves as to the number each should have.

The effect this verbal communication seems to have made upon Count Buol was to increase his anxiety that the Austrian ultimatum should be agreed on, and sent to St. Petersburgh, without further delay.

No. 28.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 1,585.)

Paris, December 9, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI having informed me, at Compiègne, on Thursday evening, that he had received information from M. de Persigny, of the departure of a Queen's messenger for Vienna, *vid* Paris, with instructions for Sir Hamilton Seymour, which were to be communicated to the French Government, I took measures to have the messenger directed to that place.

The inclosed copy of a despatch, which I addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour by the messenger who proceeded, on his way to Vienna, early yesterday, will put your Lordship in possession of the result of my communication with Count Walewski.

I must, however, add that his Excellency expressed considerable disappointment at what he called these fresh demands on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and a conviction that they would not be assented to by the Cabinet of Vienna.

I replied that I saw nothing in them which ought not to be cheerfully acceded to by Count Buol, if he was acting in good faith towards the allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Lord Cowley to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Compiègne, December 8, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch and its inclosures, to your address, sent under flying seal to me, in order that its contents might be communicated to the French Government, and stating the alterations which Her Majesty's Government desire to see made in the ultimatum which Count Buol proposes to address to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. You will observe from the inclosed copy of a despatch (No. 1,405) to myself, which accompanied it, that I was only to forward it to you in case the French Government consented to send to M. de Bourqueney instructions of a similar nature to those thus conveyed to yourself.

Having received notice of the departure of the messenger, who was the bearer of these despatches, for Paris, I directed him to come to this place, to which the Emperor had done me the honour to invite me, and where Count Walewski was also staying. I was thus enabled to lay before them, without loss of time, the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

I am happy to add that Count Walewski has authorized me, with the Emperor's sanction, to inform you that the Imperial Government does not object to any of the alterations suggested by Her Majesty's Government, and that M. de Bourqueney will be instructed to give you his best support, in order to obtain the consent of Count Buol to their introduction into his ultimatum. And it has been further settled between the Count and myself, subject to the assent of Her Majesty's Government, which can be conveyed to you by telegraph, that in case of a refusal on the part of Count Buol, he should be asked to state fully his reasons for declining to accede to the wishes of the two Governments, and that these reasons should be referred to the consideration of the Cabinets of Paris and London.

Count Walewski, however, observed that, supposing Count Buol to accept the proposed alterations, it would be necessary to change the phraseology of some of them. He adverted particularly to the wording of a part of the third point, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, which, as it now stands, applies to the final Treaty, and must be modified to suit the ultimatum.

I said that I was convinced that Her Majesty's Government would adopt any form of words that did not destroy the sense and meaning of their real sentiments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 29.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10, 6·25 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 10, 1855.

THE Saxon Minister has been authorized to express the desire of the Russian Government to treat for peace, on the basis of the neutralization of the Black Sea. He has been told that the French Government can give no answer before consulting Her Majesty's Government. More by the messenger.

No. 30.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 1,032.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1855.

YOUR Excellency will have already received the entire correspondence which has passed between this office and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, respecting the proposals which the Austrian Government are desirous of making to Russia for the restoration of peace.

My despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 6th instant, with its inclosure, will place your Excellency in possession of the amendments to the Austrian ultimatum which have been made by Her Majesty's Government, and which they consider indispensable in order to prevent the misunderstandings to which certain passages in that ultimatum might hereafter give rise.

Your Excellency will inform the Porte of what has passed respecting the proposals of Austria. You will also give to Fuad Pasha a copy of my despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, with its inclosure, and if, as Her Majesty's Government trust, the proposed arrangement meets the views of the Porte, you will invite his Excellency to instruct the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna to make known to Count Buol the concurrence of his Government and to act in concert with Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Your Excellency will inform M. de Thouvenel of your proceedings, and I need not point out to you that a conformity of views and action between the two Embassies on this nature is of the highest importance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 31.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1,593.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 10, 1855.

YOUR Lordship has been informed by a telegraphic despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour that the Russian Minister at Vienna had stated to Count Buol that he was authorised to make proposals for peace, based upon the exclusion of ships of war from the Black Sea.

M. de Bourqueney has given similar information to the French Government, with the addition, however, that Count Buol had asked Prince Gortchakoff what use he wished him to make of this announcement. Prince Gortchakoff replied "qu'il devait en prendre acte." Count Buol observed that it was not usual to "prendre acte" of a verbal communication, and they separated without coming to any decision.

Count Buol is of opinion that this step has been taken by Russia at the instance of the smaller German Powers, and he is anxious, as Sir Hamilton Seymour also reports, to send off his ultimatum without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 32.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1,594.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 10, 1855.

M. DE HUBNER has communicated to Count Walewski a memorandum embodying the views of the Austrian Government in regard to the first and fourth points. Count Walewski did not, in giving me this information, enter

into any details, but I judge from the few words which fell from him upon the subject, that he does not think that the projects of Austria will meet with the concurrence of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 33.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1,597. Confidential.)

Paris, December 10, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI stated to me this afternoon, that he had received an important communication from M. de Seebach, the Saxon Minister. That gentleman had been empowered by telegraph to inquire, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, whether the French Government would be willing to resume negotiations for peace where they had been broken off in the spring, namely, on the third point, taking as a basis the exclusion of all ships of war from the Black Sea, with the exception of such as were required for the service of the States bordering that sea, the number of which should be regulated by common agreement between those States without the ostensible interference of any other Powers. M. de Seebach asked further, whether—this basis being accepted—France would proceed to sign upon it preliminaries of peace.

Count Walewski describes himself as having replied at once to M. de Seebach, that he could give no answer to such questions without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government. M. de Seebach observed, that the intention of course was, that the French Government should communicate with the British Government, but that he should be glad to learn Count Walewski's own opinion of the merits of the proposition; this the latter equally declined to give. He asked, in his turn, whether the message with which M. de Seebach had been charged, was to be considered an overture for peace; to which M. de Seebach responded, that he would make the inquiry, if Count Walewski desired it, by telegraph. His Excellency would not, however, permit his name to be made use of in this slight degree, lest the smallest inference might be derived from it that he expressed any acquiescence in the Russian proposition.

Having given me this intelligence, Count Walewski said that he had taken the Emperor's orders, and that His Majesty was not inclined to attach the least importance to this new step taken by Russia, but that His Majesty was more anxious than ever that the Austrian ultimatum should be sent, without further loss of time, to St. Petersburgh. If that ultimatum was on its road, the natural reply to M. de Seebach would be, that the answer of the allies would be found therein. Under these circumstances he was about, by the Emperor's desire, to instruct M. de Persigny to urge Her Majesty's Government not to press the alterations on the first and fourth points of the ultimatum, for which Sir Hamilton Seymour had received orders to ask, if Count Buol could not be persuaded at once to agree to them.

I reminded Count Walewski that this was quite contrary to the engagement which he had contracted with me at Compiègne. It was then settled that in case Count Buol, contrary to the demand of the two Missions, persisted in retaining his own wording of the first and fourth points, he should be asked to explain his reasons, and that those reasons should be referred to Paris and London for consideration.

Count Walewski admitted the accuracy of my statement, but he said the face of affairs had very much changed within the last few days, and that it had become of such importance to lose no more time, that he trusted Her Majesty's Government would not persist in asking for modifications repugnant to the Austrian Government, and which were in reality of no importance. The objections of Her Majesty's Government bore on the word "guarantees;" nevertheless, whatever happened to the Principalities—whether they were rendered independent, or whether they remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan—their

future lot must be guaranteed by the Powers who signed the Treaty which was to define their state and organisation.

I replied, that I understood the objections of Her Majesty's Government to the Austrian wording of the first point of the ultimatum to be twofold. Her Majesty's Government did not wish to guarantee beforehand that which was not yet settled, namely, the future organisation of the Principalities; and secondly, they objected to any future modification of the institutions of those Provinces being subjected to the assent of the guaranteeing Powers.

With regard to the fourth point, Her Majesty's Government were unwilling to appear to sanction any agreement which gave the Powers at large, and consequently Russia among them, the very privileges which it was contended Russia did not or ought not to possess.

If, I continued, the alterations proposed by Her Majesty's Government to shield themselves on these points were of no importance, the Austrian Government could have no difficulty in accepting them. If, again, they were of importance, and that it was shown to Austria that she was playing the game of Russia, Count Buol ought to be equally ready to accept them. His persistence in a refusal could only mask a game of his own, and the sooner it was disclosed the better. For my part I felt sure that Count Buol would not shrink from fair discussion, and that he would yield to objections which were proved to be reasonable. I ventured, however, again to express the conviction that Her Majesty's Government would not hold to their own words if others, which equally expressed their meaning, were found and preferred by Count Buol; and I take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship that in order to meet, as far as is reasonable, the wishes of the French Government, Sir Hamilton Seymour might be authorised by telegraph to concede verbal alterations which do not compromise the general tenour of the instructions which he has received from your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—The Saxon Minister has expressed to Count Walewski his hope that his communication may be kept secret.

C.

No. 34.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11, 1·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 11, 1855, noon.*

SAXON Minister requests secrecy about the instructions to the French Government.

No. 35.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 11, 1855.*

WE approve of Lord Cowley's despatch to you. If any change of wording in our amendments is proposed, inform us of it by telegraph before you agree to it.

I trust Count Buol will not make any difficulties, and he must be aware that Russia is wanting to make peace, without the intervention of Austria.

No. 36.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December* 11.)

Paris, le 10 *Décembre*, 1855.

M. le Comte,

M. LE BARON DE SEEBACH, Ministre de Saxe près l'Empereur et chargé des intérêts Russes en France, vient de m'informer "qu'il était chargé par l'Empereur de Russie de pressentir l'Empereur Napoléon, par mon entremise, sur la question de savoir si la France et l'Angleterre seraient disposées à resoudre le troisième point des quatre garanties de la manière suivante:

"1. Fermeture des Détroits.

"2. Aucun pavillon de guerre quelconque ne flottera dans la Mer Noire à l'exception des forces que la Russie et la Porte jugeraient nécessaire d'y entretenir.

"3. La qualité de ces forces serait fixée par une entente directe entre les deux Puissances riveraines sans participation ostensible des autres Puissances.

"Et, si dans l'hypothèse d'une réponse affirmative, l'obstacle principal qui s'oppose à la conclusion de la paix étant écarté, les Puissances alliées seraient prêtes à s'entendre sur la rédaction de préliminaires destinés à servir de base à une négociation définitive."

M. le Baron de Seebach, tout en admettant que la démarche ne saurait avoir un caractère purement confidentiel, demande que le secret en soit strictement gardé.

J'ai répondu à M. le Baron de Seebach que je devais, avant de lui exprimer une opinion quelconque sur la démarche qu'il était chargé de faire, en donner communication au Gouvernement Britannique.

Je vous prie donc, M. le Comte, de mettre la présente dépêche sous les yeux de Lord Clarendon et de me faire connaître ce qu'en pense le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 37.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December* 11.)

Paris, le 10 *Décembre*, 1855.

M. le Comte,

LES rapports que je reçois de M. le Baron de Bourqueney me démontrent de plus en plus la nécessité de ne pas prolonger l'incertitude dans laquelle est placé le Cabinet de Vienne sur l'accueil fait à ses propositions par la France et l'Angleterre. Malgré tous nos soins, la teneur de ces propositions a transpiré dans le public; la presse s'en est déjà emparée, et un journal de Londres, le "Morning Post," révélait avant hier tous les détails d'une négociation qui, à mon grand regret, est encore en suspens. M. le Prince Gortchakoff a fait auprès de M. le Comte de Buol une démarche analogue à celle que M. le Baron de Seebach a été chargé de faire auprès de moi, et dont j'ai l'honneur de vous informer par une dépêche réservée de ce jour.

Vous savez, M. le Comte, tout le prix que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur attache à la proposition du Cabinet de Vienne, et combien il lui paraîtrait regrettable que, pour un motif quelconque, il n'y fût pas donné suite. Nous n'avons rien négligé pour donner satisfaction aux vues du Cabinet Britannique, et pour nous mettre d'accord avec lui sur les modifications à obtenir au projet primitif de M. le Comte de Buol. Nous nous étions flattés de l'espoir d'y avoir complétement réussi; et c'est avec plus de contrariété encore que d'étonnement que j'ai vu, par les instructions envoyées à Sir H. Seymour, que le Cabinet de

Sa Majesté Britannique demandait de nouveaux changements de rédaction dans l'ultimatum lui-même.

Le plus léger inconvenient que pourrait avoir cette nouvelle demande du Gouvernement Britannique, c'est de retarder le départ de M. le Comte Esterhazy, chargé de porter à St. Pétersbourg l'ultimatum de l'Autriche, et cet inconvénient acquiert, à mes yeux, une portée bien plus grande encore de l'ensemble des circonstances ci-dessus relatées.

L'Empereur vous invite, M. le Comte, à faire une démarche précise auprès de Lord Clarendon, en vue d'obtenir que Sir H. Seymour soit autorisé par le télégraphe, s'il ne l'est déjà, à passer outre dans le cas où le Cabinet de Vienne se refuserait à admettre au texte de son ultimatum les changements de rédaction suggérés, en dernier lieu, par le Cabinet Britannique.

J'ai d'autant plus lieu d'espérer que Lord Clarendon déférera au désir que vous êtes chargé de lui exprimer de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale que plus j'examiner les modifications dont il s'agit, moins elle me paraissent importantes. Il est bien entendu que ce qui a été arrêté, aux derniers Conférences de Vienne, pour le réglement des deux premières garanties, ne nous lie en aucune façon, et nous nous sommes exprimés à Vienne assez clairement pour ne laisser subsister aucune équivoque à ce sujet. Une fois ceci bien établi, je ne comprends pas l'importance que le Cabinet Britannique semble attacher à la suppression du passage qui est relatif à la garantie des Puissances; car, en effet, quelque soit l'arrangement définitif auquel nous nous arrêtions pour l'organisation des Principautés Danubiennes, cet arrangement ne fera efficace et n'atteindra notre but principal, qui est, si je ne me trompe, de constituer une barrière sérieuse contre les empiétements de la Russie, que s'il répose sur la garantie de l'Europe. Or, le passage de l'ultimatum, à ce relatif, n'a pas un sens plus spécial ni plus explicite que d'indiquer la nécessité de faire reposer l'organisation des Principautés Danubiennes sur la garantie générale de l'Europe.

Quant aux modifications apportées au quatrième point, elles me semblent également superflues, car il ressort explicitement du texte même de l'ultimatum Autrichien que les immunités des sujets Chrétiens de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance ni à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan. Le rôle des Puissances signataires ne serait autre qu'un rôle "de surveillance des intérêts garantis par le présent Article," ce qui n'implique nullement l'idée que les Puissances garantiraient les immunités; le mot "garantis" étant régi par le présent l'Article, c'est-à-dire, que les intérêts des Chrétiens se trouveront être garantis au moyen des améliorations qui leur seront octroyées par la seule volonté de leur Souverain.

Je vous prie de faire part de ces considérations à Lord Clarendon. Elles contribueront, je ne saurais en douter, à le déterminer à céder à nos instances; car il ne voudra pas, plus que nous, courir le risque de faire échouer une négociation aussi importante par des motifs d'un ordre secondaire.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 38.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 12.)

(No. 1,508.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 11, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI is about to send to M. de Persigny, for communication to your Lordship, some extracts from a despatch lately received by him from M. de Thouvenel, in which that Ambassador gives an account of a conversation which he had had with the Grand Vizier and with Fuad Pasha, as to the best means of carrying out the principle laid down in the fourth point.

M. de Thouvenel speaks of the intention of the Porte with praise. I endeavoured to engage Count Walewski to enter into a few details, but I found him disinclined so to do. He said, however, that the Porte was about to address a memorandum to the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Austria, explaining the ideas of the Ottoman Government as to the future position of

the Christian subjects of the Sultan. The intention seemed to be rather to proclaim some new law equally applicable to all the subjects of His Highness than to promulgate any special edicts in favour of Christians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 39.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 259.)
Copenhagen, December 8, 1855.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the request from Vienna, the Danish Minister at St. Petersburgh has been instructed to promote, as far as he may be able, by language and influence, the re-establishment of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 40.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

Vienna, December 11, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE been passing two hours with the French Ambassador and Count Buol, and from the extreme desire to meet your wishes shown by both, I have hopes that your Lordship's amendments will be mainly adopted by the Austrian Cabinet.

After having seen the Emperor, Count Buol will again receive the French Ambassador and myself.

It is my earnest desire that the slight alterations about to be proposed by the Austrian Cabinet may be sanctioned by your Lordship.

No. 41.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Foreign Office, December 12, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

WE are pressed by the French Government not to insist upon our modifications of the ultimatum, if they are declined by Count Buol.

We must adhere to our principle, and cannot consent to alter the meaning of our amendments, but we shall not object to any change in the wording which does not affect the meaning.

Our amendments of the last paragraph in the ultimatum on the fourth point may perhaps be offensive to Russia, and therefore objectionable to Austria, and we accordingly propose to substitute for it the following:

"A suitable arrangement shall be made, which, without infringing upon the sovereign rights and independence of the Sultan, shall secure to the non-Mussulman subjects of His Majesty the full enjoyment of their civil and political rights."

This would embody the principle, while it would leave open for future discussion the manner of carrying it into practical effect.

No. 42.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, December 12, 1855.

COUNT BUOL agrees to your Lordship's amendments, with the following slight changes, which must still be submitted to the Emperor:

In the second paragraph the words "will not enlarge" are omitted for grammatical reasons.

In the third paragraph, after the word "satisfaction," will come the words "with the assent of the guaranteeing Powers."

All that regards the Black Sea is agreed to.

On the fourth point the first paragraph of the original Austrian ultimatum is insisted on. The English text is accepted in the following terms: "arrangements being made by Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Porte, for the purpose of securing to the Christian subjects of the Sultan their civil and political rights. Russia will be invited, after the peace, to be a party to them."

No. 43.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
Vienna, December 9, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT VALENTINE ESTERHAZY'S carriage is already packed; he has received his last orders, and should the final instructions from London, which are looked for with such intense anxiety by the Austrian Cabinet, reach Her Majesty's Mission to-night, and be of the nature which is expected, to-morrow night will find him on his way to St. Petersburgh.

Every step which is to be taken after the dispatch of the ultimatum has been settled beforehand with the utmost precision: letters, already prepared, will be immediately sent off by the Emperor to the Kings of Prussia and Bavaria, apprizing their Majesties of the measure which has been taken, and calling upon them as advocates and lovers of peace to urge upon the Court of St. Petersburgh an acceptance of the terms which are now within their reach.

After the interval of two days, by which time it is supposed that Count V. Esterhazy will have reached Warsaw, Prince Gortchakoff will receive a summons to the Foreign Office, and will then be told that Count Esterhazy has been furnished with instructions calculated to bring about a peace. He will, of course, inquire what the nature of the instructions may be, but will receive no satisfaction upon that point. Count Buol intends to acquaint him that he is not at liberty to divulge a secret which belongs to him only in part, and that he must resign himself to waiting for a few days. The term during which the Russian Envoy's patience must needs be employed will coincide with the probable date of Count Esterhazy's arrival at St. Petersburgh, when Prince Gortchakoff will again be invited to repair to the Foreign Office, and will learn from Count Buol the precise nature and, I believe, words of the ultimatum.

As regards Count Esterhazy, it has been enjoined him to see the most influential persons of the Russian Court, and to endeavour to obtain their assistance in determining the Emperor to accept the ultimatum.

In the event—the probable event—of the ultimatum being at once rejected, the Austrian Envoy is directed to leave St. Petersburgh directly, with the whole of his Mission. In the more improbable event of the Russian Cabinet delaying its answer, Count Esterhazy is directed to wait in official silence for ten days, and at the end of that time to call upon the Chancellor, and acquaint him that nine days only remain for replying, and that if no answer, and a favourable one,

be not returned before the expiration of that term, peremptory orders will leave him no option as to demanding passports for himself and the whole of the Austrian Mission.

So the affair stands at present, and such has been the secrecy observed with regard to the whole affair, that when Count V. Esterhazy called upon me yesterday, to converse upon Russian subjects, it became at once manifest that he had no idea of the intentions of his Government, and of the nature of the instructions which he was about to receive.

It appears to me that a little less reserve towards the Minister of an ally with whom the Austrian Court would reluctantly break might perhaps have better served their views, but I reflect that foreign Cabinets must know best how to deal with one another.

With regard to the Austrian intentions towards us, I must freely admit that, after all that has occurred, it is natural that Her Majesty's Government should have acted with full caution before being drawn into fresh negotiations. With the openness, however, which it is my duty to employ in addressing your Lordship, I do not hesitate to express my firm conviction that the Austrian Cabinet means fairly by us. Such has been my belief from the moment that I learned the Austrian scheme for stripping Russia of a considerable portion of her ill-gotten possessions in Bessarabia, because this is an offence which Russia will never pardon, and because, losing the Northern alliance, Austria must perforce endeavour to secure that of England and France.

Nothing that the Austrian Cabinet can do or say would embitter the feelings of Russia towards Her Majesty's Government. The statements which Her Majesty's Government have it in their power to make, and the acts which they can adduce in evidence, would cause Austria to be regarded with more enmity by all Russia than are those Powers which are in open hostility against her.

The policy of the Imperial Cabinet, however, is seen to have become of late somewhat impulsive; and I will not conceal from your Lordship my eager desire that it may have been found possible on our part to unite caution with such rapidity of decision as may preclude the chances of any further abrupt change of purpose on the part of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 44.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 11.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December* 10, 1855.

I HAVE but few particulars to add to my telegraphic message of the 7th instant, respecting the overture made by Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol.

Prince Gortchakoff's tone was that of a man about to bring forward a proposal which must be accepted with eagerness. "C'est la paix que je vous apporte," was his exclamation upon entering Count Buol's room. The terms of the Russian proposal will be found in the inclosed paper, which is copied from a memorandum made by Count Buol after the Prince had left him.

Count Buol acquaints me that upon receiving the communication, he merely observed that he had no answer to return beyond this, that he would take care that it should be made known to the Emperor, and to the English and French Governments.

In speaking to me upon the subject, his Excellency expressed his doubts whether the proposition emanated from St. Petersburgh, or whether it originated with Prince Gortchakoff himself. In the first of these suppositions, Count Buol imagines the proposal to be a kind of echo to the appeals which have been made to the Emperor Alexander by the Courts of Bavaria and Saxony.

M. de Bourqueney, from whom I had the first knowledge of Prince Gortchakoff's overture, saw therein a fresh motive for coming to an understanding respecting the ultimatum with the least possible delay.

I observed to M. de Bourqueney, as I have since done to Count Buol, that

I was as little disposed as he would be to any waste of time, but that I must remark that Prince Gortchakoff's proposal tended to set us at our ease; that a weapon ceased for the moment to be a weapon as soon as it was discharged; and that the proposal made on the part of the Russian Cabinet only tended to establish the wide difference which existed between the sacrifices which Russia was prepared to make, and those which, in the interest of a permanent peace, must be required of her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Memorandum.

SOLUTION du troisième point proposée par le Prince Gortchakoff le 6 Décembre, 1855:—

Maintien du principe de la fermeture complète des Détroits pour tout pavillon étranger de guerre.

Exclusion de tout pavillon dans la Mer Noire, à l'exception des forces navales qui y seraient entretenues par la Russie et la Porte, et dont l'étendue pourrait être déterminée par une Convention directe entre les deux Puissances.

Absence de toute influence ou participation ostensible dans l'arrangement à conclure entre les deux Puissances riveraines.

No. 45.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 12, 1855.

NOT having a French cypher, I have requested the French Ambassador to beg Count Walewski to communicate at once to Her Britannic Majesty's Government the slight alterations insisted upon by the Emperor of Austria in the amendments proposed by your Lordship.

I trust that they may be considered so unimportant that the order to agree to them may be sent to me by telegraph.

No. 46.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1855.

WE learn with satisfaction that an agreement is nearly arrived at. The words "will not enlarge" are not in the second paragraph, and we do not understand to what they allude. We cannot bind ourselves at this preliminary stage to guarantee internal institutions, or to give to any one of the Contracting Parties a power of veto upon the organization which the Sultan may give to the Principalities, which would be the case if their assent was required. In order, however, to meet the wishes of Austria, we are ready, instead of the words "with the assent of the guaranteeing Powers," to insert the words "concerted with the Contracting Powers."

We agree to the version you have sent us to the fourth point: the amendments required by the Emperor of Austria are not yet arrived.

No. 47.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, December 13, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

IN answer to Count Walewski's inquiry through M. Persigny what reply should be given to M. de Seebach's proposal, we have said that it is insufficient, and not such as we can accept.

No. 48.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1,606.)

Paris, December 13, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Walewski your Lordship's despatch No. 1,032 of the 10th instant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, instructing his Excellency to communicate to the Porte the correspondence which has passed between your Lordship, this Embassy, and Her Majesty's Mission at Vienna, on the subject of the Austrian propositions, and I inquired whether his Excellency had acted in a similar manner by M. de Thouvenel.

His Excellency replied that he had informed M. de Thouvenel, in general terms, of what was passing, but that he had not furnished him with copies of the correspondence in question. He would do so, however, by the next mail.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 49.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 14, 10 A.M.)

Vienna, December 13, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegraphic despatch of yesterday is very satisfactory to Count Buol, as proving that the alterations made here in the ultimatum are likely to be agreeable to Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

His wish to attend to form, obliges Count Buol to insist on keeping the words "Russia shall be invited at the peace to associate herself thereto."

Were these words to be left out he still maintains that Russia might assert that there is an intention of excluding her.

I hope to have the word "civil" added to "political and religious."

No. 50.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Foreign Office, December 14, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

WE have received the amendments sent through Paris, and we agree to them all with the single exception of the one respecting which I wrote to you yesterday, viz., "concerted with the Contracting Powers" instead of the "assent of the guaranteeing Powers." To this change we do not anticipate any objection on the part of the Austrian Government, and we are glad that all difference of opinion is now at an end.

No. 51.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 23.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1855.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, together with the instructions which his Excellency proposed to address to the Internuncio, to enable him to discuss with the Ambassadors of England and France and with the Porte the arrangements that it might be desirable to make for the future government of the Principalities, and for ameliorating the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

Count Buol stated that it was by no means his intention to consider these instructions as definitive, nor did he propose them for the adoption of Her Majesty's Government, but he thought they might furnish the bases of arrangement, and facilitate discussion upon matters the speedy settlement of which was very important.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, and said that I must decline offering any opinion upon a subject which involved so many serious considerations. Some of the suggestions of Count Buol appeared to me of doubtful expediency, while others, I thought, would meet with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Colloredo was not authorized to leave with me a copy of Count Buol's instructions to Baron Prokesch, but he had the goodness to allow me to make an abstract of them, a copy of which I inclose confidentially for your information.

On a future occasion I shall communicate to you the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject, and shall for the present confine myself to observing that it would not be advisable to embody the concluding paragraph in a Treaty or other formal Act. If the proposed hatti-sherif were formally communicated by the Sultan to the four Powers, it would as a matter of course be open to the Representatives of those Powers to complain of any particular violation of the hatti-sherif, as they would of the violation of any law or decree having the force of law; but it would not be consistent with the dignity and independence of the Sultan to confer by Treaty upon the Representatives of foreign Powers the right to remonstrate and to claim reparation.

The establishment of such a right would indeed be tantamount to a concession of the principle contained in the demands of Prince Menchikoff.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Abstract of Instructions to Baron Prokesch.

AS regards the first Guarantee:

In order to secure to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia better prospects for the future, and the progressive development of their resources, and to enable them to pass, without a shock, from their actual legal position to one more in accordance with their true interests, the first step to be taken is the revision of the Organic Statute of 1831.*

This revision, to be effectual, must have for its object not only the modification of such of the stipulations of that Statute as may be considered the constant sources of the evils affecting those countries, but also the complete establishment and organization of a regular and prosperous society. With this view the Austrian Government recommends the following course of proceeding.

The fundamental principles of the proposed reform, after having been discussed and agreed upon between the Powers and the Sublime Porte, with due regard to the real wants and legitimate desires of the country in question, should be promulgated in the Principalities by the authority of the Suzerain Power, and

* The Moldavian Organic Statute was in 1831; the Wallachian, 1840.

under the formal guarantee of Europe. The elaboration of the details would be left to the authorities of the Principalities themselves.

The Austrian memorandum then proceeds to point out what are, in the opinion of the Cabinet of Vienna, the principal abuses arising from, and omissions in, the Organic Statute, with the remedies which they consider should be applied. These points have reference to:

1. *The General and District Assemblies.*

It is proposed to substitute for the General Assemblies, a Senate, whose constitution and functions should be such as to fit it to be the Council of the Princes, the defender of the interests of the people, and the organ of amendments in legislation.

Instead of the Departmental Assemblies there should be established District Committees, with the view of bringing the Government into closer communication with its subjects.

2. *The Mode of Electing the Princes.*

In order to preserve to the Principalities their ancient privilege of electing their Princes, and at the same time to avoid the inconveniences inherent in the present mode of election, it is suggested that the Senate should propose to the Sultan on each vacancy three candidates, from amongst whom the Hospodar should be appointed for life.

3. *Institutions which favour Corruption; for example, the Election of the Metropolitan and the Bishops by the Boyards.*

The remedy for this corruption is to be found, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, in the abolition of such anomalies, the increase of the authority of the Prince and his Ministry, and the exercise by the Senate of control over the Civil and Financial Administration.

4. *Faulty Social Organization.*

The purchase of titles, and the consequent exemption from public imposts, the degradation of the cultivator of the soil, are mentioned under this head, as evils which require a remedy.

5. *The Assessment of the Taxes, and the Arbitrary Collection of them from the Tax-payers.*

The remedies suggested are, the abolition of the capitation tax, and of monopolies of objects of first necessity; the introduction of a land-tax (contribution foncière) applicable to all lands, without exception, in the sense of the Hatti-Sherif of 1802.

6. *The want of good Laws relating to Property.*

Reforms upon this subject are considered by the Austrian Government to be the *sine qud non* of all real improvement.

It is stated that the attempts made in this direction by the Porte and by Russia failed, because the former had not the power to make them succeed, the latter had not the wish that they should do so; and it is added that the cooperation of the European Powers will now afford the Porte the support which she requires.

The result of this revision would be a *fundamental Statute*, of which the Powers might assume the guarantee, with the stipulation that in the event of differences between the Hospodar and the Suzerain, recourse should be had to the guaranteeing Powers, through their Representatives at Constantinople, and that no armed intervention by the Porte, or from any other quarter, should take place without a previous understanding with the guaranteeing Powers.

Lastly, the Austrian Government consider that it would be necessary to reproduce in a Separate Act, between the Powers and the Sublime Porte, the

engagements entered into by the latter at different epochs for the territorial integrity and administrative independence of the Principalities.

In this Act also, would have to be contained the stipulations relative to the system of defence to be established in the interest of the Principalities, of the Ottoman Empire, and of Europe.

With regard to Servia, the Austrian Government consider that various alterations are required in the actual organization of that Principality.

Certain institutions—especially, for example, the Senate, as regards its constitution and functions—require to be examined and modified, with reference to the principle of the national and independent administration of the country, and the maintenance of the other rights guaranteed by the Imperial Hatti-Sherifs.

In the discussion of the fourth point, the Powers will have first to agree as to the measures which they may consider necessary to bring about a real amelioration in the position of the Christians, and afterwards upon the best means of carrying out these measures.

The essential points to be attended to are:

1. The condition of the Christian Churches, especially of the Greek Church.
2. The independence and the constitution of the tribunals.
3. The development of the municipal system, with reference both to the principles already established and the actual wants.
4. Abolition of the principle that the soil belongs entirely to the Sultan.
5. The right of foreigners to possess landed property.
6. Admission of Christians to civil and military offices.
7. Application of the principle of Christians taking their share in the military service of the Sultan.

These measures, after being agreed upon in confidential discussions with the Porte, might be carried out by an Imperial Hatti-Sherif, which should be communicated by the Sultan to the Powers.

If hereafter, in the exercise of the rights thus granted to the Christians, the benevolent intentions of the Sultan should be obstructed from any cause whatever, the official communication of the Hatti-Sherif to the Powers would form the ground upon which the latter might base a demand for a reparation through their Representatives accredited to the Porte.

No. 52.

Amended Ultimatum.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, December 14.**)

Modifications Anglaises.	*Modifications combinées à Vienne sur le texte Anglais.*
Principautés Danubiennes.	*Principautés Danubiennes.*
ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe. La Russie n'exercera ni ne jouira d'aucun droit exclusif ou particulier de protection ou d'ingérence dans les Principautés Danubiennes. Les Principautés conserveront leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, en outre, accordera à ces Principautés ou y con-	Supprimer les mots "ni ne jouira d'."

* For fair copy, see p. 53.

firmera une organisation intérieure satisfaisante, et on fera les arrangements qui, après une mûre considération, seront jugés suffisants afin d'assurer aux dites Principautés la jouissance paisible de cette organisation.

(La suite comme au premier projet Autrichien.)

Danube.

(Comme au premier projet Autrichien.)

Mer Noire.

(A la suite du premier paragraphe.) Aucun arsenal militaire maritime ne sera conservé ni créé.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers d'une force déterminée nécessaires au service de leurs côtes.

Il est bien entendu que la Convention Séparée, à cet effet, préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du Traité Général, sera considérée comme partie intégrante du présent Traité; qu'elle aura, partant, la même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot à mot; et qu'en conséquence elle ne saurait être annulée ni modifiée par la Russie et la Turquie sans l'assentiment de tous les signataires du présent Traité.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnés dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

(Aux deux paragraphes du premier projet Autrichien on substitue le paragraphe suivant :)

Des arrangements seront faits par l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs justes droits civils et politiques, et la Russie sera ensuite invitée à adhérer aux arrangements qui seront ainsi faits.

Après les mots, "organisation intérieure," intercaler: *avec l'assentiment des Puissances garantes.* Et remplacer le mot "satisfaisante" trouvé trop vague, par: *conforme aux vœux et aux besoins des populations.* Supprimer le reste comme superflu et ne présentant pas un sens défini.

Danube.

Mer Noire.

Rédiger ainsi le commencement du paragraphe ci-contre: *La Convention qui sera passée entre elles, à cet effet, sera annexée au Traité Général après avoir été agréée préalablement par les Puissances signataires du dit Traité, et aura même force et valeur, &c.*

A la suite des mots "et qu'en conséquence elle," mettre: *Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.*

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Au lieu "Des arrangements seront, &c.," mettre: *des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, &c.* Et au lieu de "droits civils et politiques," mettre: *droits religieux et politiques.*

L'Empereur d'Autriche consent à l'insertion dans l'ultimatum, à l'Article "Mer Noire," de la déclaration suivante: *La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée, dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes aux droits internationaux et aux usages consacrées dans la matière.*

Principautés Danubiennes.

ABOLITION complète du protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit exclusif ou particulier de protection ou d'ingérence dans les Principautés Danubiennes.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs priviléges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, en outre, accordera à ces Principautés une organisation intérieure, *avec l'assentiment des Puissances garantes, conforme aux vœux et aux besoins des populations.*

D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent réclamé par leur situation géographique: aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est, et aboutirait au lac Salgyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des Riverains, qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve, destinés à assurer l'exécution des règlements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

La Mer Noire sera *neutralisée.* Ouverte à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Aucun arsenal militaire maritime n'y sera conservé ni créé.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes aux droits internationaux et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances riverains s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaires au service de leurs côtes.

La Convention qui sera passée entr'elles, à cet effet, sera annexée au Traité Général après avoir été agréée préalablement par les Puissances signataires du dit Traité, et aura même force et valeur que si elle y était insérée mot-à-mot. *Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.*

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnés dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs justes *droits religieux et politiques*, la Russie sera ensuite invitée à adhérer aux arrangements qui seront ainsi faits.

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

No. 53.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 996. Confidential.)

Therapia, December 2, 1855.

My Lord,

AS I feel strongly the importance of preparing materials for inquiring with good effect into the third and fourth points of the Vienna Conferences, as soon as the parties more immediately concerned are able to meet for that purpose, I have put into the form of a memorandum whatever has occurred to as calculated to throw light upon the question of the Principalities.

It appears evident to my judgment that the advantage of coming to a decision upon that question before the commencement of any negotiations for peace outweighs every other consideration. I am also under a strong impression that, in taking that line, the Sultan and his allies would best consult their real interests by rendering the two Provinces an effective barrier against Russia, and, if the events of the war should not justify them in requiring the return of Bessarabia to its ancient connection with Moldavia, that they would do well to proceed on the narrower ground of amending the present state of things, and securing the free enjoyment of the Danube, without introducing any fundamental changes into the arrangement.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of the paper to which I have referred above: and, while I submit it with hesitation to your Lordship's indulgent attention, I beg to reserve the power of adapting it to any more accurate views which I may hereafter find reason to entertain.

With respect to the question of privileges, I propose to set down my thoughts in writing as soon as I may have leisure for entering seriously on so extensive a task.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Memorandum.

THOUGH we are sure that the war must, sooner or later, come to a close, we cannot yet determine the form which peace, whenever it is concluded, will assume. We may, however, foresee with moral certainty that among its conditions will be the establishment of a new order of things in the Danubian Principalities. That part of the Turkish Empire has too often been made a stepping-stone for Russian encroachment not to require that the causes of its weakness should be examined, and, if possible, removed. The Treaties by which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh acquired or arrogated the right of exercising a dangerous Protectorate in the Principalities are dissolved by the war, and imperfect indeed must be our success if peace be renewed without replacing them by a more salutary arrangement. The allies, in performing that duty, will no doubt seek to provide for the future welfare of the inhabitants, at the same time that they deprive Russia of a powerful instrument of aggression, and strengthen the Turkish frontier on what has been hitherto found its weakest side. The task which Providence appears to have assigned to them is no less benevolent in its objects than arduous in execution. It rests with them to atone for ages of military vexation and misgovernment to a people entitled, on many accounts, to a far better lot than any they have hitherto enjoyed.

It is nevertheless but fair that the European interest, which is involved in the prospects of Moldavia and Wallachia, should be the first to receive attention. If something must be sacrificed, it is better that the Principalities should give way to Europe than that Europe should give way to the Principalities.

But prior to entering either on the political or on the constitutional question affecting them, it is desirable to obtain a clearer view of circumstances which bear more or less directly on both.

The two Provinces, taken together, contain, as is well known, a wide extent

of productive territory, peopled by several millions, who in general profess the same faith and speak the same language, who are influenced by the same traditions, and live under the same institutions.

In geographical position they are situated between the Danube, the Pruth, and the Carpathian Mountains, being conterminous with the Austrian Provinces of Bukovino, Temesvar, and Transylvania. They are divided from each other by the Sereth and a stream which falls into it from the west.

By the Treaty of Bucharest, Bessarabia was detached from Moldavia and added to the Russian Empire. The inhabitants of both are nearly all of the same race, creed, and language. Others of the same description dwell within the Austrian frontier.

The whole population comprised under the name of Rouman may amount to nearly seven millions, of whom from four to five occupy the two Principalities in unequal proportions, about three-fifths of the number belonging to Wallachia.

The chief productions of the country are wheat and other grain, salt, timber, and cattle, including hides and tallow. Of these articles the quantities exported, which are already considerable, might be greatly increased, and manufactures proportionally taken in return. With the exception of salt and timber, Russia is their rival in trade, and Odessa flourishes at their expense. Their great commercial channel with Germany on the one side, and with the Western nations through Constantinople on the other, is by the Danube.

Their political dependence on Turkey dates from an early period. It was formed originally on a capitulation granted to them by the Sovereigns of the Ottoman Empire. The character of the Convention was gradually modified by Treaties which Russia dictated at the close of successive wars to her Mussulman neighbour and victim. Privileges extorted by conquest from a dreaded superior in the name of religion formed naturally a bond of sympathy between the Principalities and their triumphant patron, till bitter experience proved that spoliation, misgovernment, and oppression, under the name of protection, were the only practical results.

The relations, moral and political, in which the two Provinces stand at this moment towards Turkey on the one side, and Russia on the other, may be thus described. The privileges conferred by Treaty remain in virtue of the Porte's declarations, though the Treaties themselves are no longer in force. The Sultan is recognized as Suzerain by Wallachia and Moldavia, integral parts of the Turkish Empire. The Government of both is carried on by the respective Hospodars, who hold their authority from the Porte for an appointed term, and administer the public affairs according to the Organic Statute, and the laws resulting from it, partly by agreement between the two intervening Cabinets, and partly by internal legislation.

There is reason to believe that the system is far from being unacceptable to the leading classes, and that it is susceptible of amendments, which would prove satisfactory to the others, and practically beneficial to the whole community. Its vices, and their evil consequences, are less attributable to the Constitution itself, than to a corrupt and abusive course of administration favoured, if not imposed, by Russia.

Taking the population as divided, with exceptions few and insignificant, between proprietors and labourers; and the proprietory, as classed into Boyars having some weight of family, and mere officials, including the new Boyars, it may be said that the Russian party is confined to those among the Boyars and candidates for office, who have either acquired heretofore, or expect hereafter, power and fortune through Russian patronage. The great majority appear to be animated by national feelings, some of a popular, some of an aristocratic tendency, alive to the dangers of Russian illusion and Russian encroachment, nor by any means disinclined to rely upon Turkish connection, approved and supported by the Powers of Europe. The most decided and pervading sentiments would seem to be aversion to Austria, as being identified in public opinion with the domineering pretensions of Russia unsoftened by historical traditions or by religious sympathies.

Such, in the shape of a brief outline, are the prominent features of a position which, though precarious and imperfect, contains the elements of improvement, whether political or administrative, unmingled with any obstacles of an insuperable kind. Benevolence and fair dealing may be expected to work

out the problem of reconstruction, not without difficulty, but with practical success. The most desirable result may be figured as one which would establish the Principalities in relations of mutual confidence with Turkey, of disconnected independence towards Russia, of frank good neighbourhood with Austria, and of cordial intercourse with England. Added to their securities for a peaceful and gradual advancement in prosperity, the improved Constitution should be such as to establish confidence, together with good order, among the several classes of society. A free command of the Danube, divested of all unjust and unnecessary obstructions, would open a wide and productive field for the exercise of that commercial spirit which so many circumstances concur to encourage in the Principalities, and which tends more than anything else to unfold the resources of a country, and to strengthen the bonds of political sympathy.

In striving to secure this result, the Porte and its cooperating allies will have to deal, in the very outset, with questions of paramount importance. Among the most obvious are the following:

1st. Whether the two Principalities are to remain separate, or to be moulded into one.

2nd. Whether the Prince or Princes are to be selected exclusively among natives.

3rd. Whether the Organic Statute is to be taken as the basis of an improved system, or a new system to be formed.

4th. In either case, how the administrative, judicial, and legislative powers are to be distributed.

5th. By what armed force, of whatever denomination, the internal peace of the country is to be maintained.

6th. What military defences are necessary against foreign aggression, and how they are to be kept up, garrisoned, and supported.

These several points may be examined with most convenience in their numerical order:

1st. The question of throwing the two Principalities into one may be fairly entertained as presenting important considerations on both sides. The present arrangement is best for the Porte, in regard to maintaining her influence. It affords her more room for meeting the wishes of expectant adherents, and for playing off one of them against another when put in possession of power. This advantage would extend, in a measure, to the officials in both communities.

The country would probably gain by having a single Administration; and, in the same sense, an union of the Principalities might give them greater force as a barrier against Russia. But other considerations must be kept in view. A single Government at the head of four or five millions of subjects, inhabiting a rich country, open to an extensive remunerating commerce, would hardly keep long within the bounds assigned by the jealousy of its neighbours. Activity engenders a spirit of independence; and ambition is never long dormant when there is a sufficient arena for its display. The susceptibilities of Austria—the apprehensions of Russia, would be gradually excited: and in due season, making common cause, might defeat the purpose of the alliance, and endanger, by fresh encroachments, the peace of the Levant.

It is not to be supposed that Russia can reach so extreme a point of humiliation as to renounce entirely its long-cherished dream of dominion, and the hope of recovering a lost position by the arts of intrigue and the study of opportunities. Far more likely is it that she would work upon the ambition of a Prince confiding in the resources of his Government, and tempt him to look across the Danube for instruments and materials of further aggrandisement.

If these objections were not deemed sufficient to stand against the reasons for union, it might be as well to give full play to the principle involved in so hazardous an innovation. In that case, let the idea of a barrier be frankly carried out. Let the territorial distribution which existed before the Treaty of Bucharest be restored. Let Bessarabia become once more a part of the adjacent Principalities. The Danube, with its chain of fortresses from the Black Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, would then form the frontier line; the population of Moldavia would obtain a considerable reinforcement of its own race; and the Danube, unshackled by Russian contrivances, would augment the revenue of the new State, at the same time that it conveyed to distant markets the accumulated produce of Germany.

The arrangement thus shadowed out would, perhaps, be preferable to any other, if the allies were successful enough to demand it. In the meantime, a sober exercise of judgment operates in favour of the existing division, as being better calculated, on the whole, to meet the requirements of the case, without giving umbrage to any Power whose goodwill it is important to retain.

2nd. This question turns in part on the selection of the preceding one. If the two Provinces were to be formed into a single State, the Government of a foreign Prince selected from the Sovereign houses in Europe might have its advantages. The selection, however, would not be free from difficulty. Pretensions hard to set aside, and hard to accept, would infallibly be advanced. If the profession of orthodoxy were required, where but in Russia could the "right man" be found? On the whole, there appears to be no sufficient reason for departing from the established practice. The Hospodars sent from Constantinople before the Greek Revolution have left no reminiscences to make their return desired. Intrigue, cupidity, corruption, and perfidy, were but often the characteristics of their Government. It requires no sagacity to perceive that their return to power would be viewed with alarm and disgust. The native families offer few individuals worthy of the trust, but national feelings are enlisted in favour of national choice, and the recurrence to strangers would no doubt be a cause of discontent.

3rd. The Organic Statute is by no means destitute of merit. But it bears the stamp of its Russian origin, and is not efficient either for the correction of abuses or for the repression of corrupt and arbitrary power. These circumstances would seem to indicate the proper course of proceeding. Let the Organic Statute cease to have legal force after a given term, and let a new Constitution be prepared in its place, emanating from the supreme authority with the aid and advice of its allies, taking the original Capitulation for its starting point, and receiving with amendments such portions of the Organic Statute as can be fairly approved by the parties concerned. In this manner, whatever is vicious in the principle of practice of the present organization would be extirpated, and the administration of the Principalities would be established for the future on a sound basis, equitable alike for the Sultan and for his tributary dependents.

4th. The questions comprised in the fourth point must of necessity be reserved for those special discussions which will naturally accompany the formation of a new constituent Act. It will hardly be prudent to exclude the suggestions of those who have local experience and loyalty of character to recommend them. The best meant decisions, having for their object the establishment of a just, beneficent, and stable system of administration, would ever be the stronger for carrying with them a willing obedience formed on the judgment of leading minds in the Principalities themselves. But however that may be, there are landmarks which cannot with safety or prudence be overlooked. Such, for instance, are, fidelity to the Sultan, as sovereign and supreme; free action for the Prince, and authority made effective by suitable powers and adequate means; a legislation founded on national habits and wants, and calculated to provide by its enactments for the rights and welfare of all classes; competent and independent courts of justice; efficient legislative control over the taxation and revenue of the State; responsibility of Ministers; religious tolerance, with reverential maintenance of divine worship; individual freedom, and security under law; a vigilant and sufficient police under Ministerial direction.

Any Constitution, however named, which ensures a real application of these principles, can hardly fail of giving stability to the Government and contentment to the nation. The prospect of this twofold result would at once deprive every neighbouring Power both of pretext and motive for unseasonable interference, and even any jealous anxiety.

5th. There is little to be submitted on the fifth point, which is rather a question of detail than principle. No one can doubt the necessity of providing for the maintenance of good order by some kind of armed force, in action or in reserve. Constables, watchmen, patrols, gendarmes, policemen, guards, whether rural or municipal, are only different names for a civil force auxiliary to the magistrate and answerable for the public peace. A militia is more; it may be used in aid of the police. Between that body and a standing army it occupies the middle station. This kind of force, which is already employed in both

Principalities, might be continued, on a moderate scale, with advantage. At all events due provision should be made for an adequate police in every town and district, the whole affiliated together and placed in connection with a central corps at each capital. In an age of steam locomotion and electric communication, the instruments of order, though separated by distance, may be so prepared for concentration, in case of need, as to secure the peace of society at little cost and with still less parade.

6th. Opinions can hardly settle down on this point before it be known what character will in future belong to the ultra-Danubian Provinces. Continuing as hitherto, for some time back, to be merely a delay or battle-ground in case of foreign attack, they stand in little need either of armies or of fortresses. It is only on the supposition of a different system, following upon an administrative union of the two Principalities, together, if possible, with the recovery of Bessarabia, that a plan of local military defence may be brought consistently into discussion. In view of such a contingency the existing defences of the Dniester would require a standing military force in the Principality to provide garrisons, and to support them in resisting the first shock of invasion. The limited revenues of the State, and also the Supreme Government, would correct any tendency to excess in the formation of a local army. Local it would be, of course, in time of peace, when no Turkish troops would be stationed in the country. In the event of war there would be every motive for keeping it on foot, as auxiliary to the Sultan's army, which no doubt would have to advance towards the frontier. Should circumstances lead to the adoption of any such plan, it would be highly desirable that two at least of the principal fortresses on the Dniester should be garrisoned from Constantinople, and kept always open (by water, at least) for the admission of reinforcements from the same quarter.

In addition to this view of the subject, as a whole, there are some detached questions which claim a separate notice:—

In what manner is the Danube to be secured from obstruction?

Is the passage of the river to be still impeded by an idle chain of quarantine stations?

Is all protection of the two provinces to cease with that of Russia?

Is the amount of tribute to remain unaltered?

Is no provisional arrangement required for a better administration of the Provinces while waiting for a definitive settlement?

There cannot be two opinions as to the importance of thoroughly emancipating the Danube. More interests than those of Turkey and its dependencies are involved in that act of justice. But solemn engagements having failed to counteract the machinations of an ambitious policy, it would seem that a new territorial allotment can alone supply the requisite guarantees. Every one knows what difficulties and dangers beset the channels of Sulina and St. George. The Russian authorities were bound to keep the former clear; they often pretended to do so, but somehow it happened that the obstructions remained to the prejudice of all navigation except that of Russia. The Kilia channel is still in her hands.

Not only was the course of trade by the Danube impeded, but a large tract of country along the right bank of that river was condemned to be a barren solitude that Russia might not be disturbed in the enjoyment of her monopoly. Moreover, the arrangement was wrung from Turkey by force, unjustly exerted against that country in virtue of hostilities which had their source in Russian artifice. So had Bessarabia been previously annexed to the colossal Empire. In one case, the alliance of England with France, in the other, a deadly quarrel between those countries, afforded the opportunity which Russia seized with clandestine address.

How stands the matter now? Victim and dupes are alike engaged in rescuing Europe from the snares of a policy no less aggressive than insidious. As common danger gives union to their arms, a common interest ought surely to animate their negotiation. Success in war is a flourish without meaning, if peace be not made to yield the securities which justice requires. The securities now in view are as obvious as the need of them. Take them at their lowest; Russia must recede from the left as Turkey was forced at Adrianople to recede from the right bank of the Danube. Then will the waters of that noble river become, as they ought to be, truly European, and past compliances will receive an exemplary, though imperfect and tardy, atonement.

It may further be hoped that the quarantine stations imposed by Russia will disappear with the colours of that Power from the banks of the Danube. Serious doubts may be entertained whether any real advantage accrues from sanitary frontier establishments. Plague has ceased to infest the Levant, and cholera is rather epidemical than contagious. But granting their abstract use elsewhere, they are too irregular in practice throughout Turkey to secure any effective result. The stations may answer as instruments of police; they may offer lucrative places to candidates for public employment,—that is all: and those along the Danube were founded by Russia for political purposes. They cannot but operate unfavourably on trade, occasioning expense to the State and vexation to travellers.

With respect to replacing the Russian protectorate by that of any other European Power, neither the Sultan, nor his allies, nor even the inhabitants of the Principalities, are likely to desire it. Russia herself never acquired a legitimate title to the function. All who take an interest in the welfare of the Provinces would recognize in a constituent Act, emanating from the Sultan and seconded by his allies, the best and most convenient security as well for the sovereign as for the dependent population.

So long as the Principalities retain liability to tribute, circumstances may occur to raise the question of altering its amount. The great change which is now in operation, already threatens to bring it on. The Porte has, no doubt, its arguments in favour of an increase. The Principalities would probably be glad to throw off the burthen altogether. The amount at present is light, but as the Porte has no share in the expenses of administration, it may be asked on what ground she is entitled to any part of the revenue? But as she has a commanding voice in the question of improvements, it would not perhaps be wise to cast a doubt upon her claim to tribute, especially as the charge of defensive operations, in case of invasion, would principally devolve upon her.

If the ideas thus brought together for reflection are sound in themselves and at all likely to be realized, the parties whom they immediately concern will have to consider at what period the settlement they relate to, may be most advantageously fixed. The Organic Statute, irrespective of passing events, will soon reach the term at which it may either expire or be revised. Then will arise the question of provisional or definite arrangement. Important, perhaps insurmountable, objections will be offered to the latter course. To some, it may appear that the time for a settled and final constitution is not yet come. Opinions as well as events may be thought likely to prove more conducive to a complete and durable settlement hereafter. A delay of some few years may be looked to as promising a better race of legislators and functionaries in the provinces. Much certainly depends upon the character of our future pacification.

These and similar considerations are not to be lightly thrown aside. But how are they to be reconciled with the urgency of completing a final arrangement, while Russian influence is necessarily excluded from the deliberations?

How can the Provinces be kept indefinitely under a doubtful and provisional Administration without prejudice to their best interests?

Risk and inconvenience attach to both contingencies. It remains with the Sultan and his allies to determine in which of the two cases they are likely to be least.

The following appears to be the result of the recommendations in this memorandum:

1. It is desirable to maintain the existing division of the Principalities.

2. It is, on the whole, desirable to continue the existing practice of selecting the Hospodars from among the natives of the Provinces.

3. It is desirable that the Organic Statute should be replaced by a new Constitution emanating from the supreme authority, with the aid and advice of the allies, but based on the original Capitulations between the Provinces and the Porte, and comprising such portions of the Organic Statute as, after amendment, can be fairly approved by the parties concerned.

4. In providing for the administrative, judicial, and legislative powers, regard must be had to securing fidelity to the Sultan, as Sovereign and supreme; free action for the Prince, and authority made effective by suitable powers and

adequate means; a legislation founded on national habits and wants, and calculated to provide by its enactments for the rights and welfare of all classes; competent and independent courts of justice; efficient legislative control over the taxation and revenue of the State; responsibility of Ministers; religious toleration, with reverential maintenance of divine worship; individual freedom and security under law; and a vigilant and sufficient police under Ministerial direction.

5. It would be desirable to continue, on a moderate scale, the military force at present employed in both Principalities; but, at all events, provision should be made for an adequate police in every town and district, in connection with a central corps in each capital.

6. In the event of the union of Bessarabia, the defence of the Dniester would require a standing military force (not Turkish), which, in time of war, would be auxiliary to the Sultan's forces; and it would be desirable that two, at least, of the principal fortresses on the Dniester should be garrisoned from Constantinople, and kept always open (by water, at least) for the admission of reinforcements.

Russia should be made to recede from the left bank of the Danube.

Quarantine stations imposed by Russia should disappear.

The Russian Protectorate should not be replaced by that of any other European Power; but in lieu of it, there should be a constituent Act emanating from the Sultan, and seconded by the allies, which would afford the best and most convenient security for the Sovereign and for the people.

It would not be desirable to call in question the Porte's claim to receive tribute from the Provinces.

It is a question for consideration whether the changes should be formally settled at once, or only provisionally adopted.

No. 54.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1,607.) *Paris, December 13, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI having read me a despatch which he had written to M. de Persigny, and in which his Excellency states that he has never ceased pressing Her Majesty's Government to give up the amendments which they had proposed in the Austrian ultimatum, if Austria objected to adopting them, I observed that if I left this passage uncontradicted I should expose myself to the accusation of having led Her Majesty's Government into error, for that, in writing to your Lordship from Compiègne, I had distinctly stated that the French Government had agreed to a reference to London and Paris in case Count Buol continued to prefer his own wording to that of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Walewski replied, that he had understood me to say that I would not undertake the responsibility of forwarding the messenger to Vienna unless a reference to Her Majesty's Government was secured; but that that did not bind him to suspend his efforts to obtain a more favourable view of the question from Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 55.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 18.) *Vienna, December 12, 1855.*

My Lord,

UPON receiving yesterday your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, marked No. 7, I at once proceeded to the house of the French Minister and secured his cooperation in endeavouring to obtain Count Buol's acceptance of the amendments proposed by your Lordship in the Austrian ultimatum.

I then waited upon Count Buol and read to him your Lordship's despatch, together with the amendments.

As had been agreed upon, I was soon rejoined by the Baron de Bourqueney, whose promises of assistance were much more than redeemed by the ready and indefatigable manner in which he came to my support in proposing the suppression of passages of an act, drawn up by himself, and the substitution of others, to which he felt obliged to acknowledge some verbal objections.

Count Buol made comparatively little difficulty as to admitting the first three corrections of the ultimatum; but when we reached the passage proposing that arrangements should be made by Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Porte, "afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs justes droits civils et politiques, et la Russie sera ensuite invitée à adhérer aux arrangements qui seront ainsi faits," he laid down the paper and observed, that it was quite impossible that Austria should make herself a party to an intimation so unnecessarily insulting to Russia.

Baron de Bourqueney, after observing that "justes droits" was an expression which in his eagerness to adhere to a correct "rédaction" he could never support, made, with infinite judgment and temper, various suggestions, all of which the Minister for Foreign Affairs listened to with attention, and with the most manifest desire of rendering the sense and text of the passage conformable to the views of Her Majesty's Government.

After a lengthened deliberation, in the course of which Count Buol expressed a doubt whether the intention of Her Majesty's Government might not possibly be to shut the door against negotiation, and to ensure the immediate and positive rejection of the ultimatum by Russia, this suspicion was successfully combated, and it was finally agreed that your Lordship's despatch and inclosure, together with memoranda of amendments drawn up so as to adhere as closely as possible to the English version, should remain in Count Buol's hands and be taken at once into consideration.

By this time it was past 4 o'clock, and Count Buol took leave of us, requesting that we should call upon him again five hours later, before which time, besides reflecting upon the course to be followed, he should have had an opportunity of submitting the questions pending to the Emperor, whose return to Vienna might be looked for in a couple of hours.

Upon leaving the Imperial Chancellerie, I hastened to send off a telegraphic message to acquaint your Lordship with the very manifest wish exhibited by the Austrian Minister to comply with the wishes of the Queen's Government.

In the course of a long diplomatic life, I have never felt greater anxiety than has been pressing upon me for some hours and days.

For above a twelvemonth I have entertained this belief, I might say the conviction, that the neutral position of Austria must, in the long run, become intolerable to her, and that she would ultimately escape from it by an abrupt determination to act, probably against, but possibly with, her northern ally.

This point has been reached; Austria has taken a decision which, if acted upon, must, it appears to me, embroil her irretrievably with Russia; but the same desire to cut through difficulties which appear not to admit of solution, may, if the present plan be not acted upon, very possibly compel her to try some course in which no attention would be paid to the interests and wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

She is prepared, I firmly believe, to break, if needs must, with Russia, but the resolution of permitting the rupture to be attended with forms which would be offensive to her old ally would, it is clear, be most painful to her.

The sum, then appears to be, that if there is danger in neglecting any precaution which may ensure the carrying out of that policy which Austria is apparently resolved upon adopting, there is, at least, equal danger in exposing ourselves to the chance of her being driven to some other course of action.

Intent as there is reason to believe both Austria and France to be upon peace, if the caution of England should prove an obstacle, there might be danger of the two Governments endeavouring to carry out their object with the assistance of that Power which has suffered the most severely from the war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 56.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 19.)

Vienna, December 12, 1855.

My Lord,

LAST night, Baron de Bourqueney and myself resumed our conversation with Count Buol.

I am willing to believe that the result will be considered by your Lordship as satisfactory, as the alterations in the amendments of Her Majesty's Government, which were insisted upon by Count Buol, are less considerable than I had expected.

These alterations (translated into English) were at once transmitted to your Lordship by telegraph. I have now the honour of inclosing them as they were written out by Count Buol.

Some of the objections raised to our text were made upon the grounds of style; "très satisfaisante," although allowed to stand, was considered as an incorrect translation of "satisfactory;" whilst "ne jouira" was suppressed as a neuter verb which could not properly be coupled with "exercera," and "justes," as an epithet which cannot in French be applied to "droits."

The difficulties in our way, then, are, as regards the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a great measure surmounted.

It remains to be seen whether his Excellency's proposed alterations will receive the Emperor's sanction.

This I may possibly learn to-day from His Imperial Majesty himself, to whom I am about to have the honour of presenting my letters of credence.

I ought to observe to your Lordship, that when I quitted Count Buol last night, he appeared to be as much averse as ever to making any allusion in his ultimatum, either to the Aland Islands, the right of sending Consuls to the ports of the Black Sea, or the consideration of the Russian territories to the east of that Sea, and that, as before, he pointed out the full reserve which had been made in his own ultimatum for that and any other demands which the Powers at war with Russia may think fit to make upon her.

I should likewise remark upon the great stress laid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon being apprised whether Her Majesty's Government adhere to the arrangements made by himself and Baron Bourqueney, and recorded in the paper dated the 14th November, to which their initials ("paraphé") were affixed.

To this point Count Buol attaches great importance, as he regards that document as "the basis" of the present proceedings.

Desirous, however, as his Excellency is of being informed upon this point, he has full confidence in Her Majesty's Government, and is ready to receive an answer to his inquiry in any shape which Her Majesty's Government may consider the most convenient.

I ought to state to your Lordship that Prince Gortchakoff called yesterday upon Count Buol, for the purpose of inquiring whether any step had been taken upon his overture.

Count Buol informed him that it had been brought to the knowledge of the Emperor, and had been mentioned to the English and French Ministers, when the conversation closed without any questions being asked by the Russian Envoy as to the negotiations of which so many persons suspect the existence.

He only asked what day was fixed for Count V. Esterhazy's departure for St. Petersburgh, and was told in reply that no decision was yet taken upon this point, and that Count Esterhazy's mother was suffering from illness.

I ought, before concluding my despatch, to state to your Lordship my belief and conviction that the alterations in the ultimatum now proposed are, after the concessions made by Count Buol, to be simply accepted or refused. I have every reason to imagine that no further corrections would be admitted by the Austrian Cabinet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Alterations in the Amendments of Her Majesty's Government, proposed by Count Buol.

2nd paragraph:—

"La Russie n'exercera aucun droit exclusif" ("ne jouira" is omitted for grammatical reasons).

3rd paragraph:—

After the word "satisfaisantes," "avec l'assentiment des Puissances garantes, eu égard aux vœux des populations."

4th point:—

La rédaction proposée par le Cabinet Anglais acceptée dans les termes suivants:

"Des arrangements étant pris par l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits civils et politiques;

"La Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer."

No. 57.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord.

Vienna, December 12, 1855.

I HAD the honour this morning of presenting my credentials to the Emperor, by whom I was most graciously received.

His Imperial Majesty spoke much of his attachment and respect for the Queen, and of his desire that, in the interests of Austria as of England, the relations of the two countries should become of the most friendly nature.

The Emperor proceeded to speak with the greatest openness of the war and of the state of Russia.

His Majesty was, he said, very desirous of peace, but a good and solid peace, one which would secure Europe from further attempts on the part of Russia.

It was a consolation to him to reflect that the present crisis had been inevitable. It was clear that, at some time or other, it must have been traversed. When once surmounted, the state of Europe would be more secure than it had been for years past. He had said that he was sincerely desirous of peace, but could not bring himself to believe that there was any chance of his ultimatum being accepted by Russia.

The Emperor having spoken of the high estimation which the Russians form of themselves, and of their indifferent opinion of other nations, I took the liberty of remarking that true as this was in general, it was more especially true with regard to the opinion prevailing in Russia as to the military power of other countries; of Germany, I might say of Austria; that of all the military men I had known at St. Petersburgh, General de Berg and General Rüdiger were the only ones who did justice to His Imperial Majesty's forces.

The Emperor was surprised to learn that even General Rüdiger was exempt from the common feeling, but hoped that whenever the time of trial should arrive, it would be seen how false an estimate of the value of the Austrian army was taken in Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 58.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 13, 1855.*

I AM so desirous of taking every precaution against delay and misapprehension that I do not hesitate to dispatch an extra messenger with the text of the Austrian ultimatum as it exists after the introduction of your Lordship's amendments and the changes subsequently introduced into it, first by Count Buol and then by the Emperor of Austria.

The inclosed copy will, I venture to hope, bear out the opinion which I expressed to your Lordship as to the alterations not being of a nature to affect the sense of the document as corrected by Her Majesty's Government.

Count Buol repeatedly observed that it was rather the question of form than of "fond," to which it was the wish of His Imperial Master that attention should be paid, and as regards his Excellency great anxiety was shown to depart as little as possible from the text received from London.

Your Lordship will find that clear allusion is made in the ultimatum, as it now stands, to the admission of Consuls into the ports of the Black Sea, but the objections of the Austrian Chancellerie to any mention of the Aland Islands, or of the consideration to be bestowed upon the state of the countries to the east of the Black Sea, remain insurmountable.

Both his Excellency and M. de Bourqueney continue to maintain the entire right reserved to England and France to bring forward these points as soon as negotiations are opened—these or any others which a continuance of the war may render expedient.

They likewise argue that a distinct mention of these two points might have the effect of closing the door against any further sacrifices which it may be found necessary to impose upon Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Amended Draft of Austrian Ultimatum.

Principautés Danubiennes.

ABOLITION complète du protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan accordera en outre à ces Principautés, ou y confirmera, une organisation intérieure conforme aux vœux et aux besoins des populations.

D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent, réclamé par leur situation géographique; aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est et aboutirait au lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes, dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront

également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve, destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée.

Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Par conséquent il n'y sera créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires maritimes.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée, dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet sera annexée au Traité Général après avoir été préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du dit Traité et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante.

Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnée dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer.

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

No. 59.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 13, 1855.*

AT our meeting with Count Buol yesterday, he read to Baron de Bourqueney and myself the despatch of instructions which he purposes to place in Count Esterhazy's hands upon his leaving Vienna for St. Petersburgh.

The paper struck me as being very ably written, and as good in substance as in style.

Count Buol's language, which, in fact, is addressed to the Russian Cabinet, is conciliatory, but perfectly firm; an earnest hope is expressed that peace may be restored by the willingness of the Emperor Alexander to avail himself of the opening now made; entire confidence is expressed in the moderation of the Western Powers, but, at the same time, the amplest reserves are made for the demands sketched out in the memorandum which these Powers may feel called upon to bring forward.

A copy of this paper when once placed in Count Esterhazy's hands will be communicated to your Lordship by the Austrian Mission in London, and which wil enable your Lordship to judge of the correctness of the statement which I had the honour of making some days ago as to the course to be prescribed to the bearer of the ultimatum.

It will be seen that the whole responsibility of the overture is assumed by the Austrian Government, and that while they express their hope that it will be accepted they expressly charge their Minister not to accept any modification or to entertain any counter-proposition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 60.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 16, 10·40 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 15, 1855.

I HAVE received your message of yesterday and the day before.

Count Buol assents readily to the changes you propose.

The Emperor returns here this evening, and will, in all probability, approve his Excellency's consent.

In this case, it is likely that Count Esterhazy will set off to-morrow.

I will send a second message this evening.

No. 61.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 16, 11·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 15, 1855.

THE Emperor has at once adopted your amendments.

Count Esterhazy, and the courier for Berlin and Munich, will set off to-morrow.

No. 62.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 17, 10·30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 16, 1855.

COUNT BUOL is very desirous that nine or ten days should be allowed to pass before anything is made known as to the possibility or probability of the withdrawal of the Austrian Mission from St. Petersburgh.

No. 63.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government will make nothing known, but they cannot be responsible for what may appear in newspapers.

No. 64.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1855.

SEND home immediately exact copies of the memorandum and ultimatum as finally settled and dispatched.

No. 65.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1,619.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 16, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1,597 of the 10th instant, and to your Lordship's No. 1,445 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to state that Count Walewski informed the Saxon Minister, this morning, that the French and English Governments did not consider the proposition which he had made to them on the part of the Russian Government to contain matter on which negotiations for peace could be renewed. Count Walewski added that the Russian Government would be, in a few days, in possession of the terms on which the allies would be willing to treat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 66.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1,622.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 16, 1855.

M. DE HUBNER has made a communication to Count Walewski, respecting the reduction that is being effected in the Austrian army. According to the assurance given by the Austrian Minister, none of the measures now taken will prevent that army being in an efficient state in the spring, should circumstances require it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 67.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1,623.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 16, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI has requested me to state to your Lordship that he is of opinion that the allied Governments should take immediate steps for supporting Austria in the demonstration which she is about to make at Berlin with reference to the ultimatum which she has sent to St. Petersburgh. He considers that the only chance of obtaining the consent of Russia to the ultimatum will be, if Prussia and Germany exercise pressure upon her, and that every effort should be made to induce both the one and the other to recommend the immediate acceptance by the Czar of the terms now offered to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 68.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 271.)

Foreign Office, December 18, 1855.

My Lord,

IN inclosing to your Lordship a copy of the ultimatum as finally adopted by Austria, and with reference to the invitation sent by the Cabinet of Vienna to the Prussian Government to support at St. Petersburgh the terms proposed to Russia, I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government will comply with the request.

England and France have given a fresh proof of their moderation in consenting to make peace upon these bases. Faithful to the principle of the engagements which they contracted with each other at the commencement of the war, they seek no advantage for themselves, and they require only guarantees for the future peace of Europe—guarantees which Germany is even more interested in obtaining than England and France; and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt, therefore, that Baron Manteuffel will see the expediency of supporting the ultimatum in the interests of peace, for which the Prussian Government has always shown itself so solicitous, and, it may be added, in the interests of Russia also; for that Power will assuredly not again have the opportunity of accepting terms so little onerous if the war continues, and the costs and sacrifices of another campaign are imposed upon the allies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 69.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 1,007.)

Therapia, December 4, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received a note, in appearance a private one, from Baron Köller, informing me that he is authorized to assist at any deliberations which may take place on the fourth point between the Turkish Ministers, the French Ambassador, and myself, before the arrival of Baron Prokesch, who is expected to arrive in ten days or a fortnight.

M. Thouvenel has apprised me in the same form of his having received instructions to confer with the Porte, the Austrian Legation, and myself, on the same question.

I asked Fuad Pasha yesterday whether he had received any proposal to admit the Austrian Minister into the discussions which were to take place here on the first and fourth points, and how the Porte was inclined in that respect. It did not appear from his answer that anything of a distinct character had passed between himself and the French or Austrian Representative, and I was given to understand that the Porte would rather avoid the interference of Austria, though less on the fourth than on the first point; prepared, however, at the same time, to move in concert with the Alliance.

I augur no good from the participation of Austria in discussions regarding the privileges of any dependent race.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 70.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, December 19, 1855.

THE Austrian Minister has forwarded to the King of Prussia, through Baron Manteuffel, a letter from his Sovereign, inclosing copy of the ultimatum. He is to have an audience of His Prussian Majesty to-morrow.

No. 71.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir J. Milbanke.

(No. 78.)

Foreign Office, December 20, 1855.

Sir,

THE Austrian Government has invited the Prussian Government to urge upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the adoption of the ultimatum which they have addressed to Russia; and I inclose to you the copy of a despatch* to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, instructing him to support the request of the Austrian Government.

Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe that a similar request has been made by Austria to the Bavarian Government; and should such be the case, you will govern yourself by the language of my despatch to Lord Bloomfield in making a similar communication to M. von der Pfordten.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 72.

Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives abroad.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 20, 1855.

I TAKE the earliest opportunity to acquaint you with the result of the communications which have recently taken place between Her Majesty's Government and those of France and Austria respecting a proposition to be made by the last-named Power to the Court of St. Petersburgh, which if accepted in sincerity and acted upon in good faith, may possibly lead to the re-establishment of peace.

The communications between the three Courts which have led to this state of things originated in an overture made some time back by Count Buol to Baron Bourqueney, then on the point of leaving Vienna for Paris, which indicated a disposition on the part of Austria to adopt a more decided course of policy towards Russia than she had hitherto pursued; and the subject having been renewed on Baron Bourqueney's return to Vienna, an offer was made to send to St. Petersburgh a proposition in the shape of an ultimatum, the rejection of which by Russia, or its non-acceptance within a specified time, would be followed by the immediate interruption of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia. This proposal was embodied in a memorandum which bears date the 14th of November, and to which Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney respectively affixed their initials. I inclose a copy of this memorandum for your information.†

To this memorandum was appended the draft of the ultimatum which the Austrian Government was prepared to address to that of Russia.

The terms in which that ultimatum should be framed have formed the subject of serious deliberation and well-weighed discussion between the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna: and the further paper which I now inclose will fully explain the nature of the terms upon which the three Governments have agreed as bases of negotiation for peace.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt, by a telegraphic message from Sir Hamilton Seymour, that Count V. Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at the Court of Russia, would leave Vienna for St. Petersburgh, as the bearer of the ultimatum, on the 16th instant. By a previous despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, Her Majesty's Government were informed that Count Esterhazy is instructed, in the event of the ultimatum being at once rejected by the Court of Russia, to leave St. Petersburgh directly, with the whole of his Mission. But if no immediate answer is returned by the Russian Government, Count Esterhazy is directed, on the expiration of ten days from the delivery of the ultimatum, to state to the Russian Minister that unless a favourable answer is returned before

* No. 68. † Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

the expiration of a further term of nine days, he must demand passports for himself and the whole of the Austrian Mission.

You will observe by the last clause of the ultimatum, that the right is reserved to the belligerent Powers of bringing forward in the general interest of Europe other conditions over and above those specified in the ultimatum. Her Majesty's Government would have much preferred that those conditions should have been specified in the ultimatum itself, but they felt that they had no right to press upon Austria the conditions on which the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia should depend.

The Austrian Government, however, has been made aware that the following are among the conditions which the belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right of proposing, beyond those contained in the ultimatum, namely, that no fortifications shall be restored or erected in the Aland Islands; that Consuls shall be admitted to reside at the Russian ports of the Black Sea; and that the future position of the territories on the east of the Black Sea shall be open to consideration; and Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been directed to acquaint the Austrian Government that Her Majesty's Government trust that Austria will see the propriety of making these terms known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, as Her Majesty's Government consider that it would be far better not to enter upon negotiations at all, than that such negotiations should be broken off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated and that the real intentions of the belligerent Powers had been kept from her knowledge.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the course adopted by the Governments of England and France at this juncture is well calculated either to bring about the reestablishment of peace on terms honourable to the belligerent Powers, and advantageous to the general interests of Europe, or to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not yet prepared to listen to such reasonable terms of accommodation as will afford security to Europe against renewed attempts of aggrandizement on her part.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 73.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December .)

(No. 1,636. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 20, 1855.

M. DE SEEBACH, the Saxon Minister, has left Paris suddenly. Various reports have been in circulation both before and since his departure, the most accredited being that he was gone to St. Petersburgh, with the intention of explaining the state of affairs here, and the conditions on which peace might be made.

I asked Count Walewski this afternoon whether he had been made aware of M. de Seebach's departure, and whether he could furnish any explanation of it. My question appeared to embarrass him. He said that he knew no more than that he had given to M. de Seebach the answer in regard to the propositions which the latter had thrown out on the part of Russia in the words which he had already stated to me, and which I communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 1,619 of the 16th instant; that a conversation had ensued between them afterwards (in which I cannot help thinking, from circumstances which have come to my knowledge, the late proceedings at Vienna must have been communicated to the Saxon Minister); that M. de Seebach came to him yesterday morning and told him that he had telegraphed that answer to St. Petersburgh, and that he was about to set out for Dresden, having offered to continue his journey to St. Petersburgh, if by so doing he could render any further service to Russia.

I observed to Count Walewski that I had heard from other quarters that M. de Seebach had openly stated that he was going at once to St. Petersburgh.

Count Walewski replied that he had faithfully repeated to me what had passed between himself and the Saxon Minister, and that he must request that I would consider the communication to be strictly confidential.

I must add, that a person who is much in M. de Seebach's confidence has told me that that gentleman is exceedingly anxious that Russia should accept the terms offered by the allies (a proof, by the way, that he knows them), and that his object in going to St. Petersburgh is to exhort Count Nesselrode to agree to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 74.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December* 17, 1855.

I DID not mention to Count Buol the amendment in the Austrian ultimatum suggested by your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 13th December, because at that time I did not know whether some changes in the wording desired by the Emperor might not be demanded by Her Majesty's Government.

This not being the case, as was proved by your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 14th instant, I at once waited upon Count Buol and explained to him that we were now quite agreed, if, as I presumed, he had no objection to substituting the words "concerted with the Contracting Powers," for those of "the assent of the Guaranteeing Powers."

Not the slightest difficulty having been made by Count Buol, your Lordship's amendment was admitted as far as it could be without the Imperial sanction, which his Excellency felt certain of receiving the same evening upon the Emperor's return from a shooting party.

Upon this result being obtained, I sent off to your Lordship the telegraphic message of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy.

Before I took leave, Count V. Esterhazy, who had been summoned, had arrived at the Foreign Office, that he might receive orders as to making his final preparations for his departure for St. Petersburgh.

Again, I would take the liberty of calling your Lordship's attention to the instructions which will be placed in the hands of the Minister.

I learn, with surprise, from Paris, that the dispatch of Count Esterhazy is viewed by many as a certain sign of approaching peace. That the step now taken by the Austrian Cabinet may conduct ultimately to peace is very probable, and for that reason I regret that it was not resorted to months ago; but as to immediate results, these, unless I am much mistaken, are much more likely to be the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia.

In the same way, although I will not shut my eyes to the reluctance which would be felt by Austria in becoming a party to the war, I cannot bring myself to the belief of her present course having been taken in bad faith.

It is easy to see, from the speculations of the newspapers, that some persons surmise that the step about to be taken by Austria has been concerted with the Russian Cabinet.

This suspicion I cannot share; and to believe that Russia is a party to a proposal, the effect of which would be to strip her of the half of Bessarabia, appears to me to allow mistrust to get the better of cool judgment.

It is, however, of little use to speculate upon a point which is about to be submitted to a decisive proof.

I am obliged indeed to infer that Russia is still unprepared for the sacrifices about to be demanded of her; Prince Gortchakoff's language with regard to the proposal lately made by him to Count Buol being, that it has been a great embarrassment to the parties who were negotiating at Vienna ("un bâton qu'il leur avait jeté dans les roues").

The embarrassment was unperceived, and the supposed impediment did not prevent Count V. Esterhazy's departure on the night of the 16th instant.

To return to my narrative: on the evening of the 15th, Count Buol having signified to me the Emperor's approbation of the last amendment proposed by Her Majesty's Government, the first was communicated to your Lordship in the telegraphic message of which I beg to inclose a copy.

Count Esterhazy, not being in strong health, has obtained leave to stop twice on the road, and will probably reach St. Petersburgh on the 24th instant.

There is one point respecting his instructions which, probably on account of a misapprehension on my part, requires to be made clear.

Count Esterhazy will present his proposals as soon as he reaches, but will add nothing in the shape of threat as respects non-compliance with them.

He will wait ten days, and only at the expiration of that term signify that he will be obliged to quit St. Petersburgh in ten days in the event of their not being accepted.

The delay was resolved upon in the hope that in that interval letters may be received from Berlin and Munich which will produce a favourable impression upon the mind of the Emperor Alexander.

In conclusion, and to prevent the possibility of misapprehension, I beg to remark that the phrase in the Austrian ultimatum, as amended according to the last suggestion of Her Majesty's Government, stands thus:—

"Le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera en outre à ces Principautés, ou y confirmera, une organisation intérieure conforme aux vœux et aux besoins des populations."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon (Telegraphic), December 15, 1855.

[See No. 60.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon (Telegraphic), December 16, 1855.

[See No. 61.]

No. 75.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 21, 1855.*

AT his audience yesterday, the Austrian Minister received vague assurances from the King of Prussia that he would support the ultimatum at St. Petersburgh, but must wait to hear from London and Paris.

According to instruction, the Austrian Minister was silent respecting the intended rupture of diplomatic relations in event of Russia's rejection of the ultimatum.

No. 76.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 17, 1855.*

I UNDERSTAND that a circular despatch has been addressed by the Imperial Government to their diplomatic servants, the object of which is to counteract the effect of the statements which have gone abroad as to the reductions in the Austrian army.

The circular, if I am correctly informed, sets forth that the extent of these reductions has been greatly exaggerated; that they have borne, not upon the very considerable force already under arms, but upon the extraordinary additions made thereto; that such arrangements have been made as would enable the extraordinary force to be brought back to its highest standard in the course of a very few weeks; that the very measure of economy resorted to, had for its object the means of giving more efficiency to the resources of the State, and that the army is in the highest state of efficiency.

Upon this latter point I received some naturally partial but satisfactory evidence from an English officer who had passed through several Austrian garrison towns on his way from Turkey.

He had found large bodies of troops in these towns, and he assured me he had never seen men better clothed, fed, and armed, or in a more complete state of readiness for taking the field whenever their services may be required.

Were only the financial condition of Austria on a par with her military resources, she would be well prepared for the eventualities which loom at perhaps no great distance; as it is, it must be manifest that the resolution of drawing the sword will be attended with almost as much danger at home as can be affronted abroad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 77.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 17, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL has taken more than one occasion of reminding me how desirable it is that measures should be concerted, without further loss of time, as to the future organisation of the Principalities, and by his language gives it to be understood that the delays in considering that question have proceeded rather from Her Majesty's Government than from his own Cabinet.

Austria, he says, has been occasionally suspected of a wish to favour Russian interests, and of a too exclusive regard of her own. The wish felt by her to proceed at once to an arrangement of the important questions to which he is anxious that the attention of Her Majesty's Government should be directed, proves the injustice of such suspicions.

Were she only intent upon her own objects, Austria could desire nothing more than a prolongation of the actual "état provisoire," as, besides her usual geographical influence, she possesses that to be derived from an army of 50,000 men, which would be doubled were there any urgent need of an increase of force.

She wishes, however, to act with her new allies; is prepared to enter upon the task without the concurrence of Russia, and to leave to that Power only the faculty of associating herself to resolutions already taken, should the task be completed before she has resumed her place in the European Council.

It is clear to me that Count Buol sees, in the course which he recommends, an additional incentive to Russia lending herself to these arrangements for peace, which would be so grateful to Austria and the whole of Germany. He does not, indeed, hesitate to observe that Russia cannot fail of perceiving that she will lose a great advantage if she should hereafter be unable to claim her share in the labours by which a satisfactory and definitive organisation has been worked out for Provinces of which it has been her special object to represent herself as the sole Protectress.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 78.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 33.)

Vienna, December 18, 1855.

My Lord,

THE letters addressed by the Emperor to the Kings of Prussia and Bavaria are, I am assured, drawn up with great judgment.

To the King of Prussia, His Imperial Majesty remarks that the support which he may give to the Austrian ultimatum will, he hopes, be the means of opening to His Majesty a place in that European Council from which his absence has been long painfully felt. To the King of Bavaria the Emperor states that the ultimatum contains the basis for arrangements which are the most essential to Europe, and provisions so much required by the wants of Germany.

Letters have been addressed at the same time by Count Buol to Count G. Esterhazy and Count Appony, explaining with full details to the first, and more concisely to the latter, the nature of the steps taken by the Austrian Cabinet.

Count Esterhazy is enjoined to refrain from volunteering any observation as to what is passing, but to be ready for the observations which may be made to him in the event (the probable event) of the Emperor's letter being brought to the knowledge of Baron Manteuffel.

On the 17th instant the Prussian Envoy called upon Count Buol and stated that various inquiries made to him by his German colleagues by repeated telegraphic messages received from Berlin compelled him to request some explanation as to the negotiation said to be opened with Russia. Count Buol replied that he had none to offer beyond this, that the King of Prussia had been placed in possession of the whole affair. He would observe, however, that the Cabinet of Berlin had little right to ask for marks of confidence, as it could not be denied that each time that it had done so, and that the demand had been followed by any Austrian communications, these had been transmitted from Berlin to the point at which the knowledge of them was calculated to produce the greatest amount of injury to the objects which the Emperor's Cabinet had in view.

Prince Gortchakoff has sought no explanation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and none had yesterday been offered to him by his Excellency.

His displeasure at what has been done is the more likely, when the circumstances of the case transpire, to be manifested in an unequivocal manner, as he is believed to be under the illusion of his last communication having produced a strong effect upon the mind of the Emperor of Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 79.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.

(No. 35.)

Vienna, December 19, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith an exact copy of the Austrian ultimatum as finally settled and dispatched to St. Petersburgh.

According to your Lordship's instructions, I likewise inclose a copy of the memorandum to which the initials of Count Buol and Baron de Bourqueney were affixed on the 14th of November, which has not since been amended or altered in any way, but which was not intended for communication to the Russian Government.

Shortly after this memorandum had been received by the French Government, they informed Baron de Bourqueney that it was approved by them and by Her Majesty's Government, with the exception of the word "autorisée," and they instructed him to induce Count Buol to permit it to be altered. Count Buol, as was stated in Mr. Elliot's confidential despatch No. 228 of the 29th of

November, consented to substitute for "autorisée" any form of words which might be agreed upon by Her Majesty's Government and that of France, but no further communication on the subject having been received, the memorandum was not remodelled.

In his instructions, however, to Count Esterhazy, Count Buol has entirely carried out the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, by confining himself to stating that he has reason to believe that the acceptation of the ultimatum would be followed by the signature by the allies of preliminaries of peace, without saying that he was authorized by them to make the declaration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 79.

Austrian Ultimatum.

Principautés Danubiennes.

ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera en outre à ces Principautés, ou y confirmera, une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.

D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent, réclamé par leur situation géographique; aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est et aboutirait au lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes, dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve, destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée.

Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Par conséquent il n'y sera créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires maritimes.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée, dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet sera annexée

au Traité Général après avoir été préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du dit Traité, et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante.

Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnée dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer.

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

Inclosure 2 in No. 79.

Annex (A).

LE Comte Buol avait entretenu le Baron de Bourqueney à son départ pour Paris, des conditions qui pourraient éventuellement servir de base au rétablissement de la paix.

Les idées émises par M. le Comte Buol ayant été exposées à Paris par M. le Baron de Bourqueney, ont fixé toute l'attention du Gouvernement Français. Elles ont été communiquées confidentiellement au Gouvernement Anglais, qui les a reconnues dignes d'être sérieusement examinées, les deux Cabinets constatant à la fois que l'initiative des ouvertures pacifiques n'émanait pas d'eux, mais admettant que leur inébranlable résolution d'obtenir par la guerre une paix qui répondit au but de cette guerre, n'excluait ni l'examen ni l'acceptation des conditions qui réaliseraient dès aujourd'hui l'objet de leur alliance.

M. de Bourqueney a été autorisé à reprendre avec le Comte de Buol, dès son retour à Vienne, la conversation qui avait précédé son départ pour Paris.

En conséquence, M. le Comte de Buol et M. le Baron de Bourqueney se sont réunis à diverses reprises. Développant d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe et aux résultats de la guerre actuelle les quatre points déjà acceptés en principe par la Russie, sous réserve du droit qui appartient aux Puissances belligérantes de produire des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties, mais avec l'espoir exprimé par le Comte de Buol que ces conditions n'offriraient pas un obstacle insurmontable au rétablissement de la paix, M. le Comte Buol et M. le Baron Bourqueney se sont arrêté à la rédaction ci-annexée, que M. le Baron Bourqueney s'est réservé la faculté de soumettre à l'approbation de sa Cour.

Les stipulations de la paix seraient complétées par un Traité d'Alliance entre l'Autriche, la France et la Grande Bretagne, garantissant l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman et établissant comme *casus belli* toute infraction portée par la Russie aux stipulations de la dite paix.

La Cour Impériale d'Autriche se chargerait de présenter le programme développé des quatre garanties à l'acceptation de la Cour de Russie, autorisée par ses alliés à déclarer qu'une acceptation pure et simple serait suivie de la signature des préliminaires de la paix. On passerait alors aux négociations définitives après s'être entendu sur les conditions d'un armistice général.

L'Autriche accorderait un délai de trois semaines à la Cour de Pétersbourg pour faire connaître sa réponse.

Le délai expiré sans acceptation, il y aurait rupture des relations diplomatiques et retrait des deux Missions.

Au moment de la transmission des conditions précitées à St. Pétersbourg, la

Prusse serait invitée par l'Autriche à les y appuyer. Le degré d'appui que la Cour de Berlin leur prêterait par ses démarches pourrait lui rendre une place dans les négociations générales.

Le refus du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg attestant au monde que le rétablissement de la paix est devenu impossible du fait de la Russie, les Puissances alliées se réuniraient sans retard pour se concerter sur les moyens de l'y contraindre, en s'assurant, autant que faire se pourrait, le concours général de l'Europe.

La Prusse serait admise à ces délibérations dès qu'elle aurait rompu elle-même ses rapports avec la Russie.

Paraphé: B. B.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

No. 80.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 352. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 22, 1855.

I REPORTED last week the expected arrival of Count Münster, the the Prussian military agent at St. Petersburgh; he was the bearer of despatches from Baron Werther, which do not, as I have heard from Baron Manteuffel, hold out the expectation that the Emperor Alexander will be in any way disposed to accept the terms of the ultimatum. His Imperial Majesty had received an urgent appeal, which had been lately addressed to him from Berlin, in favour of peace, with much apparent goodwill, but had said nothing to the Prussian Minister which indicated that His Imperial Majesty was disposed to make any serious concession.

Count Münster, I understand, describes the Emperor as having returned from the Crimea in raptures with the condition of his army, which appeared to want nothing, and considers that its improved condition will be a powerful argument in favour of resistance rather than of concessions. Count Münster says that Count Nesselrode, Count Orloff, and the older persons about the Emperor, would be disposed to listen to overtures of peace, but that the younger persons of influence at Court, at the head of which is the Empress, are for a continuance of the war; and that a large and fanatical party are for doing so at any cost: that they have no fear, if even the European Powers were all allied against them, that Russia would materially suffer, convinced as they are that she has boundless means within herself, and that her prosperity would not severely suffer, if she was even cut off from all communication with the rest of Europe.

Count Münster brings a very unfavourable account of the health of the Dowager Empress of Russia. Baron Manteuffel, in speaking to me to-day on this subject, said that though Her Imperial Majesty had rallied from a severe attack of illness it was not expected that her life would be prolonged many months.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 81.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 353. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 22, 1855.

I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by the telegraph that the letter of the Emperor of Austria to the King of Prussia, inclosing a copy of the ultimatum forwarded to St. Petersburgh, had been delivered to His Majesty, and that His Majesty had since granted an audience to Count Esterhazy. That Minister has given me the following account of what passed on this occasion.

His Prussian Majesty received him in the presence of Baron Manteuffel, and spoke in a calm and studied manner. He expressed his thankfulness for the letter of the Emperor of Austria, and the communication which it contained. He gave Count Esterhazy to understand that he would support it at St. Petersburgh, but that before doing so he should wait to hear on the subject from London and Paris, alluding at the same time to proposals which he understood had emanated from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

Count Esterhazy assured me that throughout the audience the King repeatedly spoke of his readiness to assist in promoting the interests of peace; but he added that he left His Majesty under the impression that His Majesty would do nothing to compromise his present attitude on the Eastern question, and that the support which he might give to the ultimatum would have no weight in making it acceptable at St. Petersburgh.

The King promised, after giving the subject the most mature consideration, to send an answer to the Emperor Francis Joseph, observing that the most important thing he had now to say was, that "he hoped Austria would not forget that she belonged to Germany;" meaning that the policy of Germany should be peace, and that the adoption of an opposite course was not called for under present circumstances, and would not be congenial to the interests or feelings of the German community.

The Austrian Minister told me that he read to the King a copy of the instructions which had been addressed to Count Valentine Esterhazy, but that he carefully abstained, as directed by his Government, from divulging the course which would be followed if the ultimatum was rejected, and which would end in the withdrawal of the Austrian Legation from St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 82.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 44.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 21, 1855.*

A CONVERSATION respecting the communication made by the Austrian Government to that of St. Petersburgh has taken place between Count Buol and the Russian Envoy.

It appears that Count Buol called yesterday upon Prince Gortchakoff and informed him that Count Esterhazy had been the bearer of certain propositions with the nature of which he had not been at liberty to acquaint him. He had been the less disposed to do so as the Prince might have been expected either to approve or disapprove of them, to urge their acceptance or to counsel their rejection. That in the one supposition it had, of course, been desired to avoid Prince Gortchakoff's opposition, while, on the other, it had been hardly considered fair to call upon him for support to proposals which possibly might not be altogether acceptable to his Court.

Prince Gortchakoff replied that he could, of course, only feel flattered at any resolution which was based upon the conviction of his being devoted, heart and soul, to the interests of Russia; and that his only regret at not having been consulted, proceeded from the belief of its being possible that the suggestions which it would have been in his power to make, would have increased the probability of the Austrian terms being acceded to by his Government.

Before the conversation closed, Count Buol took an opportunity of expressing the hope that no attempt would be made to modify proposals to which it was the wish of the Imperial Government that a simply affirmative or negative answer should be returned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 83.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 26, 1855.*

IN reply to your despatch No. 28 of the 17th instant, reporting a conversation held with Count Buol relative to the affairs of the Danubian Principalities, I have to instruct you to assure Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with him as to the importance of immediately settling the future organisation of those Principalities as far as it may be practicable.

I inclose a copy of a memorandum* on this subject as the basis on which such organisation might, in their opinion, be arranged, and Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of thinking that it does not, in any material degree, vary from the project which was communicated to them by the Austrian Government, except that it avoids placing too many matters under European guarantees. Her Majesty's Government are desirous to avoid this—

1st. Because such guarantees appear to be unnecessary; no danger from the Porte having ever threatened the privileges and immunities of the Principalities, nor being likely to arise; and

2ndly. Because these guarantees of the internal affairs of the Provinces, and the working of the institutions that may be given to them, are likely to create dissensions between the Guaranteeing Powers, and seriously to embarrass the Local Governments.

Her Majesty's Government desire to submit these views to the favourable consideration of the Cabinet of Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 84.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 71.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 8, 1855.*

IN transmitting to you, by the present messenger, the Queen's ratifications of the Treaty which, as the Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty, you signed on the 21st ultimo with the Plenipotentiaries of France and of Sweden, I have much satisfaction in signifying to you Her Majesty's entire approbation of your conduct throughout the negotiation and conclusion of that Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 85.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,452.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 14, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 1,585 of the 9th instant, I have to acquaint you that I entirely approve your Excellency's proceedings as therein reported, and also the despatch which you addressed to Sir H. Seymour on the occasion of your forwarding to him my instructions respecting the amendments which Her Majesty's Government desire to see made in the ultimatum which the Austrian Government proposes to address to the Cabinet at St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosure in No. 53.

No. 86.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 15, 1855, 6·20 P.M.

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch received this afternoon from Stockholm, states, that the ratifications are to be exchanged to-morrow, and the Treaty promulgated immediately afterwards. Count Walewski proposes to publish it in the "Moniteur" of Wednesday. Announce by telegraph whether you consent.

No. 87.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 15, 1855, 6·20 P.M.

COUNT WALEWSKI thinks that instructions ought to be sent to Berlin to support the Austrian communication respecting the ultimatum. Do you agree?

No. 88.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 15, 1855, 6·20 P.M.

DO you intend communicating to Sardinia the correspondence relating to the Vienna ultimatum? If not the whole, how much of it shall you send? Count Walewski asks the question.

No. 89.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir James Hudson.

(No. 154.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1855.

THE time has arrived when I am able to authorize you to make known to the Cabinet of Turin the result of the communications which have recently taken place between Her Majesty's Government and those of France and Austria, respecting a proposition to be made by the last-named Power to the Court of St. Petersburgh, which, if accepted in sincerity and acted upon in good faith, may possibly lead to the reestablishment of peace.

The communications between the three Courts which have led to this state of things, originated in an overture made some time back by Count Buol to Baron Bourqueney, then on the point of leaving Vienna for Paris, which indicated a disposition on the part of Austria to adopt a more decided course of policy towards Russia than she had hitherto pursued; and the subject having been renewed on Baron Bourqueney's return to Vienna, an offer was made on the part of Austria to send to St. Petersburgh a proposition, in the shape of an ultimatum, the rejection of which by Russia, or its non-acceptance within a specified time, would be followed by the immediate interruption of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia. This proposal was embodied in a memorandum which bears date the 14th of November, and to which Count Buol and Baron de Bourqueney respectively affixed their initials. I inclose a copy of this memorandum* for your information, and for communication to the Sardinian Government.

To this memorandum was appended the draft of the ultimatum which the Austrian Government was prepared to address to that of Russia. The terms on which that ultimatum should be framed have formed the subject of serious deliberation and well-weighed discussion between the Cabinets of London,

* Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Paris, and Vienna; and the further paper which I now inclose, and which you will also communicate to the Sardinian Government, will fully explain the nature of the terms upon which the three Governments have agreed as bases of negotiation for peace.

You will further inform the Sardinian Government that Her Majesty's Government have learnt by a telegraphic message from Sir Hamilton Seymour, that Count V. Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at the Court of Russia, would leave Vienna for St. Petersburgh as the bearer of the ultimatum, on the 16th instant.

By a previous despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, Her Majesty's Government were informed that Count Esterhazy is instructed, in the event of the ultimatum being at once rejected by the Court of Russia, to leave St. Petersburgh directly, with the whole of his Mission. But if no immediate answer is returned by the Russian Government, Count Esterhazy is directed, on the expiration of ten days from the delivery of the ultimatum, to state to the Russian Minister that unless a favourable answer is returned before the expiration of a further term of nine days, he must demand passports for himself and the whole of the Austrian Mission.

The Sardinian Government will observe that by the last clause of the ultimatum the right is reserved to the belligerent Powers of bringing forward in the general interest of Europe other conditions over and above those specified in the ultimatum. Her Majesty's Government would have much preferred that those conditions should have been specified in the ultimatum itself; but they felt that they had no right to press upon Austria the conditions on which the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia should depend.

The Austrian Government, however, has been made aware that the following are among the conditions which the belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right of proposing, beyond those contained in the ultimatum; namely, that no fortifications shall be restored or erected in the Aland Islands; that Consuls shall be admitted to reside at the Russian ports of the Black Sea; and that the future position of the territories on the east of the Black Sea shall be open to consideration; and Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been directed to acquaint the Austrian Government that Her Majesty's Government trust that Austria will see the propriety of making these terms known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, as Her Majesty's Government consider that it would be far better not to enter upon negotiations at all, than that such negotiations should be broken off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated, and that the real intentions of the belligerent Powers had been kept from her knowledge.

The explanations which I have given in this despatch and the documents which I have instructed you to place in the hands of the Sardinian Government, will, Her Majesty's Government trust, satisfy the Cabinet of Turin that the course adopted by the Governments of England and France at this juncture, is well calculated either to bring about the reestablishment of peace on terms honourable to the belligerent Powers and advantageous to the general interests of Europe, or to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not yet prepared to listen to such reasonable terms of accommodation as will afford security to Europe against renewed attempts of aggrandizement on her part.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 90.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 1,637. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 20, 1855.

A CORRESPONDENCE of some vivacity has been going on for several days between Count Walewski and M. de Persigny, in consequence of the latter having stated that Her Majesty's Government suspected Count Walewski of having acted in the late negotiations at Vienna in collusion with Austria.

This afternoon Count Walewski said, that he had thought it necessary, in his own defence, to give a succinct account of all that had taken place between

the Austrian Government and himself, and between Her Majesty's Government and himself, since the arrival of M. de Bourqueney in Paris in October last, and that he wished to read the despatch containing it to me.

He proceeded to read a despatch dated the 17th instant, which he said had already been communicated to your Lordship. I enter therefore into no details. I admitted the accuracy of the statement made by Count Walewski, as far as it went; but I again drew his attention to the omission of the agreement which had been entered into not only by himself but by the Emperor at Compiègne.

Count Walewski repeated, what he had before replied to similar observations, that admitting the exactitude of my account, he had never considered himself to be precluded from endeavouring to obtain better terms of Her Majesty's Government than my instructions prevented his eliciting from me.

I am, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 91.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1,640. Confidential.)

Paris, December 20, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI is anxious that M. de Bourqueney's despatches dated the 14th ultimo, which contain the Austrian propositions, and which were communicated to your Lordship by M. de Persigny, should not be published *in extenso*; one of them, indeed, not at all. Your Lordship will find in the inclosures put into my hands this afternoon by Count Walewski, in what shape his Excellency is willing that the remaining two should be given to the world.

I said that I would send them to your Lordship, and that I supposed his Excellency would have no objection to calling them extracts from, instead of copies of, despatches, should Her Majesty's Government desire it. He replied, "None whatever."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Baron de Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

M. le Comte,

AINSI que je l'annonçais à votre Excellence dans les derniers numéros de ma correspondance, nous n'attendions plus la réponse télégraphique de l'Empereur François-Joseph au rapport qui lui avait été adressé par le Comte Buol à Trieste, pour procéder au paragraphe de l'ultimatum Autrichien et du memorandum qui résume la substance des pourparlers échangés entre le Comte Buol et moi depuis mon retour à Vienne.

Sa Majesté, ayant abrégé le temps présumé de son séjour à Trieste, est rentrée hier dans sa capitale.

Le Comte Buol, immédiatement appelé chez l'Empereur, a remis à Sa Majesté les rédactions sur lesquelles nous étions tombés d'accord. L'Empereur les a scrupuleusement examinées et s'est encore réservé vingt-quatre heures de réflexion avant d'autoriser son Ministre à procéder avec moi aux dernières formalités.

Ce matin, le Comte Buol m'a annoncé par un billet que l'Empereur avait entièrement accepté notre travail; il ne proposait que deux ou trois modifications de rédaction contre lesquelles je n'avais aucune objection à élever.

Nous venons de parapher les documents que je charge M. le Comte de Serre de remettre entre les mains de votre Excellence. Initié par mon intime confidence à toutes les phases de cette dernière négociation, personne ne saurait être plus à même de répondre aux questions qui ne se trouveraient pas d'avance résolues par ma correspondance.

Nous avons, d'un commun accord, adopté la forme du paraphe comme

plus appropriée que la signature à la situation; je devais, en effet, sur tous les points, réserver l'approbation du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, tandis que le Comte Buol agissait avec celle de son Souverain. La signature m'eût fait faire un pas au delà de ma sphère d'action; le paraphe ne constate que la différence de ces deux positions, sans effleurer la valeur des engagements du Cabinet de Vienne.

Votre Excellence sait déjà avec quelle scrupuleuse exactitude je me suis conformé à ses directions dans le cours de mes pourparlers avec le Comte Buol. Elle retrouvera, constatées dans le mémorandum, les précautions que j'ai dû prendre pour enlever au rôle des Puissances belligérantes tout caractère d'initiative, pour n'établir que leur disposition à examiner et à accepter, si elles venaient à leur être, dès aujourd'hui, présentées, les conditions de paix qu'elles étaient irrévocablement déterminées à obtenir par les armes.

J'ai tenu le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre, Mr. Elliot, heure par heure, au courant des communications échangées entre le Comte Buol et moi; non seulement le Comte Buol le savait, mais il avait, dès le premier jour, désiré et demandé qu'il en fût ainsi.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a maintenant sous les yeux le résultat de mes efforts.

L'Autriche s'approprie les conditions de paix contenues dans l'Annexe B. Si la France et l'Angleterre consentent à y reconnaître une base de préliminaires, l'Autriche les porte à St. Pétersbourg comme son propre ultimatum et met leur acceptation au prix de la rupture.

Loin de moi la pensée, en soumettant à votre Excellence les documents joints à ma dépêche, de les lui présenter comme un texte irréprochable qui ne puisse admettre d'utiles modifications; je me permettrai seulement d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement de l'Empereur sur la faculté qui reste bien acquise aux Puissances belligérantes de remanier les questions secondaires dans la négociation générale avec la certitude de trouver l'Autriche à leur côté dans les Conférences définitives de la paix, et j'ajouterai, avec une entière conviction que la Russie, après avoir accepté de pareils préliminaires, ne fera pas échouer la paix sur des conditions qui, naturellement, resteraient, par leur importance, au-dessous d'un sacrifice territorial et de la perte absolue de la Mer Noire.

Je redouterais, je l'avoue, en ce moment, toute marche qui impliquerait une controverse de rédactions et qui serait en discussions contradictoires, un temps aussi précieux peut-être pour préparer la guerre avec la nouvelle attitude de l'Autriche, que pour amener la paix, si la paix doit sortir de cette nouvelle phase.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Baron de Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

Vienne, le 14 Novembre, 1855.

M. le Comte,

JE dois compte au Gouvernement de l'Empereur de l'esprit dans lequel, à la suite de mes pourparlers avec M. le Comte de Buol, ont été introduites dans l'ultimatum Autrichien les modifications que votre Excellence y aura remarquées en le comparant aux notes que j'avais eu l'honneur de déposer entre ses mains. Ces modifications me semblent toutes avoir donné plus de force et d'unité aux conditions générales que l'Autriche vient de s'approprier, et sur lesquelles elle n'attend plus que l'opinion des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres pour en faire l'usage qui sera convenu entre les trois Cours.

Nous nous sommes d'abord arrêtés, le Comte Buol et moi, à cette pensée générale qu'il ne s'agissait dans notre travail que d'énumérer les sacrifices à imposer à la Russie, que de la dépouiller, en quelque sorte, des titres sur lesquels elle pourrait appuyer plus tard sa résistance à l'application des principes que nous avions fait prévaloir; nous avons donc élagué tout ce qui ne le concernait pas directement, et nous ne lui avons laissé que sa place à la paix, soit dans les conseils, soit dans les institutions où elle aura plus tard à exercer une cinquième de surveillance, de contrôle ou de garantie.

Ainsi dans l'article des Principautés Danubiennes, nous n'avons pas seulement frappé le Protectorat exclusif, nous avons annulé tout droit particulier d'ingérence dans leurs affaires extérieures. Nous avons laissé aussi libre que

possible l'avenir de l'organisation de ces Provinces, en ne réservant que trois conditions également irréprochables—l'initative de la Puissance Suzeraine, l'assentiment des Puissances garantes, et le vœu des populations.

Nous avons posé le principe fondamental du développement du système défensif des Principautés; nous l'avons dégagé de toutes les entraves qui lui opposaient les Traités et les usages; notre but était de faire de ces Provinces un premier boulevard de l'intégrité de l'Empire, et comme les plus étranges revirements dans la politique générale veulent être prévus dans les actes qui embrassent un long avenir, il n'échappera pas à votre Excellence que notre rédaction s'applique au danger qui menacerait un jour la frontière occidentale toute aussi bien que la frontière de l'est et du nord. Les mots "contre toute agression étrangère," répondent à cette préoccupation, et le Comte Buol, en les acceptant, s'est parfaitement rendu compte d'une désignation indirecte qui atteignait sans exception les deux Puissances limitrophes.

La rectification de frontière est, à vrai dire, pour la Russie la perte de la Bessarabie. C'est l'annulation des Traités de Jassy et d'Andrinople; c'est la Porte vengée des revers de 1828 et 1829; c'est l'Angleterre, c'est la France, lavées d'un souvenir qui a si longtemps pesé sur la situation politique en Orient; et, appliquée aux circonstances actuelles, cette nouvelle délimitation territoriale contient une des plus hautes leçons de morale politique dont l'histoire ait gardé la mémoire.

L'affranchissement du Danube continue à trouver sa garantie dans l'institution d'une Commission Européenne et dans la présence de stationnaires des diverses Puissances maritimes devant ses embouchures; mais la rectification territoriale en dépossédant la Russie de la rive gauche du fleuve et des îles comprises entre les div rs bras, assure d'une manière bien autrement efficace la libre navigation du fleuve contre les obstacles créés ou maintenus sous la juridiction territoriale Russe, et l'institution Européenne préposée à l'exécution des réglements de l'Acte de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale devient à son tour une garantie contre tous au profit de tous.

La neutralisation de la Mer Noire une fois admise par le Comte Buol comme base des préliminaires de la paix, ne comportait pas, dans l'Article qui la concerne, des modifications de formes; toutefois, elle me semble mieux définie et plus solennellement proclamée dans la nouvelle rédaction. Sous la forme de quelques principes généraux, elle embrasse plus d'applications et précise mieux la seule exception admise à la règle de la clôture des Détroits, dans la présence des stationnaires étrangers devant les embouchures du Danube.

L'Article relatif à l'amélioration du sort des populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte a à peine été modifié; il stipule néanmoins d'une manière plus explicite, que les Conférences ouvertes à Constantinople devront avoir achevé leur travail avant la paix. La Russie ne réapparaîtra que comme garante et la reconnaissance des sujets du Sultan remontera naturellement vers le Souverain et ses alliés au lieu de s'égarer en allant droit à l'ennemi commun.

Telles sont, M. le Comte, les considérations que mon devoir était de placer sous les yeux de votre Excellence. Elle examinera ainsi et appréciera le travail qui lui est soumis dans l'esprit qui a présidé à sa rédaction.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

No. 92.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 1,053.)

Paris, December 23, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI will send instructions to the French Minister at Munich to give the same support to the representations which the Austrian Minister may make with respect to the propositions sent to St. Petersburgh, as he has sent to the French Minister at Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 93.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 357.)

Berlin, December 22, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH a view to carry out the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 271 of the 18th instant, I called yesterday on Baron Manteuffel.

Our conversation fell naturally on the all-absorbing subject of the ultimatum which has been forwarded from Vienna to St. Petersburgh, and considering that I could not give effect to your wishes better than by reading to his Excellency the above-named despatch, I asked his permission to do so. I laid much stress on the urgency of the case, and of the advantage that would accrue to the cause of peace if the King of Prussia would make known to the Emperor Alexander his approval of the terms which the Austrian Government had been authorized by the Western Powers to bring forward, as those on which they would treat for peace.

After I had read the despatch, Baron Manteuffel assured me of the desire of the King to cooperate in a work which might lead to the conclusion of peace, but he said that he could not at this moment say how far His Majesty would be disposed to go in support of the terms of the ultimatum; that if His Majesty sought an excuse to decline acceding to the request which had been communicated to him, he could easily find it in not having been consulted in drawing up the ultimatum, but he had no reason to believe that this would influence His Majesty's decision on the subject; that as the Austrian communication had not come from the Government, but from the Emperor himself, he scarcely knew how to treat the matter, but to me he must express his thanks for the communication of the despatch which I had just read to him.

His Excellency said that the King had ordered him to be extremely reserved, and to give no opinion on the subject, and he could assure me that he did not know at all what the final decision of his Royal Master would be.

I then urged on Baron Manteuffel to impress on the King the hope of Her Majesty's Government that His Majesty would give his strenuous support to the ultimatum. I said that the King would thereby not only be acting in the cause of peace, but in the interests of Russia, who might not again have terms so little onerous to accept or reject; and that it was in the interests of Prussia also, for if she does not support what Austria considers the minimum that we can accept, we shall hereafter be with difficulty induced to believe that she is even neutral; the more so as she appears disinclined to take effectual steps to prevent munitions of war being furnished to our enemy. I said that I believed the war in the Baltic would next year be carried on on a larger scale than heretofore, and that our Treaty with Sweden (a copy of which I left with his Excellency, as he had not yet seen it) showed the feelings of that country as to the continued aggressive spirit of Russia, and that I trusted we should, if the war continued, find powerful assistance, not only in Sweden, but perhaps in Denmark, which would render neutrality in the Baltic almost impossible.

Baron Manteuffel listened to the foregoing without showing any signs of impatience, and said with regard to my observation as to the passage of munitions of war from Prussia into Russia, that he did not know what just cause of complaint we had now to make on the subject.

I replied that we had, I believed, well-grounded reason to suppose that the trade was as brisk as ever; and that, although some few articles might have been stopped from time to time, we never knew that any one of these nefarious attempts on the eastern frontier to contravene the Royal Ordinance of the 7th of March were punished; that, although I had been told that goods had frequently been stopped for weeks, I had never heard that the individuals concerned in this contraband trade had been punished, or that the temporary seizure of these goods had been followed up by confiscation; I had been assured, on the contrary, that these goods had been released, and, finally, permitted to pass into Russia.

Baron Manteuffel attempted to doubt the accuracy of the intelligence I might have received; and said that he feared I lent too willing an ear to every story that was reported to me, of the want of attention of the Prussian custom-

house officers to their duties. I rejoined that if I heard of any instance of severe punishment having been inflicted on persons implicated in this contraband trade, my impressions might be modified; but that up to the present moment I had heard of none having taken place in the Eastern provinces, though the existence of the trade was a notorious fact; that the British and French Legations had on several occasions notified to his Excellency the passage of arms and munitions of war, and that we had not, I believed, on one single occasion been informed in reply that these contraband goods, on arriving on the eastern frontier, had been confiscated, or the parties forwarding them punished for carrying on illegal traffic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 94.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 26, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction, from your despatch No. 29 of the 17th instant, the friendly feelings manifested by Count Buol with respect to the unsatisfactory state of the relations between the British and Austrian Agents in the Principalities, and the assurances of his Excellency as to the instructions which will be sent to Austrian Agents on the subject; and you will inform Count Buol that similar instructions will be sent to British Agents.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 95.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1,665.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 26, 1855.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY has informed Count Walewski by telegraph that the accounts received by M. de Buol from Berlin are less favourable as to the amount of support to be expected from Prussia to the Austrian ultimatum.

Promises of a general nature to recommend Russia to accept the ultimatum have been received at Vienna from Munich.

The news of M. de Seebach's departure for St. Petersburgh had caused a certain emotion at Vienna. M. de Buol had written immediately to inform M. de Beust that if M. de Seebach hoped to place himself in the light of a mediator, to obtain better terms for Russia, not only would he fail, but he would in all probability put an end to the slight chance which remained of peace. Count Buol felt sure that the French Government would adhere to the plan agreed to between the three Governments. He has likewise written to Count Esterhazy, at St. Petersburgh, to tell him that his conduct is not in any way to be influenced by M. de Seebach's proceedings. He is to abide by his own instructions.

The Emperor, on being informed of the contents of this despatch, desired Count Walewski to inform M. de Bourqueney that His Majesty agreed entirely in Count Buol's views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 96.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1,671. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 26, 1855.*

IF I am to believe the reports which reach me, M. de Seebach, before his departure from Paris, gave out that he was going to St. Petersburgh with the Emperor's sanction, and that he had an audience of His Majesty, at which he had ascertained that His Majesty was not indisposed to facilitate the signature of peace by concessions to Russia.

Although I felt certain that no such assurance had ever been given by the Emperor, I was not the less sorry that such rumours should prevail, because their existence is sufficient to excite speculations in the money market, which are too likely to end in disappointment. Having, therefore, a fair opportunity for so doing, I alluded to them this afternoon to Count Walewski, expressing a hope that his Excellency would, whenever an occasion offered, contradict them.

Count Walewski replied by repeating to me what I had the honour to state in my confidential despatch No. 1,597 of the 10th instant respecting M. de Seebach's departure, but with this important modification, that after he had announced to M. de Seebach that the proposals of Russia were insufficient, and that she would learn through Vienna on what terms peace could be made, that gentleman had asked whether he could not see the Emperor; that Count Walewski had asked His Majesty's orders, and that M. de Seebach had been received by him; that at this audience M. de Seebach had recommenced the old story of the friendship and admiration of the Czar for the Emperor, and of his desire to come to a direct understanding with France; that the Emperor had replied that he was sensible of the courteous dealings ("bons procédés") of Russia, but that this was not the time or place for them, and that he could give no other advice than that the Czar should accept the terms now offered to him, for he might be sure that the allies would not be satisfied with less—that with the enormous resources of the allies, another campaign must add to the disasters of Russia, while the terms of peace would not be less rigorous, and would probably be more severe.

This, Count Walewski stated, was the general tenour of the Emperor's observations to M. de Seebach, who came to him after the audience, and said that his conversation with the Emperor had been so important that he should like to convey it himself to St. Petersburgh. Count Walewski represents himself as having neither encouraged nor discouraged the journey thus suggested, as he considered that M. de Seebach was the best judge of its utility. The journey was then determined upon, but only as far as Dresden in the first instance. It appeared, however, that M. de Seebach had there found an invitation to proceed to St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 97.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 27, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY arrived yesterday evening at St. Petersburgh. No fresh intelligence has been received from Berlin.

No. 98.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 1,687.) *Paris, December 28, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI stated to me this afternoon that all his accounts from Germany showed that the object of Russia, and of her adherent, Prussia, was to obtain from the smaller States a declaration that Russia, in signifying her acceptance of the system of neutralization of the Black Sea, recommended by them, had given proof of her moderation and conciliatory disposition, and was entitled to their moral support; that the demands contained in the Austrian ultimatum are exorbitant; and that, consequently, it is upon the allies that the responsibility of continuing the war will fall.

Count Walewski stated further, that his last accounts from Munich were more satisfactory; and that it appeared from them that, although the King of Bavaria had replied to the Emperor of Austria's letter on the subject of the ultimatum, to the effect that he considered the terms too hard, yet that, upon the whole, Bavaria would not separate from Austria.

The accounts from Dresden are less good. M. Von Beust states, indeed, that he has instructed M. de Seebach to advise the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum; but he adds that if it is refused, Germany cannot on that account quarrel with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 99.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, December 29.)

Vienne, le 16 Décembre, 1855.

LES paroles que votre Excellence a eu l'honneur de recueillir de la bouche même de l'Empereur, notre auguste Maître, ont dû de nouveau lui confirmer les intentions qui ont invariablement guidé la politique de Sa Majesté dans les différentes phases de la lutte qui pèse d'un si grand poids sur l'Europe. Toujours fidèle à ces mêmes principes, l'Empereur aurait cru manquer à ce qu'il doit à ses peuples et à l'Europe, en laissant s'écouler le moment où une force majeure impose une trêve de fait aux combattants, sans tenter un effort suprême pour ouvrir de nouvelles voies à une paix qui se présente comme le besoin le plus urgent de l'Europe.

Convaincu, d'un côté, de la sincérité des déclarations si souvent réitérées par l'Empereur Alexandre de vouloir prêter la main à toute paix qui ne porterait atteinte ni à sa dignité ni à l'honneur de son pays, Sa Majesté Impériale s'est sentie appelée à employer ses meilleurs efforts pour s'assurer du degré de réciprocité que ces dispositions pourraient rencontrer auprès des Cours de France et de Grande Bretagne. Elle a en conséquence daigné me charger de sonder à ce sujet les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres. Or, tout en les trouvant imbus de l'inébranlable résolution de ne se prêter à aucune initiative d'ouvertures pacifiques, nous avons cependant, à notre vive satisfaction, rencontré auprès de ces Cabinets des dispositions telles à nous faire espérer qu'ils ne se refuseront point à l'examen et à résoudre nettement la question qui a donné naissance à la guerre.

Il y a plus, nous nous croyons autorisés à exprimer l'espoir que ces Puissances, tout en maintenant dans toute sa force le droit de présenter telles conditions de paix qui leur sembleraient convenables, n'en seraient pas moins aujourd'hui encore disposées à ne pas dévier du principe posé lors du début de la lutte, de ne poursuivre aucun avantage particulier et de limiter leurs prétentions aux sacrifices nécessaires pour rassurer l'Europe contre le retour d'une aussi déplorable complication.

Encouragé par ces indices le Cabinet Impérial n'a pas reculé devant la tâche

de se rendre consciencieusement compte de la situation du moment et de formuler les bases sur lesquelles, à son avis, pourrait reposer l'édifice d'une paix solide. Les quatre principes déjà acceptés par la Russie nous ont paru toujours être le meilleur point de départ. Seulement, pour assurer l'œuvre de la paix et pour éviter surtout les écueils qui ont fait échouer les dernières conférences, nous avons jugé indispensable de développer ces quatre principes de manière à les rendre conformes aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe, et à faciliter l'accord final par une définition plus précise.

Le fruit de ce travail se trouve consigné dans le document ci-joint, qui par le fait de l'acceptation des Puissances belligérantes acquérerait la valeur de préliminaires de paix. La signature de ses préliminaires serait immédiatement suivie d'un armistice général et de négociations définitives.

Ce travail ayant été honoré de l'approbation de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, vous êtes chargé, M. le Comte, de le présenter à l'acceptation de la Cour de Russie en y joignant les instances les plus vives d'en peser le contenu et de nous faire savoir sa détermination, que nous attachons la plus haute importance à connaître aussi tôt que faire se pourra. Si, ainsi que nous l'espérons, nos propositions rencontrent un accueil favorable, nous ne tarderions point à en recommander chaleureusement l'acceptation aux Cours de Paris et de Londres, en exprimant la confiance qui nous anime qu'elles n'useront du droit de présenter éventuellement aux négociations des conditions particulières que dans un intérêt Européen et dans une mesure telle à ne pas offrir de sérieux obstacles au rétablissement de la paix.

Nous supplions la Cour de Russie d'examiner avec calme les propositions que nous lui soumettons. Nous ne nous étendrons point sur les graves conséquences qu'entraînerait le refus d'entrer dans les voies que nous lui ouvrons une seconde fois pour opérer une réconciliation honorable, refus qui ferait retomber sur elle le poids d'une immense responsabilité. Nous préférons nous en remettre à sa sagesse pour en peser toutes les chances.

Nous croyons être ici l'interprète des vœux et des véritables besoins de l'Europe. Il nous reste à faire appel aux sentiments élevés de l'Empereur Alexandre, dont la détermination suprême décidera du sort de tant de milliers d'existences. Sa Majesté Impériale s'arrêtera, nous en avons la ferme espérance, au parti qui seul nous semble répondre aux véritables intérêts de ses peuples et aux exigences de l'humanité.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Austrian Ultimatum.

Principautés Danubiennes.

ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes. Les Principautés conserveront leurs priviléges ou immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera, en outre, à ces Principautés ou y confirmera une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations. D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent réclamé par leur situation géographique. Aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie cousent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est et aboutirait au lac Sidzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Danube.

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve destinés à assurer l'exécution des règlements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Mer Noire.

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée.

Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Par conséquent il n'y sera ni créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires maritimes.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances Riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet, sera, après avoir été préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du Traité Général, annexée au dit Traité et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante.

Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnés dans l'Article précédent.

Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée, à la paix, à s'y associer.

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

No. 100.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1,695.)

Paris, December 29, 1855.

My Lord,

IT appears by a despatch received this morning from M. de Thouvenel that Baron Prokesch, on his arrival at Constantinople, had proceeded to communicate to the Porte the result of the late negotiations at Vienna. Neither M. de Thouvenel nor Lord Stratford had received their despatches on this subject, the mails from France having been delayed by bad weather.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 101.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30, 12·30 at night.)

Vienna, December 29, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has received a telegraphic despatch from Count Esterhazy, dated the 28th, stating that he had communicated the Austrian ultimatum to Count Nesselrode who made no observation upon it, but said that he would refer it to the Emperor Alexander.

Count Buol has likewise communicated the ultimatum to Prince Gortchakoff, who received it without remark.

No. 102.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Vienna, December 25, 1855.

My Lord,

THAT a very important step has at length been taken by Austria—a step which is calculated to bring her into closer cooperation, as it already has into closer contact, with the Western Powers—cannot, I think, be denied by the most sceptical politician.

If nothing else is obtained, it can hardly be otherwise than that the altered policy of Austria must have the effect of alienating her effectually from Russia.

That, at least, will be secured as soon as the ultimatum is made known officially at St. Petersburgh.

I apprehend that any explanations which would refer the change to which I allude to a single cause would be incorrect. As usually happens, various causes have conduced to obtain a result.

It appears certain that, from the beginning of the war, the wishes of Austria were in favour of the allies, but that various considerations prevented these wishes from being backed by cooperation.

An undue estimate of the strength and resources of Russia had been taken, and her open hostility was greatly feared, and the more so as the allied forces had undertaken a task which, according to the opinion of some of the best Austrian, and, indeed, German officers, it was impossible should be performed.

The fall of Sebastopol disproved these opinions, quieted their apprehensions, and proved, no doubt, the turning point of the policy of the Austrian Cabinet. As reflection came, it probably struck the Imperial Ministers that if there was anything to fear from Russian resentment, that of the allied Powers might prove at least as formidable; and in process of time it must have occurred to them that if Austria proposed to herself to take part in the regulation of the conditions of a peace, she must be able to show that she had in some way contributed to the state of affairs which should render negotiation possible.

To the foregoing motives may, I think, be added the very natural desire of taking up a position a little more becoming a great Power than that which had previously been occupied, a position in particular which would contrast advantageously with the neutrality behind which the Prussian Cabinet had so long entrenched itself, to its own discredit and the extreme injury of European interests.

If such considerations have had, as I imagine, a great effect upon the Emperor's admirers, the idea of being at the head of an army of 500,000 men, and yet of having exercised so slight an influence upon the great question which has agitated the world for the last two years, has, I am assured, acted no less powerfully upon the Emperor himself.

The state of financial embarrassment from which this country is suffering, and the fear of entering upon a struggle which may be turned to their own purposes by discontented populations and races little friendly to one another, may well cause the Emperor to pause before he draws the sword, and may possibly interfere with his doing so when the hour for decisive action strikes. I am willing, however, to believe that the future policy of Austria is, to a certain

extent, beyond the contact of over caution and timidity. Late measures have placed the Cabinet upon an inclined plane, down which it can hardly but glide into full cooperation with the allies, and, should the progress not be so speedy as is to be desired, I would only respectfully submit to Her Majesty's Government that the Austrian machine is one at all times slow in its movements.

A precept of the celebrated Cardinal who governed France during so many years, has taught us that some allowances are to be made for these slow moving bodies. "Diverses nations," he wrote, "ont divers mouvements; les unes concluent promptement ce qu'elles veulent faire, tandis que d'autres y marchent à pas de plomb."

I will not conclude this despatch without stating to your Lordship that Count Buol, as I observe, is very distrustful of the degree of support which his late intimation to the Court of St. Petersburgh will meet with from the King of Prussia.

It is not in my power to say how far the event will justify such misgivings; I will only remark that should this prove well-founded the part taken during the greatest events of the last half century, by His Prussian Majesty, will indeed be an unfortunate one for a Prince whose peaceful dispositions are so openly proclaimed. That His Majesty's hesitations contributed principally to the breaking out of war, I myself have seen; that the same temporizing spirit has tended to keep it alive, is very generally acknowledged: if, beyond this, any fear of giving offence should deter the King from offering his Imperial nephew the advice so obviously required by his best interests, a fresh and most unfortunate illustration will be afforded of the occasional danger of good intentions when not directed by judgment and not strengthened by decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 103.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

Vienna, December 26, 1855.

My Lord,

ON the 20th instant I had the honour of being permitted to pay my respects successively to the Dowager Empress and to their Imperial Highnesses the Archduke Francis Charles (the Emperor's father) and the Archduchesses Sophia and Hildegarde.

Like most of the persons with whom I have conversed at Vienna, some of these Imperial personages showed much readiness in speaking to me of Russia, and appear to take a more just view of the causes of the war and the condition of Russia than I had anticipated.

In the course of these conversations I have had the satisfaction of receiving confirmation of certain statements and opinions which, during my residence in Russia, I had brought before Her Majesty's Government, and I will allude more particularly to an observation made to me by the Archduke Francis Charles. Should the war be continued, his Imperial Highness said that internal disorder might be looked for in Russia; the opinion being, he said, founded upon a remark made to him by the Emperor Nicholas as to the revolutionary elements which existed in the country, where, according to His Imperial Majesty, they were only kept under by the pressure of his hand.

As I have reverted to circumstances relating to Russia which belong as much to the past as to the present, I will take the opportunity for placing on official record a communication which was made to me a few nights ago, and in the presence of several persons, by Prince Metternich.

The Prince observed that some of my Russian reports which had been very generally read, and which he would say had been of use in opening the eyes of Europe, did not require any confirmation; but that were any corroborating testimony wanted, it could be supplied by himself, as there was hardly a word said to me by the late Emperor, which had not been used by His Imperial Majesty in his various confidential conversations with himself.

"Attend," the Prince continued, "to what I am going to relate to you. You will find it of interest. We were at Münchengraetz in 1833, when, in speaking to me of the Sultan and of the state of Turkey, three different times the Emperor Nicholas used the expression 'a dying man.' At last it became essential to take notice of the phrase, and I said, 'Voilà trois fois qu'en parlant de la Turquie votre Majesté se sert de l'expression "homme malade," ou moribond; votre Majesté me permettra donc de lui demander si c'est en médecin ou bien en héritier qu'elle parle ainsi.' 'Oh,' the Emperor replied, laughing, 'il s'entend que ce n'est que comme médecin que je veux dire cela.'"

The anecdote appears to me worth recording, and I offer it to your Lordship, unaccompanied by any of the comments which so readily present themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 104.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 48.)

Vienna, December 26, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copies of two further notes which have passed between Count Buol and myself on the subject of the complaints of Her Majesty's Mission against the editor of the "Oesterreichische Zeitung."

From the tone of Count Buol's subsequent conversation with me, I apprehend that the correspondence may now be considered as closed, and this without my having succeeded in shaking the intention of the Austrian Government.

In an amicable manner, but one which satisfied me that I was intent upon obtaining that which is beyond my reach, Count Buol assured me that it was wholly out of his power to stretch the Press Law so as to bring the paper of which I had complained within the action of the police. That plainly such an admonition as I desired to be given would be contrary to law, and a measure of great severity; inasmuch as if twice repeated, it would have the effect of stopping a newspaper, of ruining its proprietor, and of throwing out of employment a number of people connected with it, and that it would be as well an act opposed to the feeling of the Austrian Government, which was favourable to the exercise of a certain liberty of the press,—of a liberty exercised within due bounds.

This assertion, I may observe, is not devoid of correctness. A certain amount of freedom, and much more than I had expected to find in existence here, is allowed to the public press, as regards the discussion of foreign affairs, while the limits of liberty are very much narrowed when criticism is brought to bear upon the internal affairs of the country.

I regret that my exchange of notes with Count Buol has not been more effectual, but I cannot regret its having taken place, as I am satisfied that it will not be entirely without effect.

Before I left him, Count Buol said: "Pray understand our system; were the Queen of England, or Her Majesty's Ministers, to be assailed by our press, the writers would receive a severe check long before a complaint could be made by Her Majesty's Government; but these measures of severity we cannot apply to the assailants of the ordinary servants of a foreign Government. In the one case, we should be justified in saying that violent attacks might compromise the external relations of the country; in the other, we should have no such ground to stand upon."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 104.

Count Buol to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Translation.) *Vienna, December 20, 1855.*

THE Undersigned, Minister of the Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs, while acknowledging the receipt of the note of Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Sir H. Seymour, of the 15th instant, referring to the Article of the "Oesterreichische Zeitung," against the British Consul-General at Bucharest, takes the liberty of adding a few remarks which appear to him to correct in essential points the character given to the affair in question.

It is, first, the duty of the Undersigned to remark that the interpretation of the 22nd Article of the Press Law of the 27th of May, 1852, as it is given in the said note of Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy, would contain within it a limitation of the legitimate freedom of the press which does not belong to the spirit of the law; while the legislator in drawing it up certainly never intended (and in such a sense no proceedings have ever been taken) to place attacks of public journals on the character of a private individual, or of an official in the service of a friendly Power, under the category of "offences against public morality and the principles of civil society," and to put in force the 22nd Article of the Press Law.

When, therefore, the said note expresses the desire of Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy that some steps may be taken against such excesses of the Austrian press, because by them the friendly relations between Governments and the communities represented by them might be weakened, the Undersigned would wish nothing more heartily than that the idea which forms the basis of that desire should find universal recognition. Most undoubtedly the best and most earnest endeavours of Governments for the attainment of a friendly and cordial understanding are but too often weakened by excesses of the press against friendly Powers, which the Government in question may indeed ignore, but which but too often leave among the public an impression difficult to remove. This evil may evidently be averted by reciprocity, which the Austrian Legislature have adopted as a basis for such efforts, when in the Code of Criminal Punishments (ch. 66) they demand reciprocity as a condition for the punishment of injurious language towards Sovereigns of foreign States. But even in the Austrian States the principle of demanding reciprocity is never carried out so far as to permit, or allow to pass unnoticed, that a journal should contain injurious language against the persons of friendly Sovereigns, because in the other country such language is daily used with impunity against His Majesty the Emperor; and this is done apart from the conditions positively laid down by law in cases like the present, but the principle cannot be so entirely abandoned as that in the one place the sacred person of the Sovereign should be exposed with impunity to all the slanders of the daily press, but in the other insinuations of journals against inferior foreign officials should *ex officio*, and by the Administration, be visited with severe blame.

The Imperial Government feels conscious of not having been led away in the slightest degree from their friendly feelings towards Great Britain and her Government, by the unrestrained excesses of the English press against them and their illustrious Sovereign, which, especially in latter times, has passed all bounds, on account of a State Treaty which in no way touches England. They, therefore, expect, with confidence, that Her Britannic Majesty's Government will not allow their friendly relations with Austria to be weakened by the humble amount of freedom which is granted by law to the Austrian press in its remarks.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) BUOL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 104.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to Count Buol.

Vienna, December 22, 1855.

THE Undersigned, in acknowledging the receipt of the note under date of the 20th instant, which Count Buol-Schauenstein, &c., has done him the honour to address to him, is desirous of offering the following observations, which are rendered necessary by the misapprehension to which his note of the 15th appears to have given rise.

Nothing assuredly could be more remote from the intentions of the Undersigned than to call upon the Imperial Government to render more stringent the law regulating the press, or to ask for any undue application of the law at present in force.

His object was only to point out (with the reluctance which belongs to a person who treats a subject with which he is not familiar) that if the writer in a newspaper exposes himself to the admonition or the censure of the police authority by any offence against public morality and the principles of civil society, that correction or that censure may be considered as justly incurred by the author of the article in the "Oesterreichische Zeitung" to which the attention of the Imperial Government had been called by Her Majesty's Mission.

The reason appears to him to be obvious. The flagrant attack upon the private character of a functionary, contained in the article in question, is not only calculated to provoke a breach of the peace (as between individuals), but, besides injuring the person against whom it is directed in his private capacity, is calculated to interfere with the efficient discharge of those duties which he is called upon to perform as the servant of an allied and friendly Government.

No one more than the Undersigned deplores the excesses which may be objected occasionally to the press in those countries in which (like his own) the press is wholly unrestricted. The greater the value which he attaches to the perfect freedom of the press, the more sincere his regret that this value should ever be diminished by casual abuse.

He would however observe that that description of abuse or excess consisting in virulent, and it may be groundless attack, which is productive of no effect when directed a Government, may become extremely effective when aimed against private character.

From his residence in England, and from his knowledge of English customs and English law, Count Buol must be well aware that no reciprocal engagements can be taken by Her Majesty's Ministers with the Governments of other countries for the restriction of the public press. That institution has grown up with the growth of England, and is as much a part and parcel of the English system as the geographical configuration of the country.

All that Her Majesty's Government can do as regards England is, to notice those offences of the press against foreign Governments or their servants which are amenable to the law, and to deplore those which are not. As regards foreign countries, the endeavours of Her Majesty's Government must be confined to endeavouring to procure the employment by their Governments of such means as may be legally at their disposal for the prevention of similar offences, the effects of which are the more mischievous when directed not against public acts, but against private reputation; not against personages whose exalted station, particularly when joined to elevation of character, places them beyond the reach of attack, but against those persons whose comparative obscurity exposes them the more readily to the assaults of calumnious writers.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 105.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 50. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 26, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL, whom I have just left, is not satisfied with the reports which he receives from Berlin. He imagines the King to be less well-disposed than he was upon the receipt of the Emperor's letter. He augurs ill of the calculated withdrawal of Baron Manteuffel from the capital, and is very anxious that the full support of the English and French Missions should be given to representations which it will be Count George Esterhazy's province to make in a second audience of His Majesty. Count Buol desires that no threat should be made to the King of Prussia; but that it should be made perfectly clear to him that his admission into the Councils which will negotiate the conditions of peace, will depend upon the Austrian proposal being warmly supported by His Majesty at St. Petersburgh.

Upon this point Count Esterhazy's declaration to His Majesty will leave no shade of doubt.

Count Buol's language upon the great affair of the day is as decided and resolute as I could desire.

He has resolved to acquaint Colonel Manteuffel, upon his arrival here, that he cannot enter into any discussion with him as to the overtures which may be made by the King: Austria being engaged in negotiation in concert with Great Britain and France, whilst his decision with regard to Baron Seebach's mission is equally decided.

Count Valentine Esterhazy is informed that any support which can be given by Baron Seebach to the ultimatum will be welcome; but that on no account must the Saxon Minister be permitted to assume the position of a mediator.

Of Count Valentine Esterhazy's progress since he left Warsaw, nothing is known here. It is, however, expected that he will reach St. Petersburgh to-day.

Count Buol is well pleased with the reports which he receives from Munich. He considers M. Van der Pfordten's language satisfactory, and reckons upon the support which the propositions will meet with from the King of Bavaria.

From a private source I learn that Prince Gortchakoff's language as to the rejection of the propositions is less decided than it was two days ago.

My informant observed to me that the feeling which was the most apparent from Prince Gortchakoff's conversation was, that of soreness at not having been consulted during the deliberations which preceded Count Valentine Esterhazy's departure for St. Petersburgh. If this report be correct, the change in the Russian Envoy's language is very abrupt, as I heard of his saying, yesterday, that he should probably be obliged to quit Vienna, but that he should not take his departure before he had stated to Count Buol what he thought of his conduct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 106.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to you a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, relative to the mission of Baron Seebach to St. Petersburgh, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government learn with great satisfaction the views of Count Buol respecting the mission of Baron Seebach, and the determination of the Austrian Government that Count Esterhazy is not to depart from the letter of his instructions.

I am, &c

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 95.

No. 107.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 367. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 29, 1855.*

ON the receipt, at Vienna, of Count George Esterhazy's report of his audience with the King of Prussia, the substance of which was conveyed to your Lordship in my despatch No. 353 of the 22nd instant, Count Buol instructed the Austrian Minister at this Court, by telegraph, to seek an interview with Baron Manteuffel, for the purpose of urging the Prussian Government to lose no time in coming to decision as to the course they will pursue at St. Petersburgh; for on it might depend the admission of Prussia to the deliberations amongst the Great Powers which may ensue if Russia accepts the bases that will have been presented to her.

Count Esterhazy was also directed to state to his Excellency that the Bavarian Government had already announced their intention of supporting the Austrian communication; to explain that the direct communication said to be made to London and Paris, and which the King had alluded to in his interview with Count Esterhazy, was of no value, and by no means answered the objects of the Alliance; and that the journey of Baron Seebach to St. Petersburgh would have no effect in diminishing the extent of concession which had been agreed upon, and which the three Powers must obtain if negotiations for peace were to be opened.

Count Esterhazy was instructed further to say that, much as the acquiescence of Prussia was desired, and gratifying as it would be to Austria if she supported their communication at St. Petersburgh, the refusing to do so would have no effect on the ulterior resolutions of the Austrian Government.

Baron Manteuffel had left Berlin for the Christmas holidays when this instruction arrived at the Austrian Legation, and as it was put in the most pressing form, Count Esterhazy considered the best means of executing his orders without delay—for Baron Manteuffel's return was then fixed for the 29th—was to request another audience of the King, which he did by addressing a letter to Count Keller, the Marshal of the Court. Twenty-four hours elapsed before any notice was taken of this application, and Count Esterhazy then received a reply from Count Keller expressing regret that he could not take on himself the responsibility of asking for an audience of the King, as such applications could only be sent through his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his letter had been forwarded to Baron Manteuffel, from whom he would hear further. This letter brought Baron Manteuffel to Berlin, and Count Esterhazy was requested, on his Excellency's arrival, to call on him at the Foreign Department.

At this interview Count Esterhazy explained the nature of the instructions which he had received, and urgently pressed the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs to exhort the King to lose no time in writing to St. Petersburgh.

The Austrian Minister has told me that he explained to Baron Manteuffel the instructions which he had received in the most clear and precise terms, and that as his Excellency requested him to repeat the most important parts twice over, he had no doubt the communication would be accurately conveyed to the King of Prussia.

Count Esterhazy mentioned to me that at this interview no question was asked, and no observation made to him, except in reply to his inquiry whether the King's answer was likely to be favourable or hostile, to which Baron Manteuffel answered, "Certainly not hostile."

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 108.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 368. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 29, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has just called upon me to say that Colonel Manteuffel had been to see him to-day, and informed him of the mission he was to be charged with to Vienna, for which place he would probably start on Sunday. The Austrian Minister endeavoured to learn the nature of the communication of which he was to be the bearer, and was told, to his great surprise, that the King would not do more than urge on the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the advantages of peace in general terms.

Count Esterhazy then observed that the King had receded from the assurances which he had given him at his audience, when His Majesty said that he would recommend the Austrian proposal to the adoption of the Russian Government.

On this, Colonel Manteuffel appears to have spoken in no very measured language against the conditions which the allies sought to impose on Russia, saying, that he should never believe that an Emperor of Russia could consent to give up half of Bessarabia; rather, he exclaimed, carry on the war against United Europe than submit to anything so degrading.

In fact, said Count Esterhazy to me, an aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander could not have advocated the interests of Russia in stronger terms than did this Prussian Colonel.

Whether these words pourtray an exact picture of the state of things here, I cannot say, but they are not encouraging or indicative of any improvement in the attitude likely to be assumed by the Prussian Government in the present crisis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 109.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 369.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 29, 1855.*

I SAW Baron Manteuffel last night, and inquired if the King had yet taken any decision upon the Austrian communication to St. Petersburgh, and whether any instruction on the subject had been sent to Baron Werther, observing that it was most important that no time should be lost, for that Count Nesselrode must now be in possession of the proposed bases of peace. His Excellency said that intelligence of Count Valentine Esterhazy's arrival at St. Petersburgh had reached him by telegraph; the more necessary then, I said, for you to make up your minds as to what you will do.

Baron Manteuffel then gave me to understand that his cousin, Colonel Manteuffel (who had been sent for by the King some days ago, and who, as your Lordship is aware, has frequently been employed in unprofitable missions to Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and is by no means a favourite at the Austrian Court), would convey the King's answer to Vienna, but what that answer would be Baron Manteuffel did not even shadow forth, and upon my further pressing him to let me know what the King would write to St. Petersburgh, all I could learn was, that his communications would be better than we perhaps expected they would be.

Our conversation afterwards turned on the passage through Berlin of Baron Seebach on his way to St. Petersburgh. I asked if he could tell me what he carried to the Imperial Court, and that I hoped at all events it would not be words that would encourage resistance to the Austrian proposals. His Excellency

replied that he believed Baron Seebach would endeavour to impress Count Nesselrode with the true state of feeling of the Emperor Napoleon, the French Government and people, on the great question of the moment, and that he would urge the necessity of making large concessions, if peace was seriously desired in Russia, for he was convinced that though there might be a powerful peace party in France, trifling concessions would not be listened to.

I asked Baron Manteuffel if it was true that Baron Seebach had seen the Emperor Napoleon before leaving Paris. He said that Count Hatzfeldt believed that he had had a private audience of His Imperial Majesty after his interview with Count Walewski, but that even if it were so, he possessed no information as to what had occurred on this occasion.

He then told me that Baron Budberg had been to see him in the course of the day, and had requested to be furnished with a copy of the proposed bases of peace, which he declined giving, as the communication had not come from the Austrian Government, but from the Emperor Francis Joseph. He said they had conversed on the subject, and that Baron Budberg told him that though his Government might agree to most of the conditions proposed, as far as he was acquainted with them, the question of the cession of part of Bessarabia could not be entertained.

Baron Manteuffel added, as from himself, that he thought resistance on this point certain; but that Russia might not be indisposed to give up the islands at the mouth of the Danube. I then told Baron Manteuffel that I had heard that the Russian Minister had been endeavouring to raise a cry against Austria for the condition regarding Bessarabia, and had endeavoured to lay at her door the whole responsibility of this part of the question, but I could assure him that England took as much interest in this point as in any other, and that the bases proposed formed a whole, and that England, Austria, and France were prepared to take their stand equally on each; but I said the free navigation of the Danube was a question which particularly regarded Germany, and, therefore, ought to deserve the fullest support of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 110.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1856.)

(No. 1,700.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 31, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI received this morning a messenger from Berlin, by whom M. de Moustier renders an account of two interviews which he had with M. de Manteuffel, on the subject of the Vienna ultimatum.

Count Walewski considers the result of these conversations to be on the whole satisfactory, but, from the account which his Excellency gave of them, I cannot see that the attitude of Prussia has in any manner changed. M. de Manteuffel said that, although he should be glad if the Russian Government accepted the ultimatum (and he would recommend them to do so), yet he felt sure that it would not be agreed to, but that probably a counter-proposition would be made, on which negotiations might be founded. He seemed surprised and vexed when M. de Moustier told him that no counter-propositions would be received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 111.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1856.)

(No. 1,702.)
Paris, December 31, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1,695 of the 29th instant, I have to state that the communication therein alluded to as having been made by Baron Prokesch to the Porte, was not official, nor were any documents given. M. de Prokesch merely stated in conversation what had been passing at Vienna. He is not instructed to do more.

The Porte, however, it appears, has knowledge of the whole transaction, and approves the proceedings of the allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1856.)

(No. 1,042. Confidential.)
Constantinople, December 18, 1855.

My Lord,

BARON PROKESCH, who arrived here yesterday in the character of an Austrian Internuncio, paid his first official visit to the Porte this morning. He did me the honour of calling at a later hour, in company with Baron Koller.

I tried, as I knew he was fully informed on the subject, to learn from his Excellency whether the Austrian propositions of peace, which he expected to reach St. Petersburgh to-day, had been founded on any previous acquaintance with the wishes of the Russian Government. I was led to infer the negative from the manner in which he said it was intended to apprise Prince Gortchakoff of the object of Count Valentine Esterhazy's mission to St. Petersburgh, although his general reasoning as to the losses of Russia, and the little she was likely to gain by a continuance of the war, implied a certain degree of confidence in the pacific result of the ultimatum.

It does not appear that any communication of a confidential character took place yesterday between Baron Prokesch and the Turkish Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 113.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January .)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, January 1, 1856.

COUNT ESTERHAZY sends word from St. Petersburgh, dated the 30th.

The Prussian Minister there has been instructed to use his influence in a conciliatory sense. Count Esterhazy adds, "he supports me loyally."

No. 114.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 7.)
Paris, January 1, 1856.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador informed me this afternoon that he had received instructions by telegraph to express the wish of the Sultan to send a general officer to assist at the Council of War to be held at Paris. Count Walewski, on being made acquainted with those instructions, said that it was too late, as the Council was to meet in a day or two; but upon being further pressed by the Ambassador, he requested him to put his demand into writing, promising to submit it to the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 115.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 16.)
Foreign Office, January 2, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch No. 7 of the 1st instant, that the request of the Sultan to be allowed to send a general officer to assist at the Council of War at Paris is a reasonable and proper one, and in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government should be complied with.

It will not only be right on account of appearance to the world, but a Turkish General may afford useful information respecting the means at the disposal of the Porte for carrying on the war. If sent for by the telegraph he might arrive before the labours of the Council are concluded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 115 *a*.

Sir James Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1856.)

(No. 181.)
Turin, December 30, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch marked No. 154 of the 19th instant, inclosing copies for communication to the Sardinian Government of the ultimatum to be signified to Russia by the Cabinet of Vienna, I have the honour to transmit herewith the copy of a "note verbale" which has been placed in my hands by the Sardinian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 115 *a*.

Note Verbale.

LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a reçu en communication et a eu l'honneur de soumettre au Roi en son Conseil les propositions d'accommodement devant servir de base à un Traité de Paix, que les Puissances Occidentales ont autorisé le Cabinet de Vienne à présenter comme ultimatum à l'acceptation du Gouvernement Russe.

Les conditions sur lesquelles le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg est appelé à délibérer, ne dépassent en aucune manière le but que la France et l'Angleterre s'étaient proposé d'atteindre en commençant une guerre généreuse, dégagée de toute idée de conquête et d'agrandissement territorial.

Et maintenant qu'à la suite d'une série de succès éclatants ce but est presque atteint matériellement, s'agissant de le convertir en droit, il y a plus que de la générosité, il y a de la grandeur à ne tenir aucun compte des immenses sacrifices faits pour le maintien d'un principe, et à ne demander à la Russie que les concessions strictement nécessaires pour en assurer la stabilité.

Cet exemple si noble et si rare, donné par la France et l'Angleterre, de se servir de la guerre uniquement comme d'un moyen extrême pour obtenir le triomphe de la cause de la justice et de la civilisation, et nullement comme d'un instrument d'ambition, nous laisse l'espoir que, si les conditions de paix sont agréés par la Russie, les Puissances alliées voudront dans le même intérêt de la justice et de la civilisation, entreprendre une tâche encore plus glorieuse, et dont le succès évitera de nouvelles complications bien plus graves que celle qu'on a l'espoir de terminer.

Nous avons lieu de croire que la Sardaigne, après avoir partagé les périls et la gloire de la guerre de Crimée, sera, dans les Conférences qui vont s'ouvrir, assez heureuse pour voir l'attention des grandes Puissances se fixer aussi sur l'état de l'Italie; sur l'impossibilité d'y maintenir un ordre de choses qui répugne en certains endroits aux plus simples notions de la justice et de l'equité; sur la nécessité d'en relever la condition et d'en alléger les souffrances, pour peu que l'on désire étouffer les germes de troubles qui menacent incessamment le repos de l'Europe, et assurer à tout le monde pour longtemps les bienfaits de la paix.

D'après le projet d'arrangement qui nous a été communiqué, l'Autriche, qui n'a pas pris part à la guerre, viendrait à acquerir en définitive une grande prépondérance en Orient en substituant, si non de droit au moins de fait, sa propre influence à l'influence Russe. C'est plus particulièrement à son profit qu'aurait lieu l'annexion aux Principautés Danubiennes de la moitié de la Bessarabie et des Bouches du Danube. Le temps est donc venu, même en ne s'inspirant que des Actes du Congrès de Vienne, de régulariser la position de cette Puissance en Italie, si on veut que l'équilibre Européen, pour lequel on a pris les armes, soit maintenu.

Les nations qui toutes ou sont ou tendent à devenir industrielles, ont grand besoin d'une paix durable pour assurer le développement de leur bien-être intellectuel et matériel. Elles ne se résignent pas plus maintenant aux longues agitations qu'aux guerres trop prolongées. En évitant ce double inconvénient, on évitera des révolutions qui commencées, dans une époque plus ou moins rapprochée, en Italie, pourraient s'étendre ailleurs.

Turin, le 29 Décembre, 1855.

No. 116.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1856.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 30, 1855.*

A MESSENGER, dispatched by M. de Bourqueney, gives me an opportunity for writing a few lines to your Lordship.

Count Buol is very much disappointed by the accounts which he has received from Munich.

M. Von der Pfordten began by saying that he had no knowledge of the terms proposed by Austria, and upon being made acquainted with them stated, that although he was ready to give them a general support they were not of a nature to bring about peace, or to be worth enforcing by war.

Count Appony has been instructed to communicate the ultimatum officially to M. de Pfordten, and in the most energetic manner to call upon the Bavarian Government for its support of them.

The conduct of Count George Esterhazy offers a striking contrast to that of Count Appony, and the spirit with which he has acted upon his instructions appears to have produced an effect upon the Court of Berlin.

Count Walewski has signified by telegraph the full approbation of the Emperor, his master, of the orders sent from hence to St. Petersburgh, and of the firm resolution taken by the Austrian Cabinet not to admit of any mediation on the part of Baron Seebach.

The intention of the Porte to send Prince Callimachi to Vienna with the rank of Ambassador is embarrassing to the Austrian Government and very unacceptable to the French Mission. As an Envoy M. de Callimachi would, it is felt, be able to discharge all the duties assigned to him, whilst his diplomatic rank would secure him against the jealousies and embarrassments to which a higher grade would subject him.

Colonel Manteuffel is expected to arrive here to-morrow.

Were his mission to be indefinitely postponed, little inconvenience would, I imagine, accrue to the service of the King of Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 117.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 6 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 4, 1856, 2 A.M.*

THE interview between Count Buol and Colonel Manteuffel has proved at least as satisfactory as could be expected.

Count Buol was very unbending, and said plainly that the omission of a single comma would be equivalent to a refusal.

No. 118.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5.)

Vienna, January 4, 1856.

Telagraphic.)

COUNT ESTERHAZY states, by message of yesterday's date, that the propositions are under serious deliberation, and that a [decision] may be shortly expected to be taken.

He had repelled all attempts at modifications, and admits possibility of a pure and simple acceptance.

Peace party at St. Petersburgh appears to gain in strength.

No. 119.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 27.)

Paris, January 5, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has received telegraphic news from Vienna to the following purport:

Count Valentine Esterhazy has informed his Government that the ultimatum is under the serious consideration of the Russian Government, and that he has been requested to state what would be the consequences if modifications were introduced into it by Russia; that he replied that his orders were peremptory, and that the slightest alteration would be considered by him as tantamount to its rejection; that he had, moreover, found it necessary to let the Russian Government understand, in an unofficial manner, that the rejection of the ultimatum would entail the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria.

Count Esterhazy adds that although he has no doubt that the ultimatum will be rejected, yet that the peace party in Russia is gaining ground every day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 120.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Frankfort, January 2, 1856.

My Lord

YOUR Lordship's No. 82 of the 20th ultimo reached me before either my Austrian or French colleagues had received the intelligence which it communicated. I was, therefore, enabled to make them aware of the nature of the terms to be proposed at St. Petersburgh, though, from the caution which your Lordship had conveyed to me by Lord Wodehouse, I did not show the inclosures either to Count Rechberg or M. de Montessuy. The latter gentleman received the same information in a cyphered despatch a few days after your Lordship's despatch had reached me, and Count Rechberg had all the documents in duly certified copies sent him by a Cabinet courier. His Excellency allowed me yesterday to collate the copies I possess with those which had been forwarded to him, and I have thus become acquainted with the important change in the wording of the Fourth Article, which invites Russia to participate in the arrangement to be concluded respecting the future condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, instead of that which stood in the draft inclosed in your Lordship's No. 82, whereby Russia was to be invited to adhere to the arrangement after its conclusion.

I may inform your Lordship that after I had seen Count Rechberg, on Sunday the 23rd of December, and made him aware of the information your Lordship had done me the honour of putting me in possession of, he was visited by M. de Brunnow, who, Count Rechberg informed me, was equally aware of the whole of the proposals, and had expressed himself to him in rather strong terms of disapproval respecting them, and disbelief in their acceptance.

To show me how accurately M. de Brunnow was informed, Count Rechberg cited to me his having remarked very acrimoniously on the phrase "rectification de la frontière Russe," on which he observed, "une telle gaucherie de phraséologie pourrait beaucoup contribuer à faire échouer le tout."

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 121.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 8.)

Vienna, January 2, 1856.

My Lord,

MY French colleague has just read me a despatch which he has addressed to Count Walewski, respecting the inconvenient consequences to the French and English Missions at Vienna of a rank as high as that of Ambassador being given to the Turkish Representative, who is shortly to be sent here.

Baron Bourqueney's objections appear to be so well founded, and to be so forcibly and intelligibly set forth, that I have requested him to move Count Walewski that a copy of the despatch may be forwarded to Count Persigny for communication to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 122.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 9. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 2, 1856.

My Lord.

YOUR Lordship will have learned from my telegraphic despatch of yesterday the only intelligence of which the Government was in possession from St. Petersburgh. More, however, may very shortly be expected, as it appears that a despatch from Count V. Esterhazy, containing the observations which he has made at St. Petersburgh, has been sent off.

It is clear to me that Count Buol attaches little importance to the assurances of support which he has received from the Prussian Government, but that he sets considerable value upon the manner in which Baron Werther is acting upon his instructions.

Count Buol is evidently anxious that good advice should be offered to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh from as many quarters as possible, and mentioned

with satisfaction the instructions which had been given by the King of the Netherlands to his Envoy, M. Gevers.

I understand that fresh instructions have been sent to Count V. Esterhazy, reiterating the injunction laid upon him to listen to no counter-propositions, modifications of terms, or qualified acceptance; and such is the rule which Count Buol has laid down for his own guidance, in the event of Prince Gortchakoff resorting to any of these expedients.

Up to a certain point the resolution of the Austrian Cabinet appears to be irrevocably fixed; beyond this, all is yet uncertainty and hesitation: and reluctance to advance must, I conceive, be looked for, if Austria is to find herself with a hostile Russia in her front and a Russianized Germany behind her.

It is satisfactory meanwhile to observe that some of these philo-Russians to be found in the ranks of German diplomacy, are beginning to be aware that the interests of Russia suggest a compliance with the terms at present within her reach.

Count Buol's language upon this point (but he, at least, is free from any predilection of the kind to which I allude) is perfectly explicit.

I am willing, he observed to me yesterday, to affirm upon oath that Russia could have obtained better terms last May than she could do now; and though I could not swear it, I can conscientiously express my conviction that the conditions now within her reach are more favourable than those which she would obtain after a third campaign.

It has been whispered to me that one at least of these diplomatists who, although not ostensibly in Russian employment and pay, are to all intents and purposes her agents, has suggested that it would be hard to deprive Russia of any part of Bessarabia, but that possibly the cession might be acquiesced in were she to receive some slight territorial compensation in another quarter.

From this and other trifling indications, as well as from the time which has elapsed since the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, it may, I think, be inferred that the conditions of peace are such, in the opinion of the Russian Cabinet, as to deserve, at least, very mature consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 123.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 2, 1856.*

I HAVE had the honour receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 49 of the 26th ultimo, and, in obedience to your directions, have communicated to Count Buol the memorandum upon the organisation of the Principalities.

The length of this paper made me certain that Count Buol would ask me to leave it in his hands, and this consideration induced me to efface the short sentence at the top of the third page, beginning with the words, "The most decided," and ending with, "religious sympathies."

It was with reluctance that I took this step without previous reference to your Lordship; but as it is my object to obtain, if possible, the Austrian concurrence in the views of Her Majesty's Government, I did not hesitate to suppress a phrase which, while it is not necessary for their explanation, might, from its wording, be offensive to the Austrian Government.

As I had expected, Count Buol requested me to confide the paper to him for a few days.

His Excellency appeared to be struck with the observations which I made in your Lordship's name as to the expediency of avoiding guarantees, which, besides being injurious to the Sultan, might prove a source of embarrassment to the guaranteeing Powers.

On his side, however, he is desirous of impressing upon Her Majesty's

Government the expediency of associating a Turkish Representative to the other three in the preparatory deliberations which will take place.

This mark of deference Count Buol thinks to be owing to the Sultan, and it is one, in his opinion, which may obviate difficulties which otherwise may be raised by the Porte.

As the memorandum contains no mention of our French ally, whilst England and Austria are frequently alluded to, I would venture to suggest that it might be advisable to add the words "and France" to those of "cordial intercourse with England."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 124.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—Received January 7.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 5, 1855.*

I HAD an interview with Baron Manteuffel shortly after the arrival of the last messenger, in which our conversation turned chiefly on the great question of the day—the chances of peace or a continuation of the war, and the surmises as to the impression which had been made at St. Petersburgh by the Austrian communication.

His Excellency said that he could give me no information of value from that quarter; that he did not believe that any decision had yet been taken by the Russian Government, nor had he received anything from Baron Werther that indicated what would be the result of the communication, but that his own impression was that the Emperor would not accept the bases of peace as submitted to him. I said that I was grieved to hear that this was his Excellency's opinion, for I had hoped that, in the interests of Russia, it would have been prudent to accept them rather than expose that Empire and Europe to a continuation of the war; nay, I said, to an extension of it, for if peace was not signed, the Baltic would probably be the scene of hostilities on a very different scale from what had hitherto occurred.

I then observed that I could not conceal from his Excellency that the feeling in England of dissatisfaction at the conduct and position of Prussia at the present crisis, was general, and that Her Majesty's Government, it appeared to me, were under the impression, from the reports which I had rendered of my various endeavours to induce the Prussian Government to support the Austrian communication at St. Petersburgh, that they were now less favourably disposed to our views than on former occasions; that we had reason to believe that she was exerting all her influence in Germany to prevent the smaller States from siding with Austria, and that we felt that Prussia was going back rather than forward, while what had been asked for at St. Petersburgh was, in the opinion of Austria, the minimum that we could be satisfied with. Baron Manteuffel endeavoured to defend himself from the accusation of going backwards, or of any want of cordiality in the support which had been given to the Austrian propositions by Baron Werther, and read me a telegraphic despatch from Count Valentine Esterhazy, stating that he had been loyally supported by the Prussian Minister. This, I said, might be; but I asked his Excellency to inform me, if this were so, why was there so much mystery about the instructions which had been sent to St Petersburgh as well as to Vienna? To this his Excellency gave me an unmeaning answer, when I observed that I thought the British Government had reason to complain that no answer, as far as I was informed, had been returned to the communication which I made to his Excellency a fortnight ago, when I read to him a despatch which I had just received directing me to invite Prussia to support the Austrian proposals at St. Petersburgh. Had any answer, I asked, been sent to Count Bernstorff? His Excellency replied that that Minister had been placed in possession of the correspondence with St. Petersburgh and Vienna. Then, I said, I hope he will be able to explain to your Lordship more satisfactorily than I have had it in my power to do, the

future policy of the Prussian Government. That explanation had been so unsatisfactory, that, coupled as it might be with the vast and increasing trade in munitions of war which was carried on between Prussia and Russia, I feared that in the spring, when hostilities would, perhaps, take place by sea and land, the friendship evinced by Prussia for our enemy might be taken into calculation, and that I implored him to endeavour to check what was passing, and to stop the illegal traffic in arms and munitions of war.

His Excellency said that my language was that of menace, and that was not the way to gain Prussia. I said, not of menace, but of warning to a country with which we desired to maintain always the most friendly relations. Baron Manteuffel then said that he had heard from Count Bernstorff of a violent article which had appeared in the "Morning Post" against Prussia, and that the Count had written to your Lordship about it. I observed that I had not seen this article, but I said it is probably not much worse than those which are published every day in the "Kreuz Zeitung" against England; and there is this difference in our positions, that the Prussian Government can exercise the fullest control over the press, and that if it has the will it will soon find the way of putting down obnoxious papers, whereas the British Government have no legal means of checking the licentious articles which occasionally appear in our journals.

The evening after I had this conversation with Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency called on the French Minister (who in consequence of family affliction had not gone out for several days), evidently with a view of discovering whether he was inclined to hold the same language to him that I had done. M. de Moustier has informed me that the Baron was much preoccupied, and after drawing the conversation on the difficulties with which the position of Prussia was surrounded at this crisis, M. de Moustier told him that in the West there was a fixed opinion that if Prussia had joined cordially in the Austrian propositions, they would be accepted at St. Petersburgh, and certainly if they were rejected the responsibility of their rejection would be laid to the door of Prussia.

My Austrian colleague received yesterday, by a Prussian courier from St. Petersburgh, a private letter from Count Valentine Esterhazy of the 29th ultimo, in which he speaks in grateful terms of the support which he had received from Baron Werther; but he begs his cousin, in the interests of peace, of Germany, and, above all, of the Emperor Alexander himself, to exert all his influence with the Prussian Government to have directions sent to Baron Werther to join with him in making the terms acceptable. Count George Esterhazy immediately sent this letter to Baron Manteuffel, and it was written in a tone calculated to produce an impression, but I know not what has resulted from this appeal, and indeed it is now almost too late to send anything further except by telegraph.

The instructions to Baron Werther were only forwarded from here on the 31st ultimo, by Colonel Rauch, son of Count Munster's predecessor at St. Petersburgh. This officer has proceeded to Russia to assist at the marriage of his sister, one of the ladies-in-waiting of the Dowager Empress, and Count Fersen, who holds high office at the Imperial Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 125.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

My Lord, *The Hague, January 3, 1856.*

AT the request of M. Van Hall, I called upon him yesterday evening, at his private residence, where he confidentially communicated to me the proposals which Count Esterhazy has been instructed by his Government to carry to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and also a despatch which he has himself addressed to the Netherland Chargé d'Affaires in Russia on the subject of peace.

I found that the report of the proposals which M. Van Hall had that morning received from the Netherland Minister at Vienna corresponded with the

printed copy of the Austrian ultimatum, as transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch marked "Confidential," No. 60, of the 26th of December, 1855; but his Excellency was not aware of the nature of the additional conditions attached by Great Britain and France to the ultimatum, as detailed in the body of your Lordship's confidential despatch; and I accordingly abstained from communicating them to the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs, nor did I allow his Excellency to perceive that I had had any previous knowledge of the contents of the ultimatum itself.

After M. Van Hall had read to me the proposals, I asked him what was his opinion of them, when his Excellency replied that he considered them to be acceptable by Russia.

In answer to my question as to what he thought of the proposal respecting the territory to be ceded by Russia in Bessarabia, he observed that, according to the information he had received, the population of the ceded territory did not exceed 400,000 souls, and that he did not apprehend Russia would object to the cession.

On further conversation, however, I perceived that his Excellency had not referred to a map of Bessarabia, and that he was not aware that by the proposed throwing back of the Russian frontier, Russia would have to abandon the important fortress of Ismail and the military port of Reni, which holds the Turkish fortress of Galatz in check, besides having to relinquish the line of the Pruth. On becoming acquainted with the full importance of the cession required from Russia, M. Van Hall appeared to entertain some doubt as to the willingness of Russia to consent to such terms.

His Excellency, however, said that in the present position of Russia, he was of opinion it would be for her interest to make peace, as it was evident that another campaign might bring with it results most prejudicial to the welfare of Russia; and, in support of this opinion, his Excellency alluded to the formidable preparations now making, both in England and in France, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in the Baltic and in the South, in the ensuing spring.

When expressing to his Excellency as my own private and individual opinion that the ready acceptance by Russia, as at present situated, of the Austrian ultimatum might give rise to some doubt as to her sincerity in thus finally acquiescing in the required abandonment of her aggressive policy in the East, by entering honestly and in good faith into engagements to renounce for the future those objects of ambition which had formed the basis of Russian policy for the last seventy or eighty years, his Excellency considered my apprehensions to be unfounded; but his subsequent conversation proved that in fact we did not in reality differ as to what might be the secret intentions of Russia, for he proceeded to remark that a Russian Minister might gladly avail himself of the first opportunity to make peace, because he might feel that so long as Great Britain and France were united together by the common interests of the present war, little or no chance existed of seeing the cordial alliance between the two countries either broken or diminished; whereas, under the calmer influences of peace, circumstances might possibly arise, of policy or of interest, which might lead, if not to a rupture, at least to a diminution of that intimate friendship and mutual confidence which at present forms the great power of the Western Alliance; and that a period of peace might enable Russia, by profiting from the experience she had acquired during the present war, to make fresh preparations for the future, and to provide against a repetition of such faults or omissions as had occurred in the course of the present hostilities.

Such arguments your Lordship will, I think, be of opinion, sufficiently justify me in feeling that in reality M. Van Hall and myself view the possible policy of Russia much in the same light—namely, that Russia, to avoid becoming more effectually crippled, and ultimately forced to abandon her ambitious projects, from utter inability to pursue them, may only accede to the present proposals of the allies, for the purpose of waiting for a more favourable opportunity to renew them, and not from a sincere and fixed determination to confine her foreign policy within such limits as may effectually secure the independence of neighbouring States and the future repose and tranquillity of Europe.

In thus reporting to your Lordship what dropped from M. Van Hall in the course of a confidential conversation as to what might be the result of the communication which Count Esterhazy is charged to make to the Cabinet of

St. Petersburgh, and as to a course of policy which might possibly suggest itself to the mind of a Russian Minister, I should be representing M. Van Hall in an invidious light, were I to lead your Lordship to believe that he anticipated that such would in reality be the motives which are to govern the decision of the Russian Government, and his hope is, that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, appreciating as it deserves, the advice that has been tendered to it from so many different quarters, from feelings of sincere friendship, and measuring to their full extent the dangers and humiliations to which an obstinate prolongation of the present contest with the Western Powers may eventually expose the Russian Empire, will embrace, in a spirit of honesty and sincerity, the opportunity now offered of restoring peace to Europe.

The impression which my conversation with M. Van Hall has, however, left upon my mind is, that his hope rather than his conviction leads him to entertain visions of the possibility of an approaching peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 126.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

The Hague, January 3, 1856.

My Lord,

IN my preceding despatch of this day's date, I informed your Lordship that M. Van Hall had communicated to me confidentially a despatch which he had addressed to the Netherland Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh on the subject of peace.

This despatch has been written in consequence of the friendly and cordial manner in which Count Nesselrode had received the previous communication which the Netherland Chargé d'Affaires had been instructed to make to him on the same subject; the substance of which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 109 of the 14th December, 1855.

M. Van Hall, in his present communication, while advocating the expediency of Russia availing herself of the opportunity now offered to her of sincerely adopting a policy of peace and moderation, has availed himself, amongst other arguments, of the Treaty lately concluded between Great Britain and France on one side, and Sweden on the other; and he particularly calls the attention of Count Nesselrode to the real importance and signification of the Swedish circular which has accompanied the communication of the Treaty itself. M. Van Hall in his despatch remarks that Count Nesselrode appears, when he attributes the conclusion of the Treaty in question simply to the exercise of a momentary pressure on the Swedish Government by those of Great Britain and France to underrate the true value and bearing of that Treaty, which, according to his, M. Van Hall's, information, so far from being the result of a temporary pressure, was in reality the expression of the general deep feeling of the whole Swedish nation, and, as such, deserves the full and mature consideration of Russia; that this Treaty afforded an additional proof of the increasing development of public feeling against Russia, and of the general desire to recommend to the attention of the Russian Government the expediency of their embracing a policy of peace; that, moreover, this feeling had now been openly shown by a great portion of Germany, and by the States of the second order; and that even in Prussia, which he had hitherto considered as being the stronghold of Russian influence in Germany, he was now forced to admit that public opinion was much divided, and that there existed a growing sympathy towards the Western Powers. That all these circumstances, joined to the prospects, which were well founded, of the allies obtaining further and important successes, should another campaign be undertaken, ought to make a serious impression on the Russian Government, and induce them to listen to the dictates of prudence and to the sincere and urgent recommendations of friendly and neutral Powers.

That it was in a spirit of friendship towards Russia, and in consequence of the cordial manner in which Count Nesselrode had received his previous communication, that he, M. Van Hall, now renewed, of his own free will, and not at the instigation of any foreign diplomacy, his instances in favour of a peace policy, upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and that he thus joined with others in urging upon the Russian Government the expediency of their dispassionately considering the true interests of the Russian Empire, and the dangers to which it might eventually be exposed.

In making these serious and well-founded observations to the Russian Government, M. Van Hall added that he entirely disclaimed all intention of endeavouring to assume for the Netherlands a prominent place in transactions in which she was not naturally called upon to take a leading part; but that an opening having been afforded him of recording the opinion of the Netherland Government, he had been unwilling to let it pass unemployed.

Considering the position of strict neutrality which the Netherland Government have hitherto scrupulously maintained from the commencement of the war; their present energetic appeal to the reason of the Russian Government; and the clear expression which they have given to their opinions, can hardly be construed otherwise than as now implying a condemnation of the preceding conduct of Russia, and as evincing sympathy and approval of the policy of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 127.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE read with no small surprise your Excellency's despatch No. 18, marked Confidential, and I am unable to account for the report made by M. de Persigny of his conversation with me, which report has but a slender reference to what actually passed between us on that occasion, and which gives an erroneous version of the opinions I expressed.

In the course of this conversation, which was unofficial, and of a desultory character, and which originated, if I remember rightly, in M. de Persigny's stating his opinion upon the object of the Emperor's speech to the troops, and the effect that it would produce in Prussia, I believe I said that an appeal to the smaller German Powers to support the ultimatum of Austria might be attended with more inconvenience than advantage, as Russia would care little for their advice, even if they could be induced to offer it, and if they did they might think themselves entitled to take part in negotiations for peace, and that Her Majesty's Government could never listen to a claim so preposterous and absurd.

M. de Persigny spoke of the necessity of holding very strong language to Prussia, and compelling her to take a decided line, and to declare whether she was with or against the Western Powers.

I said that the conduct of Prussia had been faithless, as she had not maintained the neutrality she professed, and had never ceased to afford to Russia every facility for obtaining munitions of war. I mentioned then that the English Vice-Consul at Stettin, who had been sent by me to obtain information on this subject, had lately seen twenty-four large waggons, laden with powder, proceeding on the road to Warsaw, escorted by Prussian police; and I said that if a campaign in the Baltic were undertaken on a large scale next spring, such a state of things could hardly be allowed to continue, and it might be matter for consideration between the English and French Governments whether the adoption of means to prevent the transit through Prussia of munitions of war to Russia, might not become necessary and justifiable; but the idea of declaring war against Prussia if she did not support the Austrian ultimatum never crossed my mind, and was, therefore, neither directly nor indirectly alluded to by me.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 128.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1856.)

(No. 1,054.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1855.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's instruction inclosing the Austrian ultimatum, with the marginal alterations proposed by Her Majesty's Government, and to be supported by the French Ambassador at Vienna, I settled a time for meeting with M. de Thouvenel. We met, in consequence, on the 22nd instant; and after communicating freely with each other on the subject and its attendant considerations, we agreed to apprise Fuad Pasha, by a simultaneous message, of the proceedings which had taken place, and to put him in possession confidentially of the memorandum which I had received from your Lordship.

In coming to this decision I am guided by two motives, both equally in accordance with the interests of the case and the views of Her Majesty's Government. I was not only at liberty, but directed, to make a full communication to the Turkish Ministers. It was evidently desirable for me to make the communication in concurrence with the French Ambassador.

Yesterday, in execution of our agreement, the principal interpreters of the two Embassies, acting under similar instructions, waited on the Ottoman Secretary of State together, and read the ultimatum, with its modifications, prefacing their communication to his Excellency with a brief statement of the preliminary facts, and of the reasons which had prevented any previous reference to the Turkish Government.

Fuad Pasha, after listening to the whole with deep attention, expressed the satisfaction which he had derived in general from the terms of pacification sanctioned by the allied Governments, particularly in what respected the removal of the Russian frontier from the Danube, and the neutralization of the Black Sea. He declared that for peace, as for war, the Porte was prepared to move in concert with her allies; reserving only the faculty of submitting her remarks at the proper time, and drawing attention to such considerations as might arise with reference to the question of privileges, constituting the fourth point or basis of negotiation, and that of the Danubian Principalities, which was comprised in the first.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I propose to send Fuad Pasha a copy of the Memorandum marked B, as requested by his Excellency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 129.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. - (*Received January* 8, 1856.)

(No. 1,055.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1855.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding number I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's more complete information, copies of the memorandum which I delivered to Mr. Pisani, as his instruction in waiting, yesterday, on Fuad Pasha, and of the report addressed to me by that gentleman after seeing his Excellency, in concert with the French interpreter.

It may be right for me to mention that M. Thouvenel had been instructed by his Government to suspend the communication of the ultimatum and of its preliminary proceedings till after the arrival of the mail which was to leave Paris on the 15th instant. As I was authorized by your Lordship to make the communication, and as Baron Prokesch was at liberty to make a similar one without our knowledge, he, M. Thouvenel, felt the propriety of acting, as I was prepared to do, without further delay.

As he was not in possession of the memorandum marked B, with its modifications in red ink, I acceded to his request of having a copy from me, and he was evidently desirous of not leaving me to make the communication alone.

Under these circumstances, I have reserved the communcation to Fuad Pasha of your Lordship's despatch No. 76 to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 129.

Memorandum.

LE Cabinet de Vienne ayant pris la résolution de faire passer à celui de St. Pétersbourg certaines propositions comme bases d'une négociation de paix préliminaire, s'est ouvert confidentiellement à cet égard aux Cours de Londres et de Paris. L'ultimatum qui en a résulté vient d'être remis au Représentant d'Autriche à la Cour de Russie, qui se trouvait en congé à Vienne, pour être présenté par lui au Ministère Russe au nom de l'Autriche seule, avec la déclaration que si les dites conditions ne fussent acceptées par la Russie dans le terme d'un certain nombre de jours, sans modification, réserve, ou addition quelconque, les relations diplomatiques entre les deux Gouvernements seraient rompues et les Représentants de part et d'autre retirés.

C'est ce que Mr. Pisani dira de ma part, et de concert avec le premier interprète de l'Ambassade Française, à son Excellence Fuad Pacha.

Quant au memorandum ci-joint, Mr. Pisani en fera lecture au Ministre Ottoman, si M. Scheffer est autorisé à faire la même communication. Dans le cas contraire, Mr. Pisani fera mention du dit mémorandum à son Excellence, et en permettra la communication de ma part après demain, sauf toute instruction que le prochain courrier de Londres pourrait m'apporter à ce sujet.

Inclosure 2 in No. 129.

Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, le* 23 *Décembre*, 1855.

CONFORMEMENT aux ordres que votre Excellence m'a donnés je me suis rendu aujourd'hui à la Porte avec M. Scheffer, premier drogman de l'Ambassade de France. Nous avons été introduits ensemble chez M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qui a quitté le Conseil pour nous recevoir. J'ai donné lecture du projet rédigé à Vienne et des modifications qui y ont été apportées par les deux Gouvernements alliés. Fuad Pacha a écouté avec l'attention le plus soutenue le lecture de ce document; et après s'être recueilli, il m'a chargé de dire à votre Excellence qu'il lui était particulièrement reconnaissant de la communication qu'elle lui ferait faire, et qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte des raisons qui n'avaient pas permis aux Cabinets de Londres et de Paris de prendre sur ces nouvelles propositions l'avis du Gouvernement Ottoman; que le Ministère de Sa Majesté le Sultan ne pouvait qu'être plein de gratitude pour les dispositions qui rendaient à la suzeraineté de la Porte une portion notable de la Bessarabie, et écartaient pour jamais le danger qu'avait si longtemps menacé l'Empire en neutralisant la Mer Noire; que cependant la Sublime Porte se réservait le droit d'observations pour ce qui concerne la réorganisation des trois Principautés Danubiennes, dont l'initiative est réservée au Sultan. Quand au quatrième point, a ajouté Fuad Pacha, la Porte est fermement résolu à travailler à l'amélioration du sort des populations Chrétiennes, et elle ne faillira pas à sa tâche; cependant je crois qu'il est question d'arrangements à signer en commun à ce sujet, et je me permettrai de faire observer que la guerre actuelle a eu pour cause le refus de la Porte de signer une Convention pareille avec la Russie. Du reste, nos observations seront tout amicales, et nous ne doutons pas que nous ne nous entendions avec nos alliés sur ces deux points. Ils peuvent être persuadés que pour la paix comme pour la guerre nous serons toujours avec eux. Fuad Pacha a réclamé en terminant, et à titre confidentiel, une copie du document dont je lui avais donné lecture. Le premier drogman

de l'Ambassade de France n'étant pas plus autorisé que moi à la lui donner, nous avons répondu à son Excellence que nous ne pouvions déférer à son désir sans avoir pris les ordres de son Excellence et de l'Ambassadeur de France.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) ET. PISANI.

No. 130.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 16.)
Foreign Office, January 8, 1856.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has informed me that the Austrian Government were desirous of knowing whether Her Majesty's Government adopted the memorandum which had been "paraphé" by Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney on the 14th of November.

I told Count Colloredo that there were portions of that memorandum to which Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to adhere, as the discussions which had taken place between the two Governments since the date of that memorandum had materially altered some of its provisions.

With respect to the second paragraph in the memorandum, which professed to give an account of what had passed with respect to the propositions, I begged to observe, although the matter was not of much importance, that there was an inaccuracy, for although it was true that M. de Bourqueney, when at Paris, had confidentially communicated to Lord Cowley what had passed between himself and Count Buol, yet Her Majesty's Government had limited themselves to stating that they could give no opinion upon any proposals for peace until they were before them in writing.

In the fourth paragraph of the memorandum the right was reserved to the belligerents to bring forward such further conditions as they might think proper, but Count Buol expressed the hope that those conditions would not offer an insurmountable obstacle to the re-establishment of peace, and it was clear, therefore, that any such further conditions which were insisted upon by the belligerents, and were rejected by Russia, would, *ipso facto*, become an insurmountable obstacle to peace, and Count Buol having expressed his hope that no such obstacle would be raised, he would be entitled not to support the demands of the Western Powers, and the same disagreements might then be expected with the Austrian Government which took place last year, and the recurrence of which Her Majesty's Government believed it was the firm intention of Count Buol to avoid. Her Majesty's Government accordingly, having no policy to conceal and no motives to withhold from Russia the conditions they meant to bring forward beyond those contained in the Austrian ultimatum, had at once made known to the Cabinet of Vienna that they should insist upon no fortifications being restored or erected upon the Aland Islands, upon the power to appoint Consuls at the Russian ports in the Black Sea, and the right to consider the state of the countries on the eastern shores of the Black Sea; they further desired that these conditions should form part of the Austrian ultimatum, and upon this having been declined by Count Buol. Her Majesty's Government felt that they had no right to prescribe to Austria the conditions on which she should make the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia depend, but, on the other hand, they claimed to be the judges, in conjunction with the French Government, of the conditions on which alone they would consent to negotiate for peace, and they again requested that those conditions should be formally announced to the Cabinet of Vienna.

To that request, however, I remarked to Count Colloredo, that Her Majesty's Government had as yet had no answer, and they were at this moment in ignorance as to whether the additional conditions had or had not been made known to Russia, and under these circumstances Count Buol, I felt sure, would perceive that the pure and simple acceptance by Russia of the Austrian proposals, which the Austrian Government wished to be followed by the signature of the preliminaries of peace, would not be the acceptance of all those conditions upon which alone England and France would consent to sign preliminaries of peace. The signature of such preliminaries, therefore, and definitive negotiations, and a general armistice, must all depend upon the acceptance by Russia of the conditions which the memorandum reserved to the belligerents the right of bringing forward, but which they had at once made known, in justice to Russia, and in order to avoid misunderstanding with Austria.

Her Majesty's Government, I said, would gladly agree to a Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, and France, which should complete the stipulations of peace, by guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and establishing as a *casus belli*, any infraction on the part of Russia of the stipulations of the said peace.

In the event of the conditions proposed by Austria being refused by Russia, it was proposed in the memorandum that the allied Powers should meet ("se réuniraient") for the purpose of concerting measures to coerce Russia; but I observed to Count Colloredo, that the ordinary means of communication between the three Governments would be sufficient, and that no conferences, specially established for that purpose, would be necessary.

You are instructed to communicate this despatch to Count Buol, and to give a copy of it to his Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 131.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Abercromby.

(No. 5.)
Foreign Office, January 8, 1856.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 2, Confidential, of the 3rd instant, I have to instruct you to express to M. Van Hall the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for communicating to you the judicious and well-timed instructions to the Netherlands Minister at St. Petersburgh, to which Her Majesty's Government attach additional value, as those instructions have not been sent at the request of either of the belligerent Powers, and must, therefore, be considered as the spontaneous expression of the views and policy of the Netherlands Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 132.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.

Vienna, January 9, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT V. ESTERHAZY sends word, the 7th, that on the 5th the answer was sent off.

Count Esterhazy will only know the answer the day on which the answer is delivered at Vienna. This is reciprocity.

Count Buol sends to Count Esterhazy to-day that his stay must not exceed the 17th instant, unless he has received an acceptance. He is to make all preparations for departure on that day.

The Russian answer will be here the 11th or 12th instant. Seebach left St. Petersburgh on the 7th.

No. 133.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 9, 1856.)

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, December* 31, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from Baron Stierneld, dated the 28th instant, forwarding to me an autograph letter from King Oscar (copy of which is also inclosed), in which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to express in very flattering terms his appreciation of my conduct in the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance of the 21st of November last.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 133.

Baron Stierneld to Mr. Magenis.

Monsieur, *Stockholm, le* 28 *Décembre*, 1855.

D'ORDRE du Roi, mon auguste Souverain, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce pli, une lettre autographe que Sa Majesté a daigné vous adresser, Monsieur, pour vous exprimer sa haute et gracieuse satisfaction de la part que vous avez prise à la conclusion du Traité d'Alliance du 21 Novembre dernier entre les Royaumes-Unis, la Grande Bretagne, et la France.

En exécutant cette commission agréable, je ne saurais que saisir, &c.
(Signé) STIERNELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 133.

His Majesty King Oscar to Mr. Magenis.

M. Magenis, *Stockholm, le* 27 *Décembre*, 1855.

PENDANT le cours des négociations qui viennent d'aboutir à la conclusion d'un Traité également important pour les Royaumes-Unis que pour la Grande Bretagne, j'ai eu l'occasion d'apprécier le zèle, l'esprit d'équité, et le dévouement à votre Souverain qui vous distinguent si honorablement. Il m'est infiniment agréable de vous témoigner combien j'attache de prix aux vues éclairées et conciliantes que vous avez manifestées, et en me flattant que votre Gouvernement de son côté reconnaîtra également vos services, je vous prie d'être persuadé de la part que je prendrai toujours à votre bonheur, et du plaisir avec lequel je vous verrai continuer à cultiver les intimes relations si heureusement établies entre la Reine votre auguste Souverain et moi.

Je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, M. l'Envoyé, en sa sainte et digne garde.

Votre, &c.
(Signé) OSCAR.

No. 134.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency's proceedings in communicating, in conjunction with the French Ambassador, the Austrian ultimatum to the Porte, as reported in your despatches Nos. 1,054 and 1,055 of

the 24th of December last; but Her Majesty's Government do not understand what Fuad Pasha means by alluding to "a question of arrangements for signing a document in common" on the fourth point, as his Excellency is reported to have done in Mr. Pisani's statement of the 23rd of December, which is inclosed in your despatch No. 1,055.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 135.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 44.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1856.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 35 of the 6th instant, that M. d'Azeglio read to me, and placed in my hands, a copy of the Sardinian note respecting the consequences to Italy of peace being concluded upon the terms proposed by Austria to Russia; and I made to him much the same answer that Count Walewski appears, from your Excellency's despatch, to have given to M. de Villamarina.

I said that the views, or rather the fears, of the Sardinian Government appeared to be founded on a misapprehension of facts, and a notion that Austria would, by the aid of England and France, obtain the Protectorate of the Principalities hitherto exercised by Russia, and thus become all-powerful in Germany; but so far was this from being the case, that we had taken special care, in the wording of the ultimatum, to avoid pledging ourselves to anything of the kind; and I saw no reason to think that Austria would hereafter exercise more influence in the Principalities than that which she must always derive from her geographical position; and that, with regard to the increase of power which Austria would obtain in Germany, it was likely rather to be diminished than increased, owing to the jealousy and hostile feelings of Prussia, and the disunion which prevailed between Austria and the minor States, and evidence of this was already existing, as these States had declined to support the Austrian ultimatum.

I further told M. d'Azeglio that if negotiations for peace were now entered upon, it was not easy to see in what way the condition of Italy could be brought under the serious consideration of the Plenipotentiaries; but that Her Majesty's Government took a deep interest in the question, and would, on all fitting occasions, use their best efforts to promote a better state of things in that country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 136.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January* 10, 1856.

THE Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh reports that the Russian Government have dispatched the answer to the ultimatum direct to Vienna, and that no communication had been made to the Austrian Minister.

Baron Seebach left St. Petersburgh on the 7th.

No. 136*a*.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 10, 1856.

THE Emperor's conversation with the French Ambassador at the ball last night was very striking and has produced a great effect, the greater as it was heard by some of the other members of the diplomatic body.

After shaking hands cordially with him, the Emperor congratulated the French Ambassador upon the events of the last weeks. He said further, that the crisis was now fast approaching, and that he was resolved, one way or the other, to get through the crisis. The expression is stronger in French.

The Emperor congratulated the Swedish Minister likewise upon the late Treaty. This, he said, had contributed towards bringing about the good results which are to be expected.

This language of the Emperor of Austria I consider not incidental but eventual.

No. 137.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 10.)

Berlin, January 8, 1856.

My Lord,

ANOTHER Prussian messenger has been dispatched to St. Petersburgh, and I have been informed that he conveys to Baron Werther instructions to give more strenuous support to the Austrian communication than he had heretofore done.

In speaking last night to Baron Manteuffel on this subject, his Excellency's words to me were, "Nous allons parler à St. Pétersbourg comme nous ne l'avons pas encore fait."

I am unable to discover what has suddenly induced the Prussian Government to adopt a more decided tone; but it is attributed, by persons usually well informed, to the manner in which Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who is now here, has spoken to the King of Prussia of the impossibility of the Emperor Alexander acceding to the ultimatum; but, on the other hand, the firmness of the Austrian Cabinet, the language of the Western Powers, and the isolation to which Germany may expose herself, if the proposals are rejected, may have been the combining influences to produce this apparent improvement in the disposition of the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 138.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 11.)

Berlin, January 8, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE just time to inform your Lordship by this post that the exertions of the Prussian Government at the Courts of the smaller States of Germany appear to be attended with considerable success, and that the sympathies for Austria seem to be rapidly declining. The new instructions sent from here to St. Petersburgh, as reported in my No. 10 of this date, may have been dictated by fear, and so far the language which has been held lately to this Government appears to have worked well, but I hear that a complete change has now come over the Bavarian Government.

On the communication of the ultimatum at Munich, the Bavarian Government directed Count Bray to support it at St. Petersburgh, and it was hoped that other Governments would have followed the example of Bavaria; but Prussia, as your Lordship is aware, at first declined adopting the ultimatum, and only sent, as far as we were informed at the time, a recommendation of the Austrian propositions in the interests of peace. However, her labours in Germany are bearing fruit, and a despatch has, I am assured on good authority, just arrived from M. Bochelberg, the Prussian Minister at Munich, giving an account of a conversation which he has had with the King of Bavaria, when His Majesty

assured him that he was not going to identify his policy with that of Austria, that it was unchanged, and that, further, M. Von der Pfordten was coming back into the right course.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 139.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 8, 1856.

IS the Internuncio to take part with the Porte, French Ambassador, and myself, in discussing the first point? He is instructed to do so. We all meet on the fourth point to-morrow. French Ambassador is without instructions, as I am, as to admitting our Austrian colleague. The Porte, I have no doubt, will act in the matter as England and France desire. An immediate answer is requested.

No. 140.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 65.)

Paris, January 10, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has received a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney of the same tenour as that addressed to your Lordship yesterday by Sir Hamilton Seymour; only M. de Bourqueney adds that Count Nesselrode, in informing Count Esterhazy of the departure of the messenger conveying the answer of the Russian Government to the Austrian ultimatum, said, "qu'il espérait que la réponse serait jugée satisfaisante."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 141.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1856.

WHAT are the wishes of French Government respecting the Internuncio being admitted to take part in the discussions at Constantinople on the first point? Have not instructions been given to the French Ambassador to admit Internuncio to confer on the first point?

No. 142.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 12, *midnight.*)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, January 11, 1856.

THE Russian answer arrived to-day. Articles 2 and 4 are adopted: Article 3 slightly modified; Article 5 suppressed. The last paragraph of No. 1 suppressed, and instead of it as follows:—

"In exchange for the fortresses and territories occupied by the allies, Russia consents to restore to the Porte the fortresses and territories occupied by her in Asia."

The despatch admits that a final agreement respecting the territorial rectification may be reserved for the Plenipotentiaries charged with the definitive negotiation.

Count Buol is behaving with perfect consistency and firmness. The Russian Minister will be sent for to-morrow; will be told that this is not acceptance such as had been asked, and that if such acceptance cannot be obtained by telegraph before the 17th, he and his Mission must leave Vienna. In that case Count Esterhazy will receive by telegraph fresh orders to leave St. Petersburgh, with the whole of his Mission, the same day.

Count Buol sends a messenger to London to-morrow. I shall write by him.

No. 143.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, January 3, 1856.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that the Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed on the 21st November last between the Western Powers and Sweden, has been received exceedingly well throughout this country. All the provincial papers agree in estimating highly its importance, and in praising its purport, and they describe the feelings of the people in their respective neighbourhoods as being those of entire satisfaction and hearty enthusiasm.

In Stockholm also the effect has been on the whole decidedly favourable, though not as general as the advantages secured to Sweden might have led us to anticipate. A certain number of persons belonging to the higher class of society, and whose organ in the press is the "Svenska Tidning," have thought fit to cavil at the Treaty, and to underrate its importance. They pretend that the dignity of their native land suffers by its being put under the "protection" of the Western Powers, and they deny that Sweden is in need of any such "protection." Those persons would, notwithstanding, be the first to cry out for large guarantees, and considerable subsidies, in the event of the United Kingdoms joining the allies in the present war. The "Aftonblad," in a temperate article, answers by reminding them that a hundred and fifty years have passed since Sweden was a great Power, which could give protection instead of having to seek it from others, and that the dream of a new great Scandinavian Power had not yet been realised. It advises its readers to be content with having changed one protection for another, and declares that the gain by the exchange must be clear to the blindest. This is the opinion of the middle classes. They have received the news that Sweden has allied herself with England and France with entire goodwill, and they are content to have gained such protectors, and to have thrown off the yoke of Russia. Still they only look on the present Treaty as a step, but one at all events in the right direction; and they earnestly desire and hope that it is merely a prelude to another, which will put an end to the neutrality of the United Kingdoms, and make them take an active part in the present war against Russia.

A remarkable article, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, appeared in the official "Post Tidningen," in reply to the cavils of the "Svenska Tidningen;" and, as it is supposed to have been inspired by a high source, and puts the advantages of the Treaty in a clear point of view, is deserving of your Lordship's perusal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Extract from the "Post Tidningen" of December 22, 1855.

(Translation.)

THE "Svenska Tidning" says that "our independent position would have gained if we had not been obliged to place ourselves under the protection of the Western Powers."

We have to call the attention of the "Svenska Tidning" to the fact that no such word as "protection," or the least allusion to such a thing, is to be found in the whole Treaty. That Treaty simply consists of an alliance concluded between independent States, founded on mutual respect and reciprocal advantages, by which England and France (for whom it must be of immeasurable importance that Russia should not succeed in obtaining a firm footing on the North Sea) have promised to come forward as allies, if the United Kingdoms should be attacked, and to furnish the Sovereign of those realms sufficient forces to cooperate with our own. We learn from history that the enfeeblement of Sweden, in spite of the heroic resistance of her sons, was caused by the indifference, not to say blindness, with which the affairs of the north have hitherto been regarded by Europe. It redounds to the honour of the Cabinets of the Western Powers, that they, with noble resolution and great foresight, have resolved to make good that which has for ages been neglected. It would be childish to attempt to deny the dissimilarity which exists in the means and resources over which we and the Powers now allied to us can command; but the more the sister-nations of the north show their patriotism, the closer they unite to one another for the protection of their mountains and plains, and the more warmly their hearts beat for the cause of humanity and civilization, the higher they will raise themselves in the eyes of their allies. Moral worth equalises the differences in material force.

The "Svenska Tidning" promises to give a fuller account of the "small differences which have arisen with regard to the frontiers of Finmark." We hope that the "Svenska Tidning" will then perceive that these differences are not so unimportant, and that they contain seed for future complications, as dangerous for the Scandinavian Peninsula as for the peace of Europe. The many copious articles which have appeared on that subject in foreign journals, a part only of which have been taken up by our own press, may serve as a guide in that inquiry. We shall also take an opportunity of more clearly explaining this delicate question, which has hitherto been treated only too superficially.

"The Treaty," adds the "Svenska Tidning," "is without doubt advantageous to us, inasmuch as in case of a Russian aggression taking place in our time, it assures us a powerful alliance—the most powerful that can be given us by two States in our quarter of the globe. With regard to the future, on the other hand, its security rests on the security of the alliance between England and France themselves, which we trust may, for the welfare of Europe, be of long duration."

We join our heartfelt wishes for this to those of the "Svenska Tidning," but we must also call its attention to the fact that the Treaty has not been concluded with England and France as a collective Power, but with each of these Powers separately, and that the ratifications which were respectively signed in London and Paris have also been separately exchanged.

We hope that these explanations will calm the apprehensions of the "Svenska Tidning," and we are convinced that it, as well as every true patriot, will now rejoice at the conclusion of a Treaty which in so high a degree secures our future independence, without in the smallest degree wounding our national feelings.

No. 144.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12, 12·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 12, 1856.*

IN deference to the wishes of Her Britannic Majesty's Government the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed not to admit the Internuncio to conferences on the first point, but Count Walewski is still of opinion that he ought to be admitted, and will be glad to hear that you have altered your opinion. Inform me by telegraph how this is.

No. 145.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 12, 8·30 P.M.)

Berlin, January 12, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

BARON SEEBACH has arrived from St. Petersburgh, and leaves this evening direct for Paris: has seen the French Minister; he is bearer of a communication, the nature of which has not transpired, but he considers it may be favourably received by the Emperor of the French. His tone and language evince anxiety of Russia to gain over France. He represents Russia as not disabled by the war, although willing to make peace; his apparent object is to obtain a favourable consideration at Paris of Russian counter-propositions before their arrival from Vienna.

No. 146.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 13, 10·30 A.M.)

Vienna, January 12, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

THE communication has been made to the Russian Minister. He wishes for another day, which will not be refused. He sends off a messenger to St. Petersburgh and a telegraphic "yes" or "no" may arrive here on the 17th or 18th.

No. 147.

Mr. Mayenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 13, 10·30 A.M.)

Stockholm, January 12, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

IN a private conversation which I yesterday had with the Prince Royal, His Royal Highness suggested the idea of the immediate conclusion of an offensive alliance between Sweden and the Western Powers, without regard for the possible issue of the Austrian conditions; giving as a reason that such an alliance would add great weight in the balance for peace, or if that did not preponderate it would enable Sweden to be ready to march with the allies. I answered, an offensive alliance with Sweden would undoubtedly add weight to the balance of peace, but to do so, it must be known to Russia, and I inquired if the King would desire such publicity. With regard to Swedish preparations, I told him I had more than once informed you that three and a half months' time would be required to make them, and General Canrobert must have acquainted his Government with the same fact, and that, in consequence, we should not allow the negotiations to be protracted to gain time alone. I then proceeded to inquire whether the King of Sweden had authorised His Royal Highness to make this suggestion; he answered not, and I said that without His Majesty's direct authority, I thought it would be useless and premature to transmit it to your Lordship. His Royal Highness promised to speak to the King, and sent me in the evening, through Grey, a paper, copied by the latter from what His Royal Highness said was His Majesty's dictation. I am obliged to give it you in translation, as the cypher is only in English.

Even if the Austrian conditions are accepted by Russia, or if modifications lead to negotiations, which nevertheless do not promise to result in peace, it would be perhaps useful to communicate confidentially with the Cabinet of Stockholm with regard to the conditions which the Western Powers have reserved to themselves the right of putting forward in an European interest (the fifth point) in order to ascertain if the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway would desire to add their weight to the balance. In this case a Treaty would be necessary which assured the possibility of an efficacious support of the Kingdoms.

The King of Sweden expressed a desire that I should transmit to your Lordship, by telegraph, the above, though it is vague, and not easily understood.

As I believe, His Majesty's wishes are as follows: The immediate conclusion of an offensive alliance with the Western Powers, on the general basis agreed on between His Majesty and General Canrobert, we making the official proposal to him first. In that case Sweden, as one of five belligerent Powers, would require, if peace be the result of the Austrian conditions, that one of the reserved stipulations should be either neutrality of the Aland Islands, or that no fortifications were hereafter to be erected there; if war continued, she would be prepared in time to march and share its risks with her allies.

This appears to me to be a premature step, for the conclusion of the alliance would necessitate an immediate advance on the subsidies, while Sweden wants to protract her preparations, so that we should pay for what we, possibly, may not require. But it is at the King's express desire I have transmitted it to you: and it proves that His Majesty has taken his decision to join us. I have additional proof of His Majesty's sympathy, which I will send your Lordship by the first opportunity.

No. 148.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 15. Most Confidential.)

Vienna, January 7, 1856.

My Lord,

I AM willing to believe that Colonel Manteuffel's visit to Vienna—unlike the preceding ones—will be productive of some good results.

He will have found that the access to the Palace now lies through the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs; that the society which he left so full of sympathy for Russia, has modified its tone and feelings; and that the Russian party whom he had seen so full of hope, is extremely dejected and crest-fallen.

Colonel Manteuffel's first interview with Count Buol must have made him sensible of the change for which he would have to prepare his Royal Master. At the outset of their conversation, Count Buol said to him, "I must call your attention to the points. First, remember that any, the slightest, modification of our proposals, be it the omission of a single comma, we shall consider as a refusal; and then bear in mind that all that has been done for the last two months is the work of the Emperor and myself."

The hint was an intelligible one for the erratic diplomatist, who had been in the habit of appealing from the Minister to His Imperial Master; and it probably cut short much that Colonel Manteuffel would have had to say. He spoke, however, of the singular position of the King of Prussia, who found himself invited to recommend the acceptance of propositions the origin of which was unknown to him, while he was as little aware of the measures to which they were to lead.

What answer Count Buol returned, I am not able to state; but to the same observation, when repeated by Colonel Manteuffel, my French colleague replied, I think, very happily.

Colonel Manteuffel had added, that the King of Prussia, although not approving of the Austrian proposals, had resolved upon giving them a general support.

"Then," retorted M. de Bourqueney, "all I can tell you is, that I should have preferred your approbation to your support; approbation might have produced a great effect upon the Russian Cabinet; general support of what is not approved is only calculated to encourage the Russians in their resistance."

Colonel Manteuffel then spoke of the absolute necessity of not humiliating Russia, and alluded, not very directly, to the propriety of some equivalent being found for that part of Bessarabia of which it is proposed that she should be dispossessed.

This door was speedily closed against him by Baron Bourqueney, who very properly reminded him that any territorial changes contemplated in an agreement with Russia, were those to be taken in the interest and for the security of Europe.

This notion of converting an act of justice and precaution into an arrange-

ment which would bear the character of a Treaty for the mutual rectification of frontiers, has likewise been noticed to me by the Bavarian Envoy—till lately one of the warmest supporters of the Russian Court, but grown a little more impartial in his judgments since the events in the Crimea. He too, like Count Arnim, the Prussian Envoy, insisted much upon the necessity of not humiliating Russia, of not pressing too hardly upon a people capable of making such immense sacrifices and such obstinate resistance, and of giving a young and well-intentioned Sovereign the means of repairing the mischief which has been occasioned by his father's ambition.

"What you seek," said Count Lerchenfeld, "must be a solid peace; only this bear in mind, that, if Russia feels herself injured and humbled by the arrangements to which she may be induced to consent, she will take the earliest opportunity of getting rid of them by a fresh war."

I suggested to my colleague that if he were as intent upon peace as I gave him credit for being, he would do well to refrain from resorting to a line of argument which might have the effect of prolonging the war to such an extent as would leave Russia without the power of again troubling the general tranquillity; while to his statements of the warlike spirit by which the Russian population is animated, and their willingness to sacrifice their last rouble towards the carrying on of the war, I begged to oppose the very contradictory accounts which reach me from sources which appear worthy of credit.

As I have alluded to Count Lerchenfeld's notion of Russia being supposed likely, if forced into an onerous peace, to take an early opportunity of freeing herself from her obligations, I may state that it agrees very closely with the language which has been used lately in his private circle by Prince Gortchakoff.

After abusing the Austrians in the most virulent terms ("infames gueux" was one of the epithets made use of), the Prince said, "Si j'étais près de l'Empereur je serais capable de lui offrir le conseil d'accepter les propositions des Puissances. En trois mois la Russie aura repris ses forces, et elle pourra alors tomber à bras raccourcis sur le Gouvernement perfide qui a conseillé le morcellement de la Russie. Car," he added, "nous savons d'où vient ce projet; nous avons la preuve écrite que ce n'est point la France, ce n'est point l'Angleterre, c'est l'Autriche qui a conçu l'idée de nous dépouiller de la moitié d'une Province."

This declaration I repeated verbatim the day after it was made to Count Buol, observing that, although well aware that too much importance is not to be attached to the words of an angry and indiscreet man, they ought not to be entirely put aside as devoid of meaning.

In despite of threatening words and loud speaking, Prince Gortchakoff and the persons of his Mission and his party are very much cast down; and this appeared even from the report of Colonel Manteuffel—a more open, though probably not so useful, a friend of the Russians, as his namesake, the Minister of State.

In his conversation with Baron Bourqueney, Colonel Manteuffel stated that he had passed the preceding evening at the Russian Legation—that indeed he passes every evening in the same society.

"Vous comprendrez facilement," he said, "que les ayant connus dans d'autres circonstances je ne saurais avoir l'air de les négliger aujourd'hui quand je les vois si complétement abbattus."

It is with some reluctance that I have entered into details, the repeating of which makes a certain violation of the rules of social intercourse. At a moment of such interest as the present, I reflect, however, that details ordinarily unimportant may be of value; and I have been, above all, desirous of preparing Her Majesty's Government for the attempt which I conceive may be made for softening or compensating the sacrifices to be imposed upon Russia by territorial equivalents in districts where an extended Russian frontier would be more injurious to English interests than to those of any other country.

Before concluding, I will entreat your Lordship to consider this despatch as strictly confidential. The details into which I have entered would, if known, compromise several persons; and (although this is a minor consideration) I would cut me off from valuable sources of private information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I find that I have omitted to mention that Colonel Manteuffel endeavoured over and over again to discover from Baron Bourqueney, whether the idea of altering the Bessarabian frontier had originated with the Austrian Cabinet.

On this point, however, he was not destined to receive any information.

I infer that although Prince Gortchakoff's suspicions may be deeply rooted, he is not in possession of the "preuve écrite" of which he speaks to his friends.

G. H. S.

No. 149.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 19.)

Vienna, January 9, 1856.

My Lord,

MY visit to Count Buol yesterday was a short one, as I found him overwhelmed with business, and suffering from very painful family intelligence which had just reached him.

Count Buol's last despatch from London has likewise occasioned him much perplexity.

He explained to me that Her Majesty's Government do not consider themselves bound to the course laid down in the memorandum of the 14th of November, to which his initials and those of Baron de Bourqueney were affixed, and pointed out the extremely embarrassing position in which the Imperial Cabinet would find itself in the event of the acceptance by Russia, if, after having declined the intentions of England and France, it should be found impossible to execute the engagement which he had taken in the name of Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to France, the paraphé of Baron Bourqueney, and the approbation which the whole transaction met with on the part of the Emperor Napoleon's Cabinet, show that the engagement is considered binding upon her.

With regard to Her Majesty's Government, I feel bound to state exactly what passed a few days after my arrival here. Immediately before the departure of Count V. Esterhazy for Russia, Count Buol inquired of me whether he was to consider that Her Majesty's Government adhered to the plan traced out in the memorandum of the 14th of November.

I replied that I had no instructions upon the point, but that I had no hesitation in expressing my firm belief that such was the case; that, slightly modified, Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the ultimatum, and that I inferred, therefore, that the paper which had led to it was included in the sanction.

In consequence of the expresson of this opinion, the inquiry was no further urged, and Count Esterhazy set off on his journey.

It is then only right that I should admit that if the Austrian Government has exceeded its powers in making the propositions upon which the Russian Cabinet is now deliberating, the error is to be attributed to me, and not to Count Buol.

It appeared to me that the transaction was one in which both parties found a decided advantage.

Their being able to hold out the prospect of an armistice, the Austrian Cabinet were encouraged to attempt to procure the acceptance by Russia of terms otherwise very unpalateable to her, whilst Her Majesty's Government, like that of France, made a certain concession, with a view, in the event of the propositions being rejected, of securing an object of such importance as the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia.

In the mean time, I was not called upon yesterday to discuss the point with Count Buol, who remarked to me that from his eagerness to avoid anything approaching to controversy with Her Majesty's Government, he had written upon the subject, not to Count Colloredo, but to M. de Hübner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 150.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 9, 1856.*

WITH reference to the two inclosures in your Lordship's despatch No. 58 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour of informing you that I have taken upon myself to notice to Count Buol the circumstance of Baron Prokesch having called upon M. Persiani, at Athens, while he omitted to show this attention to the Ministers of England and France.

I explained, however, that I had no instruction to make any complaint of the omission, but felt authorized to express a regret at a distinction which had given rise to incorrect surmises in a place where rumours are readily raised upon the slightest foundations.

Count Buol had no knowledge of what had passed at Athens, but was desirous of pointing out that for many years past the Internuncio had been upon terms of close intimacy with M. Persiani; that he had probably, on arriving at Athens, for a few hours, sought out his friend, and had not felt, apparently, under the obligation of waiting upon the other members of the diplomatic body.

It ought, too, in fairness, to be recollected that some latitude may be left to a foreign Minister as to visiting the "corps diplomatique" of a town where he passes only a day or two, while he has no choice but to return the visit of any head of a Mission who pays him the first visit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 151.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 9, 1856.*

THE account given by Colonel Manteuffel of his visit to Vienna, is that the King of Prussia is always eager to meet any advance on the part of the Emperor in the most cordial manner; that, to use his own expression, for a finger extended to him he is ever ready to stretch out his hand, and in consequence that His Majesty, upon receiving the Emperor's letter, resolved that one of his Aides-de-camp should be the bearer of the answer.

It would probably be more correct to say that Colonel Manteuffel has been sent here with a view to ascertaining the position of Count Buol, and to learning the origin and the full bearings of the propositions lately made to the Court of St. Petersburgh.

The long and repeated conversations which he has had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs appear to have given him, I do not say satisfaction, but at least full information, and that the report which he has addressed to his Sovereign is favourable to the views of the Austrian Cabinet may be readily inferred from the fact of Colonel Manteuffel's having communicated it *in extenso* to Count Buol.

Colonel Manteuffel has been able to convince himself, and has pointed out to his Royal Master, that the price to be paid for his readmission into the European Council is a warm recommendation to the Emperor of Russia to accept the propositions made to him from Vienna, followed by a withdrawal of the Prussian Mission from St. Petersburgh should the advice not be attended to.

On his side Colonel Manteuffel is of opinion that great value would be attached by the King to a formal invitation to shape his course upon that of the Austrian Government, and to this idea Count Buol, as he informed me, offered no opposition.

The results of Colonel Manteuffel's mission are probably discernible in the improved accounts of the attitude of the Cabinet of Berlin, which, under date of

the 7th instant, have been received at the Austrian Chancellerie from Count George Esterhazy.

A fresh bearer of letters or despatches may shortly be expected here in the person of Count Stackelberg, who was to leave St. Petersburgh for Vienna this morning.

I shall be very much surprised if he does not prove to be the bearer of some amended propositions or counter project on the part of the Russian Court.

The date of his departure strengthens the suspicion, coinciding as it does closely with that on which Count Esterhazy will have had to signify that a non-acceptance of the terms of which he was the bearer, will leave him and his Mission but eight days to remain at St. Petersburgh.

I can only desire that any proposals which may reach Vienna from the North may be put aside with the same decision which was employed by Count Esterhazy in declining to discuss those which he was instructed to make, and I venture to believe that such will prove to be the case.

Count Esterhazy reports that upon presenting the ultimatum, the Chancellor, after glancing at it and enumerating the various conditions, made some inquiry with regard to the alteration of the Bessarabian frontier, when he cut short the inquiry by remarking that it was to be remembered that he appeared at St. Petersburgh not as a negotiator but as a bearer of despatches.

It remains to be seen whether the position now taken by Austria will have the effect of bringing the war to a close; but whether or no, it is melancholy to reflect that a slighter effort, and one unaccompanied by risk, would, if attempted three years ago, have been the means of saving treasure to be told by millions and human lives to be counted by hundreds of thousands. This, too, from the advantage of local observation, I was as well aware of then as I am at present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 152.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 73. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 12, 1856.*

I HAVE availed myself of a favourable opportunity to urge the Emperor to insist, should it become necessary, on the introduction of the particular conditions into the preliminaries of peace. I made use on this occasion of the arguments furnished to me by your Lordship's despatch No. 16 to Sir Hamilton Seymour; and I dwelt particularly upon the position in which the allies would be placed if, in following a contrary course, they found Russia willing to make peace on the bases of the Austrian ultimatum, and themselves obliged either to accept that peace or to break off negotiations because Russia refused to entertain these particular conditions.

Count Walewski, I observed, appeared to fear that if we did not adhere to the Austrian memorandum in the exact words in which it had been drawn up, Austria might equally, on her part, say that neither was she, in case the ultimatum was refused by Russia, bound to break off her diplomatic relations with that Government; but there was, I thought, but little apprehension of Austria taking such a course. In the first place, what we required was just and reasonable. In the next, the relations between Austria and Russia, now that the former had shown what were her intentions, could not be of a nature to make it very desirable for her to continue to keep a Mission at St. Petersburgh. Besides, I argued, if Austria refuses to carry out that which was her own proposition, we are also free from any engagements that we have, or may be supposed to have, contracted during the late negotiations. In fact, should Austria now hang back, we have but to tell her that we prefer our interests to hers, and that the addition of a part of Bessarabia to the Principalities is not to be put in the same scale with the advantage to be derived from the non-fortification of the Aland Islands, and stipulations which will render Turkey safe on her Asiatic frontier. In other words, if Austria considers herself free to act in regard to her diplomatic rela-

tions with Russia as best suits her inclination or her interests, because the Western Powers require the insertion of their particular conditions into the preliminaries of peace, the Western Powers on their part will be no longer bound by the stipulations of the ultimatum sent to St. Petersburgh. Now, Austria must see that the advantage of such a state of things would be all in favour of the Western Powers; that nothing that she could now do would alter the sentiments which her late conduct must have inspired at St. Petersburgh; and, therefore, I felt convinced that she intended to carry out her declared intentions, and that her object in asking for our adherence to the memorandum of the 22nd November was to bind us more securely to her political views.

The Emperor replied that after the best consideration which he could give to the subject, he was of opinion that the Western Powers were morally engaged to adhere to the Austrian memorandum, but that if the ultimatum was accepted by Russia they were at liberty to insist on the particular conditions being inserted in the preliminary Treaty of Peace. "All this proves," said His Majesty, "how unwise it is to proceed in great questions with too much precipitation. I must do you the justice to admit that it is better, as is the custom in England, to reflect well before taking a resolution. For instance," continued His Majesty, "when we reflect on our present position, I cannot help seeing how bad it is. Supposing that to-morrow Russia should tell us that she would concede everything we asked except the portion of territory which we have demanded in Bessarabia, it is impossible not to feel that France and England would obtain by such a peace all the objects for which they went to war, and that if obliged to continue the war, it would be for the interests of a Power who had not furnished one man or one farthing of money to accomplish objects which concerned her more than any one else."

The Emperor, I rejoined, would recollect that when His Majesty did me the honour of expressing his anxiety that the last Austrian proposals should be accepted, I had called his attention to this fact, that the terms put forward by Austria were those which specially regarded her own interests, and that although it was fair matter for calculation for the Western Powers whether the limited cooperation which Austria offered was worth the price at which it was to be purchased, we ought not to deceive ourselves as to the objects of that Power. Austria wanted to obtain a peace which suited her, through the prowess and sacrifices of the Western Powers. His Majesty had thought, and in my humble opinion I had agreed with him, that the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia was of such importance, that if it could be obtained by entertaining the Austrian proposals, while the Western Powers were left entirely free to ask such further conditions as they considered necessary, the bargain ought to be struck. I still thought, I added, on reviewing the whole matter, that the two Governments had judged wisely, but the very doubts which the Emperor now expressed only showed how necessary it was to insist on the accomplishment of the conditions respecting the Aland Islands and the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey. The obligations of the two Governments towards the fleets and troops who had for two years braved the perils of a campaign in the North Seas, not to speak of the policy of averting future danger from Sweden, demanded the one; the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, for which we were fighting, demanded the other.

The Emperor did not gainsay these remarks, and on the whole His Majesty appeared to admit their correctness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 153.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 13, 1856.

THE telegraphic advices from M. de Bourqueney respecting the tenour of the Russian answer to the Austrian ultimatum coincide with those sent to your Lordship by Sir Hamilton Seymour.

The former, however, state in detail the modifications required by Russia; but as they have been sent to M. de Persigny for communication to your Lordship, they will be known to Her Majesty's Government before this despatch can reach London.

I have confined my remarks to Count Walewski to begging him to take no step in the matter until he had put himself in communication with Her Majesty's Government: he assured me that such was his intention.

M. de Seebach is expected to-night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 154.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 77.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 12, 1856.

I THINK it as well to report an observation which I have made to Count Walewski, and which has been drawn from me from the manner in which he seemed inclined to view what are called in the Austrian ultimatum the particular conditions ("conditions particulières") reserved to the Western Powers to bring forward.

The term "particulières" ought not to have been used. The conditions respecting the Aland Islands and the provinces east of the Black Sea are as much part and parcel of the general terms of peace on which the belligerent Powers intend to insist as any one of the so-called "four points." They can only therefore be designated "particulières" as referring to Austria herself—that is, as indicating that they are conditions on which Austria is not prepared to insist.

It was impossible for Count Walewski to gainsay this remark, and although certain expressions of his had induced me to make it, he fully coincided in regretting that some other term had not been used.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 155.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 12, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two communications which I have addressed this week to Baron Manteuffel, requesting his Excellency's attention to the passage of 543 barrels of saltpetre from Magdeburgh to Russia, and of some bales of cotton now lying at Bromberg, which I have been informed are suspected of containing arms.

I also inclose the copy of a note from Baron Manteuffel, of the 9th instant, intended as an answer to three communications which Lord Augustus Loftus addressed to his Excellency in October last, respecting saltpetre, which is refined in large quantities at Stettin, and intended for sale to Russia.

Your Lordship will observe that nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the explanations offered by the Prussian Government on this subject; for though large quantities of potash and other such things may be required for Prussian use, it is notorious that the establishments of which we complain have grown up since the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 155.

Lord Bloomfield to Baron Manteuffel.

M. le Baron, *Berlin, January 8*, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency some intelligence which I have obtained from a reliable source respecting the purchase for the Russian Government of a large quantity of saltpetre, the produce of the East Indies.

It is to the following effect: 543 barrels, or about 4,000 cwt., of this article have been bought at Franz Overlachs, in Magdeburgh, and sent to Leon M. Cohn at Berlin, by whom it is to be forwarded to the frontier. The numbers and marks of these barrels are as under.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 155.

Lord Bloomfield to Baron Manteuffel.

M. le Baron, *Berlin, January 11*, 1856.

HAVING been informed that there is reason to suspect that foreign arms, destined for Russia, are packed in certain bales of cotton now lying in the Braa, near Bromberg, which have been loaded by Ferdinand Prowe, addressed to Roving and Co., and to Samuel Fränckel, at Warsaw, I have the honour to report this circumstance to your Excellency as it has reached me; and am sure that, in doing so, it is scarcely necessary for me to express the hope that an examination of these bales of cotton will be made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 3 in No. 155.

Baron Manteuffel to Lord Bloomfield.

Milord, *Berlin, le 9 Janvier*, 1856.

LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS m'a fait le 15, 21, et 25 Octobre dernier, différentes communications relativement à des envois de salpêtre que le Sieur Klee, négotiant de Stettin, tirerait de Brême pour les expédier par Myslowitz, en Russie. M. le Ministre des Finances a fait prendre à cet égard des informations exactes, mais le résultat en a été que M. Klee n'a fourni ni de salpêtre des Indes ni de salpêtre du Chili, mais seulement du nitrate de potasse qu'il fabrique lui-même, et qui par conséquent doit être considéré comme un produit indigène. Au reste cet article est assez généralement destiné pour la consommation intérieure.

En vous donnant ces renseignements je profite, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 156.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 12*, 1856.

BARON SEEBACH has arrived here from St. Petersburgh, and proceeds direct to Paris this afternoon.

He paid a visit to the Marquis de Moustier, who has had the goodness to give me the following account of their interview.

The Saxon Minister said that he was the bearer of a communication which must lead to peace, and which contained concessions on the part of Russia

which he was sure would be well received at Paris; he refused, however, to state what these concessions were, though he loudly expressed his expectation that the Emperor Napoleon would be satisfied, and that peace ought to result from the communication of which he was the bearer.

Baron Seebach appears to have spoken of the absence of ill-feeling on the part of Russia towards France, and attempted to shadow forth the idea that Russia and France were soon to be good friends; adding also that the ill-will which existed in Germany towards France at this moment would soon disappear, for it had grown out of the existing hostilities, making no secret of the recognized sympathies of Germany for Russia.

The Marquis de Moustier said that he made several efforts to draw out from Baron Seebach the grounds on which he based his hopes of the acceptance of the Russian counter-propositions—for so the communication may assuredly be called—but he was unsuccessful.

Baron Seebach appears to have said that Russia was extremely desirous of peace, but that she was fully prepared to continue the war; that it was an error to suppose that Russia was suffering from it: he reiterated that it was not so, and that the effects of the war were perceptible no where perhaps but in the southern provinces; that the stories current of difficulties in the way of recruiting for the army were false, that on the contrary it proceeded to the entire satisfaction of the Russian Government; and that in fact it would be much easier for the Emperor to continue the war than to make peace.

M. de Moustier said, that Baron Seebach's tone was that of a person puffed up with the importance of his mission, and impressed with the necessity of making it believed that Russia was not suffering from her position; that she was fully prepared to carry on the war; that she expected better success this year than before; that she did not suffer the least from, or care for, the blockade in the Baltic; that prices at St. Petersburgh were much as usual; that her trade was flourishing, and in fact that the Emperor Alexander preferred peace to war; that, however, he had been induced to meet the Austrian communication from a desire to put a stop to the horrors to which humanity would be exposed by a continuance of hostilities, and not from necessity or from the pressure they had as yet caused him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 157.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, January 14.)

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères,
M. le Comte, *Paris, le 11 Janvier*, 1856.

EN étudiant les impressions que la démarche de l'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg a produites en Allemagne, il n'a été facile de remarquer que nos adversaires avaient adopté pour ligne de conduite de faire prendre le change à l'opinion. De là, les bruits mis en circulation sur les dispositions pacifiques du Cabinet Russe et sur les conditions de paix vaguement indiquées auxquelles on le disait prêt à négocier. De là aussi ces assertions d'après lesquelles les Puissances Occidentales n'auraient point tenu au même degré que le Cabinet de Vienne aux propositions renfermées dans son ultimatum, et n'auraient pas repoussé la pensée d'une transaction sur des contre-propositions de la Russie. J'ai voulu mettre nos agents en Allemagne en état de combattre une tactique sur le but de laquelle nous ne pouvions nous méprendre. Je leur ai adressé, en conséquence, une dépêche circulaire dans laquelle je me suis attaché à établir que les conditions de paix portées par l'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg, ont toutes au même degré l'approbation des trois Puissances, et sont bien positivement les seules qu'elles soient résolues unanimement à prendre pour bases de négociations avec le Gouvernement Russe. Vous trouverez ci-joint copie de cette dépêche, et je vous invite à en donner lecture à Lord Clarendon.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

Inclosure in No. 157.

Circular addressed to French Representatives at Foreign Courts.

Paris, le 2 Janvier, 1856.

Monsieur,

BIEN qu'il soit encore impossible d'apprécier exactement la disposition des esprits en Allemagne depuis que les propositions de l'Autriche y sont connues, il est déjà facile de remarquer les efforts que font nos adversaires pour égarer l'opinion. Nous voyons se reproduire une tactique qui cependant ne devrait plus tromper personne aujourd'hui.

Comme dans toutes les phases critiques que la question actuelle a subies, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg entretient les Cabinets Allemands de ses tendances pacifiques, et pour leur en donner un témoignage spécieux, il laisse entendre qu'il serait prêt à négocier à de certaines conditions qu'il indique. Je n'ai pas à examiner ces conditions dont nous ne sommes d'ailleurs qu'imparfaitement informés ; l'Autriche s'appropriant les seules qui puissent servir de bases sérieuses à des négociations, les a formulées dans un ultimatum qui aura l'approbation du Gouvernement de l'Empereur et de celui de Sa Majesté Britannique s'il est agréé à St. Pétersbourg ; les Etats de la Confédération Germanique se méprendraient évidemment, s'ils croyaient servir la cause de la paix en prêtant leur appui moral aux propositions de la Russie au lieu de recommander à son acceptation celles de la Cour de Vienne.

Nous aimons à penser que les expédients imaginés par les adversaires des Puissances Occidentales, quel que soit leur vif désir de semer la défiance, ne réussiront pas à donner le change aux Cabinets étrangers, en leur laissant supposer que les propositions présentées par l'Autriche à la Russie n'ont pas toutes, et au même degré, l'appui de la France et de l'Angleterre ; une semblable assertion ne saurait avoir le moindre fondement et en saisissant toute occasion qui vous serait offerte pour rétablir à cet égard, l'exacte vérité, vous contribuerez en même temps à mettre tous les Gouvernements Allemands en garde contre des manœuvres dont il nous importe de faire exactement apprécier la nature et les tendances.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, comme les Gouvernements des Souverains alliés de Sa Majesté Impériale, désire la paix, et il est prêt à la conclure ; mais si nous n'avons jamais hésité à exprimer hautement notre disposition à cet égard, c'est que nous sommes fermement résolus à continuer la guerre pour obtenir la paix, c'est que nous avons la conscience de la solidité de nos alliances. On ne saurait plus en être, en Allemagne, à apprendre que nous marcherons au but, résolument unis aux Gouvernements qui combattent avec nous, et que nous saurions, les uns et les autres, s'il en était besoin, faire mutuellement le sacrifice de nos opinions pour conserver, sans nuage comme sans atteinte, un accord dont nous attendons avec confiance des résultats efficaces pour le repos et l'indépendance de l'Europe.

Je ne saurais donc trop insister sur ce point, si l'Allemagne faiblissant dans les bonnes dispositions qu'elle nous témoignait en dernier lieu et refusant son appui moral à l'ultimatum de l'Autriche, croyait pouvoir soutenir la Russie dans la pensée d'y répondre par des contre-propositions, loin de faciliter la paix, elle la retarderait de nouveau. En faisant échouer, par une complaisance mal entendue pour des illusions qu'elle n'a que trop encouragées, la démarche si sérieuse dont le Cabinet de Vienne a pris l'initiation, elle rendrait les négociations impossibles et il est difficile de prévoir quel pourrait être le terme de la guerre. A cet égard, vous ne sauriez tenir un langage trop précis ; je vous invite donc à ne rien négliger pour faire bien comprendre à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de que l'ultimatum de l'Autriche renferme les seules conditions de paix sur lesquelles nous puissions négocier.

No. 158.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1856.

WE do not understand on what ground the Russian Government demand that the fifth paragraph should be suppressed, and we wish, therefore, to know whether the Austrian Government have or have not made known to the Russian Government the additional conditions which they have been informed that England and France must insist upon, and which they were pointedly requested, as a matter of fairness and good faith, to make known to the Russian Government.

No. 159.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government are of opinion that the Internuncio should be admitted to the discussions on the first point.

No. 160.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which your Lordship states in your despatch No. 7 of the 5th instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel on the proceedings of the Prussian Government with regard to the Austrian proposals at St. Petersburgh.

I have received no communication from Count Bernstorff upon the views and intentions of the Prussian Government, and not even the acknowledgment which in courtesy might have been expected to the request which, in the interests of peace, had been addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the Cabinet of Berlin, that the fair and moderate proposals transmitted to St. Petersburgh by the Austrian Government might receive the support of Prussia. But the silence maintained upon this subject, and upon the instructions sent to the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh ; the active measures adopted to induce the German Powers not to take part with Austria ; and the enormous facilities afforded by the Prussian Government to Russia for carrying on the war, are but too manifest indications that the sympathies of the Prussian Government are on the side of Russia and against the Western Powers, and Her Majesty's Government feel it their duty to declare that the great and partial assistance afforded by Prussia to the Russian Government in regard to the supply of munitions of war, cannot be considered consistent with the obligations of a neutral Power.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 161.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government have communicated with the French Government on the question as to the admission of the Internuncio to the discussions on the first point, submitted to them in your telegraphic despatch of the 8th instant ; and I inclose a copy of a telegraphic despatch* which I have received from Lord Cowley on the subject, and also a copy of a message† which I have sent to your Excellency this day, stating that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the Internuncio should be so admitted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 144. † No. 169.

No. 162.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Foreign Office, January 15, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

GOOD faith and a regard for our own security require that my despatch No. 16 should be communicated to Count Buol, and that without delay. No difficulty would have existed if our terms had been made known to Russia.

No. 163.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 85.)

Foreign Office, January 15, 1856.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 73 of the 12th instant, on the occasion of your Excellency's conversation with the Emperor of the French, with respect to the particular conditions to be introduced into the preliminaries of peace.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 164.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15, 12·30 A.M.)

Paris, January 15, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

I UNDERSTAND that the Saxon Minister brings from St. Petersburgh assurance that all the terms asked by the allies, including the cession of territory, may be obtained by a direct negotiation with Russia, to the exclusion of Austrian intervention. The Emperor is to see the Saxon Minister this day. His Majesty is particularly anxious that the English Cabinet should be assured that he is a stranger to the step now taken by Russia. I earnestly recommend you to hold fast to your intention of including the particular conditions for the preliminaries of peace. We shall beat Count Walewski if you do.

No. 165.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 11, 1856.

My Lord,

THE Swedish Minister has been kind enough to read me a private letter (dated the 2nd instant) which he had received from his colleague at St. Petersburgh, who has written to inform him of the manner in which the Russian Government have expressed themselves with regard to the Treaty signed on the 21st November, 1855.

With respect to the Emperor Alexander, General Nordin states that his manner is perfectly unchanged towards him. His Imperial Majesty received General Nordin with the same cordiality as before, and had only taken an opportunity of expressing a hope that nothing would ever impair the good relations which had so long existed between the two countries.

The observations made by the Chancellor seemed, on the contrary, to show that the late act of the Swedish Government had made a deep impression upon his mind.

He likewise had pointed out the expediency of cultivating friendly relations between Russia and Sweden; but upon General Nordin's assuring him that his efforts would not be wanting, observed that what had passed constituted a crack

("fissure"), that care must be used to prevent the crack being widened into a breach. "Already," he said, "you appear to have one foot in the enemy's camp. Be careful that you do not altogether quit your neutral position."

"There is," said General Nordin, "a precaution which would give security against any change of the kind." "And that is?" inquired Count Nesselrode. "That is," returned General Nordin, "to make peace as soon as possible."

The conversation, although carried on in amicable terms, did not conclude without the Swedish Envoy having adverted to Finland, as the cause of feelings which still prevail or exist among his countrymen; to which allusion the Chancellor replied, by begging it might be remembered with what pertinacity the Russian Government had pursued an object of procuring for Sweden a compensation for her loss.

My colleague appears to be very forcibly struck with the altered tone of the Russian Government in speaking of an affair which in previous times they would have considered as a grievous offence, as one, probably, which would have led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations.

Great attention to form had been, he candidly remarked, at all times observable in the diplomatic proceedings of the Russian Cabinet; still, upon any, the slightest cause of offence, a bitterness of language, an assumption of superiority, were discernible, of which, upon that recent occasion, no traces are allowed to appear.

It may be hoped that a country like Sweden, which has once enjoyed the happiness of having recovered from the pressure of such an incubus as Russia has long been to her, cannot be otherwise than well disposed to the use of the exertion required for converting temporary relief into permanent security.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 166.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 29.)

Vienna, January 12, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL'S courier, who is the bearer of this despatch, will carry to Count Colloredo the two papers which form Count Nesselrode's reply to the Austrian ultimatum.

My knowledge of these documents was obtained by the hasty perusal which enabled me to send your Lordship the short telegraphic despatch which, by this time, must be in your Lordship's hands.

It did not, however, require a close examination to ascertain that, although the Russian Cabinet have made some advance in the right direction, a considerable distance still remains between the point which they have reached, and that which would constitute compliance with the demands made upon them. A crisis has thus arisen for the Austrian Cabinet, and what I am at this moment eager to state to your Lordship is, that not the slightest suggestion on the part of Baron Bourqueney or myself was called for to remind Count Buol of the course which he had to pursue.

He intimated to me indeed that were the Governments of England and France disposed to make any slight concession to Russia, such facilities for securing peace could not but be acceptable to the Emperor's Government. At the same time, however, he felt strongly the necessity of conforming strictly to engagements, of making acts closely conformable to words, and the more so as Austria, from not taking part in the war in which her Western allies are engaged, was the more bound not to recede from the position which she had taken up in their support.

Under these circumstances he had, he said, requested Prince Gortchakoff to call upon him to-morrow (this day) at 1 o'clock, when it would be his painful duty to inform him that, the answer from Count Nesselrode not being a direct compliance with the demands set forth in the ultimatum, he had no choice but to send him and the persons composing his Mission their passports on the 17th,

unless, before that time, he (the Prince) should be able to obtain by telegraph an unconditional acceptance from his Court.

I did not conceal from Count Buol that, had I remarked any hesitation on his part, it would have been my obvious duty to remind him that, in pursuance of his engagements, he was obliged to call upon Prince Gortchakoff for a plain acceptance or refusal, but that the straightforward course which he had at once adopted, rendered all remarks on my part unnecessary, and that I had but to approve.

It had not escaped Count Buol's observation that, whilst difficulties are raised by the Russian Cabinet as to the two points to which Austria and Great Britain may be supposed to attach particular importance, a hint is thrown out of the expediency of a mode of settlement which might be more exclusively acceptable to the Government of France.

He alluded to the notice of a Congress being assembled, which Baron Bourqueney likewise considers to have been put forward with a view to producing a difference of opinion among the allies.

With regard to the tract of country demanded of Russia, Count Buol surmises that there would be comparatively little difficulty in obtaining the cession of the flat and waste land lying near the Danube, but that the Russians are very unwilling to part with the line of mountains which would form a strong frontier for the Province.

It may well be conceived that any precaution against fresh attacks upon the Principalities must prove unacceptable to those whom similar incursions had long been familiar.

Having been unable for the last three or four days to leave my house, Count Buol was obliging enough to bring me the papers which will shortly be communicated to your Lordship. I was obliged, however, to read them in such a hurry that I am very imperfectly acquainted with their contents. My great object during Count Buol's short visit was to learn what was the immediate result to which they were to lead.

This, as your Lordship will see, is closely conformable to the expectations to which my correspondence must have given rise.

I may again state that supposing no direct consent, whether conveyed by telegraph or drawn from some reserved portfolio, to be sent in in the course of the next two or three days, Count Esterhazy will receive renewed orders for leaving St. Petersburgh with the whole of his Mission on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—My acute and most valuable French colleague surmises that it is not impossible that Prince Gortchakoff may be in possession of eventual instructions, authorising the cession of the Delta of the Danube.

G. H. S.

No. 167.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 30.)

Vienna, January 12, 1856.

My Lord,

AT 1 o'clock this day the Russian Envoy called by appointment upon Count Buol, and was informed by him that the answer received from St. Petersburgh not being an acceptance it became his painful duty, after having taken the Emperor's orders, to state that on the 17th passports would be delivered to him and to the members of his Mission.

The announcement was received with assumed astonishment by the Russian Envoy.

In the course of the conversation which ensued, Count Buol took an opportunity of stating that a despatch, just arrived from Count Walewski, announced the intention of the French Government to support to the utmost the territorial demands of the ultimatum. Russia, then said Count Buol, is prepared to yield,

or she is not. If she is, it is unfortunate that present non-compliance should interfere with the preliminaries of peace; if she is not, negotiation would be undertaken in vain.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs proceeded to state that as it was his wish to act with frankness, he would apprize Prince Gortchakoff of the course which the allied Governments were prepared to follow. They intended, as soon as the term was passed, and the ultimatum was to be considered as rejected, to meet in deliberation as to the coercitive means to be employed towards Russia.

It was right, he added, that he should likewise remark that Prussia would be invited to join the Councils of the allies; that the price of her admission would be the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia, and that there was reason for supposing that the invitation would not be made in vain.

All this appeared to increase the surprise and embarrassment of the Russian Minister.

After some conversation, in the course of which Prince Gortchakoff expressed the intention of immediately dispatching a messenger to St. Petersburgh, and his hope that the delay of a day would not be objected to, Count Buol said that he had no doubt that if on the morning of the 18th, Prince Gortchakoff should be able to express the hope of receiving, in the course of the day, an answer by telegraph to his despatches, no objection would be made by His Imperial Majesty to the delay; a plain "yes" or "no" were, Count Buol said, speedily conveyed by telegraph. Beyond this, his Excellency added, should you meet an acceptance on your road from Vienna, your return here will be welcome.

I have often heard of the expediency of not humiliating a great Power and a worsted enemy, and I have joined heartily in the feeling, but it appears to me that in the scene of a foreign Minister bargaining for an extra day, in the course of which he may have the chance of receiving by telegraph a monosyllabic answer which will save him from expulsion, we have a very striking instance of self-imposed humiliation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since this hurried despatch was written, I have learnt that instructions have been received by Colonel Manteuffel, enjoining him to support to the uttermost the amendments of the Russian Cabinet.

G. H. S.

No. 168.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 31.)

Vienna, January 12, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL has had the kindness to send me a copy of the Russian notes which, should time admit of it, will be copied out as inclosures to this despatch.

Should this not be the case, the copies from the Chancellerie d'Etat will be transmitted to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 168.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 24 *Décembre*, 1855.

DES son rétour à St. Pétersbourg, M. l'Envoyé d'Autriche s'est empressé de me communiquer la dépêche que M. le Comte de Buol lui a adressée en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Décembre, et dont j'ai l'honneur de joindre ci-près une copie.

En s'acquittant de cette communication, M. le Comte V. Esterhazy m'a

remis en même temps un document contenant l'indication de quelques principes qui, selon l'opinion du Cabinet de Vienne, acquérerait par le fait de l'acceptation des Puissances belligérantes la valeur de préliminaires de paix, et pourrait, une fois signé, être suivi d'un armistice et de négociations définitives.

Je n'ai pas manqué de soumettre ces pièces à l'Empereur notre auguste Maître.

Sa Majesté Impériale s'est plu à les examiner avec le désir le plus sincère de résoudre équitablement la question qui tient l'Europe sous les armes et de mettre fin au deuil qui la couvre.

Elle hésite d'autant moins à prêter la main aux efforts que Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique veut vouer encore à l'œuvre de la paix, que, tout récemment, ne prenant conseil que des intérêts de ses peuples et de ses sentiments d'humanité, elle n'avait pas hésité d'aller spontanément au devant des vœux pacifiques de l'Europe.

Encouragé, comme le Cabinet de Vienne, par des indices que les négociations pouvaient être reprises sur la base des quatre points tels qu'ils avaient été formulés dans les Conférences de Vienne, Sa Majesté l'Empereur avait adopté une résolution qu'il croyait propre à donner une solution nette à celui des quatre points qui avait amené la rupture des Conférences de Vienne.

Par cette résolution, le Cabinet Impérial complétait les garanties nécessaires à une paix durable et sérieuse, et rassurait entièrement l'Europe contre le retour des déplorables complications actuelles.

Il avait donc lieu d'espérer que le Cabinet de Vienne, auquel on s'était empressé de la communiquer, en tiendrait compte pour simplifier les questions préliminaires destinées à précéder la négociation définitive.

Cet espoir ne s'est pas entièrement réalisé. L'Empereur notre auguste Maître l'a vu avec regret. Cependant, il veut donner une nouvelle preuve de ses intentions pacifiques, en entrant dans les voies que le Cabinet Autrichien a cru devoir ouvrir pour opérer une réconciliation.

Après avoir mûrement pesé les communications qui lui ont été faites et cherché à les accorder avec les nécessités de la situation du moment, le Cabinet Impérial s'empresse de faire connaître sa détermination à votre Excellence en l'invitant à la porter sans délai à la connaissance du Gouvernement Autrichien.

Nous prions la Cour de Vienne de bien se convaincre que les considérations que nous allons développer sont inspirées par le désir sincère d'éviter les écueils qui ont fait échouer les dernières Conférences.

Rien ne nous tient plus à cœur que de voir nos observations accueillies avec le même sentiment d'équité qui les a dictées, concourir efficacement à nous faire atteindre le but désiré.

Avant d'entrer dans l'examen des détails du travail du Cabinet de Vienne, nous avons deux observations générales à faire.

L'une découle du contenu du cinquième point de ce travail.

En en prenant lecture, nous nous sommes demandé si, avec un principe aussi vaguement conçu, et qui ouvre la porte à une négociation toute nouvelle, même alors qu'une entente complète aurait eu lieu sur les quatre points, l'espoir de la paix pouvait se réaliser?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est allé, il est vrai, au devant de cette appréhension en disant dans sa dépêche "qu'il ne tarderait pas à exprimer aux Cours de Paris et de Londres la confiance qui l'anime qu'elles n'useront du droit de présenter éventuellement aux négociations des conditions particulières que dans un intérêt Européen, et dans une mesure telle à ne pas offrir de sérieuses obstacles au rétablissement de la paix."

Cependant ces assurances sont elles-mêmes trop peu précises pour détruire notre objection.

Dans une situation aussi grave que celle où se trouve l'Europe, les incertitudes qu'inspire la réserve en question ne sauraient avoir qu'une influence fâcheuse, en enlevant à des préliminaires, même acceptés et signés, le caractère de stipulations définitives.

C'est donc dans l'intérêt bien entendu de la paix que nous insistons pour l'élimination de la clause cinq, et cela d'autant plus que l'intérêt Européen, qu'elle semble avoir en vue, complique inutilement une question déjà si épineuse, et appartiendrait du reste par sa nature à la décision, non des parties seules engagées dans la lutte actuelle, mais à celle d'un Congrès Européen, seul arbitre des transactions existantes.

Le Cabinet de Vienne saura sans doute apprécier ces considérations et les faire valoir dans l'intérêt de la paix auprès de ses alliés.

La seconde objection générale que présente l'ensemble du travail du Cabinet Autrichien, c'est, que contrairement à la pensée primitive qui avait présidé au programme des quatre points, et qui était d'établir le système politique de l'Orient sur la base d'une parité parfaite entre les deux Puissances limitrophes, les principes posés par le Cabinet Autrichien ne demandent des garanties matérielles qu'à la Russie sans en réclamer aucune de la Porte Ottomane.

N'est-il pas à craindre qu'en multipliant ainsi les obligations qui incombent à l'une des parties, on crée, contrairement au but qu'on se propose d'atteindre, des germes de complications futures?

C'est une question que nous livrons aux méditations impartiales du Cabinet de Vienne et à sa longue expérience des affaires d'Orient.

Du reste, en élevant cette objection générale contre la pensée qui domine le travail qui nous a été présenté, nous ne nous en prévaudrons ni pour articuler une réserve, ni pour éluder la discussion des détails.

Nos déterminations sont prises. Nous les consignerons ici, en examinant successivement les divers Articles du travail Autrichien.

L'Article premier n'a élevé dans ses quatre premiers paragraphes aucune objection.

Toutefois, le Cabinet Impérial n'a pu adopter le cinquième paragraphe. Tout en admettant, comme applicable à la situation actuelle des parties belligérantes, que l'évacuation des places fortes et du territoire occupés par les coalisés sur le sol Russe, peut se faire au moyen d'un échange de territoire de la part de la Russie, nous ne saurions accepter le mode par lequel on nous propose de réaliser cet échange.

La concession territoriale importante, réclamée sous la dénomination de "rectification de la frontière," nous paraît d'autant moins justifiée que la Russie a entre ses mains un territoire et une forteresse conquis sur la Turquie, et qui, par leur position et leur importance, sont faites pour servir d'objet d'échange. En conséquence, nous avons supprimé entièrement le paragraphe en question, et y avons substitué un autre conçu dans le sens indiqué ci-dessus.

Du reste, une entente finale sur cet objet pourrait être réservée aux Plénipotentiaires chargés de la négociation définitive.

Le seconde Article relatif au Danube n'a motivé aucune objection.

Le Cabinet Impérial est prêt à concourir aux développements à donner aux principes qui y sont énoncés.

Le troisième Article ne fait que reproduire dans le fonds, la proposition mise en avant par le Cabinet Impérial, et que votre Altesse avait été chargée de communiquer au Gouvernement Autrichien. Nous l'adoptons et nous consentons à ce que la Convention, arrêtée à cet effet entre la Russie et la Porte, soit préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires.

Pour le reste nous n'avons introduit dans cet Article que deux variantes.

L'une n'a d'autre but que de rendre la rédaction plus claire, afin d'éviter tout mal-entendu.

L'autre n'ajoute qu'un mot qui se rapporte plus spécialement aux moyens de surveillance qui nous sont indispensables sur les côtes orientales de la Mer Noire, afin d'empêcher le commerce des esclaves que nous avions réussi à reprimer jusqu'à présent.

Pour ce qui est du quatrième point l'Empereur n'aspire qu'au moment d'élever, en commun avec les autres Puissances Européennes, sa voix en faveur de ses coreligionnaires et de s'associer aux délibérations qui ont lieu pour assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques.

Telle est, mon Prince, notre manière d'envisager le travail Autrichien.

L'ensemble des considérations que nous avons développées donnera, je n'en doute pas, la conviction que notre réponse, loin de ressembler à un refus, est un essai franc et sincère d'entrer dans la voie que l'Autriche croit ouverte au rétablissement de la paix.

Bien plus, nous aimons à croire que si nos dispositions pacifiques sont partagées par les coalisés, les variantes que nous avons introduites dans les idées émises par le Cabinet de Vienne, contribueront essentiellement à convertir son travail préparatoire en préliminaires de paix pratiques, sérieux et efficaces.

Quoiqu'il advienne, le Gouvernement Impérial, après avoir ainsi consciencieusement rempli sa part de la tâche immense qui revient aux Puissances

engagées dans la lutte, ne saurait voir retomber sur lui la responsabilité des conséquences graves qui résulteraient de l'insuccès de l'œuvre de la paix. Il la repousse d'avance de toute l'énergie que donne la conscience de son droit.

Veuillez, mon Prince, communiquer cette dépêche et ses annexes à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche et lui en laisser copie.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 168.

Russian Counter-Propositions.

I.—*Principautés Danubiennes.*

ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte; et le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera, en outre, à ces Principautés ou y confirmera une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.

D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent réclamé par leur situation géographique; aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à restituer à la Porte Ottomane les places fortes et les territoires occupés par ses armées en Asie.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est, et aboutirait au lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Est accepté.

II.—*Danube.*

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

III.—*Mer Noire.*

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée.

Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Par conséquent, il n'y sera ni créé, ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires maritimes.

il ne sera ni créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires maritimes sur les rives de la Mer Noire.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet, sera, après avoir été préalablement agréé par les Puissances signataires du Traité Général, annexée au dit Traité et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante. Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

au service et à la protection des côtes.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnée dans l'Article précédent.

IV.—*Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.*

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Adopté.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer.

V.—*Conditions particulières.*

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit, qui leur appartient, de produire dans un intérêt Européen des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

No. 169.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

Vienna, January 15, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

THERE has been no official communication to Russia of our additional conditions, and no reasons are given by the Russian Minister for the suppression of the fifth paragraph.

Still, however, the fifth paragraph is insisted upon, like the others, by Austria, and if not accepted with the rest the Russian Mission will be sent away.

Again then I entreat of your Lordship to say whether despatch No. 16 is to be communicated to Count Buol. If it be, there is no reason why there should not be immediate reconciliation between the Austrian Government and the Russian Mission.

The party opposed to Count Buol becomes more audacious, but the Emperor as yet is firm, because he believes that England and France are acting cordially with him.

No. 170.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

Vienna, January 15, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

WHEN I sent my telegraphic despatch of this day I was under the impression that you would already have received Count Nesselrode's despatch to the Russian Minister here in answer to the Austrian ultimatum. This document, containing all the reasons of the Russian Government for the modifications they propose, will be in your hands to-morrow.

No. 171.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 79.)

Paris, January 14, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI spoke to me again this morning upon the state of matters at Vienna. He said that he found from despatches which he had received by telegraph from M. de Bourqueney that there was great danger of the late arrangement with Austria breaking down through the hesitation evinced by Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the Austrian memorandum.

I observed to Count Walewski that the hesitation of Her Majesty's Government was not extraordinary, as his Excellency had not yet vouchsafed to inform me whether the French Government considered the particular conditions as *sine quibus non* to peace, or not.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 172.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 84.)

Paris, January 15, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me this morning that he had yesterday informed M. de Persigny of the decision of the Imperial Government respecting the question of preliminaries which had been raised at Vienna. He was pleased

to add that the Imperial Government had gone to the verge of possibilities for the sole purpose of meeting the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

If I understood his Excellency rightly, the decision is this. The Imperial Government adheres strictly to the memorandum of the 14th November, and, upon the acceptance, by Russia, of the said memorandum, is prepared to sign preliminaries of peace, but offers to delay the signature of an armistice until after a discussion of the particular conditions.

Count Walewski spoke in a great hurry and with considerable reserve and caution, and I almost think, upon reflection, that I must have mistaken him, so extraordinary does it appear that he should think that hostilities could be continued after that preliminaries of peace had been signed. I said, however, that what he had stated induced me to ask him whether the French Government intended to make the particular conditions *sine quibus non* to peace or not. His Excellency refused all reply to this question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 173.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 85.)

Paris, January 15, 1856.

My Lord,

M. SEEBACH returned the night before last to Paris. He saw Count Walewski yesterday, and he is to see the Emperor to-day. Count Walewski stated to me this morning, that he was about to inform M. de Persigny by to-night's mail of the communication made to him by M. de Seebach.

His Excellency said that the Saxon Minister was the bearer of certain propositions, the nature of which, however, he did not vouchsafe to impart to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 174.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, January 15, 1856.

THE Prussian Minister writes to-day, from St. Petersburgh, that he is not without hopes that the ultimatum may yet be accepted; in short, that he is strenuously supporting it. I urged Baron Manteuffel to recall the Prussian Legation in case of refusal; he answered seriously, "I will not say yes, or no;" but the impression conveyed by his words is, that some additional instruction has been sent.

No. 175.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 63.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have read with some surprise that a communication so important as that referred to in your Excellency's despatch No. 1,055 of the 24th of December, namely, the terms of the ultimatum addressed by Austria to Russia, which might have required explanation and might have led to discussion, should have been made to the Porte merely through the channel of the English and French Dragomans.

It has, no doubt, been the practice at Constantinople to proceed in this manner, and the practice has probably arisen from the circumstance that formerly the Turkish Minister not speaking any European language, and European Ambassadors not speaking Turkish, conversation was necessarily carried on by mutual interpretation, and, to save time and trouble, messages were sent by

Dragomans. But now the Turkish Ministers speak French, and conversations can be held with them without the intervention of interpreters, and it is clear that it must be infinitely better, with a view to a satisfactory settlement of questions, that principals should meet and discuss together, rather than that such questions should be treated by means of messages sent through interpreters.

Her Majesty's Government, however, desire to be informed by your Excellency what is the custom in this respect, and upon what occasions it is usual for Ambassadors to communicate personally with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on what occasions Dragomans are sent to convey their messages.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 176.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 16, 1856.*

THE communication has been made to Count Buol in obedience to orders.

His Excellency's surprise and regret were great, but I venture to hope that these feelings will not interfere with the completion of the rupture.

As upon every occasion, the part taken in this affair by the French Ambassador has been most friendly.

No. 177.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 16, 1856.*

COUNT BUOL has just received a message from Count Esterhazy, stating that the Russian Government accept the Austrian propositions as a basis for peace negotiations.

No. 178.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1856.*

IN a despatch which Count Colloredo has read to me, Count Buol expresses his satisfaction that the views of Her Majesty's Government concerning the organization to be given to the Danubian Principalities, as stated in the memorandum which you had communicated to him, were upon so many points in accordance with the memorandum on the same subject communicated by the Austrian Government to Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the guaranty of the Principalities, Count Buol remarks, that such a guaranty had always been put forward in previous negotiations, as necessary to prevent any one Power from interfering with the Principalities; and also to secure the inviolability of the institutions of those Provinces, but Austria nevertheless will not insist upon a formal act of guaranty.

At the same time the Austrian Government considers it necessary that it should be made clear that the Contracting Powers, by assisting in the work of reconstituting the Principalities, will have thereby acquired a just claim to the acceptance of their joint intervention, if at any time serious differences should arise between the Principalities and the Porte; and this object they think would be attained by inserting the proposals made to Russia in the preliminaries of peace.

Count Buol further observes, that the Austrian Government are not convinced of the advantage of excluding the Porte—as he understands Her Majesty's Government to propose—from the confidential deliberations respecting

the Principalities, in which the Representatives of the three Powers at Constantinople are to take part. The Austrian Government fears that the susceptibilities of the Porte will be wounded by this mode of proceeding, whilst the advantage will be lost of being able to ascertain through the Porte the wants and wishes of the Provinces which will be the subject of these deliberations; and for these reasons it would appear better, Count Buol remarks, to admit the Ministers of the Sultan to the deliberations on the first point, declaring at the same time that these deliberations have no conclusive character, being only intended to furnish the respective Governments with grounds for definitive decisions.

I expressed to Count Colloredo the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government would learn that no material difference existed between them and the Austrian Government with respect to the arrangements for the future government of the Principalities, and I said that I did not apprehend any difficulty as to admitting the Porte to the deliberations which were to take place upon the subject at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 179.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1856.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 116 of the 31st ultimo, inclosing a copy of an autograph letter which has been addressed to you by the King of Sweden, expressing his appreciation of your conduct in the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, France, and Sweden, of the 21st of November last; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have read with great satisfaction the honourable and well-deserved testimony which has been borne in such gracious terms by the King of Sweden to your conduct in the negotiations in question.

You will inform Baron Stierneld of the sense which is entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the very flattering notice thus taken of your conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 180.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 17, 1856.*

DURING a shooting party, to which the Emperor did me the honour to invite me yesterday, His Majesty took an opportunity of stating to me what had passed at the audience which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 85 of the 15th instant, he intended to give to M. de Seebach; and, although the statement of His Majesty has lost much of its interest from the news received here last night that the Russian Government had accepted the Austrian ultimatum, I do not hesitate the less to put your Lordship in possession of it.

M. de Seebach, His Majesty said, had assured him of the sincere desire of the Russian Government to make peace, and had expressed the opinion that it would not be impossible to obtain of them the conditions put forward in the Austrian ultimatum, if those conditions were submitted to them under another form, and if their success at Kars was taken into consideration. In other words, that which could not be conceded to an ultimatum might be obtained by discussion; that the Emperor of Russia had charged him to propose to the French Government that Plenipotentiaries from England, France, Austria, and Russia, should meet in Paris to exchange opinions. A day or two would suffice to prove whether they were in a position to come to any agreement. If such was

the case, the negotiations for peace would be continued at once; if not, the Plenipotentiaries would separate, and hostilities would continue.

This, the Emperor stated, was, in a few words, the purport of M. de Seebach's communication, who added that if it was favourably entertained the Government of Russia would immediately address a proposal founded upon it to the different Governments interested.

The Emperor stated further that he had desired Count Walewski to inform M. de Persigny of what had occurred, and to instruct him to state to Her Majesty's Government that His Imperial Majesty considered that it merited serious consideration. He could not, however, permit the Plenipotentiaries to meet at Paris. It would expose him to suspicions of all kinds, and he should prefer Brussels.

I observed to the Emperor that the atmosphere of Brussels was supposed to be very Russian. His Majesty rejoined that he had indicated Brussels, first, because it was almost within equal reach of London and Paris; and, secondly, because the advice of the King of the Belgians might be useful in settling contested points.

I said, further, that there was another point of far greater consequence than the place of negotiation, and that was, the choice of negotiators. The Emperor replied that this had already occupied his attention, and that he thought that he could not do better than employ M. de Bourqueney, who was so well acquainted with all the subjects which must come under discussion.

It appears to be the intention of the Emperor of Russia to name Count Orloff and M. de Brunnow.

I asked the Emperor why His Majesty considered this preliminary meeting of Plenipotentiaries to be necessary. It would surely be more simple to state, in writing, the terms on which the Western Powers would make peace, and not to begin negotiations until, from the acceptance of those terms by Russia, it became necessary to work out the details. His Majesty replied that he had made a similar observation to M. de Seebach, and that he gathered from that Minister's reply that the Russian Government thought that an understanding, respecting the bases of negotiation, might be more easily attained if the attempt was made a distance from St. Petersburgh.

It is impossible not to remark that this proposal of Russia has greatly taken the Emperor's fancy. His Majesty considers it, of all those that have yet been brought forward, as the most likely to lead to peace. I repeated what I have so often said before, that, ere we go into negotiations with Russia, we must first understand each other, and that, as every day brought fresh evidence that the intention of Russia, whatever might be her ulterior object, was to negotiate, we ought to lose no time in making this necessary commencement. His Majesty answered, as he invariably does when this subject is touched, that such was his opinion also.

I asked the Emperor whether, in the course of his conversation with M. de Seebach, His Majesty had obtained any information respecting the internal state of Russia and the feelings of the Russian nation.

His Majesty replied that M. de Seebach's remarks tended to establish that there was a sincere wish for peace in the higher classes, but a fanatical desire to continue the war amongst the lower ranks. M. de Seebach attributed this state of the public feeling to the fact that the lower orders did not so much feel the pressure of the war; for it was an extraordinary fact that, while all the articles of luxury had greatly increased in value, the price of bread in Russia was very low. His Majesty added, that the impression left upon his mind, not so much from the assurances given by M. de Seebach, as from the general tone and tenour of his remarks, was, that Russia was intent upon peace. "For instance," said His Majesty, "M. de Seebach made the following observation to me: 'The Emperor Alexander counts upon the Emperor Napoleon III taking the same interest in his fate as his uncle, the Emperor Alexander, took in the fate of Napoleon I.' But," added His Majesty, "in order to render the cases similar, it must be as necessary for Russia to make peace now, as it was necessary for France to make it in 1814."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 181.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1856.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 84 of the 15th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation with Count Walewski relative to the question of the preliminaries of peace, I have to inform your Excellency that I have had several conversations with M. de Persigny, who has read to me more than one despatch from Count Walewski upon the subject of the memorandum of the 14th of November. I have upon each occasion held the same language to his Excellency, and assured him that Her Majesty's Government had no desire or intention to raise unnecessary difficulties, and that none would have occurred if the straightforward course towards Russia which Her Majesty's Government had all along recommended had been pursued, and that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had been informed of the additional conditions which it was the intention of England and France to propose; but as that course had not been adopted, and that for some reason unknown to Her Majesty's Government a mystery had been and still was observed upon the matter, Her Majesty's Government felt that it would not be safe to leave these important conditions to the chance of negotiation, and that a clear understanding must consequently be come to with Russia respecting them before any Preliminary Treaty of Peace was signed. This precaution, I told M. de Persigny, appeared now to be all the more necessary as Count Walewski was not prepared to say whether the Government of the Emperor considered these particular conditions *sine quibus non* to peace or not.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 182.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 100.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1856.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that on the 16th instant Count de Persigny read to me the despatch from Count Walewski, of which I inclose confidentially a copy,* giving an account of a conversation which Count Walewski had had with M. de Seebach, since the return of the latter to Paris, and of the assurances which the Saxon Minister was desired to give to the French Government of the desire of the Emperor of Russia to conclude peace. I informed Count Persigny, that as the Cabinet was then about to meet, I would give him an answer as soon as I had consulted my colleagues.

Later in the day I told Count de Persigny that Her Majesty's Government thought it was of the utmost importance to avoid the haste in which so many grave questions have been treated, and the tendency of which must be to create confusion and misunderstanding, and that it appeared to them necessary that one question should be solved before it was interwoven with another. Her Majesty's Government wished, therefore, that the proposal of M. de Seebach (which was by no means a practical one, or likely to lead to the object which was desired) should not be entertained until it was known whether Russia finally rejected or accepted the Austrian ultimatum, for in either case a determination of a different kind would have to be taken by England and France.

If Russia accepted the ultimatum, it would be necessary to proceed as was originally intended, provided that the additional conditions to be proposed by England and France were communicated to Russia.

If Russia rejected the ultimatum, then England and France must determine upon the course they would pursue, which must either be that to which they are now bound, namely, to concert with Austria as to the means of coercing Russia, or else England and France might entertain any fresh proposals that

* No. 184.

Russia might make, not through the intervention of Austria, with whom she would then have no diplomatic relations.

But until the last word of Russia was spoken, I said to Count de Persigny, it would be impossible to entertain the fresh proposal made by M. de Seebach, which was in fact aimed at Austria; and as England and France have entered into engagements with Austria, it would not be honourable to contract any obligation, directly or indirectly, of which that Power was not cognizant. Neither, I observed, could any inconvenience arise from the delay, since the Russian answer must arrive at Vienna on the 17th or 18th, and if that answer was unfavourable Prince Gortchakoff would have to leave Vienna, and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia would be complete.

Her Majesty's Government, I added, had no wish to continue the war wantonly; but they did intend not to agree to any conditions of peace that would not fulfil the objects of the war. They abided by the terms which had been originally proposed to them; and they only desired that those terms should be adopted *bonâ fide*, and really be what they were said to mean, and that, therefore, Her Majesty's Government could not allow them to be frittered away.

I am, &c
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 183.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1856.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Count Arnim had been instructed to support the Russian counter-proposals at Vienna, on the ground that they contained the acceptance of the Austrian proposals, with the exception of the cession of parts of Bessarabia, which point Russia was willing to treat in the definitive negotiations.

The Prussian Government therefore considered the Russian answer very satisfactory, and the Prussian Minister was directed to express the earnest wish of his Government that Austria would not go so far as to break off diplomatic relations with Russia.

A communication having been made in writing by Count Arnim to this effect, Count Buol had informed Colonel Mantenffel, who had called upon him soon afterwards, that the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia was inevitable, if the Austrian proposals were not accepted without reserve before the 18th instant, and that the only way in which Prussia could avert the rupture, would be by pressing the Russian Government to an unconditional acceptance. Count Buol added, that in the event of the Russian Cabinet persisting in its refusal, fresh deliberations would take place between the allies, and if Prussia wished to take part in them, the first step for her to take would be to recall the Prussian Mission from St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 184.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, January 18.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 15 Janvier*, 1856.

J'AI eu hier, ainsi que je vous l'ai mandé, un long entretien avec M. de Seebach. Il a été particulièrement chargé, m'a-t-il dit, de me donner les assurances les plus formelles du désir qu'a l'Empereur Alexandre de conclure la paix. La Russie, a-t-il ajouté, sans accepter l'ultimatum Autrichien, adhère en réalité à toutes les conditions qui lui sont proposées sauf de légers changements. Elle croit équitable que la prise de Kars modifie les exigences des Puissances

alliées pour ce qui concerne la Bessarabie; mais la Russie, continue M. de Seebach, ira cependant jusqu'au bout des concessions possibles.

Pour donner une preuve du sincère désir de la Russie de faire la paix, et pour hâter et faciliter les moyens de s'entendre, M. le Comte de Nesselrode a chargé M. de Seebach de déclarer qu'il est prêt à proposer officiellement, à Londres, à Vienne, et à Paris, la réunion immédiate de Plénipotentiaires qui délibéreraient sur les conditions de la paix. S'ils tombaient d'accord, comme on l'espère à Pétersbourg, on signerait les préliminaires et on s'occuperait en suite d'un armistice et de l'ouverture des négociations définitives. Si, au contraire, on ne parvenait pas à s'entendre, on se séparerait aussitôt.

M. le Comte de Nesselrode proposerait que la discussion et la signature des préliminaires eussent lieu à Paris aussi promptement que faire se pourra.

Je me suis borné à répondre à M. le Baron de Seebach que la Russie, n'ayant pas accepté purement et simplement les propositions transmises par l'Autriche, il m'était interdit, du moins pour le moment, de discuter les modifications demandées par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et qu'en ce qui concernait l'ouverture de M. le Comte de Nesselrode dont il venait de me faire part, je devais, avant de lui exprimer une opinion quelconque, prendre les ordres de l'Empereur.

J'ai, en effet, rendu compte à Sa Majesté de mon entretien avec M. le Ministre de Saxe.

L'Empereur pense que la proposition de M. le Comte de Nesselrode devrait être acceptée parcequ'elle nous procure l'occasion de produire nos conditions principales en même temps que nos conditions particulières et qu'elle ne peut retarder en rien nos préparatifs de guerre. Il désirerait seulement que Bruxelles fût choisi de préférence à Paris pour le lieu de cette réunion préliminaire, afin d'écarter toute apparence d'influence locale sur les délibérations.

Je vous prie, M. le Comte, de vouloir bien communiquer la présente dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et de me faire connaître l'appréciation que portera le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique sur son contenu.

Nous désirerions savoir également si le Gouvernement Anglais jugerait opportun d'informer le Cabinet de Vienne par le télégraphe de cette nouvelle ouverture de la Russie, ou s'il est préférable de ne s'en occuper qu'après le 18, c'est-à-dire, après la rupture des relations entre l'Autriche et la Russie.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 185.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1856.

I AM at a loss to understand why surprise and disappointment should have been manifested at your communicating the report of my conversation with Count Colloredo, which he had already made known to his Government.

We consider that the objections raised by Count Nesselrode to the fifth Article on account of its vagueness are just and reasonable, and the proper mode of meeting them will be for Count Buol at once to inform Prince Gortchakoff that our particular conditions are, the non-fortification of the Aland Islands, and the right to discuss the state of the countries to the east of the Black Sea.

If Count Buol will do this, it may remove all difficulty, and Russia cannot object to such reasonable conditions after having accepted the Austrian ultimatum.

No. 186.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 17, 1856.*

A SECOND meeting relative to the privileges and reforms took place yesterday between the three Representatives and the Turkish Ministers. The memorandum sent in my despatch No. 51 of the 14th instant meets with the concurrence of my colleagues. Appearances are favourable to the desired result. The Internuncio and myself are ready to open the first point. The French Ambassador is waiting for instructions. Could they not be hastened? We are all to meet again in Conference the day after to-morrow.

No. 187.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 94.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 18, 1856.*

I OUGHT to have mentioned to your Lordship a day or two ago that instructions had been sent by telegraph to M. de Thouvenel to admit the presence of the Internuncio at the discussions to take place at Constantinople on the first point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 188.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 18, 1856.*

THE Emperor sent for me yesterday afternoon to the Tuileries. I had a long audience with His Majesty, in the presence of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, which, however, was unfortunately broken in upon by the arrival of Count Walewski. I am not aware whether his Excellency had been summoned by the Emperor, or whether he arrived accidentally.

The Emperor, on my being ushered into his presence, said that he had put upon paper what he considered to be the present state of the negotiations concerning the Eastern question, and the manner in which they should be pursued. The paper was long, and contained some slight, though evidently unintentional, inaccuracies; and the conclusion at which it pointed was, that the Allies should require the immediate communication by Austria to Russia of the particular conditions, and that they should not enter into negotiations unless the principle of those conditions had been accepted at St. Petersburgh. There did not, however, appear to me to be such an accurate definition respecting the course to be pursued as would obviate future complications—the question which, in my humble opinion, is the question in dispute, namely, whether all the terms of peace are to be contained in the preliminaries of peace, was accorded. I ventured, therefore, to state, in as clear terms as I could, the situation which I felt myself bound to maintain for Her Majesty's Government.

"That situation," I said, "was simple in the extreme. Her Majesty's Government had a sincere desire to cooperate with the French Government in making peace upon the terms agreed to between them, that is, upon the four points as developed in the Austrian ultimatum, and upon the two points which had been erroneously called particular conditions, but which were in reality, and always had been in the estimation of Her Majesty's Government, part and parcel of the general arrangements for peace. But Austria," I continued, "contended that we were bound to sign preliminaries of peace without including in those preliminaries these so-called particular conditions, because it was said in the

memorandum which accompanied the ultimatum to St. Petersburgh, that preliminaries of peace, to be succeeded by an armistice, would follow the acceptance by Russia of the ultimatum.

In this view of the matter, however, Her Majesty's Government could not coincide. In the first place, they had always drawn a distinction between the ultimatum and the memorandum. In one of the first conversations which I had had with Count Walewski after these documents had been made known to Her Majesty's Government, I had informed his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government, while they considered that something might be made of the ultimatum, intended to take no notice of the memorandum, which appeared to them to regard the proceedings of the Austrian Government alone. Again Lord Palmerston, in a conversation which he had at an early date of the negotiation with M. de Persigny, and the substance of which that Ambassador had reported to the French Government, had taken objection to the "paraphé" which M. de Bourqueney had affixed to the memorandum as binding the present Government more than was desirable or was fair to Great Britain (a fact, I observed, which showed what were the sentiments of Her Majesty's advisers in regard to adhering to the memorandum).

In the second place, Her Majesty's Government could not expose the particular conditions on which they were quite as much determined to insist as on the other points, to the chances of future negotiation. Russia would naturally consider herself as bound in principle to those matters alone which might be mentioned in the preliminaries, and we should have no reason to complain of her if she did that which she would have a right to do, namely, adhere strictly to that which she had accepted in the preliminaries, and refuse everything else. But in what a position would the allies then be!

Austria, I said further, had no fair ground for complaint. The two Governments had honestly informed her of their views and intentions, but she had not chosen to communicate them to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and she certainly could not call upon the allies to pay the penalty of her shortcomings.

Again, I asked the Emperor to contemplate seriously the position in which we should find ourselves with respect to Kars. The preliminaries of peace which Austria called upon us to sign, stipulated that we should surrender every inch of ground held by us in Russia in return for a cession of Russian territory to the Principalities—a cession, however, which was of far greater value to Austria than to the Principalities; but they left Russia in possession of a Turkish fortress of immense importance, and of Turkish territory of considerable extent; the allies having taken up arms, among other things, to defend the integrity of the Turkish dominions. No Government in England, I felt assured, could successfully defend such preliminaries before the British nation.

A long and desultory conversation followed, in the middle of which Count Walewski arrived, and during which the Emperor manifested the greatest desire to come to an immediate understanding with Her Majesty's Government. The language of Count Walewski, which implied nothing more than complete deference to the behests of Austria, undid much of the good which I flattered myself had been matured. He disputed the accuracy of the statement made by the Emperor; he confounded, in spite of all my protestations to the contrary, the ultimatum with the memorandum; he objected to His Imperial Majesty making the particular conditions *sine qubus non* to peace: he would, in fact, make no concession beyond communicating to the Russian Government the nature of the particular conditions, and that only after the preliminaries of peace should have been signed, and he pretended that this was an immense sacrifice offered by the French Government to English exigencies, inasmuch, as in making that communication, France renounced the right of producing any further particular conditions on her own account. I told his Excellency flatly, that as I knew France had no further conditions to bring forward, I could not accept the validity of such a agreement.

In fine, my Lord, nothing was accomplished by this interview. The Emperor abounded not only in expressions of the necessity of an understanding with Her Majesty's Government, but of his determination to contribute all in his power to obtain it; but I can neither conceal from myself nor from your Lordship, that if I have interpreted correctly the feelings and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, I see but small hope of that understanding being realized. But one course, in my humble opinion, remains open to us. I hinted

it yesterday, but with little favour. Still it is a straightforward and honest course, and as such I venture to lay it before your Lordship. Let us state to the Austrian Government that since their ultimatum was framed circumstances have occurred at the seat of war, which necessarily militate against its conditions; that the capture of Kars has changed the whole territorial question; that if Russia is to cede ground in Bessarabia, she will naturally insist on retaining her conquests in Asia; that we must comply on this point, or continue the war; that Austria can pretend, however, to neither of these sacrifices on the part of the allies; and that the only alternative that remains is to remodel the stipulations respecting the evacuation of the Crimea. An appeal of this nature to the good sense of the Austrian Government ought not to fail of its effects. But however this may be, Her Majesty's Government may be assured that after what has occurred, the Emperor could not, if he would, continue the war. It is with this conviction before them that they should make up their minds as to the course they will now pursue. They may depend upon a respectful, though, considering His Imperial Majesty's position, hardly an impartial consideration on his part, of any proposals they may make; but if any impression is to be made on Count Walewski, it must be through a deliberate declaration that they will not, whatever may be the consequences, go one inch beyond what their honour commands, or what their reason dictates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—It is hardly worth mentioning that one of Count Walewski's arguments for signing the Austrian preliminaries of peace is, that he has reports that the Emperor Alexander's throne is seriously menaced by the concessions which he has made, and that it will be impossible for him to concede more.

C.

No. 189.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, January 11, 1856.*

M. DASCHKOFF, the Russian Minister at this Court, communicated on the 7th instant to Baron Stierneld the despatch which he had received the preceding evening from Count Nesselrode, in reply to the communication of the Defensive Treaty signed on the 21st of November last, between Great Britain, France, and Sweden, which General Nordin had made to his Excellency on the 18th ultimo.

As the Swedish Government forward by post this day to Baron Hochschild copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch for communication to your Lordship, it is unnecessary that I should enter into details, or do more than mention the chief points touched on by the Russian Chancellor.

His despatch is dated the $\frac{1}{13}$ December, and commences by alluding to the explanations which Baron Stierneld had directed General Nordin to make when communicating the Treaty, namely, that it in no way changed the position of Sweden, or the neutrality which that Power had laid down, assurances "dont l'Empereur prend acte." His Imperial Majesty hoped, also, that it would in no respect alter the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood which had so long existed between the two countries, relations which His Imperial Majesty on his side regarded "comme un legs précieux de ses augustes prédécesseurs."

With respect to the apprehensions which had induced Sweden to conclude the Treaty of November 21, although the Emperor could not admit that they were well grounded, nevertheless he would have been willing to have offered her every guarantee on the subject, had he not supposed that that the neutral position which Sweden had observed, and had hitherto so "loyally" maintained, rendered such guarantees unnecessary.

Count Nesselrode's despatch is drawn up with studied moderation, and betrays in no part of it the surprise which General Nordin reports he showed when the communication of the Treaty was made to him; but notwithstanding I

have reason to believe that the Treaty of the 21st November has produced a considerable impression both on the Imperial Government at St. Petersburgh, and on those Cabinets which are supposed to be favourably inclined to Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 190.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 18, 1856.*

RUSSIAN Minister has been apprized by telegraph that a courier is on the road who will bring proposals touching signature of the preliminaries and march of negotiations.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is evidently in haste.

I would submit whether Prussia, looking to admission into the allied Councils, might be induced to press the engagement not to fortify the Aland Islands.

In this manner Prussia might at length render a service to Germany.

Austria is already willing to sanction the admission of Prussia in return for her support at St. Petersburgh.

No. 191.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 19, 1856.*

THE tone of Count Walewski is completely changed. The French Government appear willing to come into all our conditions. I write to you by the messenger.

No. 192.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 19, 1856.*

I AM most happy to be able to report to your Lordship a decided improvement in Count Walewski's language respecting the coming negotiations.

I called upon his Excellency this afternoon, and although I found him stiff and reserved on first touching the subject, yet he gradually assumed a more cordial and finally a friendly tone. As I have reason to know that the Emperor has expressed himself very strongly to his Excellency, and in disapprobation of his late conduct, I have no doubt that this amendment is to be traced to that source.

I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 99, of yesterday's date. He asked me whether I could tell him that Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied if he made the declaration to which your Lordship alluded, namely, that the acceptance of the particular conditions was *sine qua non* to peace. I told him that it would be much more satisfactory if he would say that he was prepared to require their insertion, as also the eventual evacuation of Kars by the Russians, in the preliminaries of peace. I remarked, that I thought such a course would be easy if the present state of the question was fairly stated at Vienna. Count Buol was too sensible and too reasonable to insist on that which was no longer practicable, and it was clear that peace must be eventually made, not as Austria wished, but as the allies determined.

Some further conversation ensued, and eventually I stated it to be my opinion, reserving, however, the ratification of it for your Lordship's superior decision, that if the preliminaries of peace contained, in addition to the terms

already agreed upon between the two Governments, the further stipulations that in return for the evacuation by the allies of the places and territory in Russia now held by them, Russia should abandon the left bank of the Danube with the fortresses situated thereon, should restore Kars and the country belonging to Turkey now in the possession of her troops, should undertake not to refortify the Islands of Aland, and should come to some agreement ("s'entendre" was the word employed) respecting the provinces east of the Black Sea; if these additions were made, I said that I thought Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied.

Count Walewski assured me that if such should prove to be the case, he would endeavour to bring the Austrian Government into this arrangement, and that at all events he would engage to make the question of the Aland Islands a *sine qua non* to peace.

I congratulate your Lordship on this sudden change of language, which, I frankly confess, I did not expect.

Count Walewski told me that he intended sending M. Baudin to-night to London, for the purpose of better explaining to M. de Persigny the intentions of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 193.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 11, 1856.

My Lord,

THE conversation between the Emperor and the French Minister, which I have had already the honour of noticing to your Lordship, has given rise to so much comment that I feel called upon to offer to your Lordship fuller details of what passed upon the occasion than it was in my power to do in my cyphered despatch of the 10th instant.

The Emperor, upon coming up to Baron Bourqueney, shook hands with him, an honour which it is contrary to the etiquette of this Court to bestow, and expressed his regret at not having seen him for so long a time.

Baron Bourqueney alluded to the reserve which it had been necessary for him to observe upon his return from Paris, at a time when it was so desirable that attention should not be drawn to matters under discussion, when the Emperor expressed his warm satisfaction at the results which had been obtained at those Conferences, and after speaking in very handsome terms of the Emperor Napoleon and his Government, added with considerable animation, "Enfin nous sommes arrivé à la crise; et, d'une façon ou d'une autre, nous en sortirons."

The words were heard, as probably they were intended to be, by some of the foreign Ministers who were standing in the circle, and conveyed the impression of His Imperial Majesty having made up his mind to take a much more energetic part than he has hitherto done in the great question by which Europe is kept in suspense.

If the announcement of the Emperor's intentions have been acceptable to Baron Bourqueney, they have been not less so to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has at the end of long months brought his Imperial Master very near to that point to which he would have, and much more rapidly, been conducted by Prince Schwartzenberg.

This consideration, however, by no means tends to diminish Count Buol's merits.

Prince Schwartzenberg possessed an unbounded influence over his youthful master. Count Buol had to establish his influence firmly before he could apply it to the purpose for which it has latterly been used.

Upon quitting Baron de Bourqueney, the Emperor, as I before had the honour of stating to your Lordship, addressed himself to the Swedish Minister, observing that he congratulated him upon the Treaty that had lately been concluded; that this Treaty might very probably conduce towards bringing about the good results that were to be anticipated.

It is with sincere regret that I found myself, from severe indisposition, compelled to give up an opportunity of finding myself in the Emperor's circle. It would have been a matter of great interest to me to compare his manner of receiving the French and the English Minister, and I should have been glad that any remarks respecting the value to be attached to the memorandum of the 14th of November, should have been addressed to me.

To M. de Bourqueney the Emperor observed that he had learned with concern that there had been some misapprehension ("racerne") at London, with regard to the memorandum.

Baron Bourqueney feeling that the moment was a critical one treated the matter lightly, and replied that there had been some slight misunderstanding ("mal-entendu"), but that he was disposed to believe that it had been cleared up.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 194.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 16, 1856.

YOUR Lordship will have learnt from my despatch No. 20 of the 9th instant, that I had taken upon myself to mention to Count Buol the incident by which Baron Prokesch's visit to Athens had been marked.

Your Lordship will then, I trust, approve of my resolution of not acting upon the instruction conveyed in your despatch marked No. 12, except under further orders.

In his eagerness to return the visit of an old friend, Baron Prokesch may have been guilty of a breach of diplomatic etiquette, but his fault, whatever may have been its degree, assuredly did not originate in his desire to give an advantage to that party of which up to the moment of the new frontier for Bessarabia being decreed, he had shown himself the consistent and uncompromising opponent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR

No. 195.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 16, 1856.

THE violence of the language used by the Russian Mission and the Russian party is extreme at the answer received from St. Petersburgh being met by an intimation of its being incomplete, and of the intention of the Austrian Government to send away Prince Gortchakoff and his staff should a distinct acceptation of the ultimatum not be received by the 18th instant.

There are very indiscreet speeches attributed to Prince Gortchakoff and his staff, which they probably never made; I know, however, for certain of his having said, "L'Autriche vient de creuser une abîme entre elle et la Russie qu'il ne suffira pas de cinquante ans à combler. Quant au jeune Empereur il y tombera le tout premier. Avant trois ans il versera des larmes de sang sur la faute qu'il vient de commettre."

The indignation of Count Arnim, Colonel Manteuffel, and the Prussian party, is, as I am told, expressed in language equally energetic. They speak of the contemplated expulsion of the Russian Envoy as an act of brutality, and declare openly that the Austrians are much mistaken if they imagine that a Prussian Mission will ever be recalled from St. Petersburgh in support of demands made in so coarse a manner upon the Emperor of Russia.

It is not a little deplorable to see any awakening energy which can be mustered by the Prussian Government put forth for the purpose of confirming Russia in a resistance to the demands so justly made upon her.

It had been Prince Gortchakoff's intention upon quitting Vienna to take up his residence at Dresden. He has now received a telegraphic order enjoining him, when he leaves his post, to repair to St. Petersburgh.

Some of his friends here understand, as I believes he desires that it should be understood, that he is about to enter the Ministry. Should this prove to be the case, it will show that the orthodox party are in the ascendant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 196.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 16, 1856.

My Lord,

NOTHING which has ever happened in my professional life has given me such painful perplexity as the decision which I have been called upon to take respecting the communication of your Lordship's despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant to the Austrian Government.

On the one hand, the impulse is always strong to pay unhesitating and immediate obedience to your Lordship's directions; on the other, the motives in favour of a reconsideration of my instruction appear to be so cogent that I could not bring myself to act as I had been ordered to do without reference to your Lordship.

This struggle between simple obedience to orders, and the desire to guard against dangers which struck me as being of a very serious nature, led to the telegraphic messages which I had the honour of forwarding to your Lordship on the 13th instant and yesterday, the latter being sent after the receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 14th instant.

We are now in the midst of the crisis produced by Count Buol's announcement to Prince Gortchakoff, and although a reference has been made by the Prince to St. Petersburgh, according to all probability the Russian Government (however great their desire for peace may be) will hardly make up their minds to purchase that advantage by a plain and unconditional acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum.

If they do, the disabled condition of Russia, and the reserve made in the ultimatum, afford the allied Governments the means of negotiating with advantage.

If they do not, on the 18th or the 19th instant Prince Gortchakoff and his Diplomatic staff will receive their passports, and the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Russia is complete.

In the meantime, however, not only is the indignation occasioned to the Prussian party much greater and much more openly expressed than was to be anticipated, but the opposition to Count Buol's policy is likewise seen to be most powerful, not only among a party always known to be favourable to Russia, but even in the Cabinet itself.

The fact is so well established, that even a newspaper conducted under the influence of the Finance Minister, does not hesitate to express its warm disapprobation of the deplorable manner in which the conciliatory concessions of Russia have been met by the Imperial Government.

It is not to be doubted that a portion of the Cabinet, possibly the Emperor himself, would be glad of a motive or an excuse for undoing what has lately been done, and such excuse or motive would be afforded by the declaration that Her Majesty's Government decline all recognition of the memorandum of the 14th November.

I am far from being able to assert that such a declaration to this effect might not be followed by a reconciliation between the Austrian Government and the Russian Mission. Little more might possibly be required than that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should request Prince Gortchakoff to consider the declarations of the last days as "non avenues."

With regard to the point how far the ultimatum and the memorandum of the 14th November are to be considered as binding upon Her Majesty's Government, I have avoided discussion upon it, but I know perfectly well the arguments by which Count Buol supports his view of their constituting an engagement from which we should not be at liberty to free ourselves, and I must confess my inability to meet them.

The promise to break off diplomatic relations with Russia in the event of their not complying with the demands presented in the ultimatum, was recorded in that memorandum, and in my despatch of the 12th December, No. 19, the following passages are to be found: "I should likewise remark upon the great stress laid by the Minister for Foreign Affairs upon being apprized whether Her Majesty's Government adhere to the arrangements made by himself and Baron de Bourqueney, and recorded in the paper dated the 14th ultimo, to which their initials ("parraphés") were affixed. To this point Count Buol attaches great importance, as he regards this document as the basis of the present proceedings."

As regards myself—although certainly I had no wish to express the opinion—I must admit, as I did lately in my despatch No. 19 of the 9th instant, that no doubt existed in my mind as to Her Majesty's Government having adopted the arrangements of the memorandum upon the consideration of the advantages which they offered outweighing those parts to which objections were entertained.

When called upon, accordingly, a few hours before Count V. Esterhazy's departure for St. Petersburgh, to declare whether Count Buol "was to consider that Her Majesty's Government adhered to the plan traced out in the memorandum of the 14th November," I replied, "that I had no instructions upon the point, but that I had no hesitation in expressing my firm belief that such was the case; that, slightly modified, Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the ultimatum, and that I inferred, therefore, that the paper which had led to it was included in the sanction."

The declaration may have been indiscreet, but at least it was not unjustifiable, as without it the whole proceedings would at once have fallen to the ground. The ultimatum would have become waste paper, and the diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia would have remained where they had been since the outbreak of the war.

As it was, Count Buol was satisfied with the declaration of my confident belief. Count Esterhazy was dispatched on his mission; and a certain advantage, with the chance of a more important contingent advantage, was at once obtained.

If it be now said that the advantages, actual and remote, were too dearly purchased, I would respectfully submit to your Lordship that the reflection comes too late; the conditions of the ultimatum must, I think, be considered the conditions of the English Government, after this paper having received several corrections suggested and insisted upon by your Lordship; whilst there will remain some difficulty in disconnecting this document from the paper to which it owed its existence.

That it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government that no concealment should be used; that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should be made acquainted with the full extent of their demands, is certain; but I submit that the point was not peremptorily insisted upon.

That it was not, appears from your Lordship's despatch No. 7 of the 6th of December, in which after stating "that this delay has been unavoidable, as Her Majesty's Government considered it their duty to come to an agreement with the French Government respecting the true interpretation and meaning of certain terms of the ultimatum, in order to guard against future misunderstandings," your Lordship directed me "to assure Count Buol that the amendments and alterations had no other object than to render clear certain conditions in the ultimatum." In a later passage of the same despatch, the expediency and propriety of making known to Russia the conditions upon which the two Western Powers insist are urged with great force; but again I venture to remark that their setting forth is not made a peremptory condition. The expression used is, "that Her Majesty's Government trust that Count Buol will see the propriety of making these terms known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh."

If I turn to your Lordship's circular despatch of the 20th ultimo, explaining

to Her Majesty's Missions abroad the position of the Russian question, I find a similar expression; in this it is said, "Her Majesty's Government would have much preferred that these conditions should have been specified in the ultimatum itself, but that they felt that they had no right to press upon Austria the conditions on which the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia should depend." And again, that "Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna had been directed to acquaint the Austrian Government that Her Majesty's Government trust that Austria will see the propriety of making these terms" (regarding the Aland Islands, the Consuls in the ports of the Black Sea, and the conditions respecting the territories on the east of the Black Sea) "known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh."

It may then be said, I think, that the ultimatum, as finally agreed upon and sent off, is to be regarded as a sort of compromise between the Power with which it in fact originated, and the Power which gave it its somewhat reluctant adherence.

It was less explicit than was wished by Her Majesty's Government, in consequence of the warm desire felt by the Austrian Cabinet that it should be accepted by Russia; it was agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding its want of explicitness, on account of its offering the great chance of proving the cause of a rupture between Austria and her northern ally, and of her being brought into closer alliance or even cooperation with the Western Powers. When I say cooperation, however, I observe that this was to be looked to in virtue, not of the articles of the ultimatum, but of the stipulations of the memorandum to which it owed its birth.

I owe your Lordship apologies, and I offer them in great sincerity, for having expressed myself with perhaps unbecoming freedom; when, however, I see such dangers as I think may be made out a-head, I should be unworthy of the confidence which you have been wont so largely to bestow on me, if I allowed any consideration to induce me to keep silence.

I have observed the dispositions of the Austrian Cabinet to very little purpose, if I am mistaken in supposing that, besides great offence being given by the communication of your despatch No. 16, the effect of the communication will be, to throw Austria unhesitatingly into the arms of France. In that event, as I have quite as little doubt that the displeasure would have been to some degree shared by France, a great risk would be incurred of the approximation of the two countries ending, and possibly at no very distant period, in a disposition to come to terms with Russia without the concurrence and with little reference to the interests of Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 197.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 16, 1856.*

IT is right that I should state to your Lordship that Mr. Elliot has the merit of having discovered that the wording of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to the ultimatum, is such as to justify the suspicion of its having been intended, under cover of an ambiguous phrase, to obtain an important advantage.

The Chancellor, in stating that the Russian Government accept the principle of the neutralization of the Black Sea, adds, that they consent that the Convention to be concluded, "à cet effet," between Russia and the Porte, should be in the first instance agreed to by the other Powers, which Convention might be supposed to apply to neutralization of the Black Sea instead of merely to the number of small vessels to be maintained by the two countries as laid down by the Austrian ultimatum.

I have noticed the point to Count Buol, who promised to look to it, and to Baron de Bourqueney, who considers it to be of great importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 198.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 48.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 16, 1856.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's orders, I have this day placed in Count Buol's hands a copy of your despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant.

Count Buol's feelings of regret at receiving this communication were manifestly very strong, although expressed in more measured language than I had expected. He had considered Austria pledged to Her Majesty's Government, he had considered that he held the pledge of Her Majesty's Government in return, and he would ask me, Did I not understand that strong moral obligation had been contracted by the Cabinets?

He would further inquire whether or not Her Majesty's Government had insisted upon certain alterations being made in the ultimatum, and whether by their acceptance the ultimatum had not become *bonâ fide* an English as well as an Austrian document?

The English Government had desired that provision should be made for the admission of Consuls into the Black Sea; that proviso was accordingly to be found in the ultimatum. If Her Majesty's Government had laid such stress upon a specific mention of the Aland Islands and a consideration of the territories of the Black Sea, these points should have been made a condition *sine quâ non*, and Her Majesty's Government should not have allowed the ultimatum to be sent off in its present shape.

After a pause Count Buol proceeded to say that he found it difficult to express what he had to say after one reading of your Lordship's despatch, but that he should make some observations upon it in a despatch which he should address in the course of two or three days to Count Colloredo.

He added that the French Government having repeatedly made known their intention of carrying out to their full extent the engagements which they had undertaken, it would be to the French Cabinet that he should look for support to the observations which he wished to offer to Her Majesty's Government.

In conclusion, Count Buol intimated that as the rupture with Russia was now so nearly brought to a crisis, no deviation would be made from the course which had been struck out, but that, were this rupture to be averted by the unconditional acceptance by Russia of the terms of the ultimatum, it was to France that he must look for inducing Her Majesty's Government to stand by engagements which he must consider to be binding upon them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 199.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 16, 1856.*

I CAN, at present, add nothing to the announcement made to your Lordship this evening, by telegraph, of the acceptance by the Russian Government of the conditions of the ultimatum as preliminaries of peace.

It is to be hoped that a Government which has ceded so much will be disposed to purchase peace at the price of some further concessions; but in any ulterior negotiations which may take place it appears probable that little is to be expected from Austria, whose objects are now secured, and whose position from being one of great embarrassment has become easy, and, perhaps, even dignified, as compared with that of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 200.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 101.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 19, 1856.

M. DE BOURQUENEY mentions in a despatch received from him this morning, that Count Buol had stated to him that he was quite prepared to support the particular conditions of France and England in the Conferences for Peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 201.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 22.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 15, 1856.

I CALLED to-day on Baron Manteuffel with the object of hearing if any news had arrived from St. Petersburgh as to the effect produced by the last communication from Vienna, and whether the Russian Government was likely to persist in its rejection of the ultimatum. His Excellency read to me at once a telegraphic despatch which he had just received from Baron Werther, stating that he had seen Count Orloff and other persons, and that he had still hopes, though slender ones, that it might be accepted purely and simply; that he was doing everything in his power to obtain a solution of the question in this sense, and was strenuously supporting the efforts of his Austrian colleague. I then observed that there never was a more favourable moment for Prussia to step forward, and to declare at St. Petersburgh that she heartily joined with Austria, and would withdraw her Minister if Russia persisted in her refusal to accept the offered terms.

Baron Manteuffel said that he had been duly informed of all that was intended by the Cabinet of Vienna, and that he thought if negotiations for peace were opened the security against a renewal of the present complications would be greatly increased by all the Powers becoming parties and guarantees to any Treaty that might be made, but that he felt reluctant to come in at the tail of Austria, giving me to understand that it would have been more congenial to him to have come forward at the invitation of the other Powers.

I replied that we had already had several conversations respecting the course which we hoped to see Prussia pursue with regard to the ultimatum; that his Excellency had never given me a clear and explicit answer on the subject; that the mere support of the question at St. Petersburgh was insufficient, and that, as Count Buol had explained, Prussia was required to recall her Minister from St. Petersburgh if Count Esterhazy left the Russian capital. I implored him, in the interests of peace, to add the weight of Prussia in the scales; that it was evident from what he had just told me that Russia was giving way, and that if she felt she had no longer any support to expect from Berlin, she must yield; and that not a moment was to be lost in sending instructions by telegraph to St. Petersburgh, which would remove all doubt as to the position of Prussia. His Excellency rejoined that he had felt the gravity of the present moment, and that as to recalling Baron Werther, the question certainly had been entertained,—"je ne vous dis ni oui ni non;" evidently wishing me to believe, as I have already had the honour to inform your Lordship this afternoon by telegraph, that something on the subject had been sent off; but the observation was so qualified that I doubt his having addressed any instructions to Baron Werther that will compromise the Prussian Government if Russia finally rejects the ultimatum, but enough on the other hand, if it is accepted, to enable Prussia to put in a claim for admission to the negotiations.

She clings to her position as a great Power, but will incur none of its

responsibility, and will play the game of indecision to the last moment. She has no wish frankly to join us, neither has she, I believe, any desire openly to unite her policy with Russia. Her jealousy of Austria is undisguised and unabated; but she is afraid to separate from her, and the force of circumstances may yet impel her into the right course.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 202.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 16, 1856.

IN my despatch No. 17 of the 12th instant, I reported the accounts which my French colleague had given me of his interview with Baron Seebach, and as he appeared to be under the impression that the Saxon Minister was the bearer of something more than a verbal communication to Paris, I have endeavoured to discover from Baron Manteuffel whether this was true or not.

His Excellency told me that Baron Seebach called on him on his way through Berlin, and had stated that he had made every effort at St. Petersburgh to obtain concessions in favour of peace, and hoped something had been gained by his journey to the Russian capital. Baron Manteuffel however assured me that although Baron Seebach appeared fully acquainted with the counter-propositions, he could not believe he was charged with anything beyond verbal messages, in return for those of which he had been the bearer, and that he did not believe that he had been charged with a letter to the Emperor Napoleon, as had been supposed here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 203.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 26.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 17, 1856.

THE news arrived here to-day of the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum, and I called on Baron Manteuffel to endeavour to learn from his Excellency the impression which had been made on him by this important intelligence.

He seemed well pleased at the prospect now held out of approaching negotiations, but he did not appear to participate in the universal feeling existing here, that peace must necessarily follow, or that serious difficulties might not yet arise in the course of the discussion. He possessed no details, and evidently considered that it would be prudent to wait for further intelligence before giving an opinion.

I observed to his Excellency that he would perhaps now regret that Baron Werther had not been instructed to take the same course as Count Esterhazy had done. His Excellency said that as Prussia had had nothing to do with drawing up the ultimatum, it was hard to expect that she should at once step forward and adopt as her own a project compiled by the three Powers; but he would observe that Baron Werther had greatly contributed to the success which had just been obtained.

If so, I rejoined, why did you not communicate the instructions under

which he was acting? His Excellency answered, that he did not do so because he wished to avoid their becoming public, which he imagined would have happened if they had been communicated, and a knowledge of this would have done more harm than good at St. Petersburgh.

I then asked if Baron Werther had been ordered to leave if Russia refused. His Excellency said that such a possibility was shadowed forth, and that Baron Werther had been ordered to let Count Nesselrode know that this might be the consequence if Russia rejected the Austrian ultimatum.

We spoke for some time on this matter, but I elicited nothing new, and only obtained a confirmation of the opinions which I have already had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 22 of the 15th instant.

It is clearly evident that the desire of the Prussian Government is to be admitted to the future Conferences, but I doubt, if that were the case, whether she would bind herself to guarantee, in conjunction with the other Powers, the due fulfilment of the conditions that will be imposed on Russia in a Treaty to be hereafter negotiated. What Prussia wishes to hold out to the allies, is that her being a party to the Treaty would strengthen it, and be an additional security for the maintenance hereafter of the peace of the world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 204.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 17, 1856.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 19 of the 14th instant, as to the proceedings of the Prussian Government in regard to the Austrian ultimatum, I have this day read that despatch to Baron Manteuffel. When I came to the passage which states that your Lordship had received no communication from Count Bernstorff upon the views and intentions of the Prussian Government, not even the acknowledgment which might in courtesy have been expected from the Cabinet of Berlin, his Excellency said that he could not understand Count Bernstorff's silence.

With reference to the observations on the active measures adopted to induce the German Powers not to take part with Austria, he denied that anything of the sort had been done; and remarked on the passage in the despatch that the facilities afforded by the Prussian Government for carrying on the war were but manifest indications that the sympathies of the Prussian Government are on the side of Russia, and against the Western Powers, that Her Majesty's Government were not correctly informed on this point; that although Prussia had certainly not chosen to follow in the line pointed out by three Powers, she had nevertheless played a useful part at St. Petersburgh, and Prussia was far from being the tool of Russia, as was frequently reproached to her.

As to the assistance which Prussia is accused of affording to the Russian Government in supplying munitions of war which the British Government considered inconsistent with the duties of a neutral Power, this was an exaggeration of the real facts; but he added nothing to disprove the statement, and our conversation ended without my being able to obtain from him any assurances of a satisfactory nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 205.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 17, 1856.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has informed me confidentially that he received this morning a despatch from Count Buol, giving an account of an interview with Colonel Manteuffel, in which he urged him to use all his influence with the Prussian Government to adopt another position towards Russia; that her assistance would be of the greatest value, and that he hoped Baron Werther might yet be instructed to leave St. Petersburgh in the event of the rejection of the ultimatum.

Count Buol's despatch then states that in the event of Russia's refusal, war will certainly be carried on in the Baltic on a different scale from what has hitherto been the case, and that it would be impossible for Prussia to maintain her present neutral and passive attitude; that if complications arose Austria would remain faithful to her alliance with the Western Powers, and that Prussia must not look to her for assistance.

Count Esterhazy left this despatch with Baron Manteuffel for communication to the King, but has been unable to learn from his Excellency whether any fresh instructions had in consequence been sent to Baron Werther. His impressions on the subject of his former instructions coincided with those which I have reported to your Lordship in my other despatch No. 26 of this day; but I have no doubt that the Prussian Government has in its own way endeavoured to render service to the cause of the allies, though the form in which this has been done is concealed from us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 206.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 31.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 19, 1856.*

YOUR Lordship may judge of the perplexing difficulties in which Diplomatic Agents of Prussia occasionally find themselves, from the intelligence contained in my despatch No. 28 of the 17th instant, which implies dissatisfaction of Count Bernstorff for having withheld from you all knowledge of the instructions that had been sent to Baron Werther. Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, has also incurred displeasure in another way. He wrote to Count Buol on learning the nature of the Russian counter-propositions, and, probably, at the instigation of Prince Gortchakoff, urged their acceptance by Austria; and on the proceeding becoming known to the King, His Majesty highly disapproved of it, and immediately ordered Baron Manteuffel to inform Count Arnim that his conduct was disavowed, and that he had acted contrary to the spirit of his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 207.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 32.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 19, 1856.*

THE following are the words of the telegraphic despatch by which Count Buol announced to Count Georges Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, the acceptation of the ultimatum at St. Petersburgh:

"Vienne, le 16 Janvier, 7 heures du soir.

"Le Comte Esterhazy nous mande de St. Pétersbourg en date d'aujourd'hui: Le Comte Nesselrode m'annonce à l'instant (2 heures après midi) par écrit, l'acceptation des cinq propositions formulées dans le document annexé à la dépêche du 16 Décembre, pour servir de projet de préliminaires, et donner lieu à l'ouverture immédiate de négociations définitives de paix."

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 208.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 19, 1856.*

THE prospect of peace is a source of great satisfaction to the public of Berlin; but I cannot say that the Court party feel otherwise than humiliated by the unconditional acceptance by Russia of the terms of the ultimatum.

The most zealous of this party have always maintained that Russia could make no concession that would meet the demands of the Western Powers. At first they disbelieved the counter-propositions; and when the telegraph announced the pure and simple acceptation of the ultimatum, many considered the news to be false; and the "Kreuz Zeitung" did not even favour its readers with an article on the subject the evening the news arrived; and the President Gerlach, the principal manager of the journal, pretended to doubt the authenticity of an announcement that was known to the whole town.

I think it right to inform your Lordship that the principal consideration of the Prussian Government at the present moment is, as to how they are to gain admission to the Conferences which may be held.

The Austrian Minister, who has been most bitter in his invectives against this Government and country, has, I hear, suddenly come round, and now presents himself as the general protector and peace-maker. He states, I hear, that France and England have no wish to see Prussia in the Conference; but, after all that has lately passed at Vienna, there is an end of former differences, and that Austria will willingly exert her influence with the Western Powers to smooth the way for her admission.

Baron Manteuffel has already hinted to me, as I have stated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 22 of the 15th instant, the advantage which he considers it would be for the peace of the world if Prussia were a party to the future Treaty; and he has this morning spoken in a still stronger sense to my French colleague.

Baron Manteuffel has also alluded, in conversation with M. de Moustier, to the rumour that Vienna is objected to as a seat for the Conferences, and has mentioned Dresden and other places; and I apprehend that his jealousy of Austria is such, that if no place in Germany were selected, he would prefer that a Conference were established in London or Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 209.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 21, 1856.*

WE do not agree in that part of Lord Cowley's letter to you which relates to giving up any part of Bessarabia which Russia has already agreed to cede. Do not therefore mention it to Count Buol.

No. 210.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 21, 1856.*

I HAVE endeavoured strenuously to give effect to the orders contained in your telegraphic despatch of the 18th instant.

My endeavours have been cordially supported by the French Ambassador. Count Buol refuses absolutely to put himself in communication with Russian Minister with regard to the demands to be made upon Russia under Article 5.

No. 211.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, January 21.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 17 Janvier, 1856.*

JE reçois et je m'empresse de vous envoyer ci-jointe en copie une dépêche télégraphique du Ministre de l'Empereur à Vienne annonçant que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a notifié à l'Envoyé Autrichien à St. Pétersbourg l'acceptation pure et simple des propositions contenues dans l'ultimatum. Nous aurons donc à procéder nécessairement à la signature des préliminaires de paix.

Ainsi que je vous l'ai mandé ces jours derniers, nous ne saurions mettre en doute un seul instant que le mémorandum du 14 Novembre ne nous engage moralement à suivre la marche qui y est tracée et qui se trouve spécialement définie dans l'Annexe A. Mais après mure considération, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur ne pense pas qu'il soit contraire à nos engagements moraux envers l'Autriche de faire connaître à la Russie, même avant la négociation, la nature de nos conditions particulières. Il nous aurait paru préférable, je vous l'avoue, de ne faire connaître les conditions au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que lorsque le moment serait venu de les discuter. Le paragraphe 5 de l'ultimatum ne peut laisser aucun doute sur la faculté réservée aux belligérants de produire, en sus des conditions principales, de nouvelles stipulations; en informant d'avance la Russie de celles que nous nous proposons de mettre en avant, nous altérons, en quelque sorte, notre droit d'en proposer d'autres postérieurement. Toutefois ce n'est pas là une considération d'un ordre majeur, et le Gouvernement de l'Empereur est disposé à en faire abstraction pour entrer dans les vues du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique. Ainsi donc, M. le Comte, nous sommes tout prêts à faire savoir au Cabinet de Vienne que nous nous proposons de faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg nos conditions particulières, dans la teneur même où elles se trouvent définies dans la dépêche de Lord Clarendon, sous la date du 24 Novembre, que Lord Cowley a remise entres mes mains. J'ai le ferme espoir, d'ailleurs, que l'Autriche admettra, comme nous, qu'en agissant de la sorte, nous ne contrevenons en rien à la marche tracée dans le mémorandum du 14 Novembre.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

Baron Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

Vienne, le 16 Janvier, 1855.

(Télégraphique.)

LE Comte Esterhazy écrit aujourd'hui de Pétersbourg que M. de Nesselrode vient de lui notifier l'acceptation pure et simple des propositions contenues dans l'ultimatum, lesquelles propositions devront servir de préliminaires de paix. Rien ne peut être plus complet.

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, le 24 Novembre, 1854.

(Extrait.)

LA première est qu'on ne relevera ou ne créera dans les Iles d'Aland aucun établissement militaire ou maritime.

2. Le droit d'examiner la question des territoires à l'est de la Mer Noire.

No. 212.

Propositions made by Count Persigny on the 21st of January, 1855, with reference to the communication to Russia of the "Particular Conditions."

OU de signer les préliminaires dès à présent sans rien notifier à la Russie, et dans ce cas la France s'engage envers l'Angleterre à en faire une question *sine qua non* de la non-fortification des Iles Aland.

On à faire la notification à la Russie avant de signer les préliminaires.

No. 213.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 20, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI, whom I saw again yesterday after I had written to your Lordship, informed me that he had already written to Vienna in the sense of the language reported in my despatch No. 102 of yesterday's date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 214.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 21, 1855.*

I REMINDED Count Walewski, during a conversation which I had with him on Saturday last, that preliminaries of peace could not be signed without the sanction of the Porte, and the presence of a Turkish Plenipotentiary. I mention this fact, because it drew from his Excellency the expression of an opinion that the preliminaries would be signed at Vienna. Not knowing what the wishes of Her Majesty's Government might be in this respect, I abstained from any observation, but as the discussion of the said preliminaries is likely to

cause as much trouble as the settlement of their details, it occurs to me that your Lordship may not partake Count Walewski's opinion, and if this is so, the sooner he is informed of it the better.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 215.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 21, 1855.*

THE haste in which I am constantly obliged to write to your Lordship, often renders my despatches less complete than I could wish them to be. On looking over my confidential despatch No. 96 of the 19th instant, reporting the discussion respecting the preliminaries of peace which took place on the 18th instant in the Emperor's presence, I find that I omitted to mention an argument put forward by Count Walewski, which appeared to weigh more than any other with His Majesty as a reason for signing preliminaries on the basis of the Austrian ultimatum.

It was clear, Count Walewski said, that there had been a reciprocal engagement contracted between Austria on the one side and the Western Powers on the other. It was not to be supposed that Austria had engaged to break with Russia if Russia refused her ultimatum, unless she had been assured on the other hand that the acceptance of the ultimatum by Russia would lead to the conclusion of peace.

I observed in reply, that there would be more force in this argument if Austria had been left in ignorance of the intentions of the Western Powers concerning the particular conditions, but that those conditions had been fairly stated to her, and she could have been under no delusion (at all events as far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned) as to the determination that existed to make peace dependent on their acceptance; such being the case, and Her Majesty's Government being desirous above all things that negotiations should not be renewed for the mere purpose of being broken off, it became essential that the consent of Russia to the principle of the particular conditions should be obtained before Plenipotentiaries met to convert the preliminaries into a definite Treaty of Peace. In fact the moral contract which existed between Austria and the Western Powers, went no further than this—that if Austria sent an ultimatum to Russia, the Western Powers would consider the terms of that ultimatum as their own, and would not make peace until they were obtained; in other words, they were bound not to be satisfied with less, but by no perversion of reasoning could it be maintained that they were not entitled to insist on more.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 216.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 9, 1855.*

THE meeting appointed for a preparatory consideration of the question, known to Europe as the fourth point, relating to the privileges of the Sultan's non-Mussulman subjects, and connected with the still broader question of administrative reform, took place this morning at the Grand Vizier's house. In

addition to his Highness and myself, the French Ambassador, the Austrian Internuncio, and Fuad Pasha, were present.

I should have proposed a previous interchange of opinions, by means of a confidential meeting between the Representatives of the three Powers more immediately engaged in the war, as calculated to elicit and put into train their joint views, irrespective of those which may be entertained elsewhere. I had indeed suggested this mode of proceeding to my French colleague, as applicable to the question of the Principalities also, which it is evidently desirable, with reference to the eventualities of negotiation, to bring under deliberation without delay. But M. Thouvenel preferred the course which we are now following, under an impression, as he stated, that by acting separately, though confidentially, we might give umbrage to Baron Prokesch, at the same time that we could not make progress without knowing whether the question of the Principalities was to be treated on the principle of a barrier against Russia, or on that of a simple improvement of their condition. Not thinking it worth while to lose time in maintaining a discussion on points which could not be set aside as wholly insignificant, I acquiesced in the course which was finally adopted by common consent.

It affords me the liveliest satisfaction to state that in general the disposition manifested by my two colleagues, and also by the Turkish Ministers, was such as to warrant a sanguine hope of our ultimate success in the great twofold work to which our exertions are now more particularly directed. Our consultation was carried on for the most part in a conversational form, as best suited to a frank and mutual expression of our respective ideas. We all in turn expressed a desire to bring the various classes of the Sultan's subjects into harmony and confidence with each other as a source of prosperity to the Empire, whose Government would find its advantage, both internally and externally, in acting no longer on the principles of religious exclusiveness or predominance of race, but on those broader, sounder maxims, which have only to be carried out with perseverance in order to produce a full measure of national unity and strength.

Some other important points appeared to offer little or no diversity of opinion. Those which recur to my recollection may be stated here without any unseasonable pressure on your Lordship's time.

We all agreed that Ottoman ascendancy could not be dispensed with in the Government; that there was less room for extension of privilege to the Christians than want of security for the enjoyment of those which had been granted, and neglect on the part of provincial authorities in causing them to be respected; that a good system of administration, applying equally to all classes, would be found more practically remedial than fresh immunities conferred upon any separate class; that the initiative of any improvements to be adopted in future belongs to the Sultan; that by "initiative" was meant the promulgation of them in the shape of a firman; and that finally, by anticipating in that respect the conclusive act of negotiation to the exclusion of Russia as a deliberative party, the Porte would raise itself in the estimation of foreign nations, and acquire a stronger hold on the affections of its own subjects.

To these may be added the general belief, whether shown by assertion or by admission, that the present course of Ottoman administration is really so defective in action, and so liable to abusive influences in every department, as to require a searching and comprehensive reform.

The points on which difficulties are principally to be foreseen, as appearing from the language employed in our deliberation, may be thus enumerated: On the part of the Turkish Ministers, we may expect procrastination, on the ground of respect for religious antipathies, popular prejudices, and unassociating habits, moral and physical; incompleteness in carrying out laws and regulations for the enforcement of necessary measures; deficiency of will for bringing the long-alienated classes into closer communion with each other; and a very natural inclination not to limit the process of reform to the Mussulman and dominant population; on the part of my colleagues, a certain reluctance to admit the distinction which, however, exists between protection by Russia and admonition by Europe; and, consequently, an eventual want of agreement as to the terms in which it will be desirable to consign the result of our conferences to the future Treaty of Peace.

On this last point we only touched, agreeing to consider it as one not pressing for immediate solution, and fit to be reserved for the decision of our respective Governments.

The French Ambassador argued with energy in favour of the right to repair and erect places of worship in Turkey, without other check than that of an administrative character. He acknowledged the readiness with which his application for churches and church-bells had been recently granted by the Turkish Government. He expressed a confident hope that the Sultan's liberality would be carried still further; and I need not assure your Lordship that I joined with Baron Prokesch in supporting these views with cordiality, in the hope that, if so much had been conceded to a single ally, the Porte would not find it easy to resist the united importunities of all.

With respect to a gradual and retarded process of reform, I reminded the Turkish Ministers that sixty years had already elapsed since the necessity of reform had been openly acted upon in Turkey, and many more since the period when the Ottoman Empire first gave signs of meaning to associate itself with the Powers of Christendom. Admitting that the whole scheme of reform could not be accomplished in a week, I urged the rapid movement of human society in the present age, the favouring circumstances of the time, and the importance of anticipating the conclusion of peace, as so many stringent considerations for hastening the work in hand. On the question of religious difficulties, I endeavoured to show the absolute necessity of not being stopped by them, and the impracticability of realizing a plan of efficient reform while the wheels of the State continued to be clogged, and the avenues of justice to be choked by observances which were wholly irreconcileable with the known wants of the Empire and the established principles of equity.

It remains for me to state that the meeting closed with an understanding that the Turkish Ministers would present a statement of existing privileges, spiritual and civil, ancient and modern, together with an enumeration of such additions as it occurred to them to propose. In answer to an inquiry on my part, whether the intended statement was to be left open for new suggestions and amendments, the Grand Vizier replied in the affirmative, and seemed not to have any definite limitations in view.

We are to meet again in a week, and Prince Callimachi is to assist at our deliberations. I proposed an earlier day, but the whole interval was thought indispensable for preparing the statement and talking over its contents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 217.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 32.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1856.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 17th instant, I have to inform you that Count Bernstorff called here yesterday and read to me a despatch dated the 30th ultimo, from Baron Manteuffel, stating that he had not returned a written answer to the request of Her Majesty's Government that Prussia should support the Austrian ultimatum at St. Petersburgh, because that request had been made verbally to him by your Lordship.

Baron Manteuffel further added that he had not made known to Her Majesty's Government the instructions sent to Baron Werther, because the terms of the ultimatum had not been conveyed to the Prussian Government in an official and regular manner, but had been communicated in an autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria to the King of Prussia.

I told Count Bernstorff that Her Majesty's Government knew nothing of the form in which the ultimatum had been communicated by the Austrian to the Prussian Government; they knew only that it had been communicated, and they accordingly had lost no time in requesting that it might receive the support of the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh; but no answer had been given to the

request, and Her Majesty's Government were at this moment in ignorance of the nature of the instructions sent to Baron Werther, which they regretted all the more as Count Bernstorff had told me two days ago that Baron Manteuffel considered that these instructions having arrived at the right moment had mainly contributed to induce the Russian Government to accept the terms of the ultimatum.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 218.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1856.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF yesterday gave me the same information as that conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 19th instant, respecting the disavowal of Count Arnim's conduct by the Prussian Government; adding that Count Arnim had been ordered to withdraw the letter which he had addressed to Count Buol urging the Austrian Government to accept the Russian counter-propositions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 219.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 22, 1856.*

IT is of urgent and pressing importance that there should be no delay in coming to some settlement on the first and fourth points.

No. 220.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 22, 1856.*

YOUR despatch of yesterday just received is most welcome. The suspicions of the Government are awakened, and feelings of mistrust would readily be changed into those of anger. I am sure that open and straightforward course is the only one which will carry us through our difficulties.

At the same time I conceive the French plan to have been devised with a view of meeting our objections as to the signature of preliminaries.

No. 221.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 22, 1856.*

I VENTURE to submit whether at the moment of meeting to sign preliminaries it might not be expedient to present the Russian Plenipotentiary with a written specification of our demands.

Austria will unquestionably consider herself to be ill-used if we demur as

to the signature of preliminaries; but although she may and will disapprove highly of these being accompanied or preceded by an enumeration of the demands upon which we shall insist, she will at least have no grounds for complaining of a breach of contract.

The crisis gives me great anxiety. Very important consequences as regards our Austrian relations are involved in the decision we are about to take.

No. 222.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 22, 1856.*

THE Austrian Minister has this day read and left with Baron Manteuffel a despatch from his Government. The Cabinet of Vienna expresses its sense of the assistance lately afforded by the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh; alludes to possibility of conferences, and presuming that Prussia would desire to partake in them, inquires if she will associate her policy with that of the allies.

Baron Manteuffel answered that he could not doubt that the King would be disposed to do so.

The French Minister has, without instructions, spoken to Baron Manteuffel in the same sense and believes Prussia would take engagements.

No. 223.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1856.*

COUNT DE PERSIGNY, on the 18th instant, read to me a despatch from Count Walewski, stating that as Count Nesselrode had notified to the Austrian Envoy at St. Petersburgh the unqualified acceptance of the propositions contained in the Austrian ultimatum, the signature of preliminaries of peace must forthwith be proceeded with; that it could not be doubted that the memorandum of the 14th of November rendered it morally obligatory to pursue the course therein laid down, but that the Imperial Government, after deliberate consideration, did not consider it contrary to the moral engagements contracted with Austria to make known to Russia, even before the commencement of negotiations, the nature of the particular conditions. The Imperial Government would have preferred not making those conditions known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh until the time for discussing them arrived. The fifth paragraph of the ultimatum could leave no doubt as to the power reserved to the belligerents of bringing forward further stipulations in addition to the principal conditions, and by apprizing Russia beforehand of what it was intended to put forward, they in some degree impaired their right to bring forward others at a later period. However, this did not much signify, and the Imperial Government was disposed to waive the point in order to defer to the views of the British Cabinet, and it was therefore ready to make known to the Cabinet of Vienna that it was proposed to communicate to the Russian Government the particular conditions as specified in my despatch to your Excellency No. 1,356 of the 24th of November, namely, that no military or naval establishments shall be restored or created in the Aland Islands, and the right to consider the state of the territories on the east of the Black Sea; and Count Walewski added that he firmly trusted that Austria would admit that this mode of proceeding involved nothing at variance with the course laid down in the memorandum of November 14.

I told M. de Persigny that Her Majesty's Government would learn with great satisfaction the course which the Government of the Emperor was about to pursue, and which I hoped would lead to the immediate acceptance by Russia of the additional terms.

M. de Persigny called here on the 21st instant, to inform me that the communication to Russia announced in Count Walewski's despatch had not

been made in consequence of the remonstrance of the Austrian Government, but that his Excellency had been instructed to make the following proposals to Her Majesty's Government, namely, that the preliminaries of peace should be signed at once, without any previous notification to Russia, in which case France would enter into an engagement with England to make a question *sine qud non* of the Aland Islands not being fortified; or else to notify the conditions to Russia before the signature of preliminaries.

M. de Persigny, in answer to an inquiry from me, said that these proposals related only to the Aland Islands, and did not extend to the second condition respecting the countries east of the Black Sea.

I told his Excellency that I could not give him an answer until I had taken the Queen's pleasure and had consulted my colleagues. I have now to instruct your Excellency to propose to Count Walewski that previously to the signature of preliminaries, England and France should engage to each other to make the two conditions *sine quibus non* of peace; namely, that no military or naval establishments shall be restored or created in the Aland Islands, and the right to consider the state of the territories on the east of the Black Sea.

Your Excellency will also state to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government are clearly of opinion that it is necessary to make this engagement between the two Governments known to Russia before signing the preliminaries.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 224.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 124.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI mentioned to me yesterday that he had been informed by M. de Hübner that there appeared to be very little difference of opinion between the Austrian Government and that of Her Majesty, as to the future organisation of the Principalities. His Excellency added that the Austrian Minister had invited him to let him know as soon as possible the views of the Imperial Government on this important question.

Count Walewski went on to say that he had examined the memorandum which I had given him some time back as containing the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, and that although it did not coincide with the opinion of the Imperial Government, who would prefer, for instance, the union of the two Principalities in one Government, that if Her Majesty's Government urged the adoption of their proposals he should not be disposed to oppose them.

There was something in Count Walewski's language which made me apprehend that this apparent conciliatory offer might be made use of hereafter to oblige Her Majesty's Government to cede on questions on which it might suit the French Government to make a stand. I said, therefore, to Count Walewski, that I had not understood your Lordship to do more than submit the memorandum to the consideration of the other Governments interested in the question; that I was quite sure that your Lordship would be ready to consider and discuss any other proposals which the French Government might like to bring forward. The Conference would then decide upon the merits of the several propositions laid before them.

Count Walewski said that in that case he should probably draw up a memorandum embodying the views of the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 225.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1856.*

M. DE HUBNER has, by Count Buol's desire, informed Count Walewski that the Prussian Government have made overtures at Vienna to be admitted to the negotiations for peace.

Count Walewski stated to me that the Emperor was not at all disposed to comply with the wishes of the Prussian Government, but that it would be difficult to exclude Prussia, as a great Power, from any arrangements touching the general equilibrium of Europe.

I observed that Prussia had voluntarily withdrawn from the Councils of Europe on the Eastern question, and had been informed that she would not be readmitted into them but on certain conditions, which conditions she had not fulfilled; that the allies therefore, unless they intended to stultify themselves, and offer as it were a premium in future to other States who might conduct themselves as Prussia had done, could not deviate from the course which Prussia had brought upon herself; but that this need not prevent her adhering hereafter to the Treaty which, it might be hoped, would be the result of the impending negotiations.

This course would, I think, be cordially agreed to by the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 226.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI read to me yesterday a confidential despatch from Count Buol to M. de Hübner, which had been left in his hands by the latter. In it, Count Buol explains the reason why the Austrian Government declines informing Prince Gortchakoff of the particular conditions of the Western Powers. He says that the Prince would infallibly decline signing the preliminaries, without a further reference to his Government; that the war party in St. Petersburgh would become acquainted with the circumstance and turn it to account, and that the Emperor Alexander might be forced to abandon his peaceable intentions. But Count Buol promises, if the preliminaries are signed immediately, to support the particular conditions in the negotiations; and he says that if France is really desirous of peace she will agree to this, and that if England is also really desirous of peace she will yield the point.

An appeal is also made to the loyalty of the French Government to fulfil the engagements which they are said to have contracted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 227.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 23, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI read to me yesterday a despatch which had been placed in his hands by M. de Hübner, and which contained a copy of the note addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol, announcing that Russia accepted the Austrian ultimatum as containing a "project of preliminaries of peace." Count Buol expressed the hope that the French Government would fulfil the engagement which they had contracted by signing preliminaries at once, to be followed by an armistice.

Some conversation followed between Count Walewski and myself respecting the place and manner of signing preliminaries whenever the two Governments had decided what the preliminaries were to contain.

Without troubling your Lordship with details, I may say that Count Walewski appeared to coincide in the opinion which I expressed, that if the preliminaries were to be in the form of a Treaty, and subject to discussion, that discussion could hardly be separated from the discussion of the final Treaty, and must be conducted at the place where it was determined that the principal negotiations should be carried on. He clung, however, to the opinion that the preliminaries might be signed at Vienna, without further discussion, in the form of a protocol, the substance of which might almost be communicated by telegraph.

I asked his Excellency in what way he conceived that the protocol might be drawn up. He replied that he had sent a project of a protocol, which he thought might answer the purpose, some days ago to Count Persigny, but that he had not instructed him to communicate it to your Lordship, as he did not wish to appear importunate.

At my request, however, his Excellency furnished me with a copy of it, which I do myself the honour to inclose.

On reading it, it appeared to me to offer the least objectionable mode of proceeding if it is eventually determined that Vienna is to witness the acceptance by the belligerent Powers of the preliminaries of peace. I asked Count Walewski whether the Austrian Government would be satisfied with an act of the kind proposed. His Excellency seemed to hope that she would; and in reply to a further question which I put to him, he said that he was ready to insist on the signature of the preliminaries elsewhere, if Count Buol objected to this proposition.

Your Lordship will understand that I have not compromised myself in any way towards Count Walewski in regard to this new suggestion.

I should remark, further, that I drew his Excellency's attention to the term "project of preliminaries" employed by Prince Gortchakoff as indicating an intention on the part of the Russian Government to raise some sort of discussion.

Count Walewski's idea is, that when the preliminaries have been signed, an armistice, to terminate on a given day, not later, however, than the 1st of May, should be signed. This, his Excellency thinks, will prevent the Russian Government from unnecessarily lengthening the discussions. In the meantime, the preparations for continuing the war should be vigorously prosecuted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 227.

Draft of Protocol of Conference held at Vienna, , 1856.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
Le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein;

Pour la France—
Le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Sir G. H. Seymour;

Pour la Russie—
Le Prince Gortchakoff;

Pour la Sardaigne—

Pour la Turquie—

LES Plénipotentiaires sus dénommés s'étant réunis ce jour en conférence à l'Hôtel du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein a donné lecture des dépêches adressées par M. le Comte de Nesselrode au Comte Esterhazy et à le 16 Janvier de la présente année, pour notifier l'adoption pure et simple par la Russie des propositions que le Comte d'Esterhazy avait été chargé de présenter à l'acceptation du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et dont la teneur suit, &c.

Les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, de Sardaigne et de Turquie, ayant pris acte de l'acceptation absolue et sans réserve donnée par la Russie, le Prince Gortchakoff l'a confirmée, au nom de sa Cour, dans les termes les plus formels et les plus explicites; et il a, dès lors, été reconnu que les propositions réciproquement acceptées par toutes les Puissances belligérantes avaient acquis la valeur de préliminaires de paix.

En conséquence il a été expressément convenu que des mesures allaient être prises sans retard, par les dites Puissances, pour hâter la conclusion d'un armistice général, destiné à mettre fin aux hostilités.

Il a été convenu également que des Plénipotentiaires nommés par chacune des susdites Puissances se réuniront dans le délai de , ou plus tôt s'il est possible, à , pour procéder aux négociations et à la conclusion du Traité de Paix définitif.

No. 228.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24, 10 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 24, 1856, 8 A.M.*

THE Emperor wishes that the proposal to hold the Conferences at Paris should come officially from your Lordship. He thinks that the effect in France will be much greater, and that it will be more difficult for Austria to raise objections.

No. 229.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 23, 1856.*

I HELD an important conversation with Count Buol last night.

The summary of what he said was this:—

Affairs will go smoothly, or they will go all wrong.

The Cabinet of Vienna must insist on the signature (without hesitation or conditions) of preliminaries.

Austria must look to her dignity, and to the fulfilment of engagements. She cannot accept a ridiculous position.

Sign the preliminaries and all will go well. In the negotiations we will stand by you stoutly. We are sure that we can carry the cession [*sic*] of the Aland Islands. We will do so if necessary at the price of sacrifices affecting Austrian interests.

This conversation strongly confirms my own opinion of the state of affairs.

If there is risk in this course, I am willing to bear the whole blame, and to be the victim in case of failure, for in other courses there is danger for our foremost determinations.

No. 230.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 132.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1856.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to the question of the eventual restoration of Kars to the Porte alluded to in your despatch No. 102 of the 19th instant, that as the fundamental principle of the whole war was to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it would be impossible to make peace leaving Russia in occupation of any part of the Turkish territory; and this proposition is so self-evident that the omission of any allusion in the Austrian conditions to the withdrawal of the Russian armies from any Turkish districts of which they might have temporary possession during the progress of hostilities, can in no degree militate against the right of the allied Powers to insist upon it as an indispensable condition to the conclusion of peace. I have further to observe that if the allies had not occupied any portion whatever of Russian territory, the engagement which they have contracted to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire would have made it incumbent upon them peremptorily to require that as a *sine qud non* condition of peace the Russian forces should evacuate any and every portion of the Turkish territory which they might have happened in the course of hostilities to have occupied: and it cannot be contended that because the course of events has been more favourable to the allies than it would have been in such a supposed case, they should on that very account be bound to accept less favourable terms from Russia in regard to the portions of Turkish territory momentarily occupied by a Russian force.

But even if the allies were not to take their stand on this ground, which is, however, indisputable, and if they were willing to treat the question of Kars on the principle of equivalents, it is to be remembered that if Kars has been occupied by the Russians, Mingrelia is occupied by the Turks; and that the position now held on Russian territory by the army of Omer Pasha would enable the allies in the spring to take up a position which would give them the command not of Mingrelia only, but also of Imeritia, Guriel, and Georgia, and that consequently the allies by retiring from Mingrelia would give to Russia a full equivalent for their evacuation of the territory of Kars.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Count Walewski.

I am, &c
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 231.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency to Count Walewski, as reported in your despatch No. 124 of the 23rd instant, relative to the future organization of the Principalities. Her Majesty's Government have no wish and no interest in this matter beyond securing to the Principalities the best form of government attainable under present circumstances.

Her Majesty's Government were disposed to think, as Count Walewski does, that the union of the two Provinces would be the best arrangement; but they have come to the conclusion that this could not be effected without great delay, which on every account it is desirable at this moment to avoid, and that local feuds and rivalries would probably prevent the solid amalgamation of the two countries, and might hereafter furnish the pretext for foreign interference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 232.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 96.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1856.

I HAVE learned with great satisfaction by your Excellency's despatch No. 29 of the 9th of January, the good disposition evinced by the Turkish Ministers in the first meeting respecting the fourth point, which was held at Constantinople on the 9th instant; and I have to instruct you, in the event of the Turkish Ministers continuing to display the same laudable spirit, to inform them of the pleasure with which Her Majesty's Government have learned their mode of proceeding upon the great questions of toleration and reform, respecting which, for the welfare and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, Her Majesty's Government feel an anxious solicitude, and the settlement of which the Powers of Europe are entitled to expect, now that Turkey is to become an integral part of the European system.

Your Excellency cannot too strongly impress upon the Turkish Ministers the importance of avoiding delay in coming to an arrangement with respect to the first and fourth points, in order that Russia may have no pretext for taking part in the discussions on those matters at Constantinople when the negotiations for peace commence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 233.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25, 11 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 24, 1856, 5 P.M.

THE Russian formal acceptance and propositions as to course to be followed have been read to the French Ambassadors and myself by Count Buol; they will be sent to Paris and London to-morrow by Lord Cowley's messenger.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh proposes a preparatory protocol, to which initials should be affixed here, promising that preliminaries will be signed; the real preliminaries having to be signed afterwards at the place of negotiations, which the Russians wish should be Paris.

Count Buol will negotiate on the part of Austria.

No. 234.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, January .)

Vienne, le 9 Janvier, 1856.

LES rapports que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 1 et du 4 du courant, nous ont fait connaître que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'est pas disposé à regarder éventuellement l'acceptation pure et simple de notre programme de la part de la Russie comme suffisant pour entraîner immédiatement la signature des préliminaires de paix, la conclusion d'un armistice et l'ouverture de négotiations définitives, et qu'avant de passer outre il tient à acquérir la certitude que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg consentirait également aux conditions particulières que l'Angleterre entend poser en sus des quatre garanties.

Nous n'étions pas préparés à cette nouvelle difficulté, je l'avoue, puis qu'elle nous semble en opposition à la marche tracée dans le mémorandum concerté entre le Baron Bourqueney et moi le 14 Novembre dernier, ainsi qu'à la teneur de la dépêche principale adressée à St. Pétersbourg qui a obtenu le suffrage du Cabinet Anglais. Bien que ce Cabinet en adoptant notre programme de paix n'ait pas explicitement énoncé envers nous son adhésion au mémorandum, auquel ce programme était annexé, nous n'avons pas mis en doute son complet assentiment à cet égard, puisque le Gouvernement Français, pendant les négotiations qui se poursuivaient entre le Représentant de France et moi, avait constamment tenu le Cabinet Britannique au courant de tout et avait fini par obtenir son agrément pour l'ensemble du plan combiné ici.

Cela étant, M. le Comte Walewski nous paraît appelé en première ligne à éclaircir le malentendu regrettable qui a donné lieu à la divergence d'opinions dont votre Excellence nous a rendu compte. C'est dans ce but que j'ai adressé au Baron Hübner la dépêche que vous trouverez ci-jointe en copie. J'aime à espérer que M. le Persigny ne tardera pas à être muni d'instructions correspondantes au but de ma démarche. Aussi ne puis-je qu'engager votre Excellence à se concerter à ce sujet avec son collégue de France et à agir dans un esprit de parfaite entente avec lui pour faire revenir, s'il est possible, les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique sur l'opinion qu'ils se sont formé à cet égard.

En attendant, M. le Comte, vous voudrez bien expliquer à Lord Clarendon que les instructions réservées données au Comte V. Esterhazy et calquées sur le mémorandum auquel nous avons attaché toute la valeur d'un engagement réciproque, lui prescrivent de dire, dans le cas où il serait interpellé sur la nature des conditions additionnelles, qu'elles n'ont pas formé l'objet d'une entente entre nous et les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, mais que nous n'en sommes pas moins à même de donner l'assurance qu'elles ne porteront pas sur des cessions territoriales ni sur des indemnités de guerre; qu'enfin nous avons la certitude morale qu'elles ne seront pas de nature à opposer de sérieux obstacles à la conclusion de la paix.

Lord Clarendon est trop juste et trop éclairé pour ne pas reconnaître qu'en face de ces déclarations ce serait, nous compromettre que de vouloir exiger que nous soutenions aujourd'hui à St. Pétersbourg la thèse qu'indépendamment de l'acceptation sans réserve du programme de paix, il faudrait encore l'adhésion de la Russie aux conditions additionnelles articulées dès à présent par l'Angleterre, pour que les Puissances belligérantes puissent consentir à la signature des préliminaires de paix.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure in No. 234.

Count Buol to Baron Hubner.

Vienne, le 9 Janvier, 1856.

DES derniers rapports du Comte Colloredo dont j'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence les copies ci-jointes, il ressort que le Cabinet Britannique, dans le cas où la Russie souscrirait sans réserve au programme de paix présenté par le Comte V. Esterhazy, hésiterait à considérer ce fait comme devant donner lieu à la conclusion immédiate d'un armistice et à l'ouverture subséquente de négociations de paix définitives. Le Gouvernement Britannique tiendrait à acquérir d'abord la certitude que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg consent également aux conditions additionnelles que l'Angleterre entend poser en vertu de la réserve contenu dans le dernier paragraphe de notre programme de paix. Ces conditions seraient:

1. L'engagement de ne pas reconstruire les fortifications des Iles d'Aland.
2. L'engagement explicite d'admettre des Consuls dans les ports de la Mer Noire.
3. L'engagement d'entrer en discussion sur le sort des pays situés à l'est de la Mer Noire et sur celui de leurs populations.

Nous ne nous attendions pas, je l'avoue, à voir le Cabinet Britannique revenir à la charge au sujet d'une prétention qui, il est vrai, avait été articulée à titre de désir au commencement du mois de Décembre dernier, mais que nous avions lieu de croire abandonnée par suite du parfait accord établi d'abord entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et nous, soit à l'égard des bases de préliminaires soit par rapport à la marche à suivre—accord auquel l'Angleterre avait fini par s'associer de son côté.

Il suffit de consulter le mémorandum paraphé le 14 Novembre dernier par le Baron Bourqueney et moi, pour se convaincre que l'acceptation pure et simple du programme de paix de la part de la Russie devait être suivie de la signature des préliminaires de la paix; qu'on s'entendrait alors sur les conditions d'un armistice général, après quoi on passerait aux négociations définitives.

En effet c'est cet ordre d'idées qui a présidé aux instructions du Comte V. Esterhazy qui ont obtenu le suffrage des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, et c'est d'après ce même ordre d'idées que notre Envoyé règlera son langage et sa conduite à St. Pétersbourg. Vouloir aujourd'hui dévier de cette marche ce serait compromettre le Cabinet Impérial et en même temps l'œuvre de la paix dont les fondements ont été si laborieusement jetés.

Cela étant, nous conjurons le Cabinet Français d'user de tout son crédit à Londres pour décider le Gouvernement Britannique à consentir, conformément au mémorandum concerté entre le Baron Bourqueney et moi, à la signature immédiate des préliminaires dans le cas où nos efforts obtiendraient du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'acceptation pure et simple de notre programme.

Lorsque Lord Clarendon, par un dépêche dont Sir Hamilton Seymour m'a dans le temps donné lecture, nous fit connaître les conditions particulières qu'il entendait poser, nous avons, loin d'en prendre acte, décliné de les communiquer au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. En agissant ainsi nous étions mus par le considération que le droit de mettre en avant des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties n'appartenait qu'aux belligérants; que les engagements contractés entre ceux-ci et l'Autriche n'avaient pour base que les quatre principes plus ou moins largement appliqués; qu'enfin la réserve stipulée en faveur des Puissances belligérantes par le paragraphe 5 de notre programme de paix serait vide de sens, si les conditions particulières étaient présentées à la Russie en même temps que la réserve destinée précisément à les renvoyer à la négociation définitive.

L'esprit éclairé et la loyauté de M. le Comte Walewski nous sont garants qu'il saura, avec toute la force d'une conviction intime, faire valoir les considérations précédentes auprès du Cabinet Britannique et qu'il nous prêtera son puissant concours pour écarter un incident de nature à mettre en question tout ce qui s'est fait jusqu'ici dans l'intérêt de la paix.

Recevez, &c.

No. 235.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, January .)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 18 Janvier*, 1856.

PAR une dépêche transmise par le fil électrique en date du 16 du courant, j'ai eu l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que d'après un rapport télégraphique du Comte V. Esterhazy de la même date, le Chancelier de l'Empire de Russie venait de lui notifier par écrit l'acceptation des cinq propositions formulées dans le document annexé à ma dépêche du 16 Décembre dernier pour servir de projet de préliminaires et donner lieu à l'ouverture immédiate de négociations définitives de paix.

Le Prince Gortchakoff m'a de son côté fait par écrit une communication analogue dont vous trouverez ci-joint copie.

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ayant ainsi, à notre vive satisfaction, accepté sans réserve les bases de préliminaires de paix que nous lui avions présentées, de l'aveu de nos alliés, il ne nous reste qu'à inviter ceux-ci à vouloir bien, de leur côté, nous mettre à même de faire officiellement connaître à la Cour de Russie leur adhésion aux mêmes bases de préliminaires.

Pour conduire ensuite à terme l'œuvre de la paix si heureusement inaugurée, il sera nécessaire de s'entendre sans délai sur la signature des préliminaires comme sur les conditions d'un armistice général, suivi de l'ouverture immédiate des négociations définitives.

J'engage votre Excellence à prier Lord Clarendon de vouloir bien également nous faire connaître sans délai son opinion sur le mode d'exécution des différentes parties de ce programme que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique avait implicitement approuvé lors des pourparlers confidentielles qui précédèrent le départ pour St. Pétersbourg du Comte V. Esterhazy.

Au moment de voir couronnés de succès les efforts constants qu'il n'a cessé de faire dans l'intérêt du rétablissement de la paix, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître rend trop de justice aux sentiments de modération dont ses alliés ont fourni tant de preuves, pour ne pas se livrer à la confiance que les conditions particulières qu'ils se sont réservés le droit de produire dans un intérêt Européen en sus des quatre principes lors de la négociation définitive, seront empreints du même esprit de modération et n'opposeront dès lors point d'obstacle à cette réconciliation générale que tant de vœux appellent.

Je charge votre Excellence de donner à Lord Clarendon lecture et copie de cette dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

No. 236.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, January .)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 18 Janvier*, 1856.

SIR HAMILTON SEYMOUR m'a donné avant hier lecture et copie de la dépêche ci-jointe de Lord Clarendon, portant la date du 8 Janvier, et reproduisant les arguments dont votre Excellence m'avait rendu compte par un de ses rapports du 4 du courant, arguments auxquels j'ai déjà répondu par mon expédition du 9.

L'acceptation de nos propositions de la part de la Russie donnant aujourd'hui un double degré de gravité aux objections formulées par Lord Clarendon contre la force obligatoire pour l'Angleterre du mémorandum du 14 Novembre dernier, nous éprouvons d'autant plus de regrets à voir le Cabinet Britannique persister dans l'exigence d'être assuré de l'adhésion de la Russie aux conditions additionnelles que l'Angleterre compte poser avant de se croire engagée à consentir à la conclusion d'un armistice, et à l'ouverture de négociations de paix définitives.

Tout en convenant que Lord Clarendon n'a pas explicitement énoncé envers nous son assentiment au mémorandum paraphé du 14 Novembre, qui ne fait

dépendre l'ouverture des négociations définitives que de l'acceptation pure et simple des cinq clauses de la part du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, nous nous reconnaissons le droit d'adresser au Gouvernement Britannique la question, quelle valeur il attache à ce dernier document qui n'est que le corrollaire et l'annexe du mémorandum et qu'il a discuté avec nous et le Cabinet des Tuileries, Article par Article, et sur lequel une parfaite entente a fini par s'établir?

Du moment que Lord Clarendon s'était déclaré d'accord avec la rédaction définitive de l'annexe du mémorandum, n'étions-nous pas autorisés à inférer du silence gardé par rapport à la pièce principale que celle-ci était également approuvée de tout point? Et cette impression ne devait-elle pas se convertir en une entière certitude par suite du complet suffrage accordé par le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à ma dépêche adressée au Comte V. Esterhazy à la date du 16 Décembre, et dans laquelle il est dit que le document y annexé acquerrait par le fait de l'acceptation de la part des Puissances belligérantes la valeur de préliminaires de paix, et que la signature de ces préliminaires serait immédiatement suivie d'un armistice général et de négociations définitives.

Ma dépêche du 9 Janvier vous a déjà mis à même, M. le Comte, d'exposer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pourquoi nous ne nous sommes pas cru appelés à faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et ne fût-ce que dans des voies confidentielles, les conditions additionnelles consignées dans une dépêche dont Sir Hamilton Seymour m'avait dans le temps donné lecture. Les engagements contractés entre nous et les Puissances Occidentales n'ont jamais porté que sur le développement à donner aux quatre principes fondamentaux; les détails des conditions particulières à y ajouter éventuellement sont toujours restés en dehors de notre entente mutuelle. Nous avons gardé à ce sujet notre liberté d'appréciation tout comme les Puissances belligérantes ont conservé la plénitude de leur droit, qu'elles ont toutefois déclaré ne vouloir exercer que dans un intérêt Européen. La Russie vient de souscrire à nos propositions dont la cinquième réserve explicitement le droit des Puissances belligérantes de poser des conditions additionnelles. Rien ne les empêchera donc lors des négociations définitives de faire usage de ce droit dans les limites qu'elles se sont elles-mêmes tracées.

Votre Excellence est chargée de donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et de lui en laisser copie, ainsi que la dépêche antérieure du 9 du courant et de son annexe.

Recevez, &c.

No. 237.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 137.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 25*, 1856.

M. DE BOURQUENEY'S telegraphic despatch, announcing the arrival at Vienna of the messenger from St. Petersburgh, is somewhat fuller than that which passed through Paris from Sir Hamilton Seymour. Prince Gortchakoff communicated two despatches to Count Buol, the one signifying the pure and simple acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum, the other proposing the course which should be followed in order to open negotiations. It consists in a signature of a Protocol at Vienna, stating the adherence of the belligerent Powers to the terms of the ultimatum, engaging each interested Power to name two Plenipotentiaries to meet within three weeks at Paris, to sign preliminaries of peace. The preliminaries to be followed by an armistice and the opening of general negotiations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 238.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1856.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Count Walewski to M. de Persigny, dated yesterday, and explaining the views of the French Government as to the communication to Russia of the particular conditions, which was this morning placed in my hands by the French Ambassador, whom I thereupon told I would immediately make it known to the Cabinet, which was about to meet.

I have since informed M. de Persigny that Count Walewski's despatch had been attentively considered by my colleagues, and that although it contained some matters upon which Her Majesty's Government could not concur with Count Walewski, yet that I should abstain from even adverting to them, as it was impossible to deny that there existed a difference in the position of the two Governments with respect to obligations contracted with the Cabinet of Vienna; and the desire of Her Majesty's Government was to come to a perfect agreement in opinion and in action with the Government of the Emperor. I felt, moreover, that I was the less called upon to make any comments upon Count Walewski's despatch, as Her Majesty's Government were prepared to adopt the proposal which it contained.

That proposal is understood by Her Majesty's Government to be, that the question of no military or naval establishments being restored or created in the Aland Islands, is to be made a condition *sine qua non* of peace by the Governments of England and France; that the additional conditions shall at once be made known to Russia through M. de Seebach; and that prior to the opening of negotiations, no mention whatever shall be made of the engagement contracted between the two Governments. The additional conditions Her Majesty's Government understand to be as stated in my despatch to your Excellency No. 1,356 of the 21th of November, and reproduced as an inclosure in Count Walewski's despatch to M. de Persigny of the 17th instant: first, that no military or naval establishments shall be restored or erected in the Aland Islands; and, secondly, the right to consider the state of the territories on the east of the Black Sea.

Your Excellency, in giving a copy of this despatch to Count Walewski, will express to his Excellency the great satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that all cause of difference with the Government of the Emperor is now happily removed.

I am, &c

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 238.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.

M. le Comte. *Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1856.*

M. BAUDIN m'a apporté la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire avant hier, et j'y ai trouvé jointe l'annexe qui contient la proposition du Cabinet Britannique. Cette proposition a été, de notre part, l'objet d'un examen particulier, et voici, M. le Comte, comment, à notre sens du moins, elle devrait être appréciée.

Apprendre, en ce moment, à la Russie, que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique se sont mutuellement engagés à faire un *sine qua non* de l'une et de l'autre des deux conditions particulières, équivaut à lui demander d'y adhérer avant de passer à la signature des préliminaires; cette communication ne peut avoir une autre signification. Car de deux choses l'une: ou la Russie repousse nos conditions particulières, et tout est rompu; ou elle consent à passer outre, et par cela même son assentiment est acquis. C'est donc un oui ou un non, auquel tout est de nouveau subordonné, que nous

demandons au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; en d'autres termes, nous déclarons également insuffisants, pour qu'il nous soit permis de signer les préliminaires, l'ultimatum de l'Autriche et l'acceptation de la Russie, et à un ultimatum à trois nous substituons, ou, si l'on veut, nous annexons, un nouvel ultimatum à deux, contrairement à l'engagement moral qui résulte implicitement du dernier paragraphe de l'acte porté par le Comte Esterhazy à St. Pétersbourg, et loyalement offert par l'Autriche à l'acceptation de la Russie. Cette appréciation ressort pleinement des termes mêmes de la proposition du Cabinet Anglais, et ne peut être contestée.

Or, la démarche faite par l'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg, avec notre agrément, et l'acceptation de la Russie, constituent un engagement d'honneur et bilatéral pour les Puissances qui y ont concouru et, particulièrement, pour les deux Cabinets qui y ont pris une part plus directe. Cet engagement, aux termes de l'ultimatum Autrichien, réserve, pour les Conférences, l'acceptation des conditions particulières, ou bien la distinction faite entre les deux conditions générales et les conditions particulières, d'une part, et le cinquième paragraphe de l'ultimatum, de l'autre, n'aurait plus aucun sens; ainsi que je l'ai établi, la proposition que vous nous transmettez aujourd'hui, implique, au contraire, l'acceptation préalable. Nous donnerions donc à la Russie le droit, parfaitement fondé, d'interpeller l'Autriche en la mettant en demeure de se conformer à ses obligations, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire quelles seraient, en présence d'une semblable éventualité, la réponse et l'attitude ultérieure du Cabinet de Vienne. Il ne resterait, en effet, à l'Autriche d'autre alternative que de nous inviter, à son tour, à maintenir nos engagements, ou à nous déclarer que nos prétentions nouvelles la dégagent envers les Puissances Occidentales, et qu'elle n'est plus tenue de rompre ses relations avec la Russie. Dans ce cas, l'Autriche, déçue dans ses espérances, blessée dans ses susceptibilités, s'engagera, nous ne pouvons en douter, dans une voie, qui, en la rapprochant des autres Etats de la Confédération Germanique, l'éloignera, de plus en plus, des Puissances alliées, et nous aurons compromis, par un défaut de conduite, le fruit de nos efforts et de nos succès; nous aurons fourni nous-mêmes à la Russie l'occasion et les moyens légitimes de revenir sur les concessions qu'elle a faites, en l'assurant, en même temps, les sympathies et le concours moral, sinon matériel, de l'Allemagne entière.

Le Gouvernement Anglais reçoit, comme nous, sans doute, des informations exactes, et sur l'impression pénible qu'a produite dans les rangs de certaines classes en Russie, la récente détermination du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et sur la ferme résolution du Cabinet de Vienne de ne pas franchir la limite de ses engagements; on ne saurait donc révoquer en doute la justesse de nos prévisions.

D'autre part, M. le Comte, l'Autriche nous déclare qu'elle est prête à donner son appui à nos conditions particulières au sein des Conférences, et si nous n'en exigeons pas l'acceptation dès aujourd'hui, si nous n'élevons pas, en un mot, des prétentions contraires à la combinaison concertée avec elle, nous sommes assurés que, durant les négociations, ces mêmes conditions seront également soutenues par tous les alliés du 2 Décembre, c'est-à-dire, qu'en restant dans la position créée par l'ultimatum Autrichien, porté à St. Pétersbourg avec notre assentiment, nous aurons le concours du Cabinet de Vienne sur toutes les conditions indistinctement, tandis qu'en voulant sortir de cette position, nous rendons à l'Autriche, comme à la Russie, son entière liberté d'action, nous rompons les liens qui unissaient la première de ces deux Puissances à la politique Occidentale, en facilitant à la seconde les moyens de reconquérir tout le terrain qu'elle avait perdu en Europe.

Vous remarquerez, M. le Comte, qu'il ne s'agit plus pour nous, aujourd'hui, d'examiner si l'interdiction de relever les fortifications de Bomarsund doit former une condition essentielle de la paix: vous savez, à ce sujet même, tout le prix que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur attache à notre complète entente avec celui de la Reine. Nos observations portent exclusivement sur la question de conduite, et j'ai suffisamment démontré, ce me semble, que rien ne serait moins prudent que de suivre le plan qui nous est offert par le Cabinet Anglais. Mais il résulte en outre des observations que je viens d'indiquer rapidement, que nous en serions empêchés par les engagements que nous avons pris avec l'Autriche, et qui nous placent dans la nécessité de signer les préliminaires, sans exiger préalablement de la Russie l'acceptation de nos conditions particulières.

Vous connaissez notre résolution à cet égard, et si nous regrettons de ne pas nous trouver en complet accord avec le Gouvernement Anglais sur ce point important, nous ne saurions, d'un autre côté, manquer aux déclarations que nous avons fait parvenir à Vienne, quand nous avons été interpellés par le Cabinet Autrichien ; on tiendra compte, à Londres, nous l'espérons, de ces diverses circonstances.

Du reste, M. le Comte, la proposition du Cabinet Anglais n'est plus conforme au regret ni au désir qu'il vous exprimait naguère. Il regrettait, en effet, que l'Autriche n'eût pas donné connaissance au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg de nos conditions particulières, et il désirait que la Russie en fût informée avant de passer à la signature des préliminaires ; mais il n'a jamais entendu que nous dussions, dès ce moment, obtenir son adhésion. Pour satisfaire au vœu de nos alliés, nous avions adopté leur avis ; mais le Gouvernement Britannique donne aujourd'hui à la communication, que nous étions disposés à faire à la Russie, une forme qui en exagère le fond. La rédaction, qu'on nous propose, implique, pour le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, la nécessité d'accepter, au préalable, nos conditions particulières, ou de retirer l'assentiment qu'il a donné aux conditions générales. Nous devons supposer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, ne s'est pas proposé lui-même de placer la Russie en face de cette double éventualité. J'en ai signalé les inconvénients, et j'ai la conviction que les Ministres de la Reine en apprécieront, comme nous, toute la gravité.

Je reçois aujourd'hui, avec votre dépêche d'hier, l'avis télégraphique, ci-joint en copie, de M. le Baron de Bourqueney. Comme vous le verrez, on nous propose de signer à Vienne, pour le moment, un Protocole destiné à fixer le lieu et le date de la réunion des Plénipotentiaires. Ces Plénipotentiaires devront être assemblés dans un délai de trois semaines à courir de la date de ce Protocole, et ils auront successivement à procéder à la signature des préliminaires, au règlement de l'armistice, et à l'ouverture de la négociation générale. Il ne s'élève, ce nous semble, aucune objection de nature à nous faire repousser l'offre qui nous est faite, et nous sommes prêts à y adhérer. Nous désirons, toutefois, connaître le sentiment du Cabinet Anglais à ce sujet, et je vous prie de nous en faire part au besoin par le télégraphe.

Nous devons présumer du reste, que dans cette circonstance, les Ministres de la Reine partagent notre avis, et nous sommes d'autant plus portés à le croire que l'Empereur a décidé de faire, à l'intime union des deux Cabinets, une nouvelle concession. En vous chargeant de pressentir les conseillers de Sa Majesté Britannique sur la combinaison dont vous entretenait ma dépêche du 19 de ce mois, sous le No. 17, je vous annonçais que nous étions disposés à lui donner la préférence, si on le jugeait utile à Londres, sur la proposition que contenait mon expédition de la veille ; mais j'avais eu soin, toutefois, de ne vous laisser aucun doute sur notre intention de n'adopter l'une qu'en excluant l'autre. Le Cabinet Anglais les a réunies, et nous consentons à le suivre sur ce terrain, pourvu qu'il soit bien entendu que, si nous nous engageons à faire un *sine qua non* de la question d'Aland et à porter, en même temps, à la connaissance de la Russie, par l'intermédiaire de M. le Baron de Seebach, si on le veut, nos conditions particulières, cette communication conservera la forme que nous lui avons donnée en la faisant parvenir à l'Autriche, et qu'il ne sera fait, avant l'ouverture de la négociation générale, aucune mention quelconque de l'engagement concerté entre les deux Gouvernements.

Ne pouvant douter de l'accueil empressé que doit rencontrer à Londres cette détermination de Sa Majesté Impériale, qui a voulu dans cette circonstance donner une nouvelle preuve des dispositions qui l'animent, nous nous félicitons de l'accord qui ne peut manquer de s'établir entre le Cabinet Anglais et nous.

Vous voudrez bien, après lui en avoir donné lecture, laisser copie de cette dépêche au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 239.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1856.*

IN the despatch of Count Walewski to M. de Persigny, of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch No. 144 of this day, his Excellency states that it has been proposed that a Protocol should be signed at Vienna, having for its object to fix the place and the time for the meeting of Plenipotentiaries ; these Plenipotentiaries to meet in three weeks from the date of the signature of the Protocol, when they will proceed to the signature of preliminaries, to the arrangement of an armistice, and to the opening of the general negotiation.

Count Walewski adds that the Government of the Emperor is prepared to accede to this proposal ; but his Excellency, in the first instance, is desirous of ascertaining the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject.

Your Excellency will accordingly inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government see no objection to this mode of proceeding ; but they consider it indispensable that the terms of the Protocol should be agreed upon by the two Governments before any authority for its signature is sent to Vienna.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 240.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 27, 1856.*

NO instructions should be sent to Vienna about signing the Protocol proposed by Russia until the two Governments are agreed upon the terms of it : the shorter it is the better.

No. 241.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 27, 1856.*

ANTICIPATING your Lordship's wishes, I had made the inquiry again yesterday. *

Count Buol replied that he could give no other answer than this, that Turr was quite safe, and his liberation only a question of time and opportunity.

As affairs stand, Count Buol said that he could not have the appearance of offering to purchase our goodwill.

No. 242.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 52. Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 22, 1856.*

THE manner in which the news of the Russian acceptance of the propositions of the Austrian Cabinet has been received by various parties at Vienna, would (if accurately recorded) form a curious page of contemporary history.

By the Austrian Cabinet it has been hailed as an ample compensation for short but very intense anxiety ; those persons who had been the least backward in condemning Count Buol's rash policy (for so it was deemed) being as full of exultation as the rest at a result which, in the universal opinion, liberates Austria from all further demands upon her exertions.

The feeling is not less universal among the public, and was unequivocally expressed upon the Emperor's first appearance at the theatre after the news had arrived of the timely acceptance by Russia. His Imperial Majesty was received

* About Colonel Turr.

upon that occasion with an enthusiasm which could hardly have been exceeded had he been returning from a glorious campaign.

Of the Russian satellites, for such in fact are the Representatives of some of the German Courts, it is not well to speak; their position having become embarrassing, or, to use the more appropriate epithet, ridiculous. Heathens in their political worship, they have been filled with dismay at the abasement of their idol, and are in danger of falling into political unbelief. Their language had been that the last counter-propositions of Russia were the extreme effort of magnanimity exerted in the cause of peace; that more could not be asked, still less expected; that to require more argued an ignorance of public feeling in Russia, which was notoriously such that even supposing the Emperor Alexander was so bent upon peace as to be ready to make further sacrifices for its attainment, he would not be able to give effect to his wishes in opposition to the excited feelings of his country.

This very foolish sort of language was held by some of my German colleagues at the very moment that Russia's answer (telegraphed, to guard against accidents, both by Count Nesselrode and Count V. Esterhazy) had actually reached the Foreign Office.

On the preceding day, I had undertaken the unprofitable task of endeavouring to counteract the opinions which one of the diplomatists above alluded to was expressing, and I did so by remarking—first, that as a matter of fact I believed the public feeling in Russia to be the very reverse of what had been described; that I had reason to believe that peace, at almost any price, was the paramount wish of the country; and secondly, that I had seen enough of Russia to have ascertained that what was called public opinion was a very convenient instrument, a thing to be put forward as a powerful obstacle when the Sovereign objected to any particular course, but which was utterly disregarded if it stood in the way of the Sovereign's good pleasure.

It was manifest that my opinions were held to be both prejudiced and absurd, and so they may have continued to be thought till the following day, the 16th instant.

As for the Prussian Mission, their objections to the pertinacious demand of an unconditional acceptance was as strong as could be that of an orthodox Russian.

This continued up to the arrival of Count Nesselrode's telegraphic despatch, when a great change became observable. From that moment, as appeared from the language of these gentlemen, it was the friendly advice of the King of Prussia which alone determined the Emperor Alexander upon an unconditional surrender.

I should, however, be wanting in candour were I to undervalue the efforts of His Prussian Majesty; as far as it is in my power to ascertain the truth, these efforts were more strenuous than he had led his allies to expect, and were carried to the extent of his powers, and, as I believe, beyond the extent of his instructions, by the Prussian Envoy at St. Petersburgh.

It remains for me to speak of the Russian Mission at Vienna. Their position is become very embarrassing, and as for Prince Gortchakoff, it is not easy to understand how he can well remain at his present post after that very indiscreet and excited language which he held during the late crisis.

Had he confined his remarks to the policy of the Austrian Government, all might be ascribed to diplomatic zeal and ardour; but as he talked freely of the disgrace which Russia would incur were she to adopt the Austrian propositions, it would be anomalous that he should remain the exponent of a policy which he has condemned by anticipation.

It is true that Prince Gortchakoff acquainted Count Buol some days ago that he was about to be named Minister of Foreign Affairs, but there are some persons who consider the announcement a little premature, who imagine that the Prince may have mistaken a contingent summons to St. Petersburgh for a promise of a portfolio, and the impending portfolio for the particular one which has so long been held by Count Nesselrode.

Were the Russian Emperor intent upon continuing the war, he might be supposed likely to call to his councils a man recommended by his name, his violence, and his orthodoxy; all these cease, however, to be recommendations, if, worn out by an unequal struggle, Russia is really intent upon bringing it to a peaceful conclusion, unless, indeed, it be judged politic that a strictly Russian name should be affixed to a Treaty not very honourable to Russia.

Some there are, who, in their assumed acuteness, are apt to overlook the truth when lying palpably before them, and these are disposed to imagine that the Russian Mission were all along prepared for the final decision of their Government. Such, I am convinced, is not the case. No Russian, certainly no Russian employé, places himself by anticipation in contradiction to the fiat of his Government. While it may then be said that the whole of the Russian Mission had formed a false estimate of the views of their master, none was more taken by surprise than General Stackelberg, who, having left St. Petersburgh some days before an unconditional acceptance had been resolved upon, could hardly be brought to credit the intelligence which, upon his arrival here, he found to have just reached Prince Gortchakoff by telegraph.

As my despatch is a confidential one, I may take the opportunity of recording the conversation which passed between Prince Gortchakoff and Count Buol on the 15th instant, and which was altogether the more striking from the Prince having been previously at the pains of declaring very openly that he felt obliged to break off all communication with a Minister who had acted such a part as Count Buol. In pursuance of this resolution, he called upon him twice on the morning of the 15th instant, and not finding him at home, returned at 9 o'clock at night, when again he met with the same answer. He took his place, accordingly, in the ante-room, waited patiently till Count Buol returned, and then followed him into his study, where, after stating that he was likely to be Count Nesselrode's successor, he spoke with his habitual indiscretion of the "politique de vengeance" which it was not improbable Russia might be expected to pursue.

To this Count Buol replied coldly and sarcastically, that for his part he was not a believer in that sort of policy, which might indeed be acted upon at certain moments, but could never be systematically carried out. "No," Count Buol said, "Russia will not be long vindictive. If you are fortunate enough to obtain a peace, you will have wounds to heal, roads to repair, banks and manufactories to establish, and in these domestic occupations your energies may be long very usefully employed."

These details, trivial as some of them may appear, will enable your Lordship to judge correctly of the relations which exist between the Russian Mission and the Austrian Government. Knowing that Austria is accustomed to lean upon some ally, and seeing that the Russian alliance will not be available for some time, your Lordship will at once foresee to what quarter she is likely to look for support.

I will take this opportunity for apprizing your Lordship of the determining cause (according to Count Buol's opinion) of the acceptance by Russia of the terms which have been lately offered her.

"The acceptance," said Count Buol, "as I learn in the strictest confidence, is owing, not to Count Esterhazy's efforts, not to the representations of the King of Prussia, but simply to the belief which Russia entertains of England being resolved upon pushing the war with vigour, and the expectation that acceptance may be followed by dissensions among the allied Powers."

It is safer to speak of past than of coming events; to record than to predict. I venture, however, to remark to your Lordship that Austria, after a strong and very unusual effort, will in all probability be seen to exert all her diplomacy towards the peaceful enjoyment of the advantages which she has secured for herself; that she will endeavour to efface the recollection of the forward part which she played during twenty-one days, and that whilst her demeanour towards France will be that of confiding friendship, her bearing towards Russia and Prussia will be that of apologetic conciliation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I ought to have stated to your Lordship that Count Arnim has incurred the censure of his Government, by the support which he gave to Count Nesselrode's counter-propositions.

He had been ordered to counsel their acceptance, and he did so in a letter which he addressed to Count Buol. This is considered at Berlin to be too decided a measure. It was oral, not written support, that it had been intended to prescribe.

G. H. S.

No. 243.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 22, 1856.*

IN pursuance of the orders contained in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 18th instant, I waited upon Count Buol on the 20th, for the purpose of inducing him to acquaint Prince Gortchakoff with the precise demands which the two belligerent Powers would have to make upon Russia under the fifth Article of the ultimatum.

A conversation which I had previously held upon the subject with his Excellency, had fully prepared me for the reception which the proposal I had to make would meet with.

As I had expected, I found Count Buol's objections to the plan proposed by your Lordship insuperable.

"Austria," he said, "had undertaken to provide preliminaries of peace, but was not disposed to charge herself with the execution of commissions, or with the drawing up of Articles of Peace. She had fulfilled her part of an engagement with scrupulous exactness. She had a right to demand that the obligations implicitly or explicitly taken by others should be observed with the same good faith. He had a right to expect that preliminaries should be signed, and an armistice agreed upon, without loss of time, and without observations. When the moment for the negotiation of this Treaty arrived, there would be the opportunity for bringing forward the demands of England and France, and these demands would be honestly and cordially supported by Austria. Any previous attempt at making them known to Russia, would only endanger the approaching negotiation, and would give Russia the opportunity of recalling her late acceptance of the Austrian proposals."

Count Buol was convinced that the danger he alluded to was not an imaginary one. The Emperor Alexander had made an immense effort in meeting the Austrian proposals as he had done; if so bitter a cup as that now proposed for him were at once to be held to his lips, he might refuse to drain it off; if His Imperial Majesty were enabled to state to his people that the sacrifices which he had resigned himself to make for their sakes had not produced the immediate relief which had been held out, any fresh appeal which he might make to their sympathy and support would come with redoubled force.

Although Count Buol conceived himself able to support his views by the strongest arguments, he did not wish to argue upon the subject; he wished only to point to an agreement or understanding upon which he had acted with perfect good faith, and which he expected should be observed by others in the same spirit.

It had been said that it was the wish of the English Government that Russia should be apprized distinctly of the conditions of peace, but what was now seen? The demand for the non-fortification of the Aland Islands was indeed clear and distinct, but nothing could be more vague than the intention of taking into consideration the state of a vast extent of territory. Again Count Buol would remark that Austria had not been dealt with as she had every right to expect. Her relations towards Russia became most painful if she were unable to ensure the execution of engagements which she had taken for others. Never engaging her own word lightly, Austria had a right to expect that her allies should be equally scrupulous in keeping faith with her.

I pointed to the various occasions upon which Her Majesty's Government had insisted upon the precise nature of our demands being, as good faith required, made known to Russia, but Count Buol would not admit that the expression of a strong wish could be construed to mean insistance upon a *sine qua non* condition.

My object, as I then told Count Buol, was not to employ strong words, but to seek by all possible means to bring the views of our two Governments into accordance; that above all I was eager not to compromise the fair chances of peace by allowing differences of views to appear which might be made use of by the Russians for the purpose of creating dissensions in the camp.

I would here remark to your Lordship, that as my great object is always to take care that our line should be conformable, as far as possible, to that of our French ally, I called upon Baron Bourqueney before visiting the Foreign Office, and inquired of him whether he were ready to join with me in requesting Count Buol to put himself in communication with Prince Gortchakoff respecting the demands to be made under the fifth Article.

I found Baron Bourqueney, as he ever is, most ready to act hand in hand with me, and he undertook, without hesitation, to join his representations to mine.

His efforts proved, however, as ineffectual as mine had been; they were met by objections of the same nature as had been offered to my proposal, and he left Count Buol, after a conversation which lasted two hours, as resolute as ever upon not departing from the line traced out in the memorandum.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 244.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 22, 1856.*

ON Sunday last I attended the ball at the Schwartzenberg Hotel, with a view of taking my chance of speaking to the Emperor.

Either, because His Imperial Majesty did not think proper to address me, or, which is more probable, accident decided otherwise, I did not succeed in having that honour.

The disappointment was the greater, as I had been intent upon losing no opportunity for representing to His Majesty the great expediency of taking a resolution favourable to Colonel Turr.

It is just possible that His Majesty's knowledge of this purpose may have defeated my object.

The Emperor spoke to the French Minister with great concern of the incident which has occurred in London, and observed that nothing would less surprise him than to see all attempts at negotiation laid aside if any alterations were made in the preliminaries which had been held out to Russia. Like his Minister, the Emperor clings pertinaciously to the plan traced in the memorandum; first, signature of preliminaries, then armistice, and then the negotiation, in the course of which the demands made under the 5th Article should be brought forward.

In the course of the evening I ascertained that a knowledge of the difference which has arisen has already reached Colonel Mantenffel. There can then be no doubt of its having been communicated to the Russian Mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 245.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 23, 1856.*

IN obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 4th instant, I have called Count Buol's attention to the statement made by Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun respecting the encroachments of the Transylvanian authorities upon the territory of Moldavia, and more especially the forcible occupation of some ground upon which a soda manufactory has been established.

Count Buol remarked that there was no doubt that from the circumstance of the Moldavian frontier being, like that of Switzerland, very ill traced, instances were continually occurring of disputes arising between the respective

border authorities, which, in the case of these disputes assuming a serious character, become the subjects of reference to the several Governments concerned. He could not, he added, offer a better proof of the unimportance of the dispute to which I had alluded than by stating that he had no knowledge of it.

The fear of being asked, as had happened in the case of a similar inquiry made by Lord Westmorland, by what right I came forward as the advocate of the Principalities, made me cautious as to not pressing investigation, and the more so as Mr. Colquhoun states that the papers relating to the affair have been referred to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 246.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 23, 1856*

THE situation of affairs here may be described in a few words.

The Austrian Government claim pertinaciously the exact payment of what they consider their bond.

They maintain that they stood pledged to England and France to break off their relations with Russia if she declined the propositions which Count Esterhazy conveyed to St. Petersburgh, the belligerent Powers being on their side pledged to Austria to sign preliminaries without delay or conditions, in the event of the propositions being acceded to by Russia. Upon this ground the Austrian Cabinet have taken up their position, and from that position no argument or entreaty will induce them to move. Count Buol's opinions upon the point agree entirely with those of his Imperial master, and no change in them is, I am convinced, to be looked for.

It is a question, not so much of policy, as of dignity and of respect for a written engagement.

If I had entertained any previous doubts upon the subject, they would have been removed by a conversation which I held last night with Count Buol, of which a *précis* has been sent to your Lordship in a telegraphic despatch.

Count Buol said that no consideration could induce him to swerve from what he had already stated to me.

That we were in that crisis at which either a safe or a very dangerous course was about to be entered upon; that the negotiation would begin and proceed smoothly, or would lead to very serious complications.

If, he said, the Western Powers sign the preliminaries without condition or demur, Austria will have redeemed her pledge to Russia, and she is then as willing as she is able to act vigorously and cordially with her allies. In the contrary supposition she is held up to Europe as faithless to her word, and her position becomes one "not only of embarrassment but of ridicule!" "To that she cannot submit; at any price or risk her dignity must be upheld."

"Sign the preliminaries," he said, "and all goes on as you desire; your demands are brought forward in the course of the negotiations; they meet with our cordial support, and we are sure at least of obtaining, not an engagement as to the non-fortification of the Aland Islands, but a cession of the islands themselves. We will carry this, if necessary, at the price of sacrificing our own interests."

These latter words were pronounced with great earnestness, and with a significance of manner which leads me to feel confident that Count Buol has obtained some knowledge of the late French plan, and that he intended to convey to me that he should consider the cession of a part of the newly acquired territory in Bessarabia as a price which ought to be paid for promoting the objects of the allies in the Baltic.

In urging Her Majesty's Government, as I have felt it my duty to do, to take into full consideration the feelings of the Austrian Cabinet, I will only entreat of your Lordship to believe that I am not influenced by any Austrian leaning

or prejudices; my feelings, as well as my prejudices, are indeed exclusively English.

I feel only that Austria has some grounds for understanding that we are pledged to act as she calls upon us to do, and that her assistance is requisite for ultimately carrying out the objects upon which Her Majesty's Government are so deeply intent.

It is held by some persons that the whole affair might be settled without Austrian concurrence, and this is the more probable as Russia might not be found reluctant to requite her Imperial ally for what she considers an act of ingratitude, or perhaps of defection.

It may, however, I think be safely assumed that any settlement of the so-called Eastern question, to which Austria is not a willing party, would be a very insecure arrangement; I believe, in a word, either that Austria will be one of those Powers which will be pledged to resist the encroachments of Russia, or that particular Power which, when opportunity offers, will be ready to join with Russia in despoiling a weak neighbour. I will not conclude my despatch without remarking to your Lordship that I have long known Count Buol, and know him to be a man who not only means what he says, but who weighs his words with great exactness. Like most of the public men of this country he is a formalist, and desirous of keeping close, or being supposed to keep close, to the text of an engagement. His language, however, convinces me that he might have expressed himself even more strongly than he did, and that not only he has taken care to let it be known to Russia that we have demands to make upon the Aland Islands, but that he has ascertained that the demands will not be obstinately resisted: were this not the case he would not have ventured to state with confidence that there would be less difficulty in obtaining a cession of these islands than an engagement for their non-fortification; what he contemplates can be nothing else than the exchange of a portion of the ceded territory of Bessarabia against the islands.

I beg to apologize to your Lordship for the great freedom which I use in expressing my opinions; the heavy responsibility, however, which I incur by so doing will, at least, satisfy you how convinced I must be of their correctness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 247.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 64.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1856.*

THE Austrian Government have received intelligence of a Russian courier, the bearer of Prince Gortchakoff's full powers, having passed through Warsaw. It is probable, therefore, that that messenger will arrive in the course of the day at Vienna.

Count Buol has asked me what were your Lordship's views as to a place of meeting for negotiation; but I was unable to give him any information upon the subject.

Alluding to a report which has been circulated here, Count Buol remarked that he thought there were considerable objections to Brussels as a place of meeting, and that probably no more eligible spot could be found than Mannheim, recommended, as it is, by its tranquillity and its central position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 248.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1856.*

I HAVE detained Lord Cowley's messenger twelve hours longer than I had intended, that he may convey to Paris (from whence similar communications will be forwarded to London) Count Nesselrode's two despatches of the 18th instant, with the proposals as to the course to be followed ("marche à suivre") with regard to the signature of preliminaries and armistice, as well as to the place of negotiation.

I am little able to give an account of papers very rapidly read to me, but it is the less necessary that I should attempt the task, as soon after this despatch reaches you the Russian papers will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Colloredo.

The choice of Paris, by the Russian Government, is intended evidently to mark disapprobation of the Austrian Government and a leaning to that of France. As regards the latter object, the present will probably be seen to be the first of a long series of similar demonstrations.

I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the Protocol, or sort of preparatory paper of preliminaries, which Count Nesselrode proposes should be "paraphé" at Vienna. Should this plan be sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, I shall of course require powers to put my initials to this instrument.

As to the preliminaries themselves, your Lordship will have learned from my telegraphic message of this date, that Count Nesselrode wishes that they should be signed at the place of negotiation.

Two points struck me in the Russian Chancellor's despatch. I observe an allusion made to a sort of engagement taken by Count V. Esterhazy, that no pecuniary indemnity and no fresh territorial cession should be claimed by us under Article 5 of the ultimatum. I observe, likewise, that the Chancellor takes as a basis of negotiation a compensation to be made to Russia. This I do not understand, but am willing to believe that national pride may find a consolation in preferring a claim even without the expectation of its being allowed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 249.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1856.*

UPON receiving yesterday morning the messenger from Lord Cowley, who was the bearer of a copy of his Excellency's despatch to your Lordship marked No. 102, I resolved to make a fresh appeal to Count Buol, although I was perfectly conscious of the inutility of the attempt.

The result was exactly that which I had anticipated. Count Buol was entrenched in that position which he had taken up ever since the Russian acceptance, and from which it is impossible to induce him to move.

His objections were stated nearly in the same words as yesterday, only that he added, "You yourselves (the Western Powers) have closed a door upon yourselves which you can now only open by force. We wished to call our message to Russia, 'our propositions,' you insisted upon its being termed an ultimatum, and now you desire that an ultimatum after acceptance should be altered."

To my remark as to its being rather amplification and full explanation which we now and all along had desired, Count Buol replied, as before, that in the course of the negotiation Austria would be found ready to give full support to the wishes of her allies, but that she could listen to no proposals and make no promises until the engagements taken to her had been fulfilled, especially until

the Emperor of Austria should be enabled to make good the engagements to which his Imperial word had been pledged.

It is unnecessary that I should repeat the arguments by which Count Buol supports the demands which he so pertinaciously makes upon the English and French Governments, but among them I may allude to the stress which he lays upon the fact of Count V. Esterhazy's instructions having been laid before the two Cabinets and not being met with anything approaching to disapprobation either at London or at Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 250.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 26, 1856.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel yesterday, his Excellency said that your Lordship had stated to Count Bernstorff, that he (Baron Manteuffel) had communicated to the Russian Legation the Austrian ultimatum the day it had been delivered to the King of Prussia by Count Georges Esterhazy, and that Prince Lobanoff had been dispatched immediately to St. Petersburgh with it; and he asked me if I had forwarded any such intelligence to your Lordship.

I replied that this story had gone the round of the town, and formed part of the diplomatic gossip at Berlin a month ago, and that I recollected having asked his Excellency at the time how it had originated; and that he had protested that it was impossible that Baron Budberg could have obtained a copy of the document in question, as he had brought it back from the King's, and that it had been in safe keeping afterwards. Here our conversation dropped; and I apprehend that the story must have reached your Lordship from Sir Alexander Malet; for, I think I saw it stated in one of his despatches as a report that had been current at Frankfort.

There is no doubt that Prince Lobanoff's sudden departure created considerable sensation at the time. He performed the journey to St. Petersburgh in the almost incredible space of four days; and it was afterwards said here, that he had reached the Russian capital before Count Valentine Esterhazy, which it was intended that he should do. Whether Prince Lobanoff took a copy of the ultimatum or not, may be doubtful; but Baron Budberg will have had no difficulty, through his numerous channels at Court, in learning the main points of the ultimatum; and he, of course, would lose no time in communicating them to his Court.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 251.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 26, 1856.*

IT may not be uninteresting to Her Majesty's Government to hear the manner in which it has been told me, I believe from good authority, that the final decision to accept the Austrian ultimatum was brought about at St. Petersburgh.

On the 15th instant Baron Werther, the Prussian Envoy, dined with the Dowager-Empress of Russia. He availed himself of the opportunity to state to Her Imperial Majesty that if the ultimatum were refused the Austrian Legation

would depart, and that he could not conceal from her that if this occurred, circumstances might soon arise which would force the Prussian Legation to do so likewise. On hearing this, the Dowager Empress requested the Emperor to come to her; and on the following morning, His Imperial Majesty, the Empress the Grand Dukes Constantine, Michael, and Nicholas, assembled at the Empress-mother's; the question was discussed; much opposition was raised by the Grand Duke Constantine as to the cession of any portion of territory, urging that Russia never had done so before; but on breaking up of the family Council, Count Nesselrode was sent for, and two hours afterwards the note accepting the Austrian ultimatum was forwarded to Count Valentine Esterhazy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 252.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 26, 1856.*

WITH reference to my telegraphic despatch of the 22nd instant, on the subject of the communication which had been made to the Prussian Government by Count Georges Esterhazy, expressing the sense entertained by the Austrian Government of the services rendered by Baron Werther at St. Petersburgh in obtaining the final acceptance of the ultimatum by Russia, I have endeavoured to learn whether any further observation has been made to the Austrian Minister respecting this affair, but nothing has transpired. Baron Manteuffel has given no answer, and Count Esterhazy believes that nothing more will be done in the matter until the wishes of Her Majesty's Government and that of France are known.

I have already informed your Lordship that the Prussian Government would much prefer to come into the Conferences at the invitation of England and France than of Austria; but I presume, from what Count Esterhazy has said to me, that if it is thought advisable that Prussia should assist at the Conferences, the wish will be intimated in a collective invitation from the three Powers.

That the King of Prussia should be anxiously waiting for an invitation to the Conferences, there can be no doubt, and that such a step would be gratifying to His Majesty, the Court, and people, is beyond a doubt; but the obtaining the adhesion of Prussia to a Treaty for the pacification of Europe, and perhaps her guarantee to the future delimitation of the Russian Empire, would be dearly bought by a mass of difficulties that would be raised by her in discussing different matters connected with the Eastern question.

In the first place, who are the Representatives that Prussia would probably select to attend the Conferences? Public opinion says that Count Alvensleben and M. de Bismarck would probably be chosen. The former is a man of sense, talent, and experience, but who, instead of throwing light into dark and intricate matters, would probably only embroil them more. His predilections are Austrian. M. de Bismarck is thoroughly Russian; and, therefore, between these two, if the King's choice should fall on them, or either of them, I see no gain for the Western Powers, but public advocates of our enemy's cause.

No other person has been mentioned as likely to be selected for the Conferences, and in the diplomatic service of Prussia I know of none who would have a chance of selection, in whose impartiality we could place the least reliance. Such, in fact, is the present dilemma of this Government, that though Baron Manteuffel would wish to see Prussia occupying her proper position in Europe, he would be almost as well satisfied to avoid the responsibility of the Conferences, for he feels that Prussia will not be admitted without engagements, and that the King is not likely to submit to anything that will bind him down to act with the Western Powers if the Conferences should have no result.

But to form any calculation of what the King may ultimately do is vain; one thing is certain, that he would prove a clog in every negotiation that may be undertaken, and, though anxious for peace, would not be likely to support us against Russia to the extent to which it may be found necessary to go, in order to arrive at a lasting peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 253.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 26, 1856.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me yesterday that the only communication which he had received from Baron Budberg since the acceptance by Russia of the ultimatum, is the copy of the note addressed on the 16th instant by Count Nesselrode to Count Valentine Esterhazy, which had been delivered to him, together with a short despatch from the Chancellor, stating that every deference had been shown to the wishes of Prussia, and that she had had much influence in the late decision of the Emperor.

From Baron Manteuffel's tone in speaking on this subject he evidently seemed to contrast the civility and attention which accompanies the communications from Russia with the silence observed towards Prussia by the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 254.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 109. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1856.*

A QUESTION will arise in the course of the negotiation with Russia as to the renewal of the ancient Treaties between Turkey and Russia.

Those Treaties, however, contain a variety of stipulations which it may have been necessary to insert at the time of their conclusion, in consequence of the alteration of territorial limits and in the general character of relations between the two countries agreed to in the successive negotiations, but which it would seem superfluous now specifically to reproduce, and it may be doubted whether at the present time it would not be better, as regards the political relations between the two countries, that they should be regulated by an entirely new arrangement, which might be effected by inserting in the new Treaty, without any reference to the former Treaties, what are thenceforth to be the territorial limits between the two countries.

The commercial relations of the two countries may, however, require more detailed and specific stipulations.

I wish, therefore, that your Excellency should consider this matter, and report to me with as little delay as possible your opinion as to the manner in which the ancient Treaties with Turkey and Russia should be dealt with in the approaching conferences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 255.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 147.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1856.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to suggest to Count Walewski that effectual provision should be made for the rights and immunities of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, instead of confining that provision to the Christians; otherwise the Jews will be excluded from the benefits of the improvements under the fourth point, which it is the desire of the Governments of England, France, and Austria, to effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 256.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 27, 1856.*

I CALLED on Count Walewski this afternoon and found him satisfied with the despatches which he had received this morning from M. de Persigny. He said, in general terms, that Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the last proposition of the Imperial Government respecting the preliminaries of peace, and that in fulfilment of the engagement entered into by France, he should send to-morrow to M. de Seebach to communicate to him in writing the nature of the particular conditions and invite him to transmit them to St. Petersburgh.

There is, however, one point to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention, namely, that Count Walewski affirms that he has not engaged to Her Majesty's Government to make both particular conditions *sine quibus non* to peace. He admits the one concerning the Aland Islands, but he says that the other is too vaguely worded to render any engagement respecting it possible. If, however, Her Majesty's Government have no intention of binding him to do more than engage to discuss the state of the countries to the east of the Black Sea, that is a promise which he can conscientiously give.

Count Walewski then said that he trusted that your Lordship would not object to sending orders by telegraph to Sir Hamilton Seymour to concert with Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney as to the wording of the Protocol to be signed at Vienna in pursuance of the Russian propositions. In order that the instructions sent to M. de Bourqueney and Sir Hamilton Seymour might be identic, he intended transmitting a project to-night to London, and if your Lordship agreed to it, it might be forwarded by both Governments to-morrow. He proposes not to give the two Ministers power to sign the Protocol until the text of it has been seen and approved in London and Paris.

In the meantime, however, his Excellency said that he had instructed M. de Thouvenel by telegraph to move the Porte to send instructions to the Turkish Agent at Vienna to sign any Protocol to which the assent of the French and English Governments might have been obtained, and he had also urged the Ottoman Ministers to lose no time in expediting the departure of the Plenipotentiaries who were to take part in the Conferences at Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 257.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 155.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 28, 1856.*

IN my despatch No. 126 of the 23rd instant, I informed your Lordship that M. de Hübner had stated to Count Walewski that the Austrian Government had been instigated by the Cabinet of Berlin to demand the admission of Prussian Plenipotentiaries in the Conferences for Peace. I stated further that the Emperor was not inclined to comply with this demand, though he was of opinion that the Treaty of Peace, when signed, must be left open for the adhesion of Prussia.

I was somewhat surprised, the day after I wrote this despatch, to find it stated in a telegraphic despatch from Lord Bloomfield of the 23rd instant, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 122, that the Austrian Minister at Berlin had almost invited the Prussian Government to take steps to enable Prussia to participate in the Conferences, and that the French Minister had taken a similar line. I asked Count Walewski how he reconciled this with the statement which he had made to me. His Excellency replied that he could give no explanations respecting the proceedings of the Austrian Government. He could only repeat what M. de Hübner had stated to him; but, with respect to the language attributed to M. de Moustier, he said that that Minister had stated particularly to the Prussian Minister that he was speaking without instructions, and he had only been anxious to ascertain how far the Prussian Government would now bind themselves to the policy of the Western Powers.

The opinion of the French Government, Count Walewski added, remained unchanged; but, before giving any answer to M. de Hübner, he should like to be informed, officially, how the demand of Prussia was viewed in England. It seemed certain that the Prussian Government would refuse all written engagements with respect to the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 258.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 28, 1856.*

THE Sardinian Minister has been instructed to assert the right of his Government to sign the preliminaries of peace. Count Walewski is of opinion that the demand is a just one; but he observes that care must be taken to confine the position of Sardinia in the peace negotiations to that already laid down for her. She will sign the final Treaty; but, during its negotiation, she will only be consulted on matters which interest her immediately.

Sardinia was anxious, Count Walewski observed, that something should be done in the Conferences for Italy. He should be very glad if an opportunity presented itself for ameliorating, in any way, the condition of the Italian Peninsula. He could not flatter himself, however, that any real good could be effected, and to force the consideration of Italy, in connection with the Eastern question, would produce a further complication where there were difficulties enough already.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY

No. 259.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 157.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 28, 1856.*

I HAVE communicated to Count Walewski a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 137 of the 24th instant, stating the reasons why Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the peace negotiations should be carried on at Paris.

His Excellency has requested me to represent to Her Majesty's Government how highly the Emperor and his Government appreciate this mark of confidence on the part of Her Majesty's advisers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 260.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14, 1856.*

IT appears that the Turkish Ministers are far from being satisfied with the conduct of Omer Pasha. No answer has yet been received from the Generalissimo to their proposal that he should transfer his command to Erzeroom. His Highness, as I am informed, is desirous of coming to Constantinople, and the Porte is not disposed to give him permission for that purpose.

Fuad Pasha, in conversation with Mr. Pisani two or three days ago, let fall an expression which implied that in his opinion Selim Pasha was less culpable than Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 261.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 49.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14, 1856.*

THE Sardinian Envoy, Baron Tecco, came to me on Thursday or Friday last to complain that he had not been invited to take part in the discussions which were opened here on the 9th instant respecting the question of privileges. I asked him whether he addressed me in virtue of his instructions. It appeared from his answer that he did not, although he considered himself authorized as a Plenipotentiary to enter upon the subject with me. I then inquired whether he desired me to bring the matter officially before your Lordship. Such at first seemed to be his wish, but after some heated expressions he softened down into an intimation which left the mode of proceeding to my discretion.

I told him distinctly in reply, that I was taken by surprise; that I had no instructions on the subject, and that I could not accept his communication as an official step after what he had declared in answer to my inquiries.

I have since learnt from M. Thouvenel that Baron Tecco made a similar representation to him, and received a reply similar in its purport to mine.

This coincidence took place without any previous communication on the subject between us.

I heard nothing more from the Sardinian Minister till a few minutes ago, when his Secretary of Legation brought me an official note and an official letter, which I hasten to submit to your Lordship by the messenger, without having time to consider, and still less to answer them.

The hasty perusal I have taken of the former document, and of the beginning of the second, has occasioned me no small surprise. I do not understand how Baron Tecco could have felt himself entitled to any further communication, either from the French Ambassador or from myself, and equally am I in wonder at the tone which appears to prevail in his official note.

The French Ambassador told me that Baron Tecco had spoken to him of the feeling which might be excited in the Sardinian Chambers if he kept silence, at the same time that he acknowledged having written to his Government, and received no answer.

The matter is in your Lordship's hands. Most assuredly I shall not abstain from pursuing the discussions, and if Sardinia is to take part in them hereafter, I hope its Representative will be prepared to enter upon his unforeseen duty with less pretension and a calmer spirit.

I am ignorant whether Baron Tecco has made any application to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 261.

Baron Tecco to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, ce 14 Janvier, 1856.*

LE jour même que j'ai eu connaissance de l'ouverture des conférences où le Représentant de la Sardaigne n'a pas été admis à siéger avec ceux des Puissances alliés de son Gouvernement, j'ai cru devoir d'abord porter verbalement à votre Excellence, ainsi qu'à M. l'Ambassadeur de France, des représentations que je dus ensuite consigner dans un office écrit. Dans l'espoir toutefois que quelque changement survenu dans ma position pût me dispenser de sa remise, je l'ai différée de quelques jours. Cet espoir ne s'étant cependant pas réalisé, il ne me reste qu'à l'adresser à votre Excellence, comme j'en adresse une autre de teneur identique à M. l'Ambassadeur de France.

En remplissant ce que je considère comme un devoir absolu de ma position, j'ai, &c.

(Signé) R. TECCO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 261.

Baron Tecco to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, le 12 Janvier, 1856.

Le Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne près la Porte Ottomane, n'a pû apprendre qu'avec une très grave surprise que des conférences concertées ici d'avance à son insu entre les Représentants des Puissances alliées de son Gouvernement venaient de s'ouvrir le 9 de ce mois par une réunion assez solennelle qui eut lieu auprès du Grand Vizir, et avec l'assistance du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte.

La surprise du Soussigné a dû augmenter encore en apprenant que dans cette première réunion, où l'on entama une question d'un intérêt aussi général pour l'alliance que celle du quatrième point, connu comme une des bases projetées de pacification, leurs Excellences MM. les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre s'y trouvèrent à délibérer ensemble avec M. l'Internonce d'Autriche, Puissance qui n'entre pas dans l'alliance aux mêmes titres que la Sardaigne, tandis que le Représentant de cette dernière Puissance s'en trouvait exclu.

Ce fait de l'exclusion du Représentant Sarde d'une pareille réunion, et en de telles circonstances, a paru au Soussigné si peu convenable qu'il n'a pu l'envisager d'abord comme intentionnel et délibéré de la part de ses honorables collègues représentans les Puissances alliées de son Gouvernement. Aussi dans son désir empressé d'obtenir quelque explication qui pût le confirmer dans cette opinion, tout en faisant à ce sujet ses réclamations à la Sublime Porte, ne tarda-t-il pas à s'adresser à ces mêmes Représentants qui avaient provoqué la réunion.

Mais à part l'expression polie de regrets personnels le Soussigné n'eût pas la satisfaction d'obtenir aucune explication dans le sens désiré, ni même telle qu'il pût l'envisager comme officiellement acceptable.

Les explications obtenues au surplus parurent seulement faire allusion à une prétendue entente avec le Gouvernement Sarde, dont le Soussigné n'a pas la moindre connaissance, et dont la nature d'ailleurs en rend à ses yeux l'hypothèse même impossible. Cette entente en effet n'impliquerait rien moins qu'une espèce d'engagement de la part de son Gouvernement à ne participer ici par son Représentant aux conseils de l'alliance. Or, il paraît suffisant d'énoncer un pareil engagement pour qu'il ressorte tout simplement impossible, ne pouvant subsister en présence des droits et des devoirs essentiels à un membre d'une alliance quelconque.

Et ici à côté de cette impossibilité de la part du Gouvernement Sarde le Soussigné ose en signaler une autre, pour ainsi dire, parallèle de la part de ses puissants alliés. Il croit impossible, en effet, que leurs Cabinets si éclairés puissent tarder à reconnaître que l'exclusion du Représentant de la Sardaigne des Conférences de ses collégues dans l'alliance, porte atteinte, quoique certes contre leurs intentions, à un droit incontestable qui ressort non seulement de la nature même d'une alliance entre Puissances indépendantes, mais aussi de la lettre même des stipulations des Traités auxquels la Sardaigne a accédé.

Il suffit, en effet, de jeter un coup d'œil sur le premier et principal Article du Traité du 10 Avril pour y voir l'engagement de chaque membre de l'alliance de coopérer par tous ses moyens au rétablissement de la paix sur des bases solides, &c. Or, si la Sardaigne s'est généreusement dévouée jusqu'à présent à remplir son devoir de coopération plutôt par son concours à la guerre, ses alliés ne pourraient y voir une raison de ne pas lui permettre aussi sa coopération dans leurs conseils et dans leurs conférences qui tendent plus directement même à la pacification, but suprême de l'alliance. Et cela d'autant plus s'agissant de conférences où l'on discute les bases de cette pacification.

Le Soussigné a en même temps trop de confiance dans les lumières et dans les nobles sentiments de ses honorables collégues les Représentants des Gouvernements alliés pour douter qu'ils ne soient pas disposés à fixer l'attention de leurs Cabinet sur les simples considérations qu'il vient de signaler à l'égard d'un droit trop incontestable pour que tout développement ultérieur en soit superflu.

Il en coûterait trop d'ailleurs au Soussigné de s'arrêter davantage à développer des raisons qu'il est même aux regrets de trouver si évidentes, pour prouver le tort qui résulte pour son Gouvernement de l'exclusion même momentanée de son Représentant des Conférences communes à ses alliés. Il aime plutôt à nourrir l'espoir que ce tort, dont a maintenant à se plaindre un allié, dont la loyauté et la constance ont été si bien éprouvées, ne tardera pas à être noblement réparé.

Quoiqu'il puisse advenir toutefois le Soussigné aura rempli un stricte devoir de sa position en réservant par cette note de la manière la plus formelle les droits de son Gouvernement dans cette grave et importante question.

Il entend ainsi mettre en même temps à couvert sa responsabilité officielle avec celle qu'il a moralement envers sa nation.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) R. TECCO.

No. 262.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14, 1856.*

I RECEIVED yesterday from Fuad Pasha the enumeration of privileges *in esse* or *in posse*, which the Turkish Ministers promised to deliver, before the appointed meeting ten days hence, to the three Representatives, with whom they have agreed to confer on the subject of its contents.

Unfortunately the paper is drawn up in Turkish, and of such length as to make the transmission of it to your Lordship by to-day's messenger an utter impossibility, notwithstanding the skill and diligence of the translators.

A paper has also been composed, in anticipation of further proceedings, by each of my colleagues; and, in justice to Her Majesty's Government, I have not thought it right to stand in the back ground.

There will, probably, be an interchange of our respective views and suggestions at the next meeting, and I think it will be desirable for me and my two colleagues to ascertain those of each other with some degree of exactness before we enter into discussion with the Sultan's Ministers.

In the mean time I forward to your Lordship, herewith, the memorandum to which I have consigned my portion of the common labour, and most earnestly do I desire that the truths expressed in it may engage the concurrence of my fellow-labourers, and obtain, however modified, the cordial acceptance of the Porte.

It has been my object, for the sake of brevity and expedition, to enunciate principles rather than measures, and in framing propositions to give them an air of enactment which conveys the impression of practicability. The paper is, at best, a sketch, and may, perhaps, be subjected to amendment before presentation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 262.

Memorandum.

L'EMPIRE et la souveraineté de la dynastie Ottomane dans leur juste extension se rattachent de nos jours au grand système Européen, et les Puissances amies et alliées de la Porte ont constamment à cœur d'éloigner tout danger qui pourrait les atteindre. Le désir de ces mêmes Cours de fournir à Sa Majesté le Sultan les occasions, pour ne pas dire les moyens, d'asseoir son indépendance sur des bases solides et permanentes n'admet pas de question.

Le progrès de la guerre fait prévoir que selon toute probabilité les opérations combinées auront, tôt ou tard, pour résultat une pacification conforme aux vœux de l'Europe et aux besoins de la Turquie. Mais ce qui peut aider d'avance l'achévement d'une si belle œuvre n'en est pas moins digne d'attention. Il est urgent, au contraire, de fixer dès à présent les principes et de concerter, autant que possible, les mesures nécessaires pour en obtenir tout l'effet au bénéfice de l'Empire, objet de tant de soins et de sacrifices. Garantir le territoire Ottoman contre les dangers d'un envahissement, et l'abandonner en même tems aux vices intérieurs qui le font dépérir à vue d'œil, que servit-il, si non une illusion pernicieuse, dont les peuples, martyrs de la guerre, pourraient à juste titre demander raison ?

La Porte est en droit de dire que dès l'origine elle s'est montrée prête à tolérer les cultes autres que le sien propre, en ajoutant à la tolérance de ces cultes un nombre considérable de priviléges accordés aux peuples qui en faisaient profession. La confirmation de ces dons précieux, transmis de Souverain en Souverain, lui ont valu, à peu d'exceptions près, l'obéissance et la fidélité de ceux parmi ses sujets qui, sans lui être unis par les liens de la foi, sont néanmoins soumis au sceptre du Sultan. Elle ne cesse non plus de professer les principes de la réforme administrative, et d'aviser aux moyens de leur donner une impulsion, et surtout une application, telle que ses sujets de toute classe et les amis de l'Empire se réjouiraient de voir réalisée.

En lui rendant cette justice, en appréciant aussi les motifs qui lui ont inspiré la résolution de repousser les prétentions de la Russie, les alliés de son gré veulent maintenant s'associer aux travauxdestinés à en perpétuer l'exclusion. Par l'adoption, la promulgation et la mise en vigueur à temps de mesures, d'autant plus efficaces qu'elles seraient équitables et généreuses, la Porte fera taire le reproche de ne pas avoir employé tous les moyens que l'occasion lui offre pour assurer son avenir. De ces mesures l'initiative et l'exécution lui appartiennent. Les Puissances appelées au secours de la Turquie ne sauraient refuser leur coopération. L'Europe, qui reconnait la nécessité des réformes dans l'intérêt de la paix et de la civilisation, se fera, sans doute, un devoir d'en consacrer l'accomplissement, et de veiller, en ami, à leur maintien.

La question des priviléges est tellement liée avec celle des réformes administratives que toutes les deux semblent devoir se ranger dans le même cadre. Les rapprocher de manière à faire disparaître les différences qui séparent les Mussulmans des Rayahs, serait un pas de géant dans la régénération progressive de l'Empire.

Il est à espérer que le temps viendra en aide à la législation pour effectuer cet immense bienfait.

La Porte, en continuant à prendre le devant, se fera encore plus d'honneur et consultera ses meilleurs intérêts. Tout concourt pour lui inspirer le courage de le faire et lui imposer le devoir de le faire sans délai. Elle est aujourd'hui à même de mettre en pratique les mesures qu'elle a déjà adoptées, de faire une application plus complète des principes qu'elle a déjà proclamés, et d'étendre en les confirmant de nouveau les priviléges qu'elle a accordés de longue date. Elle a déjà la mission de sévir contre les abus et la corruption, de purifier l'administration de la justice, et l'adapter aux besoins de toutes les classes, d'activer les fonctions des employés publics, et de puiser de nouvelles forces pour la marche du Gouvernement et pour le maintien de l'Empire, dans l'admission de tous ses sujets à l'honneur de défendre la patrie, et à l'obligation de vouer leurs talents au service de l'Etat.

De toutes les institutions, celles qui sont capables de s'adapter aux mouvements et aux besoins de la société deviennent à la longue les plus stables et les plus dignes de notre vénération. Jamais elles ne sauvegardent mieux l'Etat que lorsqu'elles ouvrent sagement le sein aux réquisitions fondées de l'opinion et du temps. La nature, telle qu'une intelligence infiniment bienfaisante l'a voulu, répugne à l'isolément et aux formes exclusives. Rien n'est au fond stationnaire. La vie c'est le mouvement. Elle se développe, elle s'alimente par la double action de l'exercice et de l'assimilation. Le corps politique ne diffère pas de si loin du corps naturel. La société et l'individu subissent à plus d'un égard les mêmes conditions.

Eclairés de ces convictions le Sultan et ses Ministres reconnaîtront sans peine ce qu'il y a de vrai et de pratique dans les propositions suivantes, dont plusieurs ont déjà passé en lois, et dont les autres sont pour le plupart acceptées en principe. Elles se trouvent couchées en forme d'articles, aux numéros près, dans l'intention de les rendre plus courtes et plus nettes. Il faut avouer qu'elles sont toutes, plus ou moins, d'une urgence incontestable.

Le Gouvernement du Sultan devant exercer l'autorité suprême de l'Empire, les lois du Tanzimat dans leur ensemble seront observées et mises en exécution par ordre de Sa Majesté de manière à ce que toutes les classes de ses sujets, sans distinction quelconque, jouiront également de la même protection et de la même sureté par rapport à leurs personnes, à leurs biens, et à leur honneur.

Il s'ensuit que le Gouvernement défendra à tous ses sujets, sans exception, d'employer des expressions injurieuses ou humiliantes les uns contre les autres, et toute distinction tendante à rendre une classe inférieure à une autre à raison du culte, de la race, ou de la langue sera repudiée par les lois et par les autorités.

Tous les priviléges antiques et d'autres accordés par firman, ou légalement attribués aux diverses communautés non-Mussulmans, seront déclarés de nouveau et confirmés d'une manière solennelle.

Tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans distinction, seront éligibles aux emplois publics en se conformant aux règlements établis et montrant les qualités convenables.

La tolérance religieuse sera mise en plein effet de manière que personne ne sera insulté ni molesté, encore moins persecuté ou puni, à cause de ses opinions religieuses. La protection efficace de l'autorité sera donnée de même à tout individu exposé à de pareils abus, et le culte Divin jouira de la même protection selon le rit et la pratique de chaque communauté.

La faculté de réparer ou de bâtir de nouveau des églises ou d'autres édifices consacrés au culte Divin, partout où besoin en sera, d'après la déclaration des autorités spirituelles de chaque diocèse ou autre district ecclésiastique, sauf un délai nécessaire pour en vérifier les circonstances sous le point de vue administratif, sera pleinement reconnue et légalisée à perpétuité.

Le Grand Conseil de l'Empire, sous les auspices immédiates du Souverain, adoptera les réglements les plus propres à s'assurer les fins de la justice, à se faciliter la marche des affaires, et à donner un cours séparé à chacun ce ces deux départements.

Le Conseil admettra à ses délibérations quelques membres choisis respectivement par les diverses communautés, et libres de toute objection fondée de la part du Gouvernement.

Chaque membre du Conseil durant les séances—quelle que soit la classe dont il relève—aura pleine liberté d'exprimer impunément et sans réserve ses opinions relativement à la matière mise en discussion, pourvu qu'il ne sorte pas des formes convenables.

La même règle sera appliquée aux Conseils, soit de province, soit de district ou de municipalité.

Tout chef de département dans la capitale, tout Gouverneur de province ou de ville, aura auprès de lui un conseiller, ou Musteshar, nommé d'entre les Chrétiens sujets de la Porte.

La nomination de l'individu sera sujette à la confirmation du Gouvernement, et sa démission, à cause de mauvaise conduite ou de manque de capacité, ou d'autre défaut suffisant, aura également besoin de la confirmation du Gouvernement.

Les Cours de Haute Justice, constituées d'après la loi du Koran, seront réservées pour les sujets Mussulmans. Les Cours Civiles le seront de même, lorsque les parties seront entièrement Mussulmanes.

Les différends qui pourraient survenir entre les sujets non-Mussulmans de la Porte, seront jugés d'après les lois, les usages, et les règlements de la communauté, ou des communautés, dont relèvent les parties intéressées. Lorsqu'il sera question d'un acte criminel ou d'un affaire litigieuse, soit entre un Mussulman et un sujet de la Porte qui ne l'est pas, soit entre deux sujets qui sont de communautés différentes, le procès sera lutenté devant un tribunal mixte, établi d'avance pour de pareils cas en matière criminelle, et devant le Tidjaret en matière civile. Il en sera de même dans les provinces comme dans la capitale.

Les lois pénales, civiles, commerciales, qui doivent régler la procédure et les jugements, seront complétées au plutôt, codifiées séparément, et publiées. On aura soin de les rendre conformes aux principes les plus généralement reconnus de la justice impartiale et de l'humanité.

Il va sans dire que les Cours de Justice seront ouvertes au public, que les témoins seront assermentés, que les parties adverses seront mises en présence, que les témoignages seront admis indifféremment par rapport à la croyance, à la race, ou à la position sociale des individus.

Les procès doivent se faire avec promptitude, l'arrestation sans violence, et l'emprisonnement sans dureté, au delà d'une stricte nécessité. Toute facilité doit être accordée à l'emploi des moyens à décharge.

On fera en sorte que la propreté, la ventilation, la salubrité, aussi bien que la sureté, seront établies dans les prisons de toute espèce. Point de torture,

point d'exaction. Toute acte de l'un ou de l'autre, n'importe de quel genre ou degré, sera défendu sous des peines sévères.

Il sera permis aux prisonniers de voir leurs parents et leurs avocats d'une manière réglée. Les sexes, les ages, et les crimes ne seront pas confondus dans le même appartement. Les prisons seront inspectées de temps à autre par des personnes compétentes et responsables, nommées *ad hoc*. Aucune peine corporelle ne sera infligée qu'en conformité avec une sentence légale, d'une manière responsable et publique.

Un corps effectif de police dûment organisé, dont les individus seront choisis avec soin et suffisamment payés, veillera, sous la direction d'un Ministre d'Etat, au bon ordre de la capitale. Les villes provinciales jouiront de la même protection, chacune selon sa population. Pour les campagnes il y aura une police montée, ou gendarmerie, réglée d'après les mêmes principes.

Il sera permis à chaque communauté d'avoir, selon le besoin des diverses localités, une police séparée, choisie par ses propres magistrats, approuvée par l'autorité Ottomane, et subordonnée à la police générale.

En fait de finance, les impôts et d'autres charges, quelle que soit leur nature, seront les mêmes, à proportion, pour toutes les classes. Le budget annuel des revenus et des dépenses sera soumis au Conseil Suprême, et publié ensuite. La perception des revenus publics sera réformée de manière à garantir le trésor contre toute concussion, et les contribuables contre toute exaction injuste. On réglera surtout la manière de prendre la dîme en nature, le cas échéant, sans injustice.

Aucune branche du revenu ne sera plus donnée en ferme, et toute imposition locale sur les objets, ou le mouvement du commerce, cessera à l'intérieur.

Non obstant que par suite de l'abolition du haratch les taxes se trouvent en principe également à repartir sur tous les sujets de la Porte, sans distinction de classe, le portion à payer par ceux de chaque communauté sera perçue et remise aux officiers du fisc par les magistrats ou notables de la même communauté.

Sera reconnu comme chose à faire, aussitôt que pourra, la substitution d'une bonne circulation métallique à la place du papier et de la monnaie de mauvais alloi, qui se trouvent maintenant en usage légal.

Par suite de la participation de toutes les classes à la jouissance des droits civils de l'Empire, les rangs de l'armée Impériale seront ouverts à tous les sujets, conformément aux règles qui ne doivent pas tarder à se faire d'une manière équitable et conciliante, par rapport surtout à l'obligation pour les Chrétiens de servir aux conditions de leur organisation, à leur traitement dans le service, et aux limites de leur avancement dans les grades supérieures.

Quant aux places fortes, aux bâtiments de guerre, aux arsenaux, le Gouvernement Suprême doit être le seul juge en dernier ressort des dispositions nécessaires pour en assurer la meilleure administration.

L'enseignement conforme aux besoins de la société progressive sera partout encouragé. Dans ce but des séminaires et des collèges seront graduellement établis dans les sites les plus convenables, et une partie du revenu sera spécialement affectée à leur construction. Les sujets de toute classe y seront admissibles, et les communautés non-Mussulmanes auront en outre la faculté de former de pareils établissements avec la sanction de l'autorité suprême.

Des mesures efficaces seront adoptées, avec l'emploi des fonds nécessaires, pour exploiter les ressources matérielles de l'Empire, et pour en faciliter la consommation et le transport. Tout ce qui opère, tout ce qui s'offre comme obstruction à l'agriculture, à l'industrie, au commerce, sera réformé de manière à tirer parti des capitaux, de la science, et des bras de l'Europe pour leur développement complet.

Par rapport aux biens fonds, la même faculté légale de les hériter et de les acquérir, d'en jouir, de les léguer, de les vendre ou autrement transférer, sera reconnu à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan sans exception quelconque.

Quant aux emplois publics, une révision générale en sera faite afin de rendre leur exercice plus effectif, et la rémunération des employés à la fois plus économique et mieux distribuée.

Chacune des diverses communautés non-Mussulmanes sera tenue de passer en révue ses institutions actuelles d'une manière convenable, et d'y introduire les réformes jugées nécessaires par qui de droit. Dans la conduite de cette opération on visera surtout à l'adoption des règles les plus propres à remédier aux abus de l'autorité, à faciliter aux pauvres le recours à la justice, à fixer les traitements du clergé selon l'ordre de la hiérarchie et les moyens des contribuables; à mettre, enfin, l'administration des biens de la communauté sous la sauvegarde d'une assemblée mixte du clergé et des laïcs.

Les lois pénales émanées de l'autorité suprême contre la corruption, la concussion, et la malversation, s'appliqueront, d'après les formes légales, à tous les sujets de la Porte, quel que soit leur classe ou leur dénomination.

En précisant ainsi les chefs des réformes dont l'adoption, ou la mise en activité, est à ne pas douter urgente, l'ami le plus dévoué de la Turquie, l'étranger le plus habitué à l'observation de ce qui s'y passe, doit nécessairement subordonner ses impressions aux connaissances intimes, au jugement délicat de ceux qui sont nés dans le pays, et dont les intérêts de tout genre s'identifient avec le progrès de l'Empire et avec la gloire de son auguste Souverain.

No. 263.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1856.*

REFERRING to my previous despatch inclosing copies of an official note and letter addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, by Baron Tecco, the Sardinian Envoy, I wish to mention that I have agreed with M. Thouvenel, as the most advisable course of proceedings, to confine my answer to a simple acknowledgment, and reference to Her Majesty's Government, with the sole exception of what may be necessary to remove any mistaken impression as to the verbal communications which preceded the delivery of the note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 264.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 27, 1856.*

THE Austrian Minister has this day sent to Baron Manteuffel a copy of the communication which Count Rechberg is to make to the Diet at Frankfort of the five points which have been accepted by Russia as a basis for negotiations of peace.

I understand that the Austrian Government is to invite the Diet to appropriate the five points; and as Prussia has, I am informed from good authority, addressed a circular to the German Courts, dated the 24th instant, in which it

is stated that although Prussia approves of the five points as a basis, she reserves her liberty of action as heretofore, it is not unlikely that the two Governments may come into collision as to the mode of recording the Austrian proposals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 265.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 27, 1856.*

BARON BUDBERG has this day communicated to Baron Manteuffel the desire entertained by his Government that a meeting of Plenipotentiaries to settle the preliminaries of peace may immediately take place, naming Paris as a capital that would be agreeable to the Russian Government. He appears also to have stated that in three weeks it might be hoped that the terms of an armistice would be agreed to, and that no time would be afterwards lost in entering on the discussion of a definitive Treaty.

Baron Manteuffel has just mentioned the foregoing to me, and added, that inquiries had been addressed to him from different quarters about the Sea of Azoff, Kertch, and Nicolaieff, and that he did not apprehend that any insurmountable difficulties connected with questions relating to these places would be raised by the Russian Government.

I replied to this observation, that I was not in possession of information on these points, and therefore had none to impart, but I was desirous to know what the feeling of Russia was as to Kars; that one of the objects for which the war had been undertaken was the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and therefore it could not be allowed to be dismembered. His Excellency said, that he had no positive knowledge of the intentions of Russia respecting Kars, but he seemed to agree to the argument I used, as to the absolute necessity of the restitution of this Province to Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 266.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, January 29.)

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{6}{18}$ Janvier, 1856.

VOUS concevez sans doute qu'en ne décidant aux sacrifices qu'impliquent pour la Russie les propositions Autrichiennes, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître a eu en vue non seulement d'arriver à la paix, mais de la rendre aussi prompte que possible.

Pour réaliser cette pensée il faut accélérer aussi l'entente sur la marche à suivre. La dépêche du Cabinet de Vienne ne contient sous ce rapport que de vagues indications; de son côté le Comte Esterhazy n'en possède aucune plus précise.

Pour sa part, le Cabinet Impérial préférait la plus courte et la plus simple. Elle consisterait à confier la double tâche de la signature des préliminaires et de la négotiation définitive à des Plénipotentiaires munis à cet effet des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires.

De cette manière les divers actes pourraient se suivre immédiatement et sans souffrir de retard.

Si le Cabinet de Vienne partage cette manière de voir et la fait agréer par les Cours maritimes, vous proposerez de convenir à cet effet en commun d'un Protocol qui réglerait la marche à suivre.

Votre Excellence trouvera ci-joint un projet rédigé dans ce but. L'Empereur notre auguste Maître vous autorise à la signer le cas échéant.

Le terme de trois semaines qui y est mentionné pourra être modifié; il est essentiel cependant qu'il soit le plus court possible.

Pour ce qui est du lieu où les Conférences seraient tenues, vous connaissez déjà les intentions du Cabinet Impérial à cet égard. Vous savez que l'Empereur tient à ce qu'elles aient lieu à Paris.

Il n'y a donc pas d'inconvénient à ce que vous vous expliquerez dans ce sens.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure in No. 266.

Project of Protocol.

PAR suite de l'acceptation par leurs Cours respectives des cinq propositions renfermées dans le document ci-annexé sous le titre de projet de préliminaires, les Soussignés, après l'avoir paraphé, conformément à l'autorisation qu'ils ont reçue à cet effet, sont convenus que leurs Gouvernements nommeront chacun des Plénipotentiaires, munis des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour procéder à la signature des préliminaires de paix formels, conclure un armistice et un Traité de Paix définitif. Les dits Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir à Paris dans le terme de trois semaines à partir de ce jour, ou plutôt, si faire se peut.

Fait à, &c.

No. 267.

Baron Werther to the King of Prussia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, January 29.)

(Extrait.) *St. Pétersbourg, le 18 Janvier*, 1856.

LE Comte Esterhazy a montré autant de modération et de conciliation que ses instructions lui permettaient. Déjà dans un rapport adressé au Comte de Buol le 29 Décembre, il relève l'appui franc et loyal qu'il a trouvé chez moi pour engager le Gouvernement Russe à faire autant de concession que possible dans l'intérêt de la paix.

Il a compris que ces propositions, qui ne nous étaient communiqués qu'après avoir été formulées, et pour lesquelles nous ne connaissions pas les motifs réels, ne pouvaient pas être appropriées par nous, et je lui ai fait sentir que cette nuance à part, nous faisions tout ce qui était dans notre pouvoir pour les faire adopter. Immédiatement après avoir reçu la notification de leur acceptation il s'est rendu chez moi pour me remercier avec beaucoup d'empressement pour les efforts que j'avais faits en faveur de cet heureux événement.

J'ai, en effet, la conviction que la dernière lettre de votre Majesté du 7 Janvier, les données et rapports que son Ministère à mis à ma disposition, et les efforts que j'ai faits par ses ordres en faveur de la paix, ont largement contribué à provoquer cette décision de l'acceptation des cinq propositions de préliminaires.

No. 268.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 160.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 29*, 1856.

COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that, although he had obtained your Lordship's sanction to his proposal that instructions should be sent to the English and French Ministers at Vienna to concert a project of Protocol with Count Buol, yet he had not sent any orders to M. de Bourqueney, because he had in the interim received a communication from M. de Hübner of the project of Protocol sent from St. Petersburgh. This project, Count Walewski said, he was quite ready to adopt, if it met with the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Its adoption would, he thought, simplify matters, as it would render

unnecessary any further reference to the Russian Government. Austria, he added, would have preferred that some more formal Act consecrating the principles of the ultimatum should have been signed at Vienna, but was not disposed to oppose the wishes of the Western Powers, if they were satisfied with the arrangement now proposed.

Count Walewski told me, further, that M. de Hübner had communicated to him the copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, explaining the grounds on which Russia was finally induced to accept the ultimatum. He saw nothing in the despatch, he said, which need alter the intentions of the Western Powers. He had not a copy of it, and, therefore, he could not show it to me; but it would give him satisfaction to learn that Her Majesty's Government viewed it in the same light as himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 269.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 161.)
Paris, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

IT appears from a statement which Count Walewski made to me to-day, that he has not waited to know your Lordship's opinion, for which he had asked, as to the advisableness of admitting the Prussian Government to take part in the Peace Conferences; but that he has addressed an instruction to M. de Persigny, in which he informs him that the Imperial Government are decidedly opposed to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 270.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 162. Confidential.)
Paris, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has caused the archives of the French Foreign Office to be examined, in order to ascertain what were the conditions entered into when the Aland Islands were annexed to Russia; and he finds that the most strenuous efforts were made by Sweden to induce Russia to engage that no fortifications should ever be erected there, and that the Russian Government had answered that the Czar would never allow the law to be dictated to him in his own dominions.

I observed to Count Walewski that the parts were now changed, and that Russia was asking—not dictating—a peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 271.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 163.)
Paris, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

M. DE PERSIGNY has informed Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government desire that Sardinia should be admitted to sign the Protocol recording the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum.

Count Walewski is opposed to the signature of Sardinia being affixed to that document. In the first place, his Excellency says, the part of Sardinia has

been already assigned to her in despatches which have passed between the several Governments; in the next, she has had nothing to do with the Vienna Conferences; and Austria may make difficulties, to say nothing of the delay which references to the different Governments interested in the matter would cause. His Excellency hopes, therefore, that your Lordship will reconsider your opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 272.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 164. Confidential.)
Paris, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

MY late communications to your Lordship can have left no doubt in the minds of Her Majesty's Government as to the state of feeling of the French nation—at least as far as I can ascertain it—in regard to the alliance with England. I can only repeat that it is far more Russian than English; and if I were to attempt to define it more closely, I should say that it was essentially Austrian.

It is not my intention in this despatch to trace the causes which have led to this state of things; but there is one point to which I desire to call your Lordship's attention, because I believe that in no other country in the world could such an anomaly exist. I allude to this, that while the Emperor has—it is impossible to doubt it—taken the English alliance as the basis of his policy, and maintained and defended it against all attacks, the language of the Imperial Government, and of the members of His Majesty's Court, has been such as must have made those who are unacquainted with His Majesty's real sentiments believe them to be the reverse of friendly towards Great Britain.

It has been for some time upon my mind to speak to His Majesty upon this matter whenever an opportunity offered itself for so doing. A favourable occasion presented itself on Sunday last. His Majesty had expressed to me the pleasure and satisfaction which he had experienced on learning from M. de Persigny that Her Majesty's Government had accepted his last propositions; and I replied that Her Majesty's Government had accepted them out of deference to His Majesty alone. It was, in fact, a sacrifice which they had made to the maintenance of the alliance. But sacrifices such as these, I continued, would not avail to maintain the alliance unless they were duly appreciated; and I could not but fear that, if the sentiments which now pervaded the French nation were allowed their sway unchecked, not all the good intentions of His Imperial Majesty, responded to as they cordially were by the British nation, would prevent the alliance from crumbling under our feet.

His Majesty said that he thought I greatly exaggerated the state of public feeling; that no doubt in Paris there was a great desire for peace; and that some irritation had been expressed against the warlike propensities which were alleged to prevail in England; but that I made the mistake of supposing that the salons of Paris represented the French nation. Such was not the case. France was quite prepared to continue the war, if necessary. As a proof that such was the case, His Majesty said that he had the most satisfactory accounts of the sentiments with which the new conscripts joined their colours.

I asked His Majesty's permission to reply with perfect freedom; and having been graciously invited to do so, I said that I would not venture to dispute the more authentic information which must reach His Majesty from the interior, though I confessed that the reports which I had heard did not tally with those just stated by His Majesty; but what I wished to convey to His Majesty was this—that, with the exception of himself, I could not name a Frenchman who was a cordial supporter of the English alliance. I did not except from this sweeping declaration even His Majesty's own Ministers; and I asked—admitting that this unfriendly feeling towards England was at present confined to Paris—how long it would be before it spread through the provinces, if those who were in duty bound to support His Majesty's policy, made no secret of their repugnance to it.

His Majesty asked me whether my statement was capable of proof.

I replied that it might be difficult to bring proofs of the truth of what I asserted; but that it was matter of such notoriety that I was perfectly ready to assume the responsibility of my words. But your Majesty admits, I said, that the feeling of irritation against England, to which I have alluded, exists to a strong degree in Paris. It is said that England is determined on prosecuting the war for her own purposes. Does not your Majesty's Government know that this accusation is unfounded? Are they not convinced that we are as ready as they are to make an honourable peace? But have they collectively or individually, though sure of this, and being the representatives of your Majesty, done one single thing or made the slightest effort to counteract the dissemination of a contrary opinion, which, if allowed to gain ground, must sow the seeds of distrust towards Great Britain throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. Why did they not come forward and answer for the honour of those whom they called their allies?

The Emperor, without replying to these observations, said that unfortunately the opinion that Her Majesty's Government were determined on continuing the war prevailed throughout the Continent.

"Look," exclaimed His Majesty, taking up a paper from his table, "here is the last telegraphic despatch received from M. de Bourqueney, and here he tells us that the conviction of the Emperor of Austria is that the British Government is determined on continuing the war, and that Count Buol is also beginning to feel uneasy."

"Sire," I replied, "your Majesty could not have furnished me with better means for illustrating that which, in my relative situation to your Majesty, it was difficult and delicate to convey to you. In my humble opinion, Count Walewski should not have had that despatch five minutes in his possession before another was employing the telegraphic wires between Paris and Vienna, to desire M. de Bourqueney to see Count Buol without loss of time, and to tell him that the Imperial Government answered for the honourable intentions of the British Cabinet as they did for their own; and your Majesty has here a sample of what daily takes place in Paris. Your Ministers hear convictions such as those partaken by the Emperor of Austria expressed without attempting to contradict them. (I could have added my persuasion that they as often originate them.) What wonder then, that there should be so much irritation when no attempt is made by those who know the truth to divert the current of public opinion?"

His Majesty again seemed desirous of avoiding this particular line of argument, but he entered at some length into the general question which has been under discussion.

His observations, while implying the necessity of the present mode of treating the particular conditions, yet admitted that Her Majesty's Government were right in the main. He said among other things that there were unfortunately no statesmen in France, meaning by that that there were no men who could take a broad political view, and consequently follow a determined policy, which he attributed to the unsettled state in which France had been for so many years. He expressed, however, great confidence in his own influence over the French nation, and concluded much as he had begun by assuring me that I had taken too exaggerated a view of the consequences to be apprehended from the difficulties of the present moment.

Whether this is the case or not, time can alone determine, but I do not regret having spoken to the Emperor, for I repeat that the greatest enemies of England are His Majesty's own Ministers.

If I had wanted for my own conviction additional proof of that which I so confidently assert, the Emperor would have furnished it himself, for in his endeavours to convince me that my apprehensions were exaggerated he said that he himself had been the object of attack from his Ministers, and that one of them had gone so far as to ask him, how he dared, with his name and with his knowledge of the feelings of the French nation, make himself subservient to the interests of England.

I cannot refrain from giving the Emperor's reply as His Majesty stated it to me. "My answer was very simple," said His Majesty; "I told my interrogator that there was no question of subserviency, but that England was right, and France was wrong, and that I could not therefore act otherwise than I had done."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 273.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 166.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 29, 1856.

I HAVE read to Count Walewski your Lordship's despatch No. 144 of the 26th instant, recording the acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in the last proposals sent from Paris in regard to the ensuing negotiations, and I have placed a copy of it in Count Walewski's hands.

Count Walewski said that the contents of it were quite satisfactory, and that having received on Sunday a communication of a similar nature from M. de Persigny he had sent yesterday for M. de Seebach, and requested him to forward to St. Petersburgh the text of the particular conditions. He had since heard from M. de Seebach that they were sent off last night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 274.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1856.

A SECOND meeting relative to the privileges and reforms took place yesterday, between the three Representatives and the Turkish Ministers. The memorandum sent in my despatch No. 51 of the 14th instant meets with the concurrence of my colleagues. Appearances are favourable to the decided result. The Internuncio and myself are ready to open the first point. The French Ambassador is waiting for instructions—could they not be hastened? We are all to meet again in Conference the day after to-morrow.

No. 275.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 52. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1856.

I HAVE to inform you that Her Majesty's Government, while giving you full credit for your motives, and making due allowance for local influences and exaggerated apprehensions which appear to exist at Vienna, yet cannot concur in the reasons stated in your despatch No. 44 of the 16th instant, which induced you to suspend the communication to Count Buol of my despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant. You would have been justified in doing so, and would have taken upon yourself a proper responsibility, if that despatch had contained any matter calculated to cause surprise to the Austrian Government, or if between the time when it was written and the date at which it was received, any circumstances had occurred which would have made its communication inexpedient; but the despatch contained nothing but the report of a conversation between Count Colloredo and myself upon the subject of an inquiry which he had been directed to make, and which you must have been aware had been duly reported by Count Colloredo to his Government. Count Buol, however, hearing nothing upon the subject from you, and knowing, probably, that you were withholding a despatch upon it, might not unnaturally have inferred that you concurred in opinion with him, rather than in the views of Her Majesty's Government.

You say it is not to be doubted that a portion of the Cabinet, possibly the Emperor himself, would be glad of a motive or an excuse for undoing what has lately been done, and such excuse or motive would be afforded by the declaration that Her Majesty's Government decline all recognition of the memorandum of the 4th of November.

Her Majesty's Government, however, have not declined all recognition of the memorandum, as you will find on reference to my despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant, and if your convictions are well founded, and the Austrian Government is even now so unsteady in its policy and so fearful of the consequences of its own acts as to meditate a reconciliation with Russia, simply because Her Majesty's Government continues to insist upon certain conditions of peace, and thinks it would be an act of good faith to make those conditions known to Russia, it is clear that no reliance can be placed on Austrian support during

the negotiations for peace, nor on Austrian aid in afterwards coercing Russia, should the war be renewed in consequence of reasonable conditions of peace being rejected by that Power.

Her Majesty's Government are willing to believe that the feelings of self-respect and deference for public opinion which every Government must, more or less, possess, would alone have been sufficient to prevent Austria from acting in the manner supposed; but if, unfortunately, any such intention had existed, it would have been far better to have learned the fact at once than to be made aware of it at a later period when we were entangled in negotiations, and the results of Austria withdrawing from her engagements would have been more injurious to the honour and the interests of the belligerent Powers.

From first to last we have held that Austria has no right to dictate to us the conditions on which we should make peace, and, from first to last, we have declared that the conditions respecting the Aland Islands, the Consuls, and the countries east of the Black Sea, were indispensable; and as you quote certain passages of my despatch No. 7 of December 6th, to show that the point was not peremptorily insisted upon, I must direct your attention to the concluding paragraph of that despatch, of which you have only referred to a portion. You will there find it stated, "On the other hand, however, Austria will admit that the belligerent Powers have a clear and indisputable right to decide upon what conditions they will consent to make peace; and as Her Majesty's Government do not think it would be just or honourable towards Russia that she should be allowed to enter upon negotiations for peace, in ignorance of the terms to which her assent will be required, Her Majesty's Government trust that Count Buol will see the propriety of making these terms known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, for it would be far better not to enter upon negotiations at all, than that they should be broken off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated, and that the real intentions of the belligerent Powers had been kept from her knowledge."

To have couched this demand in more peremptory terms would have been as discourteous as it appeared to be unnecessary. Her Majesty's Government could not doubt that such an expression of their wishes addressed to an ally who, unasked by them, had offered to make known to Russia the conditions upon which they would be willing to make peace, would have been sufficient to secure compliance, or, at all events, that some formal notice would have been given that Austria had determined to keep the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in ignorance of our conditions; but you, at all events, could have had no doubt concerning the objects of Her Majesty's Government, and I had, moreover, informed you by my despatch No. 7 above quoted, that Her Majesty's Government would greatly prefer "not to enter upon negotiations at all, rather than that they should be broken off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated, and that the real intentions of the belligerent Powers had been kept from her knowledge." I cannot therefore but regret that when you were called upon, a few hours before Count V. Esterhazy's departure for St. Petersburgh, to declare whether Her Majesty's Government adhered to the plan traced out in the memorandum of the 14th of November, you had not asked Count Buol for a specific engagement that the wishes of Her Majesty's Government as to making known the additional conditions should be complied with, or else that you had not gone beyond the first part of your answer to Count Buol, viz., that you had no instructions; you might have asked for those instructions by the telegraph; the delay of a few hours would have been unimportant, and the painful differences which have since arisen might possibly have been averted.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 276.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 53.)

Foreign Office, January 25, 1856.

Sir,

YOU will express to Mr. Elliot the approval of Her Majesty's Government for having discovered, as reported in your despatch No. 47 of the 16th instant, the advantage which the Russian Government endeavoured to obtain by an ambiguous phrase in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff.

The same discovery was made by Her Majesty's Government, who, as I need hardly inform you, have no intention to permit Russia to deviate from the meaning and the letter of the Austrian ultimatum.

I mentioned the subject to Count Colloredo, who said that as Russia had not replied to the ultimatum in the terms required, the Austrian Government looked upon Count Nesselrode's despatch as "non avenue."

Her Majesty's Government approve of your having noticed the point to Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney, and it is to be hoped that they will learn from it the necessity of extreme caution in dealing with Russia, who, even in the very earliest stage of negotiation, has given evidence of her intention to evade the conditions which she professes to have accepted.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 277.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 54.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 25, 1856.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48 of the 16th instant, I have to state that, although Count Buol may have expressed regret at receiving from you the copy of my despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant, he can have felt no surprise at its contents, as that despatch did nothing more than record the answer I had given to Count Colloredo, who been instructed to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government adopted the memorandum of November 14th, which had been agreed to by Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney. Count Colloredo reported our conversation to Count Buol, who remarked upon it in a despatch dated the 9th instant, of which Count Colloredo has given me a copy; and Count Buol was therefore perfectly well informed of the contents of my despatch, and had even expressed his opinion upon them several days before you gave him a copy of it.

Count Buol says that he considered that Austria was pledged to Her Majesty's Government, and that he held the pledge of Her Majesty's Government, in return; and his Excellency inquires whether or not Her Majesty's Government had insisted upon certain alterations being made in the ultimatum, and whether, by their acceptance, the ultimatum had not become *bond fide* an English as well as an Austrian document?

Upon this I have to observe, that Count Buol appears to confound two things which are totally distinct, viz., the memorandum and the ultimatum; and he must be aware that they are distinct, because it was not until after the ultimatum had been sent to St. Petersburgh that he instructed Count Colloredo to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government agreed to the memorandum. But, with respect to the ultimatum, Count Buol is quite right in saying that the two Governments are pledged to each other; and, consequently, Her Majesty's Government have not disputed, and will not recede from, any of the conditions contained in that ultimatum. Moreover, they insisted upon certain alterations being made in it, in order that it might become an English as well as an Austrian document, and that they might take their share of responsibility of its being sent to St. Petersburgh, instead of that responsibility, as was originally proposed, being borne exclusively by Austria.

Her Majesty's Government, however, although pledged to Austria not to accept less from Russia than the terms of the ultimatum, assuredly never pledged themselves not to demand more; but, on the contrary, they at once declared upon what further conditions they should insist. The Aland Islands; the Consuls in Russian ports of the Black Sea; and the right to consider the state of the countries east of the Black Sea; were announced as indispensable conditions. Austria adopted the one respecting the Consuls, but declined to insert the other two in her ultimatum. She had a right so to decline, and it was admitted by Her Majesty's Government; but Austria had no right to consider that the other two were regarded by Her Majesty's Government as less *sine qua non* conditions than that about Consuls; and, as she adopted the one, Her Majesty's Government had a fair right to expect that at least she would have

stated the others to Russia at the same time; whereas it appears she took upon herself, without any authority for so doing, to inform Russia of the conditions which Her Majesty's Government would not bring forward.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 278.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour

(No. 55.)
Foreign Office, January 25, 1856.

Sir,

I INCLOSE copies of three despatches* from Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at this Court, which Count Colloredo placed in my hands after reading them to me a few days ago.

I told Count Colloredo that, after listening to those despatches, I could only repeat the same observations that I had already made to him, and again express the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the course which the Austrian Government had thought proper to take in declining to make known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the additional conditions on which they were determined to insist.

The Russian objections to the fifth article of the ultimatum were, I said, regarded by Her Majesty's Government as reasonable and legitimate; and those objections might have been at once removed, and the future progress of negotiations made more easy, if Count V. Esterhazy had been instructed to comply with the request of Her Majesty's Government, which was made in fairness and good faith towards Russia.

I begged to assure Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government never did, and never would, shrink from any engagement they had contracted, but that they were determined to make peace only upon their own conditions, and not to allow conditions to be imposed upon them by any other Power. They held the same language now as they had held throughout. They were resolved now, as they had been from the first, that their additional terms should be known by Russia before the preliminaries of peace were signed—those terms being founded as much on European interests as any that were contained in the Austrian ultimatum; and I added, it was with extreme surprise that in the despatches which Count Colloredo had just read I had heard the words "pretensions" and "exigencies" applied to the course of proceeding which Her Majesty's Government thought it right and necessary to pursue.

This appeared to me, I said, of bad omen for the spirit in which, on the part of Austria, the negotiations for a Treaty of Peace would be conducted, and I saw but too much reason to fear a renewal of the unhappy misunderstandings which took place at the Conferences last year, when the determination of Russia not to give effect to the conditions she had accepted was held by Austria to be a release from her engagements with the Western Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 279.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 57.)
Foreign Office, January 28, 1856.

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct you to suggest to Count Buol that effectual provision should be made for the rights and immunities of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, instead of confining that provision to the Christians; otherwise the Jews will be excluded from the benefits of the improvements under the fourth point, which it is the desire of the Governments of England, France, and Austria to effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 234, 235, and 236.

No. 280.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 37.)
Foreign Office, January 28, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Lordship, in reply to your despatch No. 47 of the 26th instant, that it is not unnatural that the Power which possesses all the sympathies of Prussia should show civility in return for the many services rendered to her.

It would be strange if any communication respecting the Austrian ultimatum were made to Prussia by the Western Powers, who, up to this moment, do not know in what way that ultimatum was viewed by Prussia, or what instructions upon it were sent to St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 281.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, January 29.)

M. le Comte,

Paris, le 28 Janvier, 1856.

J'AI prié M. le Baron de Seebach de passer ce matin au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, et conformément à ce qui a été arrêté entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et nous, j'ai demandé à M. le Ministre de Saxe de vouloir bien se charger de faire connaître à M. le Comte de Nesselrode la teneur des conditions particulières que nous nous proposons de produire dans la négociation générale.

Je lui ai fait remarquer que cette communication avait pour objet de faire cesser toute incertitude sur la portée du cinquième paragraphe de l'ultimatum Autrichien, car il me paraissait d'un égal intérêt pour toutes les parties d'entrer dans la négociation avec une entière connaissance de cause.

J'ai ajouté que les observations faites par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, dans sa première réponse adressée au Cabinet de Vienne sous la date du 5 Janvier, démontraient que le Gouvernement Russe envisageait au même point de vue que nous les inconvénients de laisser dans le vague un élément quelconque d'une aussi importante négociation.

J'ai remis à M. le Baron de Seebach la petite note dont vous trouverez ci-joint copie, et je l'ai prié de la faire parvenir le plus tôt possible à St. Pétersbourg. M. le Ministre de Saxe m'a promis de transmettre ma communication aujourd'hui même à M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

P.S.—M. le Baron de Seebach m'annonce qu'il vient d'expédier, ce soir, à Pétersbourg la communication que je l'avais prié de transmettre à M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

A. W.

Inclosure in No. 281.

Memorandum.

1. Il ne fera ni reconstruit ni créé d'établissement naval ou militaire dans les Iles d'Aland.

2. On examinera l'état des territoires à l'est de la Mer Noire.

No. 282.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

Vienna, January 28, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

TURR is sentenced as a deserter; but not only is he safe, but he will be, I have reason to believe, set at liberty very soon.

No. 283.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

Vienna, January 28, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE private letters from Count Buol stating that the liberation of Turr is decided on.

He must be delivered to a British military authority, and, as this is considered necessary, I have suggested Corfu: Count Buol agrees to this fact, being, he says, desirous of meeting the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

Shall this proposal be acted upon?

No. 284.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 39.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Lordship held to Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 51 of the 27th instant, respecting the restoration of fortresses captured by the belligerents; and I have to acquaint you that no peace will be made which leaves any portion of the Turkish territory in Russian hands.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 285.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 40.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF called upon me last week, and with great earnestness expressed his hope that Prussia might be admitted to the Conferences for the restoration of peace, which may shortly be expected to take place.

In favour of this he urged that Prussia had been mainly instrumental in inducing Russia to accept the Austrian ultimatum; and he added further that the prudence might well be questioned of excluding Prussia, one of the Great Powers of Europe, from taking part in the settlement of questions which were essentially of an European character.

I reminded Count Bernstorff of the various occasions on which, in the course of the last two years, I had lamented the imprudence which Prussia committed by excluding herself from the consideration of European questions, and I assured him that now, when there was some prospect of peace, it was as much a matter of regret to Her Majesty's Government that Prussia should have abdicated her position as a great European Power as it had been during the course of the war; but as such had been her policy, I was at a loss to understand upon what imaginable ground Prussia could rest a claim to take part in the negotiations for peace.

Count Bernstorff had expressed his belief that Prussian intervention at St. Petersburgh had led to the acceptation of the Austrian ultimatum, and it might

have been so, but we had no knowledge of it. Count Bernstorff had admitted that he had not seen the instructions sent to Baron Werther, and was unacquainted with the tenour of them, or whether the Prussian Minister had been informed that the terms of the ultimatum were approved by his Government, and that he was on that account to support them; but we did know that the Prussian Minister at Vienna had been ordered to support the Russian modifications of the ultimatum, which were equivalent to its rejection.

I then recalled to the recollection of Count Bernstorff, that the Prussian Government, through its Diplomatic Agents, by its circular to the German Courts, and its speeches in the Chambers, had missed no opportunity of proclaiming that the war in which the Western Powers were engaged involved no German interests, and that until German interests were affected, Germany was bound to stand aloof. Moreover, whenever Austria, whose interests were endangered by the aggressive policy of Russia, had been disposed to take a more active part in the contest, her intentions had always been paralyzed by the opposition of the German Courts and the Diet at the instigation of Prussia. In fact, throughout the war, Prussia, under the garb of neutrality, had rendered important services to Russia, for she had supported Russian interests in German; she had supplied Russia with munitions of war; and it was through her ports that Russian trade had been carried on; but, if it were true that the advice of Prussia had led to the acceptance of the ultimatum, there could be little doubt that that advice given at any time during the last two years, might equally have led to peace, and Prussia therefore could hardly escape from responsibility for the duration of the war. Prussia, moreover, I said, gloried in her policy, and congratulated herself upon having husbanded her strength while the belligerents were exhausting their resources, and she had no right therefore to expect that when all danger was over she should be permitted to put off her exclusive German character and to assume the position and claim the privileges of a great European Power. Nevertheless, I added, it was probable that the allies might not carry the principle of exclusion beyond its necessary limits, and that Prussia would be invited to accede to any General Treaty that might be signed; but Count Bernstoff said he did not see how Prussia could accede to a Treaty if she had not been a party to the previous negotiations.

On the following day Count Bernstorff again called on me to say that he understood a difficulty had arisen with respect to the Aland Islands, and he wished to suggest that Prussia might be admitted to the conferences if she obtained from Russia an engagement that no fortification should be erected on those islands.

I told Count Bernstorff that as the non-fortification of those islands was a condition *sine qud non* of peace it was a question to be settled between the belligerents, and it neither required nor admitted the intervention of another Power.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 286.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 165.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 153 of the 27th instant, that Her Majesty's Government think it most desirable that the particular conditions should be inserted in the preliminaries; and they are disposed to concur in the course suggested by Count Walewski, and, passing over the preliminaries altogether, conclude a short armistice, and proceed at once to the negotiation of the final Treaty, provided that unanimity of opinion upon this matter can be obtained.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 287.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 60.)

Foreign Office, January 30, 1856.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff dated the $\frac{8}{20}$th instant, stating that in consequence of the communication which Prince Gortchakoff had been directed to make at Vienna, Count Esterhazy had been instructed to read to Count Nesselrode a confidential despatch relating to the fifth clause of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Nesselrode informs Prince Gortchakoff that this despatch contained positive assurances as to the meaning of the fifth clause, and that it explicitly indicated that the belligerent Powers would not make use of the latitude reserved to them by that clause to demand territorial cessions or indemnities of war, but would avail themselves of it only within such limits as would cause no obstacle to the conclusion of peace.

Count Esterhazy was instructed, Count Nesselrode states, by Count Buol to communicate these assurances to the Russian Government in order to induce them not to insist upon the elimination of Article 5; and the Austrian Minister also read to him a telegraphic despatch from Count Buol, in which his Excellency remarked upon the little difference which existed between the original terms of the Austrian ultimatum and the Russian variations, and especially pointed out, with reference to the fifth paragraph of the first clause, that in fact the Austrian no less than the Russian version reserved for the definitive negotiation the final understanding upon the new boundary-line.

The Russian Cabinet, Count Nesselrode says, took note of the assurances and explanations thus communicated to them by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Count Nesselrode then goes on to observe that the object of the Russian Cabinet has always been to proceed to formal negotiations, in order to put an end to the calamities of war: but nevertheless before making sacrifices so important as those implied by the Austrian proposals, the Russian Cabinet desired at least to be certain that these sacrifices would lead to peace. The assurances now given by the Austrian Government appearing to offer a favourable chance, the Russian Cabinet would, on its side, do everything to remove the difficulties which prevented the opening of negotiations, and it had therefore determined to accept the five Austrian propositions as a project of preliminaries, and immediately to open the way for negotiations of peace.

This acceptance had been announced to Count Esterhazy in a note dated the $\frac{1}{13}$th instant, which Prince Gortchakoff had at the same time been instructed to communicate to Count Buol.

A copy of this note was read to me by Count Colloredo, and is to this effect:—The Russian Government accept the five propositions contained in the document annexed to Count Buol's despatch of the 16th of December, to serve as a project of preliminaries, and to open the way immediately to definitive negotiations for peace.

Count Nesselrode concluded his despatch to Prince Gortchakoff by observing that no doubt Count Buol will admit that the Russian Cabinet, in adhering without reserve to the project of preliminaries, has carried its desire for peace far beyond what was required by the necessities of the situation, and will therefore consider it equitable that the principle of a just compensation should be taken as the basis in questions which may be presented for negotiation under Article 5.

By this means, also, Count Nesselrode thinks that the work of peace will be accelerated, and he adds that the Russian Cabinet will contribute to this work both in this manner and also by hastening the agreement as to the course to be followed for the signature of preliminaries, and the entering upon the definitive negotiations. Prince Gortchakoff is instructed to read and give a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 288.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

I INCLOSE a copy of a Protocol* which was this day placed in my hands by Count Colloredo, who informed me that it had been proposed by the Russian Government for signature by the belligerent Powers and Austria at Vienna.

Her Majesty's Government having consulted the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, are prepared to adopt the mode of proceeding suggested by the Russian Government, and you are accordingly instructed to sign the Protocol, but you will take particular care that the document which is to be annexed to it, and to which you will affix your initials, is framed in precise accordance with the terms of the Austrian ultimatum.†

This precaution is rendered the more necessary, as it appears that the important deviation from one of the Articles of the ultimatum, and to which the attention of Her Majesty's Government was drawn by your despatch No. 47 of the 16th instant, is persisted in by the Russian Government, and is contained in a circular despatch of Count Nesselrode to the Diplomatic Agents of Russia, which has recently been published.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 289.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

YOU are authorised to sign the Protocol with your colleagues, but you will take special care that the document which is to be annexed to it, and to which you will affix your initials, is word for word the same as the Austrian ultimatum.

No. 290.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

EXPRESS our thanks to Count Buol for the liberation of Colonel Turr. We concur as to his being delivered up to a British military authority, and approve of Corfu as the place for that purpose. Inform the Lord High Commissioner.

No. 291.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 169.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 160 of the 29th instant, I have to acquaint you that Count Colloredo yesterday communicated to me the despatch of Count Nesselrode referred to by Count Walewski, and Her Majesty's Government concur with his Excellency that there is nothing in it that should alter the intentions of the Western Powers; but Count Walewski will probably be of opinion with Her Majesty's Government that it contains matter which gives rise to much apprehension as to the spirit in which Russia has accepted the terms, and will take part in the negotiations, coupled as it is with the circular despatch of Count Nesselrode to the Diplomatic Agents of Russia, announcing that the neutralisation of the Black Sea is to be the subject of a separate Treaty between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosure in No. 266.

† This passage was altered by telegraphic despatch of January 31, thus: "is word for word the same as the Austrian ultimatum."

No. 292.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to convey to Count Walewski the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government for the steps taken by his Excellency, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 166 of the 29th instant, to forward to St. Petersburgh, through M. de Seebach, the text of the particular conditions attached to the preliminaries of peace.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 293.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 172.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

I HAVE the satisfaction of conveying to your Excellency the entire approval by Her Majesty's Government of the language held by you, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 164 of the 29th instant, in the important conversation which your Excellency has had with His Majesty the Emperor of the French on the present state of the feeling of the French nation towards this country.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 294.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 173.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, with regard to the armistice, there are strong reasons why it should be only an armistice by land and should not extend to the sea. The Russians have no naval force in existence with which the naval forces of the allies could by possibility come into conflict between this time and the 31st of March. But during that interval the Russian forces in the Black Sea might derive great advantage from the establishment of free communications by water, that is to say by the cessation of all blockades and of all interruption to the navigation of Russian and neutral vessels by the ships of war of England and France. The right of blockade is, however, a belligerent right, and its exercise during an armistice by sea might be questioned by neutrals.

Moreover, the Baltic might, or some Russian ports in it might, become open before the expiration of the armistice, and it would be very unwise not to have the power of resuming the blockades in the Baltic at the earliest practicable moment.

Her Majesty's Government are desirous that these considerations should be stated to the French Government, as reasons why the armistice ought not only to be limited to a short period of time for its duration, but should also be confined to the land forces of the belligerents. England and France might give an assurance verbally to the Russians that it is not our intention during the continuance of the land armistice to employ their ships of war in making any attack upon any of the Russian seaports or towns on their coast.

Your Excellency will accordingly direct the immediate attention of the French Government to this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 295.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 174.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1856.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 163 of the 29th instant, stating that Count Walewski is opposed to the signature of Sardinia being affixed to the Protocol recording the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum; and I have to instruct your Excellency to express to Count Walewski the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Government of the Emperor of the French will not persist in their objection.

The third Article of the Treaty between England and France of the 10th of April, 1854, to which Sardinia acceded on the 26th of January, 1855, provides that the Contracting Parties shall not enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia without having in the first instance deliberated upon it in common; and Her Majesty's Government cannot conceive that Austria should object to Sardinia, as a belligerent Power, taking part in a proceeding which the Austrian Government looks upon as the first step towards the restoration of peace.

The admission of Sardinia to sign the Protocol will in no degree militate against the arrangement made in June last, and stated in my letter to the Marquis d'Azeglio of the 19th of that month, as to the share to be taken by Sardinia in the subsequent negotiations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 296.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 27, 1856.

I BEG to call your Lordship's attention to the following words, which I find in the leading article of the "St. Petersburgh Gazette" of the $\frac{3}{15}$th instant:—

"Les propositions transmises aujourd'hui par le Gouvernement Autrichien partent du même principe, c'est-à-dire, la neutralisation de la Mer Noire au moyen d'un Traité entre la Russie et la Porte pour régler le nombre des batiments de guerre."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 297.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1856.

SUBSTITUTE, in my despatch No. 62, for the words "is framed in precise accordance with the terms of the Austrian ultimatum" the following: "is word for word the same as the Austrian ultimatum."

No. 298.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 172.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 30, 1856.

I HAVE inquired of Count Walewski whether he has made any answer to the pretensions of the Sardinian Envoy to take part in the Conferences respecting the first and fourth points now carrying on at Constantinople.

His Excellency said that he had written both to Constantinople and to Turin to say that those pretensions could not be admitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 299.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 173.)
Paris, January 30, 1856

My Lord,

I HAVE requested Count Walewski, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 147 of the 28th instant, to instruct M. de Thouvenel to take care that effectual provision should be made for the rights and immunities of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, instead of confining that provision to the Christians; otherwise the Jews will be excluded from the benefits of the improvements under the fourth point.

Although Count Walewski eventually agreed to write to M. de Thouvenel in the sense suggested by your Lordship, his Excellency did not at first seem to think it desirable, nor does he appear to entertain the slightest sympathy for that portion of the Sultan's subjects alluded to by your Lordship, who, unless matters are greatly changed since I knew the Ottoman Empire, are, on the score of humanity, more deserving of compassion than the Christians themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 300.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 179.)
Paris, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 163 of the 29th instant, and to your Lordship's reply No. 174 of yesterday's date, respecting the question whether Sardinia should or should not sign, at Vienna, the Protocol recording the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian ultimatum, Count Walewski requests me to observe to your Lordship that he does not understand that Sardinia has made any claim to sign the Protocol. None has been communicated by the Sardinian Minister at Paris to him, and, in fact, it is understood by M. Villa Marina, that the signature of the Protocol is a question which does not interest Sardinia, though she will, of course, be invited to sign the preliminaries of peace. At the same time, Count Walewski says that he has no wish to put a veto upon the signature of the Protocol by Sardinia, if she desires it and Austria consents to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 301.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 181.)
Paris, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 169 of yesterday's date, expressing your apprehensions concerning the spirit in which Russia has accepted the Vienna ultimatum, and contrasting that acceptance with the language of other public documents emanating from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to state that, having called Count Walewski's attention to these facts, his Excellency observed, perhaps with some truth, that the documents to which I alluded were intended to throw dust in the eyes of the Russian people; that the terms of the Vienna ultimatum were so strict that there was no escape from them; and that this was the document by which the Russian Government must be bound.

I said that I need hardly ask his Excellency whether he was prepared to resist any attempt of the Russian Government to make the neutralisation of the Black Sea a separate affair between themselves and the Porte; and his Excellency's assurances of his determination to resist such a pretension were as positive as I could desire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 301 *a*.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 182.)
Paris, January 31, 1856.

My Lord

COUNT WALEWSKI stated to me this afternoon that he had received a telegraphic despatch from M. de Thouvenel dated yesterday, in which that Ambassador informed him that the Porte had made very large and unexpected concessions in the religious questions connected with the fourth point, but that the Turkish Ministers resisted the demand made upon them to abolish the punishment of apostates from the Mussulman religion.

M. de Thouvenel appeared to think that the persistance of Lord Stratford to obtain a declaration from the Sultan in the sense alluded to above would imperil the concessions already made by the Porte, and he asks Count Walewski to obtain instructions from Her Majesty's Government to Lord Stratford, directing him to withdraw, or, at all events, to modify his demands. Count Walewski added that he was going to send a copy of M. de Thouvenel's despatch to M. de Persigny, with a request to your Lordship to transmit to Lord Stratford the instructions suggested by M. de Thouvenel.

I asked Count Walewski whether he had reflected that the Christian Powers would probably never have so favourable an opportunity of setting aside this barbarous Turkish law, and whether it would not be better to persist in, rather than desist from, our attempts to have it abolished.

His Excellency replied that it would be hard to force the Porte to repeal laws which were permitted to exist in Christian countries. For instance, in Italy and, he believed, in Sweden there were penal statutes against heretics.

I observed that I apprehended that Her Majesty's Government would find it necessary, in order to satisfy Parliament and the country, to obtain an engagement from the Sultan that punishment for apostacy should be abolished. Whether this engagement could be obtained by some sort of Convention between the Sultan and his allies, which need not be published in Turkey, but which would satisfy public opinion in Europe, and secure the object to be attained, was, perhaps, a question which the two Governments might consider.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 302.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, January 31, 1856.

OUR arrangements are made with Count Buol. We sign the Protocol to-morrow at noon.

No. 303.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, February 1, 1856.

WE hope Count Buol has called the attention of the Russian Government to the falsification of one of the most important conditions of the ultimatum, which is contained in the "Pétersbourg Journal," to which you have called my attention. This is of bad omen for the spirit in which Russia will enter upon negotiation.

No. 304.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1856.

IF the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires applies to sign the Protocol, you will inform Count Buol and your colleagues that we entirely concur in the propriety of his doing so.

No. 305.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 16, 1856.

THE whole of this morning has been devoted by M. Thouvenel, Baron Prokesch, and myself to the question, the twofold question, of privileges and reforms. We met by agreement at the French Embassy. The memorandum, which I had drawn up and transmitted to your Lordship with my despatch No. 51 of the 14th instant, was read over and approved by my colleagues, with the reserve, in which I partook, of eventual amendments. I observed with pleasure, and drew a favourable inference from, the spontaneous accordance of our opinions.

In talking over some of the points, language such as I should have held myself, was used by the Austrian as well as by the French Representative. At their suggestion, I introduced a clause for extending to foreigners the privilege of holding land in this country. I had contemplated the addition of this very essential auxiliary to an effective system of reform, but reserved the expression of it for a later and more promising occasion. Baron Prokesch stated that in conversing with the Grand Vizier, he had found that Minister well disposed on the subject. I cannot say that any such intimation has ever reached me from a Turkish quarter; and on the subject of holding land, I believe that in England we still lie open to the charge of a strong remnant of exclusiveness.

From the French Embassy we went to the Grand Vizier's house in Constantinople. Prince Callimachi was there with the two Turkish Ministers. Our proceedings were necessarily limited to an open perusal of the Turkish enumeration of privileges, which had been previously communicated by the Grand Vizier, and to a free exchange of remarks and explanations relative to certain passages. A translation of this paper is inclosed herewith. It was understood to be a mere basis for discussion. It must be allowed to exhibit in its full extent a greater amount of liberality towards the Sultan's Christian subjects than is generally supposed. Two things are particularly striking, namely, the degree of power attributed to the patriarchs and other dignitaries of the Christian churches, particularly of the Greek, over their respective dependents, and the little provision made for protecting the latter from any abusive exercise of authority. Upon the whole, it may be affirmed with confidence that when the ancient and modern immunities are taken together, reality of application and practical enforcement are more palpably wanted than any considerable number of additional measures; and it must be added in fairness that the best work of amendment will be imperfect so long as the Greek and other Christian communities are not brought decidedly and practically within the pale of reform.

It was suggested, I think with propriety, that a Commission composed so as to command a sufficient degree of respect and confidence, should be charged with the duty of inquiring and reporting for that purpose.

It was agreed that another meeting should be held on the 19th instant, and as the three Representatives intend to consult together beforehand, with the view of going into Conference with opinions completely identical, I venture to hope that essential progress will be made in our joint task before the end of the week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 305.

Memorandum as to Privileges granted ab antiquo *to the Christian Subjects of the Porte with reference to Spiritual Affairs.*

(Translation.)

WHEN the Greek Patriarchate falls vacant, the Archbishops whose sees are in the neighbourhood of the capital, being those of Heraclea, Cygicus, Nicomedia, and Chalcedon, together with the Synod at Constantinople, proceed to elect a prelate in accordance with their religious rites and their opinion, after which they address a report announcing their choice to the Porte, who confirms the person chosen in the dignity of Patriarch. The elections of the Armenian and (Armeno) Catholic Patriarchs are effected by the spiritual heads and notables of those nations and their investitures, as in the previous case.

The Patriarchs, as long as they do not oppress their flocks or act contrary to their religion, are not dismissed, or unless they voluntarily resign, but hold office for life. If, as said before, they are dismissed, upon the unanimous consent of the Synod, after an accurate investigation of the facts.

The direction and arrangement of their religious affairs, their income and expenditure, and other business of the Patriarchate does not depend, according to their religious customs, upon the actual Patriarchs exclusively; as these affairs are under the control of the Archbishops, the Patriarchate seals are consigned to those of the latter, chosen among themselves for the purpose. In the same manner the seals of all the convents in the Empire are in the hands of the Synod.

From a very ancient period the Archbishops are unable to proceed to Constantinople occasionally without the express sanction of the Patriarch and Synod.

The subjects of all classes must have recourse to the Patriarchs upon all matters within the competency of the latter, whom they must obey in everything.

The Patriarch names and deposes, without hindrance, the Archbishops, Vicars, Bishops, and priests, in all the places under his jurisdiction.

When it becomes necessary to change a Greek Archbishop, the seal of the Synod must be used for the purpose; and when a Bishop or Vicar of another community is to be changed, a memorial, bearing the seal of the Patriarch and Medjlis of that nation, is to be presented, upon which the person elected will receive a Berat, enabling him to take possession of his post, and with it a firman inclosing the conditions imposed upon him by the Porte. No one can be named Archbishop or Vicar upon representations coming from other quarters.

If the Pashas or Cadis denounce the misconduct of an Archbishop, Vicar, or Bishop, and demand his dismissal or exile, the complaints are not to be entertained without reference being made to the Patriarch for information; and if by chance a firman should be issued in consequence of the complaints of a Pasha or Cadi, the necessary steps are taken.

If an Archbishop, Vicar, or Bishop comes to Constantinople on business, leaving in his place another priest to represent him, no obstacle is met with by him in such a proceeding.

No interference can be offered by any one to the Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, Vicars, and Priests reading the Scriptures in their dwellings, lighting lamps and candles, hanging curtains and images, fixing stools, swinging censers, or holding a crozier in the exercise of their rites.

No objection can be made to the members of any community whatever burying their dead in accordance with their rites, nor any molestation offered to their churches in their possession from old times, or their holy places, whether in Constantinople or in the Provinces.

Respect is paid to the memorials bearing the patriarchal or synodal seal, or that of the National Assembly. Every request having reference to their rites is accorded.

No one can search the churches or convents of any community without a firman.

No one can hinder the repair, upon the ancient plan and under the recognised principles, of the churches and convents of any community; and

these ancient churches cannot be transferred to others upon (mere) petitions and written representations.*

No claim can be raised upon the properties of a church or convent on account of another person's debts, nor can they be interfered with or held as security; and if by any means any one has taken them, he will be forced, by law, to restore them, and consigned to the quarter whence they were taken.

All individuals of whatever communitity who are desirous of being married or divorced under the rites of their nation, must do so by means of the Patriarch or his representative, without the interference of any one else. When the Patriarch wishes to punish a priest for having married a couple uncanonically, and without a patriarchal, episcopal, or vicarial license, no interference can be made. When a dispute arises between two persons with reference to marriage or other subjects, and the Patriarch wishes to administer oaths in the church, or punish any one with excommunication, no opposition should be made by the Cadis or their deputies. It is contrary to the Christian religion for a person to divorce his wife, to commit bigamy, or to marry more than three times after the death of his wife; and the violation of this canonical law must be punished. Entrance to the church must also be forbidden to those who violate the ecclesiastical law of marriage; and neither the Cadis, Naibs, nor other authorities can force the priests to bury the body of one deceased under the ban of excommunication.

Archbishops, Bishops, Vicars, Priests, Monks, and other Christians can bequeath property to their Patriarchs or churches, or to the poor, consisting of some article, or of one-third of their possessions. On their death, their wills are in force and valid, after the rules of their religion; and, after the reception of evidence, the property is recovered from the heirs of the deceased by the agency of the law. When Archbishops, Bishops, Priests, Monks, and Nuns die without heirs, the Patriarch or his deputy receive the money, effects, horses, and all other property of the deceased, in order to hand it over to the public chest; and the Kassam, or distributor of dead men's effects, the Mutevellis, and the Muhassils cannot offer any interference. With reference to those who die leaving heirs, neither the Patriarch nor his deputy can seize any of the property belonging to them, with the exception of their ecclesiastical robes, which are to be deposited in the vestry.

The Greek Metropolitans, the Armenian and Catholic Delegates, Priests, and Monks, who may conduct themselves in a manner contrary to the prescriptions of their respective sects, are punished by their Patriarchs, each according to his rite; their hair is shaved, themselves deprived of the priestly office, and the churches in their charge transferred to others; the necessary priests are elected in the room of the clergymen thus dismissed from their charge in accordance with their rules, and without any impediment or obstacle from other quarters. And those priests or monks who are not attached to any church or monastery, but roam about from place to place and corrupt the real Greek and Armenian subjects of the Porte, contrary to their rules, are apprehended by means of the Patriarchs under a firman, and the necessary punishment is inflicted upon them according to law.

No interference on the part of any one is permitted with reference to the property and live stock attached to the churches and monasteries, and all their appurtenances situate in places dependent upon the patriarchate of each Patriarch, as well as to other churches; but such property is held and enjoyed as practised from olden times.

The money paid by the Greek, Armenian, and Catholic subjects of the Porte formerly as taxes to the treasury, or as voluntary contributions, the revenues and expenditure of the Patriarchate, and the (personal) patriarchal income, are paid now as before, and no hesitation or opposition is allowed. If the agents of the churches or monasteries appropriate or use any of the treasury or patriarchal dues, their accounts may be examined, and themselves forced to pay compensation without any interference. If the Patriarch have claims, in whatever place it may occur, upon the episcopal delegates or clergy out of these dues, the persons appointed by them to collect the said sums, having received an Imperial order for the same, and also a letter from the appointing Patriarch, receive legal assistance from the Cadis and Naibs, and the money is realised; while the persons thus appointed to secure patriarchal claims, or their deputies, receive assistance in every way

* The translator doubts the correctness of this passage.—F. PISANI.

when on their journeys, and attention is paid to their safety in travelling; nor is any opposition made to their changing their dress or carrying arms, as may be necessary, or any demand made for presents or other articles.

No interference or contravention of ancient practice is carried on by the Customs authorities at the various ports and gates with reference to the conveyance of contributions made by the Christians under the titles of "vineyard produce" and "charity," and destined for the Patriarch's own consumption, consisting of syrup, oil, honey, &c., to their houses; and the articles particularly destined for the Patriarch's delegates, and Bishops themselves, or for their churches, are not subject to any demand of customs or "octroi" duty at the various ports and gates.

Those of the Greek, Armenian, or Catholic persuasion, who have sincerely and resolvedly embraced Islam are naturally, it is clear, exempt from interference on the point of religion; those, however, who under their own free will have not embraced Islam cannot be subjected to violence or compulsion from any quarter.

The imprisonment of any Greek, Armenian, or Catholic priest becoming necessary, under legal permission, the offender is kept in custody at the Patriarchate, and cannot be imprisoned elsewhere.

No interference can be made regarding the patriarchal staff or crosier, the horses he rides, his men, his or their dresses and robes; or regarding the provincial delegates' or bishop's horses and animals; nor can the delegates and bishops be obliged to afford the use of their residences as "konuck" (or traveller's lodging).

Should any law-suit arise between Metropolitans, Delegates, or Bishops, and other individuals, it is referred to the capital, and examined and decided according to the principles of equity, and with a reference to its special nature and conditions.

The Patriarchs and Capu Kiayas, together with fifteen men of the suites, are exempted from all taxes, Government imposts, or customary levies or demands.

Conduct of Clerical Functionaries as practised by them under the name of the above "Spiritual Privileges."

If the Metropolitans, their Delegates, or the Bishops, levy dues at their pleasure from the Christian subjects, neither as regards the amount, nor the method of levying, do the State authorities exercise any interference.

Each sect may open a school of any kind and in any place, nor has the State any interference with or knowledge for cognizance of the method of instruction therein followed. On a Patriarch, Metropolitan, Delegate, or Bishop, demanding the exile of an individual, whoever he may be, among the Christians on the grounds of his having acted contrary to the rites of his sect, such demand is complied with and executed without a trial.

Each Patriarch prohibits the publication and perusal of books among his nation and punishes those who act in a contrary manner.

Concessions recently granted in Spiritual Matters.

The permission formerly accorded to the reparation of churches is now applied to their extension or renewed construction.

In the case of a Christian subject wishing to embrace Mahometanism, inquiries must be made, with a view to ascertaining that no kind of compulsion or violence has been employed, before the Porte in the capital and before the Medjlises in the provinces, in the presence of the person's relations and connections; and if he has voluntarily abandoned his faith, he is to be accepted. Permission is not accorded to children who have not reached the age of puberty or discrimination to change their religion.

Ancient Condition of non-Mussulman Subjects.

At all times non-Mussulman subjects have held property of every description similarly with the Mussulmans, and under precisely the same title-deeds.

While the Mussulman subjects used to pay the State an "ushur," or tenth, upon the produce of the soil, the non-Mussulman subjects used to pay the State a "sunn," or eighth.

Mussulman subjects paying 4 per cent. upon their merchandises as customs duty, non-Mussulman subjects used to pay a duty of 5 per cent.

Non-Mussulman subjects were exempt from military service, and in its place paid compensation tax, or "tizyeh;" besides this, they paid under various names and titles different taxes, from which the Mussulmans were exempt, and rendered certain services under the names of "amja" ( ) and "angaria" (corvée).

They had no permission to travel out of the Ottoman dominions, except such as were at liberty to trade with Europe.

The whole of the public employments and ranks were universally bestowed upon Mussulmans, and the non-Mussulman subjects were ineligible to all of them.

Distinctions existed between the Mussulman and non-Mussulman subjects in the form and colour of their dress and houses, in all transactions and in employment of terms.

Concessions accorded to non-Mussulman Subjects since the Tanzimat.

All the Sultan's subjects are in the enjoyment of equal rights, and security of life and property and preservation of honour and character.

The difference in taxation which existed between the Mussulman and non-Mussulman subject is entirely abolished, and the whole of the Ottoman subjects are now upon an equal footing as regards the payment of taxes, whether of general taxation, of tithes, of custom or other dues.

Forced services of the nature of "amja," or corvée, are completely abolished for all classes of Ottoman subjects.

All classes of Ottoman subjects are at liberty to travel wherever they may please, whether for commerce, for information, or for pleasure.

Ottoman subjects are admitted to military service, and the commutation-tax is abolished; it has, however, been decided that a tax be levied, called "Military Aid Fund" (Tyäne-i-askeriyé) as a substitute for their rendering personal service.

Non-Mussulman subjects are employed in the service of the Porte according to their merits and capacity, and participate in the ranks conferred by the State.

In the provincial assemblies of each Eyalet, Liva, and Kaza, each nation or sect is naturally represented by its spiritual chiefs; but in addition to them they have other members respectively, who all equally have a voice in civil and municipal affairs; and in all causes tried before these assemblies the opinions and decisions of the Mussulman and non-Mussulman members are upon an equal footing.

In the Tidjaret Courts, and Courts of Inquiry, established in the capital and the provinces, the members, likewise, consist of Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans, whose opinions and decisions are on a footing of perfect equality.

Each nation may hold an assembly in its Patriarchate for the transaction of its own special national affairs, such as the control of hospitals, schools, and the like; in the provinces, likewise, each nation chooses and appoints its own chiefs in the cities and the villages.

In the provinces, the larger and the smaller districts (Eyalet, Liva, and Kaza), the general taxation is levied by the Porte, but each nation effects its own assessment for purposes of raising its own national taxation, and the amount being obtained by means of its chiefs is deposited in the national chest. All Ottoman subjects being equal before the law, the legal tribunals accept the evidence and information of subjects of all classes.

All distinctions affecting non-Mussulman subjects in the matter of dress, residence, and other particulars, are completely done away with, and everybody is at liberty to dress himself, to build his house, and to move about precisely as he may like, while as regards forms, titles, and the use of terms, a treatment of perfect equality is practised towards all subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

No. 306.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of the answer which I have addressed to Baron Tecco, in acknowledging the receipt of his official note and letter, transmitted in copy with my despatch No. 49 of the 14th instant. The French Ambassador has replied to the Sardinian Envoy in the same terms. The latter sent a copy of his note to Fuad Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 306.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Baron Tecco.

M. l'Envoyé, *Péra, le* 16 *Janvier,* 1856.

JE profite du premier moment libre pour vous accuser la réception de l'office que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 14 de ce mois et de la note formelle dont il servait d'enveloppe.

La question que vous avez cru devoir soulever est tellement réservée au jugement des Cabinets qu'il ne m'est pas permis sans inconvenance de la discuter, et encore moins de la résoudre avant que de l'avoir soumise à mon Gouvernement et reçu des instructions spéciales à son sujet. L'Ambassadeur de France, qui m'a fait l'honneur de s'entretenir avec moi de cette matière, se trouve dans la même position. L'impression faite sur son Excellence, comme sur moi, par votre remontrance était celle de surprise, qui, de mon côté, n'a subi aucune diminution lorsque vous m'avez avoué que le démarche n'avait d'autre base que votre propre appréciation, non seulement de votre droit, mais aussi de nos devoirs.

En attendant que je sois informé des intentions de ma Cour, qui sans doute regarde la vôtre avec les sentiments que ses nobles principes et sa loyale conduite doivent lui inspirer, je me borne à vous annoncer le départ de votre note, en copie, pour Londres, et à prier votre Excellence d'agréer, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 307.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1856.

IN concert with my French and Austrian colleagues, I have devoted nearly the whole of to-day and yesterday to the pending question of privileges and reforms. The progress has been considerable in so far as concerns our understanding with the Turkish Ministers. The result of two separate meetings on our part was a paper founded principally on my memorandum, and expressive of our joint opinion after due inquiry and discussion. This series of articles, which is inclosed herewith, became the subject-matter of a third interview between the three Representatives and the two Turkish Ministers, assisted by Prince Callimachi. We met, as before, at the Grand Vizier's house. We agreed to discuss the paper, after a general perusal of its contents, article by article, noting down at the close of each whether, and with what alterations or reserves, it could be accepted unanimously. I observed with pleasure that the Grand Vizier and Fuad Pasha were to all appearance favourably disposed to the acceptance of our proposals. Their assents, however, were varied with different degrees of

admission; they intimated, with respect to some leading points, an apprehension of difficulties elsewhere, and they reserved for the whole, in distinct terms, the approval of their colleagues and the sanction of their Government. It is further to be observed, that on two or three points they drew back at first from the statement which had been previously given in by themselves. They seemed to have much to surmount with respect to the abolition of all restraints on conscience in religious matters, and to the admissibility of all classes under rules of general application to public employment.

It was agreed that the question of administrative improvement did not belong to the fourth point in the same sense as that of Christian privileges belonged to it. But no one denied that the two questions were virtually bound up together as the essential elements of an effective reform in this country. The Grand Vizier avowed with laudable frankness that a thorough administrative reform was indispensable to the existence of the Empire.

It can hardly escape your Lordship's notice, on comparing the series of articles with the propositions contained in my memorandum, that although much of what might seem at first sight to have been lopped off, has been only condensed or moulded into a better form, yet that in several instances not only prominent details but even important securities have been dropped. The change is attributable to a very simple cause. It was impossible to avoid some differences of opinion in so extensive and complicated a work, and it was felt by all that whatever discussions might be found unavoidable at a later period, there would be great advantage in placing an unanimous opinion in the outset under the consideration of our Turkish allies. It was evident that their acceptance of the plan, as now presented to them, would be an earnest of further success both in urging the adoption of corresponding measures, and in obtaining whatever else might be necessary for the completion and enforcement of a new administrative system.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 307.

Memorandum.

QUATRIEME garantie:

1. Des mesures efficaces seront prises pour que les garanties promises à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan par le hatti-schérif de Gulhané et les lois de Tanzimat, sans distinction de classe ni de culte, reçoivent leur plein et entier effet. Ces principes seront rappelés et consacrés de nouveau par un acte solennel, émané du Souverain.

2. La Sublime Porte ne fera aucune difficulté de proclamer la reconnaissance et le maintien de tous les priviléges spirituels accordés *ab antiquo* et à des dates postérieures, à toutes les communautés non-Mussulmanes établies dans l'Empire, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

3. Chaque communauté non-Mussulmane sera tenue, dans un délai fixé, de procéder à l'examen de ses immunités actuelles et d'y introduire les réformes exigés par le progrès des lumières et du temps. Les pouvoirs concédés aux Patriarches et aux Évêques des rits Chrétiens par le Sultan Mahomet II et ses successeurs seront mis en harmonie avec la position nouvelle que les intentions généreuses de Sa Majesté le Sultan assurent à ces communautés. Le principe de la nomination à vie des Patriarches sera exactement appliqué. Les redevances ecclésiastiques, de quelque forme et nature qu'elles soient, seront supprimées, et remplacées par la fixation des revenus des Patriarches et Chefs des communautés, et par la location de traitements et salaires équitablement proportionnés à l'importance, au rang et à la dignité des prêtres. Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux propriétés mobilières et immobilières des divers clergés Chrétiens. Toutefois l'administration temporelle des communautés non-Mussulmanes sera placée sous la sauvegarde d'une assemblée, choisie dans le sein de chacune des dites communautés parmi les membres du clergé et des laïques.

4. Dans les villes, bourgades, et villages, où la population appartiendra en totalité au même culte, il ne sera apporté aucune entrave à la réparation, d'après leur plan primitif, des édifices destinés au culte, aux écoles, aux hôpitaux, et

aux cimitières. Les plans de ces divers édifices, en cas d'érection nouvelle approuvés par les Patriarches ou Chefs de communautés, seront simplement soumis à la Sublime Porte, qui devra les approuver ou faire ses observations dans un délai déterminé.

Chaque culte dans les localités, où ne se trouveront point d'autres confessions religieuses, ne sera soumis, dans ses manifestations extérieures, à aucune espèce de restriction. Dans les villes, bourgades, et villages où les cultes sont mélangés, chaque communauté habitant un quartier distinct, pourra également, en se conformant aux prescriptions ci-dessus indiquées, réparer et consolider ses églises, ses hôpitaux, ses écoles, et ses cimitières.

Lorsqu'il s'agira de la construction d'édifices nouveaux, l'autorisation nécessaire sera demandée à la Sublime Porte, et la Sublime Porte prendra une décision souveraine en accordant cette autorisation à moins d'obstacle administratif. L'intervention de l'autorité administrative dans tous les actes de cette nature, sera entièrement gratuite. Le Gouvernement prendra des mesures pour assurer à chaque culte, quel que soit le nombre de ses adhérents, la pleine liberté de son exercice.

5. Toute distinction ou appellation tendant à rendre une classe quelconque des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan inférieure à une autre classe à raison du culte, de la langue ou de la race sera à jamais effacée du Protocole Administratif. Les lois séviront contre l'usage entre particuliers, ou de la part des autorités, de toute qualification injurieuse ou blessante.

6. Aucun sujet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, à quelque culte qu'il appartienne, ne sera ni insulté ni molesté, encore moins persecuté ou puni à raison de ses opinions religieuses.

7. Tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans distinction de nationalité, seront admissibles aux emplois publics et aptes à les occuper, selon leur capacité et leur mérite et conformément à des règles d'une application générale.

8. Tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan seront indistinctement reçus dans les écoles civiles et militaires du Gouvernement aujourd'hui existantes ou qui seraient créés à l'avenir, s'ils remplissent d'ailleurs les conditions d'âge et d'examen spécifiées dans les Réglements Organiques des dites écoles.

9. Toutes les affaires civiles ou criminelles dans lesquelles seraient mêlés des Mussulmans avec des non-Mussulmans, ou des non-Mussulmans de rits différents, seront déférées à des tribunaux mixtes.

L'audience de ces tribunaux sera publique, les parties y seront mises en présence et produiront leur témoins, dont les dépositions seront reçues indistinctement sous un serment prêté selon la loi religieuse de chaque culte.

10. Les lois pénales, civiles et commerciales et les règles de procédure à appliquer dans les tribunaux mixtes seront complétées le plus tôt possible et codifiées. Il en sera publié, sous les auspices de la Porte, des traductions dans toutes les langues en usage dans l'Empire.

11. Il sera procédé, dans le plus bref délai possible, à la réforme du système pénitentiaire dans son application aux maisons de détention, punition, ou de correction, et d'autres établissements de même nature, à concilier les droits de l'humanité avec ceux de la justice. Aucune peine corporelle, même dans les prisons, ne pourra être appliquée que conformément à de réglements disciplinaires émanés de la Porte et tout ce qui ressemblerait à la torture sera radicalement aboli. Les infractions à ce sujet seront sévèrement réprimées et entraîneront en outre de plein droit la destitution des autorités qui les auraient ordonnées et des agents qui les auraient commises.

12. L'organisation de la police dans la capitale, dans les villes de province et dans les campagnes, sera révisée de façon à donner à tous les sujets paisibles de Sa Majesté le Sultan les garanties désirables de sécurité quant à leurs personnes et à leurs biens.

13. L'égalité des impôts entraînant l'égalité des charges, comme celle des devoirs entraine aussi celle des droits, les non-Mussulmans devront, comme les Mussulmans, satisfaire aux obligations de la loi de recrutement. Le principe du remplacement ou du rachat sera admis.

Il sera publié, dans le plus bref délai possible, une loi complète sur l'organisation et sur le mode d'admission et de servir des sujets non-Mussulmans dans l'armée, réglant l'avancement dans la hiérarchie et le traitement affecté à chaque grade. La position d'activité et celle de réforme des officiers seront également garanties.

14. Il sera procédé à une réforme dans la composition des Conseils Provinciaux et Communaux, pour garantir la sincérité des choix des délégués des communautés Mussulmanes et non-Mussulmanes, et la liberté des votes dans les Conseils. La Porte avisera à l'emploi des moyens les plus efficaces pour connaître exactement et de contrôler le résultat des délibérations et les décisions prises.

15. Les lois qui régissent l'achat, la vente, et la disposition des propriétés immobilières seront communes à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Le droit de propriété foncière sera concédé aux étrangers, sous l'observation des lois qui régissent la matière, et l'obligation d'acquitter les mêmes charges que les indigènes.

16. Les impôts sont exigibles au même titre à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans distinction de classe ou de culte.

On avisera aux moyens les plus prompts et les plus énergiques de corriger les abus dans la perception des impôts, et notamment des dîmes. Le système de la perception directe sera successivement, et aussitôt que faire se pourra, substitué au régime des fermes dans toutes les branches des revenus de l'État.

Tant que ce système demeurera en rigueur, il sera interdit, sous les peines les plus sévères, à tous les agents de l'autorité et à tous les membres des Medjlis de se rendre adjudicataires des fermes qui seront annoncées avec publicité et concurrence, ou d'avoir une part quelconque d'intérêt dans leur exploitation.

Les impositions locales seront autant que possible calculées de façon à ne pas affecter les sources de la production ou entraver le mouvement du commerce intérieur.

Les travaux d'utilité publique recevront une dotation convenable, à laquelle concourront les impositions particulières et spéciales des provinces appelées à jouir de l'établissement des voies de communication par terre et par eau.

Le budget des recettes et dépenses de l'Etat sera communiqué, à une époque périodique et autant que possible par prévision d'une année, au Grand Conseil de Justice.

Le budget sera annuellement publié et l'on procédera à la révision des traitements affectés à chaque emploi.

19. Les chefs et un délégué de chaque communauté désignés par la Sublime Porte seront appelés à prendre part aux délibérations du Grand Conseil dans toutes les circonstances qui intéresseraient la généralité des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Ils seront spécialement convoqués à cet effet par le Grand Vizier. Le mandat des délégués sera annuel. Ils prêteront serment en entrant en charge.

Tous les membres du Conseil, dans les réunions ordinaires et extraordinaires, émettront librement leurs avis et leurs votes sans qu'on puisse jamais les inquiéter à ce sujet.

20. Les lois contre la corruption, la concussion, ou la malversation, seront appliquées, d'après les formes légales, à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, quelle que soit leur classe et la nature de leurs fonctions.

21. Il est à désirer que la Sublime Porte annonce l'intention de s'occuper au plutôt de son système monétaire et la création d'institutions du crédit public.

No. 308.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1856.

WITH reference to the dissatisfaction which it would seem, from your Excellency's despatch No. 40 of the 14th of January, is felt by the Porte at the conduct of Omer Pasha, I have to instruct your Excellency to represent to the Turkish Government, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, how unwise it would be for the Porte to put aside and deprive of command the only General in the Sultan's service who has shown himself fit to hold a great command.

Omer Pasha may have faults, but he is a perfect General as compared with

Selim Pasha and other Turkish officers. He looks after his troops, provides as well as he can for their wants, possesses their confidence, and maintains their discipline. There may be better Generals in the field than Omer Pasha, but he is, what the other Pashas are not, a good organizer.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that there are cabals and intrigues at Constantinople against Omer Pasha; but they wish that your Excellency should exert any influence which you may be able properly to exercise, to prevent the success of those intrigues.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 309.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 127.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 2, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government have considered the point which formed the subject of your despatches Nos. 49, 58, and 62, of the 14th, 15th, and 17th ultimo, and have been in communication with the French Government upon it, and I have now to acquaint you that they approve of your not having acceded to the claim of the Sardinian Minister to be admitted to take part in the discussions now going on at Constantinople, on the first and fourth points, and that an intimation to the same effect has been given by the French Government to M. Thouvenel.

Your Excellency will, however, learn from my despatch to Lord Cowley, of which I inclose a copy, the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the position of Sardinia with regard to the present negotiations; and as reference is made in that despatch to an understanding which has already been come to on that subject, I inclose for your more complete information copies of a correspondence which I had last summer with the Sardinian Minister at this Court.

I transmit for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Turin upon this subject.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 310.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 1, 1856.

AT noon, to-day, we signed the Protocol, and put our initials to the annex.

Marshal Paskewitch is dead.

No. 311.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 187.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 2, 1856.

IN the course of one of the last conversations with which the Emperor was pleased to honour me, His Majesty said that with a view of entering into the Conferences under a complete understanding with Her Majesty's Government on all the points of detail which must necessarily come under discussion, he had desired Count Walewski to draw up a paper embodying these points, which His

* No. 341.

Majesty proposed sending to London for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I yesterday inquired of Count Walewski whether this paper was ready. His Excellency answered me very evasively, and as if he had no intention of executing the Emperor's orders. He said that upon considering the matter, he found that there were many points on which the two Governments were not sufficiently informed to enable them to come to any decision.

He alluded particularly to the first and fourth points, concerning which a great deal must depend on the result of the Conferences now carrying on at Constantinople. I observed that if this was the case concerning those points, there were others of great importance respecting which it appeared to me to be matter of necessity that the two Governments should thoroughly understand each other. I alluded particularly to the number and size of the armed vessels which Russia should be permitted to have for the future in the Black Sea, and to the stipulations to be made in regard to the provinces to the east of that Sea. Count Walewski showed no wish to discuss these matters, but he evinced a willingness to entertain a hint which I threw out, and which proceeded originally from the Emperor, that the Admirals should be consulted upon the number and the size of the ships to be allowed to Russia, and I venture to suggest that if Her Majesty's Government entertained this idea, Sir Edmund Lyons should be instructed on his return through Paris to talk the matter over with Admiral Hamelin. It appears to me that, under all circumstances, a written opinion from them would be of value in the discussions which must ensue on this subject. But I should not feel that I had done my duty by Her Majesty's Government if I did not earnestly invite your Lordship to insist on a preliminary discussion with the French Government of all those points on which Her Majesty's Government are determined to insist, and on which there is no clear understanding between Paris and London. The object which Count Walewski has in view is clear. It is to enter upon the Conferences with as few engagements towards England as possible, but the interests of England require that this object should, if possible, be defeated.

Besides the question which I have brought more prominently forward in this despatch, there is one other on which Her Majesty's Government will do well to insist, and to demand a categorical answer from the Imperial Government. I allude to the evacuation of Mingrelia by Omer Pasha being considered as an equivalent for the evacuation of Turkish Armenia by the Russians. There are also the questions of the renunciation by Russia to the erection of forts on the eastern coasts of the Black Sea, of the extension of commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of those countries, and others to which your Lordship has at different times called my attention, but on which I have never been able to elicit the slightest expression of interest from Count Walewski. If I might venture to offer an opinion, it would be that your Lordship should come to Paris a few days before the opening of the Conferences, in order that by your personal weight and superior authority, you may bring about the necessary unity of action on the part of the two Governments in regard to these important matters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 312.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 188.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 2, 1856.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to state to your Lordship that the French Government agrees entirely in the observations contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 173 of the 30th ultimo, respecting the manner in which any armistice with Russia should be concluded. It should, in their opinion, be as short as possible, should be confined to the land forces of the belligerents, and should reserve the right of the maritime Powers, not only to continue the

blockade of those Russian ports now under interdict, but to impose it on others if found advisable.

An engagement such as your Lordship refers to at the end of your despatch, not to attack any of the Russian sea forts or towns, might be made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 313.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 2, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has been good enough to read me a confidential letter which he received yesterday from the French Minister at Frankfort, giving an account of a conversation which he (M. de Montessuy) had held with M. de Brunnow, and which is not without interest at the present moment.

M. de Brunnow had not received any official notification that he was to be one of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to conduct the negotiations for peace, though he considered it likely that he should be named. In that case he expected that Count Orloff would pass through Frankfort, and that they would proceed together to Paris. M. de Brunnow expressed himself as exceedingly happy at the prospect of peace. He hoped only that the allies would take the position of the Emperor of Russia into consideration, and consent to put the sacrifices made by Russia into such a written form "that they would bear translating into Russian."

He said that the great object of Russia was to advance quickly with the negotiations, and he was of opinion that the best plan of proceeding would be to come to a decision at once upon all the principal points; for, those once settled, the solution of the others would be comparatively easy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 314.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.

(No. 190.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 2, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has inquired of me whether the Austrian Minister in London has made any overture to Her Majesty's Government with a view of admitting Prussia to take part in the Conferences. Your Lordship is aware, by my despatch No. 126 of the 23rd ultimo, that M. de Hübner had made an official application on behalf of Prussia to the French Government; and before answering him, Count Walewski desires to ascertain whether Count Colloredo has spoken on the subject to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 315.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 70. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

IN the course of a private conversation which I held, two or three days ago, with Colonel Manteuffel, he stated, much to my surprise, that he had no doubt that all that is required by England and France would have been conceded without resistance by the Russian Government, if our demands had been made known explicitly in the first instance at St. Petersburgh.

If that be really the present opinion of Colonel Manteuffel, it is remarkably at variance to that which had been expressed by himself, and by all Prussian and Russian Agents up to the very moment of its being known that the Emperor Alexander had closed with the Austrian ultimatum.

Till that moment it had been held by the partizans of Russia that the demands upon her were such as the Emperor, even if so disposed, would be unable to comply with; and I am inclined, therefore, to ascribe Colonel Manteuffel's altered language to a jealousy of Austria, which is so strong on the part of Prussians as hardly to affect concealment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 316.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 72.)

Vienna, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

I LEARN from Count Buol, that on the 28th instant, a telegraphic message was received by Prince Gortchakoff, expressing the wish felt by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh that the armistice, if agreed to, should be concluded for four months.

I did not conceal from his Excellency my belief that the proposal would not be entertained by Her Majesty's Government, who would probably be of opinion that there would be no difficulty in prolonging a short armistice, should it be found that negotiations are proceeding in a satisfactory manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 317.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 73.)

Vienna, January 30, 1856.

My Lord,

THE Prussian Minister communicated to Count Buol, on the 28th instant, a despatch which he had received, expressive of the readiness of the Prussian Government to take part in the approaching negotiation, with the understanding of their being prepared to take the present state of affairs as the *point de départ* and as the rule of future action.

It is probable that the eagerness felt by the Prussian Cabinet to be represented at the Conference, is increased by their knowledge of its being Count

Buol's intention that the late diplomatic proceedings of his Court should be brought under the consideration of the Diet, with a view to receiving a sanction which under present circumstances would be little likely to be withheld.

However, if Prussia is desirous of reentering the European Council, the Austrian Government appears equally anxious that the doors should be thrown open for her reception. Count Buol remarked to me, that the Treaty to be prepared for the protection of Turkey, could only become the more secure from the participation of another great Power in its arrangement; and that it might be considered certain that if Prussia were not a party to precautions taken against Russia, she would, sooner or later, be found acting with the country against which these precautionary measures were to be adopted.

I mentioned to Count Buol M. de Bourqueney's notion of the King of Prussia being pressed to take a leading part in the negotiation respecting the Aland Islands—a point of immense importance to Northern Germany; but he appeared to be convinced that no effort of the kind is to be expected from His Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 318.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 80.)

Vienna, January 30, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH regard to Baron Seebach's opinions, as reported in Lord Cowley's confidential despatch No. 89 of the 17th instant, I am desirous of remarking to your Lordship that I am disposed to admit their correctness, with the abatement which may be due as well to the difficulty of obtaining at St. Petersburgh a correct knowledge of the feeling of the vast Russian Empire, as to the predilections which Baron Seebach may be supposed naturally to entertain to a country with which his own interests have become identified.

With one opinion professed by M. de Seebach I am bound to concur, because it is in perfect accordance with that which I submitted to your Lordship, I believe even before the war broke out. It was clear to me that, except in the very important point of recruitment, the pressure of war would be felt more painfully by the higher than by the labouring classes of Russia; or rather, that the very evil inflicted upon the one would be a benefit conferred upon the other.

It is obvious that the consumer of foreign articles and the owner of home produce would suffer severely from the interruption of sea-transport; but it was equally so that the poor serf would profit by the decrease which this very inability to obtain access to foreign markets, could not fail to bring about in the price of agricultural produce of all kinds.

Many persons have spoken of the inconvenience which must be felt by the labouring classes of Russia from the increased price of such articles as tea, sugar, and coffee, not reflecting that these, although in general use among the poor of our own country, are utterly unknown to the serf, whose food is the blackest bread and the coarsest oatmeal.

By such a man, unless he himself or a member of his family is carried off as a soldier, the evils of war are but little felt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 319.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 81.)

Vienna, January 30, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH regard to your Lordship's despatch No. 30 of the 17th instant, I have had the satisfaction of pointing out to Count Buol the great similarity which is to be observed between the views of Her Majesty's Government and those of the Austrian Cabinet, with regard to the organization of the Danubian Principalities.

Count Buol, in return, stated that he had the pleasure of learning by despatches which had just reached him from Constantinople, that the same agreement existed among the members of the Conference to whose examination the proposals of the Porte, under the fourth Article, were submitted.

The proposals of the Porte were, he said, considered satisfactory, whilst great unanimity prevailed as to the amendments which it might be desirable to propose to the Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 320.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 85. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL has desired to remark to me, in confidence, that the wording of the Article of the ultimatum relating to the cession of territory to be made by the Russian Government, left it in doubt whether Chotyn were to be included in the cession.

His Excellency is of opinion that this is the construction which is to be given to the Article, not for the purpose of ultimately depriving the Russians of a town to which they attach great importance, but for that of obtaining a "moyen de négociation," and having in hand something to give up, which may render the stipulations with regard to the Aland Isles less unpalateable to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 321.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 88.)

Vienna, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE apprized Count Buol that I have been authorized by your Lordship to sign the Protocol with my colleagues.

A similar authority has been given by a telegraphic message, which he received last night, to Baron Bourqueney; and at the same time, Baron Bourqueney has been informed that he has been chosen by the Emperor Napoleon as the second French Plenipotentiary at the approaching Peace Conferences.

No better selection could, I am persuaded, have been made in the interests either of France or of England—Baron Bourqueney being at once a man of

great intelligence, thoroughly acquainted with the subject which he is about to treat, and, as he has been proved to be during the whole of his diplomatic career, the warmest partisan of a close alliance between the two countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 322.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)

Vienna, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

A MORE melancholy position than that which the Prussian Government has made for itself by its hesitations and tergiversation can hardly be conceived.

Within the last few days I have met Colonel de Manteuffel several times at the house of my French colleague, and I was very much struck by the change in his language. It appears to me that instead of expressing her readiness, if called upon, to take part in the Conferences, Prussia now appears in the guise of a petitioner praying for admission.

This being so, I would again submit to your Lordship whether it might be expedient to make her re-entrance into the European Council, subordinate to an engagement to be taken by her of insisting upon the acceptance by Russia of the terms of the Western Powers.

If Colonel Manteuffel's feelings are to be taken as an index of those of his Government, the conditions of admittance to which Prussia would refuse compliance must be extremely .

To complete the state of humiliation to which the Prussian Cabinet is reduced, I may add that the Courts of Bavaria and Wurtemberg appear to be greatly incensed with their late director for having been led to assume that these conditions of peace were outrageous and unreasonable, which the King of Prussia ended by pressing upon the acceptance of the Emperor Alexander.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 323.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, February 3, 1855.

MR. FONBLANQUE, under date of the 2nd instant, requests me to inform your Lordship that the Prince of Servia sent his Ministers on the 31st of January, to Vouchitch, for the purpose of inditing a letter to Prince Gortchakoff at Vienna; represents that the Servian Senate was disposed to side with the Porte and the Western Powers; and that his Highness being, under the present circumstances, nearly powerless against such an opposition, entreated the Government of Russia to supply him promptly with adequate means of action.

No. 324.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 4, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, February 4, 1856.

THE Russian Minister was informed yesterday with me that Count Orloff and Baron Brunnow are to attend the Conferences.

No. 325.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 4.*)

(No. 193.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 3, 1856.*

THE "Moniteur" of this morning has published an amended edition of the article which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 185 of yesterday's date. I have the honour to inclose it herewith, although the alterations are of no importance whatevever. Your Lordship will find them exhibited in Inclosure No. 2.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 325.

Amended Article from the "Moniteur" of February 3, 1856.

DES erreurs s'étant glissées dans l'impression de l'article du "Moniteur" d'hier, nous en reproduisons le texte exact:

La Russie a adhéré aux cinq propositions devant servir de préliminaires de paix qui ont été présentées à son acceptation par l'Autriche, avec l'assentiment de la France et de l'Angleterre.

Cette adhesion, sans réserves, a été formulée dans une note adressée par M. le Comte de Nesselrode, Chancelier de Russie, à M. le Comte Esterhazy, Ministre d'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg, et dans une dépêche communiquée à M. le Comte Buol par M. le Prince Gortchakoff, Ministre de Russie à Vienne. En consequence, le Gouvernement Russe a proposé la signature d'un Protocole à Vienne, pour constater l'adhésion des Cours Contractantes aux propositions destinées à servir de bases à la négociation, et pour établir que des Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir à Paris, dans trois semaines (ou plus tôt, si faire se peut), dans le but de procéder successivement à la signature des préliminaires, à la conclusion d'un armistice et à l'ouverture de la négociation générale.

Le Gouvernement Britannique avait déjà exprimé le désir que les Conferences fussent tenues à Paris, et le Gouvernement Autrichien ayant, de son côté, accédé avec empressement à cette désignation, c'est dans la capitale de l'Empire que se réuniront les Plénipotentiaires appelés à délibérer sur les conditions de la paix.

Le Protocole constatant l'acceptation de toutes les parties a été signé à Vienne, aujourd'hui, à midi, et il a été arrêté que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances devant prendre part à la négociation seront rendus à Paris avant le 20 Février.

Inclosure 2 in No. 325.

Alterations in Articles in the "Moniteur" of February 2 and 3.

"Moniteur" of Saturday.	*"Moniteur" of Sunday.*
Cette adhésion, sans réserves, a été formulée dans une note adressée par M. le Comte Esterhazy, Ministre d'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg.	Cette adhésion, sans réserves, a été formulée dans une note adressée par M. le Comte de Nesselrode, Chancelier de Russie, à M. le Comte Esterhazy, Ministre d'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg.
Et pour établir que les Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir, dans trois semaines, &c.	Et pour établir que les Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir à Paris dans trois semaines, &c.

No. 326.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 189.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to Count Walewski the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government on learning, from your Excellency's despatch No. 188 of the 2nd instant, that the Government of the Emperor of the French agree with Her Majesty's Government as regards the manner in which an armistice with Russia should be concluded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 327.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 190.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 181 of the 31st ultimo, that the Government of the Emperor of the French are prepared to resist any attempt on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to make the neutralization of the Black Sea, a separate arrangement between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 328.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 192.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency as reported in your despatch No. 187 of the 2nd instant, and concur in your opinion as to the necessity of a clear understanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French with regard to those points of detail which must necessarily arise at the approaching Conferences. If the opportunity should present itself, your Excellency will represent to the Emperor the great importance to the success of the negotiation that His Majesty's own plan should be carried into effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 329.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 195.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 190 of the 2nd instant, that Count Colloredo did speak to me about the expediency of admitting Prussia to take part in the Conferences on account of the support which she had given to the Austrian ultimatum at St. Petersburgh.

I told Count Colloredo that there existed no ill-will towards Prussia, but, on the contrary, much regret that she had perseveringly excluded herself from the consideration of great European questions; but as she had abdicated her European position and for her own interest had adopted one that was exclusively German, there could be no reason for admitting her now to take part in the

Conferences, where, even if she did not appear as a Russian advocate, she would be an embarrassment to all parties by the wayward policy and unsettled principles that her Plenipotentiaries would represent.

Count Colloredo did not gainsay this, and he gave but feeble support to his own application, which appeared to me to have been made solely for the purpose of enabling Austria to inform the Cabinet of Berlin that she had wished for the admission of Prussia to the Conferences, but had been unable to overcome the repugnance of the Western Powers; nor could I help thinking that Count Colloredo would have been disappointed if the suggestion which he had been instructed to make had met with an affirmative answer.

I, however, told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government thought it would be matter for consideration whether Prussia should not be invited to become party to any General Treaty of Peace that might be signed.

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Bloomfield,* giving him an account of a conversation which I have had with Count Bernstorff on the same subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 330.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 197.)

Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 172 of the 30th of January, respecting the claim put forward by the Sardinian Minister at Constantinople to be admitted to take part in the preliminary discussions now going on in the Turkish capital, with the view of coming to an understanding with the Porte on the first and fourth points, previously to the general discussion on those points by the Plenipotentiaries about to assemble at Paris.

The French Government, it appears, have lost no time in acquainting their Representatives at Constantinople and at Turin that this claim on the part of the Sardinian Minister could not be admitted; and your Excellency will state to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government will, as matters stand, not object to adopt the same course, though they would have preferred, if the French Government had entertained a different opinion, to concur with it in a recognition of the Sardinian claim.

It may indeed be said that the discussions at Constantinople are not negotiations for peace, but friendly and confidential communications between the Representatives of England, France, Austria, and the Porte, with a view to induce the Porte to make, of its own accord and by its own authority, internal arrangements which would have the effect of superseding negotiations on one or more of the four points.

On the other hand, however, although Sardinia has certainly no ground of right on which to found a pretension to be ranked among the great Powers of Europe, yet it cannot be doubted that it is very desirable for England and France that Sardinia should be upheld as much as possible in the general estimation of Europe, and that the greatest care should be taken to avoid wounding her susceptibilities, by insisting too rigorously on the exact observance of the limitations assigned to the part she is to take in the negotiations for peace.

The popular feeling in Sardinia is understood at present to be one of doubt whether Sardinia has done wisely in entering into alliance with the Western Powers, instead of husbanding her resources for any contingencies in the Italian Peninsula which might hold out to Sardinia a prospect of direct reward for any cooperation she might afford to other Powers; but the Western Powers have certainly reaped substantial advantages from their alliance with Sardinia, not only in consequence of the military forces which she has placed at their disposal, but also from the moral effect in Europe of the first adherence of a secondary Power to the great cause for which they were contending.

Whenever the period, whether remote or near at hand, for an improvement in the social condition of the Italian Peninsula shall arrive, it will be of the utmost importance that the position of Sardinia should be well-defined and that

* No. 335.

she should present an example to the other States of the Peninsula of a well-ordered constitutional Government; and everything that tends in the meanwhile to encourage in the Sardinian people feelings of self-respect will be so much in the way of preparation for the establishment of a better order of things in Italy.

Actuated by these considerations Her Majesty's Government, on learning from your Excellency's despatch No. 179 of the 31st ultimo, that the Government of the Emperor did not object to the signature of a Sardinian Plenipotentiary being affixed to the Protocol which was yesterday signed at Vienna, have instructed Sir Hamilton Seymour, if the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires should apply to sign the Protocol, to inform Count Buol and the other Ministers that Her Majesty's Government concurred in the propriety of his doing so; for it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that Sardinia might think it hard that she who has been fighting by the side of the Western Powers, and has placed all her means at their disposal, should be treated with less deference, consideration and confidence than a Power which has been standing aloof, and should not be allowed to put her hand to an act by which the belligerent Powers bind themselves to negotiate for the restoration of peace.

I inclose further to your Excellency copies of two despatches which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and Her Majesty's Minister at Turin on this subject.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 331.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 1, 1856.

My Lord,

AT a ball which was given last night by the Prince of Prussia, the King spoke to me in a depressed and embittered tone on the subject of a conversation which Count Bernstorff had lately held with your Lordship respecting the approaching Peace Conferences.

His Prussian Majesty said that, without instructions, Count Bernstorff had chosen to originate the question of the admission of Prussia to the Conferences, and that he feared his Minister had spoken in an unbecoming manner to your Lordship; that Count Bernstorff had a violent temper, proofs of which he had himself witnessed; that at times he had difficulty in controlling it; but that on the present occasion his conduct was highly blameable, and that he had given just cause for his displeasure, as he had taken a step unwarranted by His Majesty's orders and wishes in initiating the question of his admission to the Conferences, for that although he might desire to assist at the Conferences, it was beneath his honour and dignity to do anything which could bear the appearance of asking for an invitation to them.

The King appeared greatly irritated at the proceedings of his Minister in London; His Majesty, nevertheless, closed his remarks by saying that he wished me to think no more on the subject.

Your Lordship's despatch No. 40 of the 29th ultimo only arrived this morning, and I was consequently unable to make any other reply to the King than that His Majesty's words were the first that had reached me.

Baron Manteuffel, to whom I have since related the substance of the King's remarks, told me that His Majesty had been very angry with Count Bernstorff, but that he had succeeded in softening the terms of the reprimand which he had been ordered to address to him by telegraph.

I have also requested his Excellency to inform His Majesty that in the despatch which your Lordship had addressed to me, giving an account of the conversation which you had held with the Prussian Minister, nothing whatever appeared to have been said by him in an unbecoming tone, and that any anxiety that was entertained by His Majesty on the subject might be at once relieved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* Nos. 309 and 341.

No. 332.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 57.)

Berlin, February 2, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 40 of the 29th ultimo, giving an account of a conversation which your Lordship had held with Count Bernstorff, when the Prussian Minister pressed on your consideration the question of admitting Prussia to the approaching Peace Conferences.

I called last night on Baron Manteuffel, and on alluding to the above-mentioned conversation, I said that it had been extremely painful to your Lordship to make the remarks—which of course were already known to his Excellency—to Count Bernstorff, the representative of a country with which the British Government must always desire to entertain friendly, nay, intimate relations; but that Prussia, by the policy which she considered it her interest to pursue, had separated herself from all participation in the discussion of the great question of the day; and that as her German interests appeared to be of greater value to her than her European ones, she had voluntarily excluded herself from all participation in the Conferences, and that your Lordship had deemed it a duty to record in your answer to Count Bernstorff the occurrences of the last year, in proof that the position which Prussia now occupies was entirely one of her own seeking, and the natural result of the policy she had thought proper to pursue. I endeavoured then to discover from Baron Manteuffel whether any change was likely to occur in the King's policy on the Eastern question, and whether there was any chance of His Majesty taking engagements to support the five points. His Excellency said, that the King had already given evidence of his desire to arrive at an honourable settlement of the questions about to be discussed at Paris, but that His Majesty would certainly not bind himself to support anything so vague as the proposals that might be brought forward in explanation of the fifth point in the ultimatum; that the question of an alteration of the Russian Asiatic frontier might grow out of it, as well as questions of war indemnities, and others of equal importance; and that it would be too much to expect Prussia to bind herself to anything so undefined. I replied, that as to war indemnities, I had never heard that the question had been agitated, except by the newspapers, but that if peace was not made this year, and that we had another successful campaign, of course our demands would go on increasing; but I said England was about to enter in good faith into negotiations for peace, and that as Prussia seemed as little inclined as ever to make engagements as to her future policy, there would be nothing left for us but to propose the Treaty of Peace for her adhesion when we had concluded it. To this Baron Manteuffel replied, that Prussia would not adhere to any Treaty in the negotiation of which she had not participated, and that therefore if she was excluded from the Conferences, her adhesion hereafter would be declined. I rejoined, that the circumstances attending the negotiation of the Treaty of the Dardanelles would certainly be in his recollection, to the terms of which another great Power, France, had at the time refused to agree, but that the year following its signature she found it inconvenient to be excluded, and was readmitted into the European Council; that perhaps this might become the case with Prussia, and if we happily succeeded in concluding peace in 1856, it might happen that in 1857 Prussia would desire to reassume her place with the great Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 333.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 58.)

Berlin, February 2, 1856.

My Lord,

BARON DE BEUST, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King of Saxony, came here from Dresden a few days ago, and remains till Monday next. His Excellency called on me yesterday; and after some allusion to the approaching Conferences for peace, and to the difficult position in which Prussia found herself with respect to them, I said that we deeply regretted that Prussia had lately abstained from joining us in our discussions of the matters relating to the Eastern question, and that she appeared desirous to avoid taking any engagements that would define her future policy.

Baron Beust gave me to understand that the chief object of his visit was to endeavour to smooth the difficulties which had arisen between Austria and Prussia, and bring about a common understanding as to the direction to be given to the German Diet in the matter of the five points which was about to be communicated by Austria.

He assured me that he hoped to have made a favourable impression here, and that Germany would appear more united than she had been. He then threw out some hints as to the admission of Germany to the Peace Conferences, observing that it would be an advantage for the Western Powers to assure themselves of the sympathies of Germany; and it was evident that, if such a decision was taken, Baron Beust looked forward to becoming himself the Representative on the occasion.

He spoke reasonably on the general question; he seemed to consider that Russia was sincere in her wish for peace, and to believe that she had already suffered severely from the war; but I cannot divest myself of the impression that one of the objects of this visit of Baron de Beust is to concert measures to guard Germany from all unnecessary implication in the war, and to prevent Austria from attempting to screen herself behind the Confederation.

In the meantime I hear that the Austrian propositions to maintain the five points at the Diet meet with more favour here than they did at first, and that there are hopes that Germany may agree to them.

I shall hope in a few days to be able to inform your Lordship of the results, if any, which Baron de Beust's visit to Berlin may have produced.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 334.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 59.)

Berlin, February 2, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to an observation in a despatch of Lord Cowley's No. 140 of the 25th ultimo, that there appeared to be a lurking intention on the part of Count Walewski to make some concession to Russia in the question of ceding a portion of Bessarabia as stipulated in the Austrian ultimatum, I would venture to observe that the importance to be attached to this cession applies to the emancipation of the Pruth from Russian influence. The freeing henceforth of the Danube from a Russian armed flotilla, a point of essential importance as regards the safety of Turkey from Russian attack, will be only partially obtained if Russia shall be enabled to remain in command of any portion of territory touching the Pruth whence an armed flotilla might be at all times launched into the Danube to assist an invading army.

To avoid this eventuality, and thus to remove all possible communication of Russia with the Danube, appears to have been the principal object of the

Austrian proposal for a cession of that particular portion of Bessarabia laid down in the ultimatum, and it would seem essential that Russia should be deprived of all immediate contact with the Pruth, and thereby with the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 335.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 44.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Cowley,* giving him an account of a conversation which I have had with Count Colloredo, respecting the admission of Prussia to take part in the Conferences at Paris.

I have at the same time to state to your Lordship that Count Bernstorff has again spoken to me about the inexpediency and even the danger of excluding Prussia from the Conferences, and I again pointed out to him the insurmountable difficulties which appeared to lie in the way of her being admitted; but I repeated that it was probable that she would be invited to become party to any General Treaty that might be signed.

Count Bernstorff said he did not see how it would be consistent with the dignity of Prussia to become party to a Treaty if she had not taken part in the negotiations which led to the Treaty.

Upon that point I answered that I could give no opinion; but it appeared to me quite consistent with the policy she had adopted throughout to decline taking part in negotiations, which, though they might lead to the conclusion of peace, might also terminate in a renewal of war; but if the former event took place, I thought that the Powers who signed the Treaty, which would then have a general and European character, might not consider their work complete unless Prussia also became a party to it; and I ventured to express a hope that Prussia would seriously reflect upon the consequences to herself of declining such an offer, and would abstain from any acts while negotiations were pending, that might render it impossible to invite her accession to the Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 336.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 123.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,† by which you will learn that the French Government are afraid that the Porte will not make concessions on the fourth point, if the demand that the punishment by death of apostates from the Mahometan religion should be abolished, is persisted in.

Her Majesty's Government are for many reasons unwilling to desist from the demand, but you are at liberty to postpone it if you think it will endanger the settlement of the fourth point, which is of urgent importance before the negotiations begin.

You will endeavour at all events to get the punishment of death commuted to some lighter punishment.

I have sent your Excellency to-day an instruction to the above effect by the telegraph and in cypher.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 329.

† No. 301a.

No. 337.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 125.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve of your Excellency's proceedings reported in your despatch No. 73 of the 19th of January, and they consider the memorandum on the fourth point which you inclose is very satisfactory.

I have to request your Excellency to report to me your opinion as to the probability of the reforms contained in that memorandum being carried into operation, and as to the guarantees for that purpose which might with propriety be expected from the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 338.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 126.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 60 of the 16th of January, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course of proceeding which you have followed relative to the questions of privileges and reforms in Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction the identity of views which exists between your Excellency and your colleagues upon the most important of the points which have come under discussion.

You will express to the Porte the thanks of Her Majesty's Government, and their cordial satisfaction at the liberal and enlightened spirit in which they have met the proposals that it was the duty of the allies of the Sultan to submit to the Porte, and you will further express the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that by giving real and practical effect to the principles which have been laid down, the best interests of the Sultan will be promoted and His Majesty will earn for himself the sympathy and gratitude of the Christian Powers, which will prove the firmest support of the position which Turkey is now about to occupy in Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 339.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 3, 1856.*

THE fourth point is virtually settled. Turkish forms and hesitations have, by delaying its progress, retarded the consideration of the first point.

No. 340.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

THE French Government are afraid that the Porte will not make concessions on the fourth point, if we persist in our demand that the punishment of apostates from the Mahometan religion should be abolished.

Her Majesty's Government are, for many reasons, unwilling to desist from the demand; but you are at liberty to postpone it if you think it will endanger the settlement of the fourth point, which is of urgent importance, before the negotiations begin. Endeavour, at all events, to get the punishment of death commuted to some lighter punishment.

No. 341.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir James Hudson.

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1856.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of three despatches* from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe respecting a claim put forward by the Sardinian Minister at Constantinople to be admitted to take part in certain preliminary discussions now in progress at Constantinople.

You will perceive by the inclosed copy of a despatch† which I have addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe that the English and French Governments agree to Baron Tecco not being so admitted; and you may explain, if necessary, to the Sardinian Government, that the discussions at Constantinople are not negotiations for peace, but friendly and confidential communications between the Representatives of England, France, and Austria, and the Porte, with a view to induce the Porte to make of its own accord and by its own authority internal arrangements which would have the effect of superseding negotiations on one or more of the four points.

You will collect from the inclosed copy of a despatch‡ which I have addressed to Lord Cowley, the general feelings of Her Majesty's Government as to the admission of Sardinia to take part in the negotiations when formally set on foot. It would not be desirable that you should communicate that despatch to the Sardinian Government, but you will regulate your language by it in order, if occasion should arise, to allay any feelings of annoyance or irritation which may be felt at Turin at the non-admission of Sardinia to take a greater share in the negotiations for peace than has already been assigned to her.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 342.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, expressing regret that Her Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade had not paid the usual visit of ceremony on New Year's Day to the Prince of Servia.

I informed Count Colloredo that the Prince of Servia had only himself to blame, if Mr. Fonblanque had not paid his respects to his Highness on the day in question, as the Prince had for the first time departed from the usage of personally visiting the Consuls-General, who follow the Gregorian Calendar; and that, as there was good reason to believe that the omission had been deliberate and unfriendly, I had instructed Mr. Fonblanque, in answer to an inquiry which he had properly made, not to visit the Prince on the 13th of January.

I then, in my turn, expressed regret that the Austrian Government should show favour to the Prince of Servia, who was a servile adherent of Russia, and over whom, therefore, Austria would exercise but a slender influence whenever peace was restored, and Russian agencies came again into full play.

The Prince, I said, was besides a weak and inefficient person, and the best course would be for the Porte to depose him, and to place in his stead a man capable of governing the country with some reference to its interests rather than to his own.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 261, 303, and 306. † No. 309. ‡ No. 330.

No. 343.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.*

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, respecting the questions of privileges and reforms in Turkey.

You will communicate that despatch to Count Buol, who no doubt will have learnt with the same satisfaction as Her Majesty's Government, the identity of views which exists between the Representatives of the three allied Powers at Constantinople, as well as the liberal and enlightened spirit in which the Turkish Ministers have received the proposals which have been brought under their consideration for ameliorating the condition of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 344.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 72 of the 29th instant, stating that you had been informed by Count Buol that Russia proposed an armistice for four months; and I have to inform you that no such proposition can be entertained by Her Majesty's Government. The armistice must be of short duration. Within one month the allies will be as able to ascertain whether Russia really means to make peace or not, as in four months.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 345.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.*

I HAVE to state to you, in reply to your despatch No. 73 of the 30th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government agree with Count Buol as to Prussia being a party to the Treaty of Peace, and Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to invite Prussia to accede to it when signed; but for obvious reasons it would be extremely inexpedient that she should take part in the negotiations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 346.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 81. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.*

HER Majesty's Government concur with Count Buol in the opinion which you state, in your despatch No. 85 of the 31st ultimo, that his Excellency entertains in regard to the construction to be put upon the Article in the

* No. 336.

ultimatum with reference to the cession of Chotyn by Russia; and I shall be happy to confer with his Excellency upon that subject at Paris, before the opening of the negotiations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 347.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

(No. 83.)
Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.

Sir,

WITH reference to the observation made in your despatch No. 62 of the 23rd ultimo, that you feared to press Count Buol for an investigation into the statement made by Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun respecting the encroachments of the Transylvanian authorities upon the territory of Moldavia, because Count Buol, on a former occasion, had questioned the right of the Earl of Westmorland to come forward as the advocate of the Principalities, I have to state to you that the case with respect to which you were inquiring, is not precisely similar to the one alluded to in which you advert to the answer given to Lord Westmorland by Count Buol. In the present case you were quite justified in speaking to Count Buol upon the subject, because this country as well as Austria is engaged to maintain the integrity of the Turkish dominions, and the matter in dispute was a portion of those dominions which appeared to be taken possession of by an Austrian force.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 348.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 49.)
Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

I APPROVE of the remarks which you made to Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 56 of the 1st instant, with reference to the language which the King of Prussia held to you respecting Count Bernstorff's conversation with me upon the admission of Prussia to the Conferences at Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 349.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 50.)
Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which you state, in your despatch No. 57 of the 2nd instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel respecting the admission of Prussia to the Peace Conferences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 350.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, February 5, 1856.

WE hear that the Porte is desirous immediately to publish a firman embracing the matters that have been agreed to with respect to the fourth point.

We shall not object to this being done, if you and your colleagues think it expedient, and you approve of the firman, which, of course, will be submitted to you before it is published.

No. 351.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 91.)
Vienna, February 1, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the Protocol which was signed to-day by the Representatives of the Five Powers, as well as the Annex to which their initials were affixed.

As soon as the business of signing and placing the initials was concluded, Prince Gortchakoff stated that he had received the orders of his Government to propose formally that Prussia should take part in the negotiations about to be undertaken; this participation being her due, as well in her quality of a Great Power as with respect to her future association to acts growing out of the approaching negotiation.

Count Buol had no hesitation in expressing his desire that the proposal made on the part of his Government by the Russian Representative might meet with the approbation of the two Western Powers.

Baron de Bourqueney and myself confined ourselves to expressing successively our readiness to bring to the knowledge of our respective Governments the proposal made by the Russian and supported by the Austrian Representative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 351.

Protocol.

Présens :

Les Représentants de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Russie, et de la Turquie.

PAR suite de l'acceptation par leurs Cours respectives des cinq propositions renfermées dans le document ci-annexé sous le titre de projet de préliminaires, les Soussignés, après l'avoir paraphé, conformément à l'autorisation qu'ils ont reçue à cet effet, sont convenus que leurs Gouvernements nommeront chacun des Plénipotentiaires, munis de pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour procéder à la signature des préliminaires de paix formels, conclure un armistice et un Traité de Paix définitif.

Les dits Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir à Paris dans le terme de trois semaines, à partir de ce jour, ou plus tot si faire se peut.

Fait à Vienne, ce 1 Février, 1856, en quintuple expédition.

(Signé) G. H. SEYMOUR.
BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
GORTCHAKOFF.
IHSAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 351.

Projet de Préliminaires.

1. *Principautés Danubiennes.*

ABOLITION complète du Protectorat Russe.

La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes.

Les Principautés conserveront leurs priviléges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera en outre à ces Principautés ou y confirmera une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.

D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent, réclamé par leur situation géographique; aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est, et aboutirait au Lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

2. *Danube.*

La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées, sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

3. *Mer Noire.*

La Mer Noire sera neutralisée. Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Par conséquent, il n'y sera créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires-maritimes.

La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée, dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire, par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageront mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet sera, après avoir été préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du Traité Général, annexée au dit Traité, et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante. Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnée dans l'Article précédent.

4. *Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.*

Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrées sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer.

4. *Conditions Particulières.*

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire dans un intérêt Européen des conditions particulières en sus des quatre garanties.

G. H. SEYM[ou]r B. B. G. I.

No. 352.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 6.*)

(No. 204.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 5, 1856.*

I STATED in general terms to Count Walewski, this afternoon, the substance of what had passed between your Lordship and Count Colloredo, respecting the admission of Prussia to take part in the Peace Conferences, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 195 of the 4th instant.

Count Walewski said that since he had spoken to me upon this subject, two circumstances had occurred. Prince Gortchakoff, in signing the Vienna Protocol, had made a formal proposition, in the name of his Government, for the admission of Prussia to the Conferences—a proposition which had met with Count Buol's approval, and this morning M. de Hübner had renewed the application which he had made some days ago to the same purport. Russia grounded the justice of her demand upon the fact that Prussia having been a party to the Treaty of 1841, which would be modified by the arrangements now proposed, had a right to be consulted. Moreover, the questions under discussion were European questions which concerned Prussia as much as any of the Great Powers. Austria, without asserting the rights of Prussia as positively as her northern neighbour, gave it to be understood that there would be danger in excluding Prussia from any European arrangements. It would, Count Buol conceived, throw her into the arms of Russia, and perpetuate the schism which existed in Germany. Prussia, moreover, had expressed her willingness to sign the preliminaries as laid down in the Austrian ultimatum.

I asked Count Walewski what answer he had given to M. de Hübner. His Excellency replied that he had stated, in general terms, that he saw no reason to alter the opinions which he had formed, that there would be no advantage in admitting Prussia to take part in the negotiations about to commence, but that he could give no official answer without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government. To another of my questions, whether his Excellency's personal opinion had been modified by this fresh appeal on the part of Austria, Count Walewski replied that under no circumstances did he think that Prussia should be invited to participate in the Conferences, which was evidently her present pretension, but that he was not inclined to make a declaration of exclusion which would bind the French and English Governments beyond the present moment, if Prussia herself made advances. He should be glad, he added, to know the opinion of Her Majesty's Government after Count Colloredo, who, he supposed, would make a similar communication to that made to himself by M. de Hübner, had seen your Lordship.

I said, with reference to the Austrian arguments, that it should be recollected that no Government had been more determined respecting the exclusion of Prussia from the councils of Europe than Austria, until it suited the interests of the latter to take a contrary course; that under no circumstances but those of taking part with Russia in the war, could the policy of Prussia be more Russian than it was already; and that, without the least desire to underrate the

importance of Prussia I could not admit that it really signified whether she agreed or not to adhere to such a settlement as might result from the Conferences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 353.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 205.)
Paris, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me this afternoon that M. de Seebach had applied to him for passports to enable Count Orloff and M. de Brunnow to come to Paris as Russian Plenipotentiaries to take part in the negotiations for peace. The passports, he added, had been sent, those for Count Orloff to Berlin, those for M. de Brunnow to Frankfort. The general orders to prevent the passage of all Russian subjects into France, with the exception of the Plenipotentiaries' suite, had been received on the frontiers, and would be maintained unless the negotiations terminated favourably.

The Plenipotentiaries, on their arrival in Paris, are to be received by the Emperor at a private audience, and Count Walewski will inform them what visits they are to make. They will lodge at the hotel of the Russian Mission.

I asked Count Walewski when he expected them to arrive. He said that Count Orloff would not reach Paris until the last moment, but that M. de Brunnow would probably be here much sooner. I took the liberty of remarking to his Excellency that to allow M. de Brunnow to remain in Paris several days before the opening of the Conferences would be much remarked upon, and certainly ought to be avoided. An early arrival would be so indecorous on his part, that it must be attributed to political motives, and I could not too earnestly recommend his being confidentially advised not to come to Paris before his colleague. Count Walewski at first appeared to think that it would be very indelicate in him to interfere, but upon my telling him that I would not answer for the remarks of the press if matters went wrong during the negotiations, and this most extraordinary proceeding had been permitted, he said that he would write to M. de Montessuy, to prevent M. de Brunnow's undertaking the journey as soon as he had intended.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 354.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 207.)
Paris, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have seen that the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna did not receive instructions to ask to affix his signature to the Protocol signed on the 2nd instant, until that act had already been accomplished for some hours.

Count Walewski thinks that the way in which the exchange of this instrument was made, five originals having been signed, prevents the possibility of Sardinia now becoming a party to the transaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 355.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 208.)
Paris, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

M. DE THOUVENEL has informed Count Walewski by telegraph that the fourth point is settled, with the exception of the abolition of punishment in cases of apostacy. A hatti-sherif was about to be published, promulgating the Sultan's decision.

Count Walewski wishes that this hatti-sherif should be communicated to the Western Powers before it is made public. He proposes therefore (probably he has done it already) that the two Governments should ask by telegraph for its transmission to them. He calculates that it may reach Paris before the Conference assembles, and that, if France and England have no alteration to ask for, their acquiescence in its publication may reach Constantinople by means of the electric telegraph before any progress is made in the negotiations. Should modifications be required, Aali Pasha will be here to give advice upon them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 356.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 209.)
Paris, February 5, 1856.

My Lord,

I REMARKED to Count Walewski this afternoon that I had not heard that he had made any official communication to Her Majesty's Government in reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 144 of the 26th ultimo, in which you apprised his Excellency of the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the last French propositions. But as this acceptance involved a solemn agreement between the two Governments relative to the terms of peace, and as it was my duty to assure Her Majesty's Government on this point, I proposed addressing his Excellency a short note, embodying that agreement, and asking him to admit its correctness. His Excellency replied that he should prefer following the course which had been commenced, of exchanging despatches, and that he would address immediately to M. de Persigny a despatch notifying that he concurred in the construction put by your Lordship on the French propositions, and desire him to place a copy of it in your hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 357.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 75.)
Constantinople, January 21, 1856.

My Lord,

THE Sardinian Envoy has addressed another official note to me, and also to the French Ambassador, in explanation of his meaning when he made his preceding communication to us. A copy of the note is inclosed herewith. I purpose, in concert with M. Thouvenel, to acknowledge its receipt, and refer it our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 357.

Baron Tecco to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Péra, le 17 Janvier, 1856.

My Lord,

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier, pour m'annoncer la transmission à son Gouvernement de ma note du 12 de ce mois, son objet lui ayant paru pour le moment de la compétence exclusive des Cabinets.

Là dessus je n'aurais maintenant que des remercimens à vous offrir, Milord, si je ne crus devoir en même temps laisser subsister une impression qui paraît s'être produite sur votre esprit, ainsi que sur celui de son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur de France, au sujet de l'appréciation que j'ai dû faire dans la note susmentionnée du droit de mon Gouvernement à être représenté dans les Conférences. Je vois en effet avec peine que cette appréciation ait pu paraître mêlée à celle des devoirs aussi de leurs Excellences. Si elles voudront toutefois reporter un instant son attention sur la teneur de cette note, il leur sera facile de constater, je l'espère, que malgré la corrélation nécessaire des droits et des devoirs dans une alliance comme en tout autre contrat synallagmatique, je n'ai aucune part, en parlant de devoirs, signalé un devoir qui se rapportât à d'autres qu'à moi-même et à mon Gouvernement. Et sans m'arrêter à ce que je dis sur la fin de cette note du devoir de ma position, qui évidemment ne peut se rapporter à aucun autre, je n'ai qu'à examiner avec votre Excellence les deux autres paragraphes précédent, les seuls où il soit mention de devoir.

Dans le premier, en effet, où il est question d'une prétendue entente d'après laquelle le Gouvernement Sarde serait engagé à ne pas se faire représenter dans les Conférences de ses alliés, j'observe qu'un pareil engagement est impossible en présence des droits et des devoirs d'un allié. Or, on voit ici que la mention des devoirs ne s'applique qu'au Gouvernement Sarde comme il ne s'applique aussi qu'au même Gouvernement dans le paragraphe suivant où je fais ressortir l'engagement contracté par la Sardaigne dans le Traité du 10 Avril, 1854, de coopérer par tous les moyens avec ses alliés au rétablissement de la paix—engagement d'où j'ai montré découler le droit aussi bien que le devoir de sa coopération non seulement pour la guerre, mais dans les conseils et dans les Conférences de ses alliés. Or, il ne me paraît pas moins évident que dans ce dernier paragraphe comme dans l'autre il n'est question que du devoir concernant le Gouvernement Sarde, sauf toujours la corrélation ci-dessus signalée, implicite et nécessaire de tous les devoirs comme de tous les droits d'une alliance.

Je n'ai enfin qu'une bien simple réponse à ajouter à l'observation que votre Excellence paraîtrait me faire que ma démarche n'aurait eu d'autre base que ma propre appréciation, et c'est que me trouvant ici au centre même de l'alliance en qualité de Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'un Gouvernement qui en fait partie, je n'ai pas cru avoir besoin d'instructions spéciales pour réserver ses droits d'allié, lorsqu'il m'a paru les voir gravement compromis.

Vous ne trouverez pas excessif, Milord, le soin que j'ai dû mettre par ces explications à ne pas laisser subsister d'impressions qui puissent donner une idée moins correcte sur les circonstances de l'acte que ma position vient de m'imposer.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) R. TECCO.

No. 358.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 24, 1856.

I LEARN from Baron Tecco that he is ordered by his Government to repair to Turin, for which place he is to embark in a few days. He expressed himself so as to give me to understand that his journey is connected with the question of his participation in the discussions now in progress here. It is possible that his Court, unwilling to support him in his pretensions, has taken him out of the way for the present. He declares that he will not return to Constantinople unless he returns in a manner satisfactory to his views.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of the note by which I replied to a second one received from him. The French Ambassador has, I believe, replied in a similar sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 358.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Baron Tecco.

Péra, le 21 Janvier, 1856.

M. l'Envoyé,

JE me fais un devoir de vous accuser la réception de l'office que vous avez jugé opportun de m'adresser le 17 courant.

La question à laquelle il a trait est tellement du ressort de mon Gouvernement, que je dois me rapporter à ce que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous en dire.

En attendant je profite, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 359.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 205.)

MyLord,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve the representation made by your Excellency to Count Walewski, as reported in your despatch No. 205 of the 5th instant, on the inexpediency of Baron Brunnow's too early arrival in Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 360.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 206.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps taken by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 209 of the 5th instant, with respect to the official notification to Her Majesty's Government of the concurrence of the Government of the Emperor of the French in the construction put by Her Majesty's Government on the last French propositions as to the conditions of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 361.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 7.)

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 6, 1856

COUNT WALEWSKI read me this afternoon the despatch which he had addressed yesterday to the Duc de Grammont, in reply to his report respecting the conversation which he had had with M. de Cibrario, to which reference is made in my despatch No. 206 of yesterday's date. After explaining that if the Sardinian Government had made known their wishes in time, no difficulty would

have been made to the signature of the Vienna Protocol by the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires, Count Walewski says that he is most anxious not only to pay the utmost deference to the just titles, but also to the natural susceptibilities, of the Sardinian Government; and that although the Imperial Government desires to abide by former precedents in regard to form, yet in reality they will aid to give every facility to the Sardinian Plenipotentiaries to be admitted to the Conferences on all occasions when the material or commercial interests of Sardinia can by any possibility be affected. The Duc de Grammont is desired to give to M. de Cibrario an official copy of the Protocol of the 2nd instant, and of its annex.

The despatch is written in very courteous and friendly language, and Count Walewski assured me that it was his desire to give every satisfaction to the Sardinian Government.

His Excellency had just heard that Count Cavour was to replace M. d'Azeglio as Plenipotentiary at the Conferences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 362.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 209.)
Foreign Office, February 7, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 204 of the 5th instant, I have to state to you that Count Colloredo has made to me a communication similar to that which, as you reported in that despatch, has been addressed by Baron Hübner to Count Walewski. Count Colloredo dwelt at some length upon the importance of producing union in Germany, and the danger of differences in the Diet being created by Prussia with respect to the terms of peace, if the latter Power were not permitted to take part in the negotiations

I admitted to Count Colloredo that it was quite natural for Austria to desire unanimity of opinion in the Diet, upon any acts in which she was concerned; but the true object of the approaching Conferences at Paris appeared to have been altogether lost sight of, and I must therefore beg to remind him that negotiations were about to be entered into by belligerent Powers, to put an end to the war in which they were engaged, and for that purpose the union or disunion, the approval or disapproval, of Germany, was of no importance, and could not influence the proceedings of the Conference. I added, that throughout the war, and the costly sacrifices it entailed, the Western Powers had met with nothing but ill-will from Prussia and the German States, whose sympathies for Russia had never been disguised; and it was too much to expect that England and France should now invite Prussia to take part in negotiations for peace, in order that at their expense a temporary agreement of opinion should be created in Germany, where, as Count Colloredo well knew, the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, and the disturbing influence of Russia, forbad the hope of permanent union. Her Majesty's Government, I said, had no wish to undervalue the power of Prussia, nor to act harshly towards her, but it seemed to them, upon an impartial review of the policy of Prussia for the last two years, that to satisfy her ambition by admitting her now to take part in the consideration of questions from which she has hitherto excluded herself, would constitute a mischievous precedent and justly expose England and France to the charge of being indifferent to political dishonesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 363.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 64.)
Berlin, February 6, 1856.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 58 of the 2nd instant, I reported the impressions which I had then received as to the object of Baron de Beust's visit to this Court.

His Excellency returned to Dresden on Monday, and I cannot say that he has entirely effected a reconciliation of the differences which existed between the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets respecting the communication of the five points to the German Diet. When Baron de Buest left Berlin, it was understood to have been agreed that the Austrian proposal to the Diet was to be answered by the expression of readiness, on the part of that body, to accede to it upon the understanding, that if Germany adopted the five points she was to be invited to participate in the Conferences.

The Prussian Government did not at the time raise any objection to this conditional arrangement suggested by Baron de Beust, but on its being communicated to Vienna, Count Buol immediately told Colonel Manteuffel that it could not be taken into consideration, and it may therefore be presumed that the question will not be seriously pushed, though, to judge from the language of the Representatives of the small German Courts, they are unanimous in thinking the moment arrived for forcing on the question of the admission of the Diet to the position of one of the Great Powers, to emancipate her from her German sphere, and thus obtain her recognition as an active, instead of passive, implement in the general political negotiations of Europe.

The opinion of Austria on the point has already been given, and there is no doubt, if Prussia is not to be herself represented at the approaching Conferences, that she will never consent to her interests being delegated to any other Power, or to have them mixed up with those of Germany; Russia, I hear also, has no desire to have Germany admitted to the Conferences, though she will endeavour not to give offence in enunciating an opinion on the matter, and as I presume there can be no doubt as to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French on the subject, this part of Baron de Buest's proposal will fall to the ground. One result, however, of his visit is evident—the tone of communication between Austria and Prussia is improving, and there is a partial restoration of confidence between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 364.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)
Berlin, February 6, 1856.

My Lord,

THE subject which absorbs public attention at the present moment is, whether Prussia is or is not to be represented at the approaching Conferences at Paris. The opinion of the Russian party is, that it may be regrettable for Prussia, as a Great Power, not to be there, but that it would be equally so if she bound herself by any engagements that would interfere with her freedom of action hereafter, as their desire naturally is that in no case should Prussia ever be called upon to take part against Russia; and I have good reason to know that Baron Budberg gives them no encouragement to seek for admission to the Conferences, as he is perfectly contented with things as they are, and that he has now brought forward a fresh argument—that the Emperor Alexander, in accepting the five points, has raised a clamour amongst the old Russian party; and that if Prussia were now to join the Western Powers, his position would

become one of extreme danger from internal commotion, and that he would be perhaps forced to continue the war.

The Liberal party regret the humiliating position of their country, and seeing it reduced by the policy of the present Government to a mere German State; they, however, do not desire to see the King take engagements, at the suggestion of Austria, which would bind Prussia to the position of a second-rate Power in Germany. Then, again, there are many of both parties who, putting aside the question of the dignity of their country, are glad to see it free from any immediate danger; and they trust to the King's political ingenuity to secure Prussia from being involved in serious difficulties hereafter.

The language of the Austrian Minister, in his late communication to this Government, has been to induce a common attitude at the Diet; and he has latterly declared the anxiety of his Government that Prussia shall be represented at the Conferences. The language of the French Minister has been of friendly admonition, stating that if Prussia pursued her present impulses, she could not be admitted; but he has not concealed from Baron Manteuffel that the unfavourable disposition of his Government towards Prussia has been increased by arguments from England. We are therefore held up as the determined opponents of the pretensions of the King of Prussia to be invited to take part in the Conferences; and your Lordship can well imagine that the partizans of Russia are not idle in promoting the anti-English feeling which, unfortunately, exists to a considerable extent.

The Marquis de Moustier sets out for Paris to-morrow, on a short leave of absence for family affairs. He saw Baron Manteuffel last night; and on asking if his Excellency could not charge him with a favourable word for Paris—some argument which would enable Count Walewski to shake the present disposition of England towards Prussia—he was told in answer that the opinions of the Prussian Government have not undergone any modification, but that Prussia, in order to avoid giving a "spectacle" to Europe, will not appear in a different line from Austria at the Diet.

For the moment, the opinion of this Government appears to be that they will enter into no binding engagements as to the future; that they will not seek an invitation to the Conferences, to which, as a great Power, they consider they have a right of access; and that, further, no European arrangement can be completed without their participation.

The question now, rises in how far it might be for the interests of Europe to admit Prussia to these Conferences, and whether her presence would be advantageous or not.

It must not be expected that she can at once change the part she has been playing in the interests of Russia, for one of tendency towards the policy of the Western Powers; but with her great desire for the reestablishment of peace on a good and solid foundation, might not Prussia be found useful in assisting us in obtaining from Russia concessions, if she felt that withholding them would entail a continuance of hostilities?

The terror of war is such that she might be better disposed than we imagine to act with us in the Conferences; though at the same time it is not likely that she would ever take a decided part.

That Austria should wish for Prussia in the Conferences is natural. If she can obtain her adhesion to the five points, she will find her a ready ally to support her to the extent of her own objects, and also to prevent the Western Powers from pressing on the Conference more than she wishes them to obtain with regard to the Additional Articles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 365.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 67.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 6, 1856.*

I HAD just finished my despatch No. 66—in which I inform your Lordship of the statement made last night by Baron Manteuffel to the Marquis de Moustier, that Prussia, in order to avoid a spectacle in Germany, would agree to the

arrangement to be proposed by Austria at Frankfort—when Count Esterhazy called on me.

He said that the King had spoken to him in the most cordial manner at a ball which took place at the Palace last night, and said, with reference to the communications that have passed between Berlin and Vienna: "We shall remain together, be assured of this." This morning Count Esterhazy, in full confidence that a communication he had been ordered to make would be well received, called on Baron Manteuffel, and submitted to his Excellency's consideration the draft of an answer which his Government desires should be made by the Diet to the intended Austrian proposition, to the effect that Austria and Prussia having adopted the five points, the Confederation approved of the decision, and entrusted the protection of their interests in the forthcoming Conferences conjointly to Austria and Prussia. Your Lordship may judge of Count Esterhazy's surprise, when, instead of taking a favourable view of this communication, Baron Manteuffel said that such a project could not be entertained; and the Austrian Minister further considers that there is little chance of its being reconsidered, as he has reason to believe, from intelligence which he has received from different quarters, that Prussia has definitively made up her mind to exclusion from the Conferences; that she is supported in this impression by Russia; and that she will now devote all her energies to attaching to herself the interests of the smaller States, and establishing a formidable coalition in the interests of Germany alone.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 366.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 68.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 6, 1856.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of an instruction which was addressed from here to the Prussian Minister at Vienna on the 26th ultimo.

This despatch alludes to the services rendered by Baron Werther at St. Petersburgh in obtaining the final acceptance by Russia of the five points; it states the conviction that the conduct of Prussia will hereafter be duly appreciated, and that the English and French Governments must be aware that if the other Powers invite Prussia to maintain the bases of peace obtained in common, she will be ready to sign the preliminaries and firmly stand by her engagements.

Allusion is also made to the little deference in the course of the negotiations shown to Prussia by the Western Powers.

A further despatch was sent to Count Arnim after Baron de Beust's visit. It is dated the 3rd instant, and the Prussian Government, as I am informed, state therein that although Austria had not previously communicated to the Cabinet of Berlin her intended proposition to the German Diet, her Minister is ready to consider it when brought forward, and will be found disposed to support it; that Russia has no fault to find with the five points, and would assist and maintain the principle of them, provided it is not too much extended.

She will, however, not bind herself to anything, and the whole despatch, I am assured, breathes this spirit of unwillingness to take special engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 366.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

Berlin, January 26, 1856.

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a despatch from Count Buol to the Imperial Austrian Minister at this Court, of which the latter has had the goodness to allow me to take copy.

Your Excellency knows already, through my telegraphic despatches and instructions, the extreme satisfaction with which the King received the intelligence of the acceptance by Russia of the preliminaries of peace, announced by Baron Werther on the 16th instant, and for which, as an important step towards a speedy restoration of the blessings of peace, His Majesty has commanded his good wishes to be immediately conveyed to the Emperor Francis Joseph. We know how to appreciate the friendly manner in which Count Buol expressed himself at the attitude lately assumed by the King's Ministers at St. Petersburgh, and for the assistance which he was thus enabled to afford to his Austrian colleague. His Majesty has, in the present instance, as during the whole course of the Oriental complication, taken full consideration, though not always fairly recognised, of the interests of Europe. His Majesty trusts, in calm confidence, that Prussia will, sooner or later, receive an impartial appreciation of her position.

We accompany the measures, taken by Austria to obtain official information of the consent of the Cabinets of Paris and London to the preliminaries of peace accepted by Russia, with our best wishes for their speedy and complete success. The above-named Cabinets cannot, as well from what I have said to their Representatives here as from the language of the King's Ministers in Paris and in London, doubt that. The result of the simple fact of our having cooperated through Baron Werther for the acceptance of the preliminaries of peace by the Russian Cabinet is, that if the other Powers invite us to maintain the bases of peace obtained in common, we shall not hesitate to declare ourselves ready to sign with them the preliminaries: we shall thus best prove that we are determined to accept this document in future, although we did not cooperate in its details at the commencement, as a point of departure for our political conduct, and will certainly strive with all our strength in order not to see the bases of harmony already gained again postponed and destroyed. To make a further special communication to the Cabinets of London and Paris on the subject, since they have not even now made known to us officially their consent to the preliminaries accepted by Russia, would not only not be in accordance with the position which we have maintained hitherto, which wished to avoid the appearance of pushing into negotiations withheld from our knowledge; but, on the contrary, prove a troublesome mistrust of our intentions as a German and European Power, which is foreign to the King and His Majesty's Government.

We regard with the liveliest interest the proposal before us, respecting the communication by Austria to the Diet, and hope, with the Austrian Minister at this Court, that it will be of a nature to prove the unity of the Germanic Confederation, in its judgment of the great political question of the moment, and of the duties accruing to it therefrom.

You will bring this despatch to Count Buol's knowledge, with the repeated assurance of our bounden gratitude for the Austrian communication of the 20th instant.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 367.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.— Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 8, 1856.*

AT the request of the Consul-General in Servia, and for no other reason, I send you this message from him:—

"I received special information that Austria contemplated keeping her army in Moldavia and Wallachia, to preserve order and prevent intrigues, should peace be restored."

No. 368.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 9, 1856.*

IN reply to your last despatch of the 8th of February I have the honour to state that Ardahan, Kars, and Byazid are still held by the Russians.

Three battalions, or about 2,500 men, under Colonel [name omitted] are stationed at Kars, and from 5,000 to 6,000 men are at Byazid or in its neighbourhood. There is a small advanced post at Bardee on the Saghanluk.

The total of the Russian troops actually cantoned on Turkish ground amounts to about 10,000.

No. 369.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 8, 1856.*

SINCE I addressed your Lordship, on the 5th instant, my despatch No. 209, I have spoken several times to Count Walewski on the necessity of a thorough understanding being established between the two Governments on all the points of detail which must necessarily come under discussion during the Peace Conferences.

His Excellency informed me a few days ago that he was employed on the paper which the Emperor had desired should be drawn up with a view to this concord of opinion, but that it could not be terminated before the end of this week. His Excellency has since read passages of it to me. It appears to me to be a document that will be of use for the purpose designed, but the length of it prevents my attempting any analysis of it. It is intended rather to place before the two Governments the different ways in which the details arising out of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum may be worked out, than to suggest the adoption of any of them. Count Walewski has promised that it shall be in your Lordship's hands on Monday morning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 370.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 226. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 9, 1856.*

SINCE I wrote to your Lordship yesterday, respecting the memorandum which Count Walewski was about to send to London, for the purpose of facilitating the preliminary discussion between the two Governments relative to the terms of peace, the Emperor has informed me that he did not approve of the vague form in which the memorandum was drawn up, and that he had desired Count Walewski to be more explicit as to the opinion of the French Government. His Majesty added, that he did not on that account wish to convey the idea that those opinions were not to be discussed or modified. His object, on the contrary, was to facilitate discussion. His Majesty did not enter into any details.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 371.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 9, 1856.*

IN my despatch No. 68 of the 6th instant, I alluded to an instruction which had been addressed to the Prussian Minister at Vienna on the 3rd instant, and I have now the honour to inclose a translation of this document.

Baron Manteuffel states that Prussia, if invited to sign the preliminaries, is ready to appropriate to herself the bases on which the negotiations are about to commence, and he considers that the Germanic Confederation will be likewise disposed to do so. An opinion is also thrown out that a proper representation of the Diet at the approaching Conferences would be desirable.

Finally, the despatch to Count Arnim announces that the Prussian Minister at Frankfort is directed to speak in the foregoing sense in the Committee, and it is to be hoped that he will be able to cooperate in effecting an unanimous resolution of the Diet; but this paper contains such dark and confused passages, that the only conclusion to be drawn from it is, that Prussia still hopes to obtain admittance to the Peace Conferences, and is disposed, perhaps, to go a little further in the way of engagements than she was.

In the meanwhile the Austrian proposition has been submitted to the Diet, and forwarded to the Committee, and some of the members of the Prussian Government say that there is plenty of time to consider what is best to be done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 371.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

Berlin, February 3, 1856.

(Translation.)

MY despatch of the 26th ultimo will have been in your Excellency's hands when I received the inclosed Austrian communication of the 25th ultimo from Count Esterhazy.

We have naturally made its inclosure, the proposed Austrian communication to the Diet, the object of mature consideration. If the Vienna Cabinet had, before this was settled, placed itself in communication with us, we should perhaps have been in a position to suggest sundry alterations as desirable, and we could not at once have completely negatived the question, if it might be advisable to defer its communication to the Diet for some time longer. This, however, has not deterred us from approaching the decision of the Austrian Cabinet, on our part, with the sincere wish, so often proved, of seeing joined thereto a decision, proving the unanimity of Germany and of its two great Powers, as far as is compatible with the true interests and dignity of the Germanic Confederation.

We are convinced that all our German Confederates recognize, with as great pleasure as ourselves, in the preliminaries obtained from the belligerents, a newly-acquired basis for a speedy peace.

I have already stated in my despatch of the 26th ultimo, that if Prussia is invited by the parties interested she is ready to appropriate to herself those bases, to the attainment of which she is admitted to have contributed in the interests of Germany, by signing the preliminaries, and taking a part in the negotiations attached to them, in such a manner as shall prevent their being again prejudiced and postponed. While Prussia takes this position as a European Power, she has not been unmindful of her duties as a German Power towards the Diet as a totality, and towards its individual German Confederates. She believes, therefore, that she may take for granted that the latter recognize the bases obtained by agreement of the interested parties as a pledge of a speedy peace guaranteeing the interests of Germany, and that they are willing to maintain them proportionately, when an opportunity is afforded them, in their capacity of members of the Germanic Confederation, of forming a well-grounded opinion on those points which might constitute a subject of divergence of views and claims calculated to defer and even place in doubt the conclusion of the negotiations.

The Imperial Austrian Cabinet will agree with us that a due representation of the Diet itself at the Conferences would be especially fitted for this object, and is therefore desirable in the general interest.

The King's Minister at the Diet will be charged to speak in the sense of

the foregoing remarks in the Committee to which Count Rechberg refers the Austrian communication, and we trust confidently that he will thereby soon be in a position to cooperate beneficially towards bringing about a unanimous resolution of the Diet.

Your Excellency will communicate a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 372.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 9, 1856.

My Lord,

THE following intelligence has reached me from a private source, and as it comes from a person in whom I am inclined to place reliance, and who I cannot suppose capable of wilfully desiring to mislead one, I hasten to forward it for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

It is to the following effect:—

The Russian Government contemplates the creation of an arsenal on a very extensive scale in the neighbourhood of Astrachan, near the mouths of the Volga. The plans are completed, and, according to estimates made, the building and works will require ten years to construct, and in connection with these works engineers and skilled mechanics have already been sent from St. Petersburgh to Astrachan. The arsenal is to be supplied with iron from the Ural, and coal from the Don.

It is, moreover, in contemplation to facilitate the communication with St. Petersburgh by deepening one of the three systems of canals which connect the River Neva with the Volga, so as to admit of the passage of vessels from the Baltic to the Caspian.

Four iron flat-bottomed steam-boats, constructed in the Kuma previous to the war, by Mr. Carr (an Englishman who gave up his appointment, and returned to England on the outbreak of hostilities), have been put together at Astrachan, and tried, as it is said unsuccessfully, upon the Caspian.

The writer of the foregoing adds:—

"It is not for me to suggest what motives the Russian Government may have in erecting a second Bomarsund at the south-eastern extremity of the Imperial dominions, where there can be no danger of attack. My object in giving this information to your Lordship is to prevent the possibility of these have combined to put a stop to the encroachments of Russia in one quarter, and not unwittingly to allow her the opportunity of preparing secretly to extend her frontier in another, where it may be difficult to oppose her progress."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 373.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 9, 1856.

My Lord,

I AM privately informed that a Russian of rank who has lately returned from St. Petersburgh, having accompanied the Emperor to the Crimea, and who enjoys the confidence of the Russian Cabinet, has stated here the following motives for the Russian acceptance of the Austrian proposals.

He said that the Commissary-General in the Crimea, Wassilchelf, or some such name, had done wonders; that he had assured the provisioning of the army in the Crimea till the 1st of May; that the army were in good order (en assez bon état); that for the next campaign Russia intended to act only on the defensive, both in the Crimea, in Bessarabia, and in the Baltic and Asia; that accordingly the utmost success which they could expect would offer no ulterior gain; and that their principal aim would be not to lose ground, and not to risk any great losses of men: that they knew perfectly well that the resources of England and France

were greater than theirs, and that the sacrifices of war could be borne by them for a longer period; that therefore it was better to yield now when certain advantages were attainable than if obliged to do so at a later period; that in Russia the people did not know nor understand the question, and that the few scratches they had received as yet were of no great moment. But if they could arrest the war, and thus retrieve the false step (faux pas), by the present arrangements, which were not very onerous, they would then be enabled to reorganize themselves (se réorganiser).

He further remarked, as a signal advantage, that if they could now cut the war short, Russia would at all events maintain the ascendancy she had held in Asia and the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 374.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 74.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February* 9, 1856.

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel last night, with the view of softening, if I was not unable to remove, the impression which exists generally here, that the exclusion of Prussia from the approaching Conferences rests mainly with England.

I said to his Excellency that I had been surprised to find that this opinion had grown almost into a fixed idea at Berlin, and that though we should never shrink from a just responsibility, this was carrying the matter rather too far; that we had invited Prussia, and had hoped that she would not have refused to adopt and appropriate the five points, which would have given a colour to her policy; and that having refused to do so, the affair remained unsettled, and that France was perfectly agreed with us on the subject.

Baron Manteuffel replied that the Marquis de Moustier had certainly always spoken to him in this sense, and had said that the two Governments were of one and the same opinion, but there had been a shade of difference in the mode of treating the matter, and that England had held much more decided language than France.

This, I said to his Excellency, might perhaps be explained by the different preparations being overlooked, at a time when nearly all the nations of Europe mode of transacting business in the two countries. In England there was generally more bluntness of manner; our opinions were expressed plainly and clearly, and we had a straightforward way of acting, which resulted from the nature of our institutions. We sought less of concealment than other people. We had nothing to hide, and were in the habit of going straight to our point, and not by a circuitous route; a recommendable system, in my opinion, but which I was sorry to say was rarely appreciated.

I then endeavoured to learn from his Excellency what would be the result of the Austrian communication at Frankfort.

He said that the Committee would consider their report; but not a word dropped from him which indicated his ultimate intentions, and the probability is that he does not know them.

I then asked if the King was resolved to keep aloof from the Conferences.

His Excellency answered that His Majesty would not buy his entrance into them.

Then, I said, the position that would probably be occupied by the Prussian Government at the head of the smaller States, who were all clamouring to be represented at Paris, was exactly that which would be most agreeable to Russia. Prussia would keep out of all responsibility, and, if peace should not result from the Conferences, would be ready to play the same friendly part to Russia that she had done throughout the war. In fact, I said, you almost constitute yourself the ally of Russia.

This, Baron Manteuffel denied; but he threw out some unintelligible hints that our policy might drive her in a direction that might not be agreeable to us, and that she would probably find allies that understood her better than we did.

This morning the French Chargé d'Affaires called on me, and informed me that he had just seen Baron Manteuffel, whom he found firm on the question of refusing to enter into any species of engagement; and his Excellency, it appears, finished his conversation with M. Rothan with words to the following effect, which he doubtless said in order that they might be repeated to me as a supplement to our conversation of last night; "that he hoped peace would result from the Paris Conferences, that he looked forward hereafter to a close alliance being established between France and Russia, and that when the time came Prussia might be inclined to join it."

This was evidently meant to flatter the French Chargé d'Affaires, who, however, attached as little value to the words as they deserved, and to be repeated to me as a menace of what would occur to the relations of England and Prussia if we persisted in our present policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 375.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February* 9, 1856.

THE greatest confusion and contradiction appears in all the instructions that emanate from the Cabinet of Berlin at this moment, the jealousies of the different states have been roused, and Germany presents a spectacle to Europe of weakness and internal division impossible to describe. Bavaria has declared, as I understand from good authority, that she is willing to adopt only the four first points of the Austrian ultimatum, and will not agree to Baron Beust's idea of a general representative of the Confederation at the Paris Conferences, because, as the third great Power of Germany, she claims to be represented by her own Minister.

Hanover is ready to adopt and maintain, as Saxony is said to be, the principle of the five points at the Diet, but only on the condition that Germany is represented at the Conferences. This latter point seems a settled project among the smaller States, and as Prussia is not admitted at the Conferences, she naturally, to the dissatisfaction of Austria, will place herself at the head of them, and if their differences amongst themselves can be removed they may form a compact body, and be able yet to render important services to Russia.

The immediate consequence of Baron de Beust's mission, I am sorry to observe, has been, for the moment, greatly to increase the influence of Russia in Germany, and I must not omit to mention to your Lordship, that he stated to one of my colleagues during his stay here, that he had reason to believe that France would not object to a representative of the Diet at the Paris Conferences. I cannot learn what he considered to be the feeling on the subject at London and St. Petersburgh, but one would suppose that, out of gratitude to Germany, Russia would be less opposed to the idea now than she was in 1848, when she refused to have an Envoy from the Diet sent to St. Petersburgh; still, I understand that Russia would object to the entrance of a German representative on principle.

The visit of the Saxon Minister for Foreign Affairs may have originated in a desire to pave the way for more unity between the States of the Confederation, and to obtain the adoption by them of the five points; but the results, as far as they at present appear, have been to widen the breach between Austria and Prussia, to promote the interests of Russia, and the union between Prussia and and her followers.

Austria stands apparently, at the present moment, alone at Frankfort. She wants the aid of Prussia to carry her object in the Diet, and Count Buol has again expressed to the Austrian Envoy at this Court, this very day, his great and unabated desire to see Prussia at the Paris Conferences. He apparently hopes that, if the motion before the Diet is carried, the door may yet be opened

for her admittance; and he is the more desirous for this, as he is under no delusion as to the goodwill of Germany being opposed to Austria, who could not expect to be empowered to act at Paris for the interests of Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 376.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 100.)

Constantinople, January 28, 1856.

My Lord,

HAVING received information from a sure, though private, source that the Turkish Ministers were startled by difficulties proceeding from their colleagues in the Council, and hesitating as to the acceptance of the propositions given in by the three Representatives, I thought it my duty to make an additional effort for their encouragement and support. The points from which they were most inclined to recede, are, those of religious persecution; equal admissibility to office; and the possession of landed property by foreigners. To these important questions I therefore confined myself, as your Lordship will perceive on reading the copy, inclosed herewith, of my instruction to Mr. Pisani. It was no longer a time for recurring to arguments which had been previously exhausted. Respecting the first of the three questions, I sent in the official note which, as your Lordship is aware, had been long since prepared. On the question of landed property I made a statement calculated to remove every doubt of any difference of opinion between me and my colleagues. With regard to public offices, I repeated in decided terms the opinion jointly expressed at our preceding conference.

My note on religious persecutions and the rights of conscience in matters of religion, has received an addition at the end, and a few amendments in the preceding paragraphs. Your Lordship will be able to appreciate their extent and signification on comparing the two versions, the first of which was forwarded with one of my preceding reports last year. I stated at the time that some changes might be found necessary, and I hope that in the additional sentences I have offered a facility or two for attaining the desired conclusion. Sedition under religious pretences ought to be repressed in Turkey, as elsewhere; and blasphemy, when kept within its natural limits, and not visited with any extreme infliction, may fairly be left on the list of punishable offences.

The French Ambassador had often expressed a wish that I should postpone the complete execution of your Lordship's instructions on this subject until the general question of privileges and reform should be treated with reference to the fourth point of negotiation.

Having complied with his Excellency's wish I felt a greater responsibility as to leaving open the door for an unfavourable decision without the advantage of bringing to bear upon it the full weight of opinion and requisition which had been placed in my hands by Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Pisani has recorded in what manner the note and the instruction were received by Fuad Pasha and the Grand Vizier. A copy of his report is inclosed herewith.

I have since learnt from him that the joint propositions were taken into consideration at a meeting of the Council the night before last, and generally sanctioned by that Assembly, with the exception of what concerns the possession of landed property by foreigners, and the procedure in Civil Courts. The subject matter of my official note is also reserved for some ulterior communication, and I am under an impression that it will not improbably be made a ground of resistance, which nothing short of a very decided perseverance in support of it will overcome.

Another and I trust a final interview is to take place to-morrow on the whole question of privileges.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 376.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Mr. Pisani.

Palais d'Angleterre, le 25 Janvier, 1856.

Monsieur,

SOUS le même pli avec cette instruction vous recevrez un memorandum en Français relatif aux privilèges et reformes administratives dont la Porte s'occupe de concert avec ses alliés; et une note officielle en Anglais, accompagnée d'une traduction Turque, relative aux persécutions religieuses. Vous vous empresserez de présenter ces pièces à son Excellence Fuad Pacha après en avoir donné lecture à son Altesse le Grand Vizier. Celle qui concerne les privilèges est confidentielle, mais les Ministres Ottomans peuvent en faire tel usage qu'ils jugent convenable, en la soumettant même à Sa Majesté le Sultan et à leurs collègues. C'est le même memorandum dont il a été question dans notre seconde réunion chez le Grand Vizier.

Il m'est revenu que je suis supposé d'attacher moins d'importance que les Représentants de France et d'Autriche à ce que la permission de posséder des biens fonds en Turquie soit accordée aux étrangers. J'ai à cœur de faire savoir que cette supposition est tout-à-fait erronée. Je suis convaincu, au contraire, que le rapprochement cordial de la Turquie à l'Europe est essentiel au bien-être et au maintien de l'Empire Ottoman, et que la mesure la plus efficace dans ce sens ne serait autre que la faculté accordée aux étrangers d'y posséder des immeubles de toute espèce.

Quant à la note, elle est à peu près identique en substance avec ce que j'ai soumis au Ministère Ottoman il y a déjà plusieurs semaines par l'ordre exprès de mon Gouvernement, soit de bouche soit par écrit. Les hésitations qui se sont laissées apercevoir dans les réponses des Ministres en dernier lieu, m'imposent le devoir de présenter sans plus de retard cette pièce formelle, que j'avais déjà préparée il y a deux mois environ, et j'espère que la Sublime Porte en prendra connaissance avec les sentiments que j'aime à lui attribuer.

Il ne me reste qu'à ajouter un mot en confirmation de mes opinions, déjà plus d'une fois exprimées, relativement à l'admissibilité de toutes les classes aux conseils et aux emplois publics de l'Empire. Dans l'état actuel des choses c'est l'union seule des classes qui, à mon avis, peut rendre à l'Empire la force qui lui manque dans l'intérieure, et sans la mesure que je viens de nommer, toute union réelle est une impossibilité.

Je vous salue,
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 376.

Note addressed to the Porte by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

SEVERAL years have passed away since the execution of a young Armenian at Constantinople, who had renounced the Mahometan faith and returned to that of Christ, followed shortly afterwards by another similar infliction at Broussa, excited the indignation of Europe, and induced the Governments of England and France to unite in preventing the repetition of so great a scandal. The Sultan and his Ministers were not deaf to their persevering remonstrances. The promise given personally by His Imperial Majesty to the British, and also to the French Ambassador, in addition to the official engagements of the Porte, had every appearance of sufficing to secure the Christian subjects of the Empire from religious persecution, and, in particular, to abolish the barbarous practice of putting seceders to death.

It cannot, however, be conceded that in practice these diplomatic agreements between the Porte and its allies, though crowned with the Sultan's promise, have not been attended with results so steady or effectual as the French and British Governments were entitled to expect. In two known instances, individuals have lately suffered death by the hand of the executioner on account of religious considerations. In other cases, imprisonment, ill-treatment, and forced removal to a distance have been employed, either to obtain an unwilling

recantation, or to appease the malice of a fanatical populace. Whole families of Catholic converts were on one occasion driven from their homes and sent across the sea into Asia, under circumstances revolting to humanity, and operating on their lives with fatal effect. Protestants, though recognized by Imperial firmans, and recommended to the local authorities, have been exposed to unmerited vexations, while Turkish functionaries, far from protecting them against the violence of their Christian persecutors, have themselves but too often connived at the work of persecution.

Surely the time is come when these remnants of an ignorant age should be completely and permanently effaced, when the Porte's enlightened declarations should be carried into full effect. Acts which, to speak plainly, are absurdities in the view of reason, and horrors in that of humanity, can no longer with prudence defy the common sense and good feeling of nations united by the closest ties. True policy condemns, and civilization rejects them. A legislative system which retains the anomaly is dangerous to those who uphold it. A nation, incapable of throwing off the taint, forfeits at length the sympathy of others, and finally becomes the victim of its insulated weakness.

Deeply convinced of these important truths, and anxious to rescue the Ottoman Empire from evils generated by neglect of them, a friendly Government, in concert with a powerful and generous ally, appeals once more to that wisdom and magnanimity which on critical occasions have rarely been wanting to the counsels of the Porte.

England and France, as every one knows, are making gigantic efforts, and submitting to enormous sacrifices, in support of the Sultan's Empire. Though many glorious successes have marked the progress of their arms, they have still a wide field of exertion before them, and Providence alone can determine the final issue.

Such are the circumstances under which the Undersigned is instructed by his Government to press this subject most earnestly on the attention of the Ottoman Porte. He is ordered to observe that the Great European Powers can never consent to perpetuate, by the triumphs of their fleets and armies, the enforcement in Turkey of a law which is not only a standing insult to them, but a source of cruel persecution to their fellow-Christians. They are entitled to demand, and the British Government distinctly demands, that the Mahometan who turns Christian shall be as free from every kind of punishment on that account as the Christian who embraces the Mahometan faith. It stands to reason that, in all such cases, the human conscience being left free, the temporal arm must abstain from interfering to coerce its spiritual convictions.

The Undersigned entertains a firm hope that the Sultan's Ministers, enlightened by experience, and duly attentive to the exigencies of time and circumstance, will not only do justice to the motives of this demand, but recognize the necessity of redressing a grievance which stands in such painful contrast with the services rendered to Turkey by Christian Powers.

It rests with the Porte to determine in what manner this just and indispensable reform may be most satisfactorily completed. The Undersigned cannot for a moment doubt that the Turkish Government, in doing away with the last remnant of sanguinary fanaticism, and clearing its antecedent pledges from every shade of uncertainty, will maintain an inviolable protection over all its subjects, of whatever creed, who, following the dictates of conscience in religious matters, may exercise its rights without seeking to disturb the peace of society.

Hitherto the British Government has treated with similar liberality the millions of Mussulman population brought under its rule in India, and it would deeply lament the necessity of adopting a less generous policy towards them.

The Porte, unwilling to incur so deep a responsibility, will, doubtless, bear in mind that society may be secured against sedition working under religious forms, and that religion itself may be secured from reproach, by special enactments applied with judgment and moderation to cases of open turbulence and undisguised blasphemy. Her present and first obligation is to meet the demands of her ally with gratitude equal to the circumstances which inspire that sentiment, and with wisdom adapted to the political prospects of her Empire, and to the welfare of those who profess the Mussulman creed beyond as well as within its limits.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 376.

Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, le 26 Janvier,* 1856.

CONFORMEMENT aux ordres que votre Excellence m'a donné je me suis empressé de me rendre chez son Altesse le Grand Vizir et de lui donner lecture des pièces annexées à l'instruction que vous m'avez adressé en date d'hier, savoir, le memorandum en Français relatif aux privilèges et aux reformes administratives, et la note en Anglais, avec une traduction en Turc, par rapport aux persécutions religieuses. Après avoir pris connaissance de ces pièces, son Altesse m'a chargé de vous dire, que quant à la note officielle, elle contient un point fort délicat auquel il ne peut répondre sans l'assentiment de ses collègues; que ce soir même le Conseil Ministériel se réunissait chez lui pour prendre connaissance du résultat des Conférences qui ont eu lieu chez lui avec les Représentants des Puissances alliées au sujet du quatrième point, et qu'il ne manquera pas d'y soumettre aussi la note en question, mais qu'il croyait qu'elle ne serait pas favorablement accueillie.

Après avoir quitté son Altesse je me suis rendu chez Fuad Pacha, à qui j'ai remis les pièces en question, ainsi qu'une copie de l'instruction de votre Excellence. Ce Ministre, après avoir lu les pièces dont il s'agit, m'a dit que il s'empresserait de les communiquer à ses collégues, qui se réunissaient ce soir chez son Altesse le Grand Vizir.

(Signé) E. PISANI.

No. 377.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 103.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 28, 1856.

I CALLED upon the Grand Vizier a few days ago to thank him for the willingness he had shown to comply with my wishes respecting the temporary disposal of Abbé Hamilton on his arrival here. The visit afforded me an opportunity of going once more over two or three points of the question of privileges and reforms which I thought susceptible of improvement under the general principles jointly recommended by the three Representatives, and formally accepted by the Turkish Ministers.

It is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with the particulars of our conversation. The appointment of some one, among the intended Representatives of the Christian communities in the Supreme Council, to correspond with their fellow-Christians in the Provinces; the nomination of Deputies from the same communities to take part in the management of their affairs in the capital; the selection of a Christian adviser to be attached to each provincial Governor, and a complete recognition of the rights of conscience in religious matters, are the leading matters on which I dwelt.

It was not my fortune to make much apparent impression on Aali Pasha. His Highness abounded in objections to each of my suggestions. He did not, however, recede from his general declarations in favour of reform, or positively shut the door against any extension of the accepted principles. Feeling, nevertheless, the inexpediency—not to say uselessness—of going into a prolonged discussion, I intimated an intention to send in the official note which I had long prepared on the subject of religious persecutions, and took my leave after exchanging a few sentences on less important matters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 378.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 109.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE this day transmitted to Sir Hamilton Seymour the following telegram:—

"Telegraph to Lord Cowley for the information of the French and British Governments that the Porte has this day sent instructions by telegraph to her Representative at Vienna to sign a Protocol respecting preliminaries of peace and armistice in concert with yourself and Baron Bourqueney."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 379.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 111.)

Constantinople, January 30, 1856.

My Lord,

ANOTHER long meeting of the Turkish Ministers and the three Representatives took place yesterday at Her Majesty's Embassy, and I am happy to say with every prospect of a successful issue. Another reference to the Council was found to be necessary on two points of the question of privileges and reforms, namely, those of religion and of land.

The Porte, as its Ministers allege, is resolved that there shall be no more religious persecution in Turkey—no further effusion of blood in execution of judgment on account of religious opinions; but it is thought impossible for the Sultan either to abrogate the Mussulman law, or to make any public declaration equivalent to its abolition in that respect. The Ministers assure me that they are sincerely willing to meet our wishes to the utmost of their power, but they entreat our forbearance, and urge that time and the progress of opinion will not fail to consummate the work of humanity. Observing that my Christian colleagues were not prepared to go the whole length with me, and apprised by M. Thouvenel of his last unfavourable instruction from Count Walewski, I found myself under the necessity of either modifying my demand, or delaying indefinitely the completion of the fourth point. I preferred the former course, as being the least inconvenient, and likely in the end to be attended with the smallest sacrifice. I therefore accepted the Porte's version of the clause relating to religious liberty, slightly amended, with the reserve of obtaining a separate answer to my official note on that subject, which should incorporate the version previously adopted and amended by the three Representatives. Both these versions are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information, the former marked A, the latter B.

With respect to the possession of land by foreigners, the Porte is unwilling to make so great a concession without some security against the interference of foreign protection in virtue of the Capitulations. Objections on this ground could only be met with friendly assurances and earnest exhortations. The Sultan's Ministers were reminded that on the question of land, as on that of religion, the establishment of a cordial sympathy between Turkey and Christendom was the main object in view, and that they would best consult their Sovereign's glory and the welfare of the Empire by declaring the principle at once with becoming frankness, and leaving such guards and securities as might be required for a friendly and honourable arrangement hereafter between the respective Powers.

Our conference broke up at a late hour, with a mutual understanding that the Grand Vizier and Fuad Pasha would support the propositions, as modified, in discussion with their colleagues, and that a final decision should be taken and declared with the least practicable delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 379.

(A.)

AUCUN sujet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, à quelque culte qu'il appartienne, ne sera ni insulté ni molesté, encore moins persécuté ou puni à raison de ses opinions religieuses.

Inclosure 2 in No. 379.

(B.)

VU que tous les cultes sont et seront librement pratiqués dans les Etats Ottomans, aucun sujet de Sa Majesté le Sultan ne sera gêné dans l'exercice de la religion qu'il professe, et ne sera en aucune manière inquiété à cet égard. Personne ne pourra être contraint à changer de religion.

No. 380.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 114.)

Constantinople, January 31, 1856.

My Lord,

THE Sardinian Envoy was to leave Constantantinople to-day for Turin, in obedience to orders from his Government, but the wind being strong from the south, I have persuaded him to postpone his departure till after this evening, when he will have the opportunity of paying his respects to the Sultan at Her Majesty's Embassy.

Baron Tecco appeared to be gratified by this attention, and it may be presumed that the Sultan will like to see the usual Representatives of the alliance in his presence on such an occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 381.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, February* 11.)

Paris, le 9 Février, 1856.

M. Comte,

LORD COWLEY m'a donné lecture et remis copie de la dépêche dont vous trouverez, ci-jointe, une expédition.

Comme vous le verrez, cette communication a eu pour objet de nous faire part de l'assentiment du Cabinet Anglais à la combinaison dont vous entretenait ma dépêche du 25 du mois dernier.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur se félicite de se trouver, sur ce point important, comme sur tous ceux qui ont été examinés en commun, en parfait accord avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Vous voudrez, M. le Comte, en donner l'assurance à Lord Clarendon en lui laissant copie de la présente dépêche.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 382.

Count Walewski to Count Persigny.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, February 11.)

Paris, le 9 Février, 1856.

M. le Comte,

M. LE DUC DE GRAMONT m'annonce que le Ministre de Sardaigne à Londres a transmis à sa Cour l'information suivante: "Lord Palmerston m'a exprimé son regret et son étonnement de rencontrer dans le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France des dispositions très peu favorables à la Sardaigne."

Cette assertion est, certainement, inexacte. Elle ne répond ni aux sentiments du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, à l'égard du Gouvernement Sarde, ni à l'opinion que le Premier Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique a dû s'en former. Elle est, sans doute, le résultat d'une erreur que nous ne pouvons laisser accréditer, et je vous prie de vouloir bien la signaler à Lord Clarendon, qui jugera urgent de la rectifier.

M. le Marquis d'Azeglio se serait cru autorisé, en outre, à mander à Turin qu'il s'était assuré l'assentiment du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ou de Lord Palmerston à ce que la Sardaigne fût admise à participer sans restriction aux Conférences; mais que, dans la pensée de ces Ministres, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur s'y opposerait, vraisemblablement par condescendance pour l'Autriche, que, dans ce cas, le concours de l'Angleterre serait acquis aux Plénipotentiaires Sardes.

Je n'hésite pas à croire que M. le Ministre de Sardaigne, se méprenant sur les intentions du Cabinet Anglais, n'en a pas été, dans cette circonstance, l'interprète fidèle. Il existe entre le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique un accord qu'atteste la dépêche que Lord Clarendon a adressée, le 13 Juin dernier, à Lord Cowley, et dont je vous entretenais dans celle que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire le 15 du même mois. Si les Ministres de la Reine avaient eu la pensée d'y substituer une autre combinaison, ils s'en seraient entendus avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale avant de faire part au Ministre de Sardaigne de leurs nouvelles dispositions; nous avons, d'ailleurs, une trop grande confiance dans des sentiments dont nous avons souvent recueilli l'expression pour admettre l'exactitude de l'impression dont M. le Marquis d'Azeglio se serait fait l'organe auprès de son Gouvernement. Le Cabinet Anglais sait avec quel empressement nous nous prêtons aux résolutions qui nous semblent conformes aux intérêts de l'alliance, et nous avons la conviction qu'il s'en serait ouvert franchement avec nous, s'il avait jugé utile de revenir sur la détermination que nous avons prise de concert et dont nous avons fait part au Gouvernement Sarde.

Il est, toutefois, d'un intérêt essentiel de ne pas laisser ignorer à Lord Clarendon les appréciations que M. le Ministre de Sardaigne prit aux Ministres de la Reine, et je vous prie de vouloir bien donner lecture et laisser copie de cette dépêche au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, qui appréciera l'esprit de conciliation qui nous guide dans cette circonstance.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 383.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

Constantinople, February 11, 1856.

(Telegraphic.)

THIS is the explanation of the discrepancy in the Russian *note verbale* of March 16, 1851:—

The note, though received by Rifaat Pasha from Prince Menchikoff, and communicated verbally in substance to the British Embassy, was subsequently concealed, with a view to not returning any answer to it. After the Prince's retirement it was thought best by the Porte to treat the document as *non avenu*, and this no doubt led the Prince to speak of it as not existing. The report of Mr. Smythe, whom I employed to investigate the matter more searchingly, will be forwarded by the next opportunity.

No. 384.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 229.)

Paris, February 9, 1856.

My Lord,

I SPOKE this afternoon to Count Walewski, as instructed by your Lordship's despatch No. 213 of yesterday's date, respecting M. de Beust's proposition for the admission of the Germanic Confederation to take part in the negotiations for peace; and I expressed the hope that this proposition would meet with no encouragement from the French Government.

Count Walewski's reply was more evasive than positive. He said that, as the proposition had found no support any where, it was useless pronouncing an opinion upon it.

I was not surprised at the answer; for in some of the conversations which I have lately had the honour to hold with the Emperor, I have found His Majesty more or less imbued with an idea that it would be possible, by admitting the smaller States of Germany to take part in the Conferences, to raise up a third Power in Germany, which, supported by France and England, would be able to hold Austria and Prussia in check. I have observed to His Majesty, in the first place, that M. de Beust's proposition, as I understood it, was, that the Confederation should be admitted to take part in the Conferences. But the Confederation included both Austria and Prussia; and the scheme, therefore, if it succeeded, would not bring about, as the Emperor supposed, a schism among the German Powers, but, on the contrary, a greater approximation.

But, in the second place, I said that I had lived long enough in Germany to be assured of what would happen, were this idea of the third party to be sincerely entertained. Austria and Prussia would forget their rivalry, for the moment, for the purpose of conjointly crushing a rising Power which might become formidable to them; and it would eventually be found that, instead of diminishing the influence of these two, the allies had aided to consolidate it, unless, indeed, they were prepared to go to war to support the cause of the secondary States.

Thirdly, I observed that, as yet, the secondary States had done nothing to entitle the Western Powers to hope that, even if they obtained greater power, that power would be exerted against Russia.

The policy of the smaller German Powers, I added, never varied. They would never allow one of the greater German Powers to obtain such an ascendancy over the other as would endanger their own security; and unless France was desirous of strengthening Germany, she had better leave the States to their interminable jealousies and discords.

The Emperor appeared to listen with much interest and attention to what I told him, and, at all events, to be convinced that the scheme of raising a third Power in Germany was not likely to succeed at present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 385.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 230.)

Paris, February 9, 1856.

My Lord,

WITHOUT in any way quoting Lord Bloomfield, I have, as directed by your Lordship's despatch No. 212 of yesterday's date, informed Count Walewski of the language held by the French Minister at Berlin, with regard to admitting Prussia to the Peace Conferences.

I had previously, on more than one occasion, spoken to Count Walewski respecting the rumours which had reached me, in regard to the language of the French Diplomatic Agents in Germany, and the manner in which they attributed to English councils the refusal to admit Prussia to the said Conferences.

Count Walewski said that he had this morning had a long conversation with M. de Moustier, and that that Minister had, in the most unqualified manner, denied ever having given the Prussian Government the slightest reason to suppose that any difference of opinion existed between the two Governments in regard to this matter. On my mentioning what M. de Moustier was reported to have said, on taking leave of Baron Manteuffel before leaving Berlin, Count Walewski said that M. de Moustier had represented his own language in a very different light. He had merely said to M. de Manteuffel that Prussia wished to enter into the Conferences, and yet would not furnish him with a single argument of which he could make use at Paris.

As a proof of his own sentiments, Count Walewski added that he had yesterday received letters from two of the French Ministers in Germany (he would not name them, he said) who asserted that a general opinion prevailed that France was well disposed towards Prussia and England the contrary, and that he had not lost a moment in replying that there was no difference of opinion between the French and English Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 386.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Howard.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by Lord Cowley to Count Walewski, as reported in his Excellency's despatch No. 204 of the 5th instant, on communicating to Count Walewski the substance of what passed at my interview with Count Colloredo on the subject of the admission of Prussia to take a part in the Conferences to be held at Paris for the reestablishment of peace.

The arguments used by the Governments of Austria and Prussia that the latter Power ought to be admitted into the Conferences, because the proposed Treaty will modify the Treaty of 1841, has no force; for the only modification of the Treaty of 1841 which is proposed to be made, consists in the admission of two small vessels, of each of the Contracting Parties not having territories on the Black Sea, to lie off the mouths of the Danube, to watch the freedom of navigation of that river. The great principle of the Treaty of 1841, namely, the shutting of the Straits to ships of war of all nations while the Porte is at peace, is maintained.

The Treaty of 1841 allowed of exceptions for light vessels with despatches, or in the service of Embassies and Missions at Constantinople, and the same principle includes light vessels for the mouths of the Danube.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 387.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1856.

AALI PASHA embarked this afternoon for Marseilles in French steam-frigate. The Porte, in an official note addressed to me, has confirmed its former declaration respecting renegades, and expressed as including Mussulmans. Disputed territory near Choorooksoo is an irregular triangle formed by the Rivers Teholosk and Teheralon with the mountains, whence they spring. As the question turns upon what is the ancient boundary of Gouriel, contradictory evidence was produced on both sides. The inhabitants of Gouriel are in possession under a provincial arrangement made in 1835 by the then Pasha of Trebizond.

No. 388.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1856.

HER Majesty's Government approve of the communication which you made to the Porte as to privileges and reforms, and as to the question of punishments for apostacy, as set forth in the instruction to Mr. Pisani, copy of which is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 100 of the 28th ultimo.

Her Majesty's Government also approve of the language which you held to the Grand Vizier on the same subjects, as reported in your despatch No. 103 of the 28th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 389.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 174.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1856.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 111 of the 30th of January, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having accepted the Porte's version of the clause relating to religious liberty, with the reserve explained in your despatch.

As regards the privilege of holding land, Her Majesty's Government consider it of vast importance to Turkey, as there is reason to believe that a large amount of capital is ready for investment in land, upon proper guarantees as to tenure, whenever peace is restored.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 390.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 176.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1856.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 114 of the 31st ultimo, I have to state to you that I approve of your having persuaded Baron Tecco to postpone his departure for Turin, so as to enable him to have an opportunity of paying his respects to the Sultan, on the occasion of His Imperial Majesty's visit to the British Embassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 391.

General Suggestions as to the Course to be pursued at the Conferences.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Persigny, February 13.)

TOUT le monde semble d'accord sur la nécessité d'arriver le plus promptement possible à une solution. A cet effet, il y aura à examiner:

S'il faut se borner à signer des préliminaires qui contiendraient purement et simplement les cinq propositions paraphées à Vienne; ou s'il ne serait pas préférable, dès l'abord, de résoudre nettement les questions principales et celles qui se rapportent aux conditions particulières, de façon à conclure un Traité de Préliminaires qui serait, déjà, à lui-seul un véritable Traité de Paix dont le Traité définitif ne serait que le développement; ou bien encore, s'il n'y aurait pas avantage à considérer les conditions paraphées à Vienne comme des préliminaires

suffisants, et à passer immédiatement à la conclusion de l'armistice et à l'ouverture de la négociation générale.

Il est bien entendu toutefois que l'une ou l'autre de ces deux dernières alternatives ne saurait être adoptée que par suite d'un accord entre toutes les Parties Contractantes.

Dans le cas où l'on se serait entendu pour discuter la réduction d'un Traité de Préliminaires devant comprendre explicitement toutes les clauses de la négociation, les éléments de ce Traité seraient les quatre premières propositions de l'ultimatum Autrichien avec l'adjonction des conditions suivantes :—

1. L'engagement de la part de la Russie de ne point " reconstruire ni créer d'arsenaux ou d'établissement naval ou militaire dans les Iles d'Aland."

2. La fixation, d'une manière définitive, des frontières de l'Empire Ottoman à l'est de la Mer Noire.

3. La double évacuation, par l'armée Russe de l'Asie Mineure, et par l'armée Ottomane des positions qu'elle occupe en Mingrélie.

4. Une amnistie générale accordée aux Tartares, et, en un mot, à tous les sujets Russes compromis dans les provinces occupées par les armées alliés.*

Si l'on ne pouvait pas se mettre d'accord sur cette manière de procéder, on en reviendrait à la marche convenue :

1. Signature des préliminaires fondés exclusivement sur les cinq propositions telles qu'elles se trouvent énoncées dans la pièce annexée au Protocole paraphé à Vienne.

2. Conclusion de l'armistice.

3. Ouverture de la négociation générale.

Si le document contenant les préliminaires ne doit comprendre purement et simplement que les cinq propositions dans leur texte actuel, il serait désirable qu'il fut signé dès la première séance, afin de procéder à l'armistice le plus promptement possible.

Armistice.

Après la signature des préliminaires de paix, les Plénipotentiaires auront à fixer les conditions de l'armistice. Il ne devra s'étendre, selon nous, qu'aux opérations de terre. En ce qui regarde la mer, l'armistice n'entraînerait ni la suppression des blocus aujourd'hui existants, ni le non-rétablissement de ceux qui ont été levés en considération de la saison. Mais dans le cas où le blocus serait maintenu dans la Mer Noire et la Mer d'Azoff, et rétabli dans la Baltique et la Mer Blanche, les croiseurs alliés devront s'abstenir de toute opération contre le littoral de l'ennemi, et se borner à agir en mer contre le pavillon ennemi et les pavillons neutres qui seraient en contravention.

La perspective de la reprise des hostilités à bref délai devrait nécessairement exercer une salutaire pression sur les dispositions de la Russie. l'armistice devrait être limité et il conviendrait d'en fixer l'échéance au 15 Avril au plus tard. Il resterait, d'ailleurs, dans ce cas, la faculté de prolonger, s'il le fallait, l'armistice en le renouvelant.

Traité Général.

De l'ordre à suivre dans la distribution des Articles.

En abordant la discussion du Traité Général, il y aura lieu d'examiner si l'on suivra, pour la distribution des Articles, la marche indiquée par les notes de Vienne et les propositions de paix. Peut-être serait-il plus logique de placer le troisième point, soit au premier rang, parcequ'il domine les autres par son importance; soit au dernier, parcequ'il les résume et qu'il est destiné à les consolider. Dans cette seconde combinaison, qui paraît la plus rationable, on pourrait faire figurer au premier rang le quatrième point réglant le grand intérêt qui a été l'occasion de la guerre; viendrait ensuite l'abolition du protectorat dans les Principautés, qui se rattache logiquement à l'abolition du patronage sur les Rayas ;

* N.B.—Si le Traité de Préliminaires contient le développement du premier et du troisième points, nous aurions à indiquer, dès lors, nos vues sur Chotyn, Nicolaief, et Kherson, avec l'intention, toutefois, de ne pas insister d'une manière absolue, ainsi qu'il sera expliqué ci-après, et dans le but seulement de fournir matière à compensation.

puis le réglement de la navigation du Danube; et enfin, la neutralisation de la Mer Noire, qui est, en quelque sorte, la garantie de tous les autres points.

Il y aura aussi à considérer à quel moment de la négociation il serait opportun de discuter les conditions particulières.

Le mode qui semble le plus propre à déterminer une prompte solution serait de discuter, au préalable, toutes les clauses du Traité, et de ne procéder au développement et à l'application des principes posés qu'après avoir explicitement constaté un parfait accord sur toutes les bases générales.

Quel que soit l'ordre adopté, il sera nécessaire de stipuler en tête du Traité l'introduction de l'Empire Ottoman dans le droit Européen, annoncée par les notes de Vienne, mais dont les propositions de paix ne fait pas mention. Il faut, toutefois, se garder de l'erreur où est tombée la Conférence de Vienne en établissant que les Puissances s'engageaient, non seulement à respecter, mais à faire respecter, l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Turquie. Cette obligation, en effet, constituerait pour les Parties Contractantes un rôle de protection auquel il ne serait pas prudent de convier la Russie. On éviterait cette difficulté en rédigeant ce point de la manière suivante :—

Art. I. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que l'Empire Ottoman participe aux avantages du système établi entre les divers Etats de l'Europe, déclarent que les Conventions ou Traités conclus, ou à conclure, entre elles et la Sublime Porte, feront désormais partie du droit public Européen, et que dans le cas où une mésintelligence viendrait à surgir entre la Porte et l'une des susdites Puissances, les deux Etats, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devront mettre les autres Parties Contractantes en mesure d'interposer leurs bons offices, afin de prévenir une rupture.

Art. II. Seront notamment considérées comme rentrant dans la définition de l'Article précédent, les stipulations, quelles qu'elles soient, du présent Traité, aussi bien que les arrangements particuliers qui y sont annexés.

Examen des Quatre Points dans leur Ordre Actuel.

PREMIER POINT.

1. Abolition complète du Protectorat Russe.

Cette disposition suppose l'abolition de tous les Articles qui, dans les Traités entre la Porte et la Russie, concernent les Principautés, notamment, l'Article XVI du Traité de Kainardji de 1774; l'Article VII du Traité de Constantinople de 1779; la Convention de 1781, qui constitue le Consul-Général de Russie censeur de la conduite des Princes; l'Article IV du Traité de Jassy de 1792; l'Article V et l'Article VIII du Traité de Bucharest de 1812; l'Article III et l'Article V de la Convention d'Akermann, ainsi que les Actes qui y sont annexés pour la Moldo-Valachie et pour la Servie; les Articles V et VI du Traité d'Andrinople, ainsi que l'Acte Séparé qui en fait partie; enfin, la Convention, d'ailleurs temporaire, de Balta-Liman.

Les Puissances auront à examiner s'il ne conviendrait pas de poser en principe que tous les Traités conclus entre la Porte et la Russie sont et demeurent abolis, sauf ceux qui seraient rétablis après révision et d'accord avec les Puissances Contractantes.

2. La Russie n'exercera aucun droit particulier ou exclusif de protection ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés Danubiennes.

Ce paragraphe laisse dans le doute la question de savoir si à un protectorat exclusif ou ne substituera point un protectorat collectif; toutefois, le paragraphe suivant implique une réponse négative et autorise ainsi à lever le doute, en faisant disparaître dans la rédaction définitive les mots " particulier et exclusif."

3. Les Principautés conservent leurs privilèges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, et le Sultan, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, accordera en outre à ces Principautés ou y confirmera une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations.

Cette rédaction suppose la réorganisation des Principautés sur la base de leurs anciennes Capitulations avec la Porte, c'est-à-dire, d'après le principe de leur autonomie combiné avec celui de la suzeraineté du Sultan. On irait contre

l'esprit de cette disposition en retirant aux Principautés un ou plusieurs des privilèges dont elles étaient en possession sous le Protectorat Russe. Les nouvelles institutions des deux Provinces devront être accordées ou confirmées par la Porte, de concert avec les Puissances Contractantes, ce qui implique l'idée d'une garantie, mais nullement celle d'un protectorat. Quant à la garantie, elle paraît indispensable. En effet, si les Puissances ne restaient pas garantes de ce qu'elles auront fondé, la nouvelle organisation n'aurait aucun stabilité ; les populations des Principautés, toujours en défiance des intentions de la Porte, ne considéreraient le nouvel état de choses que comme un provisoire auquel elles n'hésiteraient pas à préférer la protection directe de l'une des Puissances voisines, et on pourrait prédire, sans crainte de se tromper, qu'en très peu de temps et après des tiraillements et des conflits inévitables avec l'autorité suzeraine, l'anarchie la plus complète viendrait de nouveau donner beau jeu à l'influence de la Russie, à laquelle on ferait appel pour rétablir l'ordre.

Si les nouvelles institutions étaient, au contraire, placées sous la garantie de l'Europe, elles acquéreraient un caractère de stabilité qui en permettra le développement paisible, et qui fera disparaître toutes les chances d'un retour au Protectorat des Puissances limitrophes. Nous croyons superflu de mettre en évidence la distinction essentielle qui existe entre la garantie et le Protectorat. La garantie ne peut s'exercer que sur une combinaison définie ; elle est limitée par la portée et les termes mêmes de l'Acte qui l'a provoquée ou stipulée. Le Protectorat, au contraire, confère un droit d'intermixtion, une sorte de participation dans le mouvement administratif et dans ses détails.

Quant à ce qui concerne spécialement le travail de réorganisation des Principautés, il y aura pour les Plénipotentiaires à distinguer entre les questions politiques et d'intérêt général qu'ils auront à résoudre directement, et les questions administratives et locales qui seront remises aux délibérations d'une Commission spécialement organisée pour cet objet. Il y aura à considérer si la réorganisation des Principautés devra être l'objet d'un Acte synallagmatic entre les Puissances Contractantes et la Porte ; ou si le Traité Général n'aura à stipuler en ce point que le principe du maintien de l'autonomie des deux Provinces, et l'entente des Puissances avec la Porte relativement à cette réorganisation.

Quant aux bases mêmes de la réorganisation des Principautes, on peut admettre trois hypothèses : ou l'on se bornerait à maintenir le *statu quo ante bellum*, sauf à chercher les moyens de l'améliorer sur certains points ; ou, tout en respectant les privilèges administratifs des Principautés, on les unirait plus étroitement à la Turquie, et on leur imposerait vis-à-vis d'elle des obligations plus étendues ; ou, enfin, on adopterait une combinaison qui, sans rompre le lien de vassalité qui rattache la Moldavie et la Valachie à la Porte, accorderait cependant à ces pays en Europe une place mieux marquée, et leur donnerait plus de consistance politique. Les points essentiels de celui de ces trois systèmes qui paraît le plus conforme aux vœux des populations et aux intérêts de l'Europe, se trouvent indiqués dans le mémoire ci-joint en annexe.

4. D'accord avec la Puissance Suzeraine, les Principautés adopteront un système défensif permanent, réclamé par leur situation géographique ; aucune entrave ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

L'établissement d'un système défensif permanent devant résulter de l'accord de la Porte avec les Principautés, le Traité Général doit se borner à rappeler la nécessité de l'accord en consacrant le principe du système.

Quant aux mesures extraordinaires de défense pour repousser toute agression étrangère, par cela même que ces mesures sont déclarées extraordinaires et ne peuvent, par conséquent, dépendre que des circonstances et de la libre appréciation des Principautés elles-mêmes, il suffira peut-être de reproduire textuellement le paragraphe de l'ultimatum dans le Traité Général.

5. En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie Européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotyn, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction sud-est, et aboutirait au Lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le Traité de Paix et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte.

Il y aura lieu de déterminer exactement le tracé de la nouvelle frontière dont les points extrêmes seraient Chotyn et le Lac Salzyk. Cette ligne doit partir des environs de Chotyn et se rejoindre aux montagnes pour en suivre les crêtes. Il pourrait y avoir utilité à donner à entendre, à l'origine des négociations, sauf à se désister plus tard, comme on le dira ci-après, que la place de Chotyn doit être comprise dans le territoire que la Russie cède aux Principautés.

Il serait aussi nécessaire de stipuler que le territoire qui retournera à la Moldavie sera remis à la Puissance Suzeraine dans son état actuel, avec ses villes, villages et places fortes, sans que la Russie puisse préalablement détruire ou endommager les fortifications de Kilia, de Reni, et surtout d'Ismail.

DEUXIEME POINT.—*Danube.*

1. La liberté du Danube et de ses embouchures sera efficacement assurée par des institutions Européennes dans lesquelles les Puissances Contractantes seront également représentées sauf les positions particulières des riverains qui seront réglées sur les principes établis par l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne en matière de navigation fluviale.

La rectification des frontières, en éloignant la Russie de toutes les embouchures du Danube, diminue l'opportunité de toutes les dispositions concertées l'année dernière à Vienne à ce sujet. Mais le travail préparé à cette époque avec le concours de nos Plénipotentiaires, pourra servir de bases à nos délibérations.

2. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre légers aux embouchures du fleuve, destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Cette disposition extrêmement importante quand la Russie est riveraine, n'a plus la même utilité si les embouchures du Danube sont rendues à la Porte. Il reste, toutefois, à déterminer si l'avantage d'avoir nos pavillons en permanence dans la Mer Noire ne doit pas l'emporter sur toute autre considération, et s'il n'est pas par cela seul nécessaire de profiter des clauses de l'ultimatum pour introduire cette disposition dans le Traité Général, bien qu'elle ne doive plus avoir pour but, dans notre pensée, d'exercer une pression sur la Puissance redevenue maîtresse des bouches du Danube.

TROISIEME POINT.—*Mer Noire.*

1. La Mer Noire sera neutralisée.
2. Ouvertes à la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux resteront interdites aux marines militaires.

Ces deux premiers paragraphes du troisième point ne soulèvent aucune question particulière et peuvent être introduits tels quels dans le Traité Général, sauf les développements qu'ils comportent dans la forme.

3. Par conséquent, il n'y sera créé ni conservé d'arsenaux militaires-maritimes.

Cette clause comprend tous les points du littoral et particulièrement ceux sur lesquels la Russie avait élevé des arsenaux militaires-maritimes. Mais, au moment où cette question se trouvera posée au sein des Conférences, et simplement dans le but de nous assurer le moyen de faire certaines concessions à la Russie, il pourrait être bon d'exprimer l'opinion que les places de Nicolaief et de Kherson sont implicitement indiquées dans la stipulation dont il s'agit.

4. La protection des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations sera assurée dans les ports respectifs de la Mer Noire par l'établissement d'institutions conformes au droit international et aux usages consacrés dans la matière.

Cette clause peut être ainsi formulée :

"Les deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire voulant donner aux intérêts commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations toutes les garanties désirables, admettront dans tous leurs ports situés sur le littoral de cette mer, des Consuls, en se conformant aux principes consacrés en pareille matière."

5. Les deux Puissances riveraines s'engagent mutuellement à n'y entretenir que le nombre de bâtiments légers, d'une force déterminée, nécessaire au service de leurs côtes.

Les deux Puissances riveraines pourraient entretenir, chacune, dans la Mer Noire, et sans qu'il puisse en résulter, ce nous semble, un danger essentiel :

(1.) Six avisos à vapeur armés de quatre canons au plus, et ayant cinquante mètres de longueur à la flottaison ;

(2.) Six transports à voile ou à vapeur pouvant porter 1,000 hommes, et ayant soixante-cinq mètres de longueur à la flottaison.

Avec ces navires, la Russie pourrait satisfaire à tous les besoins du service de ses côtes et concourir à la répression du commerce d'esclaves qui se fait sur le littoral oriental de la Mer Noire.

6. La Convention qui sera passée entre elles à cet effet, sera, après avoir été préalablement agréée par les Puissances signataires du Traité Général, annexée au dit Traité, et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante.

7. Cette Convention Séparée ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général.

Ces deux clauses ne prêtent à aucune observation particulière. Elles pourraient être fixées ainsi qu'il suit :

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant conclu entre elles une Convention pour déterminer le nombre et la force des bâtiments légers qu'elles pourront conserver dans la Mer Noire, cette Convention est annexée au présent Traité et aura même force et valeur que si elle en faisait partie intégrante. Elle ne pourra être ni annulée ni modifiée sans l'assentiment des Puissances signataires du Traité Général."

8. La clôture des Détroits admettra l'exception applicable aux stationnaires mentionnée dans l'Article précédent.

Cette disposition serait ainsi formulée :

"La règle de la clôture des Détroits admettra une exception en faveur des stationnaires destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube."

Nous avons dit que l'Article 1 du Traité Général pourrait avoir pour objet d'assurer une place à la Turquie dans le droit Européen ; cette idée, simplement énoncée dans le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, nous conduit à faire remarquer que cet Acte a été invalidé par l'état de guerre et qu'il y aura lieu de le renouveler ; mais pour procéder sans déroger aux précédents, il conviendra d'inviter la Prusse à concourir au renouvellement de cette Convention ; si cette Puissance ne doit prendre aucune part à la conclusion du Traité Général, il sera utile d'insérer dans ce Traité particulier la disposition que nous venons de rappeler, afin de faire consacrer par tous les Grands Etats indistinctement le principe qui, simplement indiqué en 1841, doit recevoir en 1856 le développement qu'il comporte. Dans le cas contraire, si la Prusse participe à la conclusion de la paix, il ne serait pas sans importance de maintenir la disposition telle que nous l'avons formulée comme Article 1 du Traité Général. On trouvera, joints aux dossiers, deux projets de Traité faisant revivre, pour l'un et l'autre cas, celui de 1841.

QUATRIEME POINT.—*Populations Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte.*

1. Les immunités des sujets Rayas de la Porte seront consacrés, sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan.

2. Des délibérations ayant lieu entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, afin d'assurer aux sujets Chrétiens du Sultan leurs droits religieux et politiques, la Russie sera invitée à la paix à s'y associer.

La marche à suivre à l'égard de ces deux clauses est nettement indiquée. Les délibérations auxquelles la Russie sera invitée à s'associer, n'ont pas pour objet de fournir les éléments d'un acte synallagmatique. Les Puissances apportent le tribut de leurs lumières aux conseils du Sultan et usent de l'influence que leur donne leur position pour leur signaler les améliorations qui paraissent utiles.

Les réglements qui résulteront de cet examen seront purement et simplement communiqués aux Puissances Contractantes par une note qui n'aura rien d'obligatoire. Le Traité Général devra en faire mention ; en un mot, les "consacrer sans atteinte à l'indépendance et à la dignité de la Couronne du Sultan." Cette disposition pourrait être ainsi conçue :

"Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, dans sa constante sollicitude pour les populations non-Musulmanes de son Empire, ayant émis un firman destiné à améliorer leur condition dans le présent et à servir de base à de plus amples réformes dans l'avenir, et voulant donner à ses alliés un témoignage de ses sentiments à cet égard, a résolu de leur donner communication du dit firman émané spontanément de sa volonté souveraine."

Conditions Particulières.

Les Puissances belligérantes réservent le droit qui leur appartient de produire dans un intérêt Européen des conditions particulières, en sus des quatre garanties

La France et l'Angleterre ont fait connaître les deux conditions particulières qu'elles comptent produire dans les négociations, et elles exigeront de la Russie l'engagement de ne point rétablir des fortifications ni des arsenaux dans les Iles d'Aland. Il serait toutefois préférable, dans le cas où il deviendrait possible d'obtenir l'assentiment de la Russie, de faire prévaloir le principe de la neutralisation de ces îles sous la garantie des Puissances Contractantes.

Il s'est produit d'ailleurs, au sujet des Iles d'Aland, une idée dont la Suède a eu connaissance et qu'elle paraît avoir accueillie favorablement. On étendrait à une certaine portion de la Baltique qui embrasserait l'Archipel d'Aland, et dans laquelle la Suède consentirait à entrer pour l'Ile de Gothland, l'interdiction de conserver ou d'élever des établissements militaires. Cette combinaison pourrait offrir l'avantage de décider plus facilement la Russie à un sacrifice qui ne serait pas sans compensation apparente, et permettrait en même temps d'appeler la Suède à signer le Traité Général. On pourrait donc établir que toutes les îles de la Baltique situées entre le seizième et le vingtième degré de longitude, à quelque Puissance qu'elles appartiennent, ne pourraient être fortifiés à l'avenir. Quant à l'état des territoires à l'est de la Mer Noire, cette question pourrait être examinée de façon à ce que les frontières Asiatiques de l'Empire fussent réglées désormais d'une manière définitive.

Compensations Eventuelles.

Kars et son territoire devant nécessairement être restitués à la Turquie, on pourrait offrir à la Russie, à titre de compensation, de ne pas comprendre Chotyn dans la cession qui doit être faite aux Principautés, et de ne pas placer Nicolaieff et Kherson parmi les points où il lui sera interdit de conserver des arsenaux militaires-maritimes. Si la Russie s'élevait contre les propositions des alliés relatives aux Iles d'Aland, et pour la déterminer à les accepter, on pourrait, en annexant à la Moldavie le territoire qui comprend les forteresses situées sur la rive gauche du Danube jusqu'à l'embouchure du fleuve, la laisser en possession des autres portions de la Bessarabie.

Inclosure 1 in No. 391.

Memorandum on the Organization of the Principalities.

LA première garantie comprend le réglement des relations des Principautés avec la Porte et en même temps leur réorganisation administrative. La première partie de cette tâche revient naturellement aux Plénipotentiaires chargés de signer la paix. C'est à eux qu'il appartient de poser les principes de la nouvelle condition politique qui sera faite aux Principautés: une fois ces principes d'intérêt général établis, il serait impossible de résoudre au sein de la Conférence, sans s'engager dans une discussion qui doit nécessairement se prolonger et sans ajourner par conséquent la conclusion de la paix, les questions purement administratives ou locales; ce soin doit être réservé à une Commission spéciale qui serait formée d'un Représentant de chacune des Puissances Contractantes, de deux membres Ottomans, et à laquelle on pourrait adjoindre deux députés des Principautés ayant voix consultative.

Les questions purement politiques et à régler par les Plénipotentiaires concernent:

1. Le territoire des Principautés.
2. La souveraineté.
3. La forme du Gouvernement.
4. Le système défensif du pays et l'effectif de ses troupes.
5. Enfin, le tribut.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a déjà fait connaître son opinion sur quelques uns de ces points dans un mémorandum qui se trouve annexé au Protocole No. 6 des dernières Conférences de Vienne:

1. L'union de la Moldavie et de la Valachie en une seule Principauté lui paraît motivée par la communauté de religion, de langue, d'intérêt, et nécessaire pour donner au pays une consistance proportionnée à l'importance de sa position géographique.

2. Il est également indispensable que le pouvoir qui sera placé à la tête du nouvel Etat cesse d'être l'objet d'intrigues et de compétitions malheureusement trop fréquentes dans l'histoire des Principautés, et si favorables à l'influence dont on veut prévenir le retour.

La souveraineté deviendrait par conséquent héréditaire.

Le pays ne présentant point les éléments d'une dynastie nationale, l'autorité suprême serait confiée à un Prince d'une des familles régnantes de l'Europe. L'hérédité princière n'a rien d'incompatible avec la suzeraineté du Sultan, puis qu'elle est en vigueur en Egypte et qu'elle avait été naguères accordée à la Servie; les rapports de vassalité qui unissent les Principautés à la Porte seront donc maintenus dans toute leur force et conserveront leur caractère actuel.

3. Le pays pourra être appelé à partager le pouvoir législatif avec le Prince; on poserait le principe d'une assemblée ou Divan investi de pouvoirs temporaires, représentant autant que possible les intérêts essentiels, participant à la confection des lois, votant l'impôt, et exerçant, s'il y a lieu, un certain contrôle sur l'emploi des revenus publics.

4. Quant au système de défense que l'ultimatum accepté par la Russie stipule en faveur des Principautés et qu'elles établiront de concert avec la Porte, il n'y aura qu'à s'en référer aux termes mêmes de cet ultimatum en vertu desquels ce système est déclaré permanent sans préjudice des mesures extraordinaires que le nouvel Etat pourrait librement prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère.

Il y aurait, à cette occasion, à s'occuper de l'effectif militaire que les deux Provinces unies pourraient entretenir, ainsi que de celui des troupes spéciales nécessaires pour le service de leur police. Le chiffre de leurs forces, au moyen du système de réserve en usage dans l'Empire Ottoman, pourrait être, sans difficulté porté au double de ce qu'il est aujourd'hui.

Le territoire de la Bessarabie étant rendu aux Principautés par le bienfait des Puissances elles pourraient stipuler en faveur de la Porte le droit de tenir exceptionnellement garnison sur quelques points de ce territoire, par exemple, à Ismail et à Réni.

5. Enfin, par suite même de la réunion des deux Principautés, il deviendra

nécessaire de déterminer les obligations pécuniaires auxquelles le pays continuera d'être soumis.

Les questions à régler par la Commission dont nous avons parlé regardent:

1. L'état social du pays.
2. L'organisation de l'assemblée ou Divan.
3. L'administration, les tribunaux, et les finances.
4. Les rapports de l'Eglise avec l'Etat.

Il est important que sur tous ces points, la législation du pays soit mise en harmonie avec sa nouvelle condition politique.

1. L'état social des Principautés réclame impérieusement de sérieuses réformes. Ces réformes doivent avoir pour objet de faire disparaître le principe en vertu duquel la noblesse est attachée aux fonctions publiques, véritable source de la corruption que l'on reproche aux deux Provinces; de supprimer la franchise dont jouissent les propriétés nobles en matière d'impôts, au détriment des revenus publics; enfin, de constituer la propriété des paysans, aujourd'hui encore organisée sur la base de la sujétion et grevée de telles obligations arbitrairement établies, qu'aucun progrès matériel n'est possible s'il n'y est d'abord remédié.

2. L'état social du pays ayant une base plus équitable, il sera plus facile de déterminer les principes de la loi destinée à former l'assemblée ou le Divan. Cette loi devra tenir compte des intérêts de la grande et de la petite propriété, de ceux de l'industrie, des écoles et de l'église.

3. L'administration devra être organisée de manière à faire prévaloir sur tous les points l'action du Pouvoir Central, en laissant cependant aux Municipalités et à des Conseils de District qui remplaceraient les Assemblées actuelles de Département, une juste part dans les affaires locales et départementales.

L'organisation des tribunaux sera révisée, et l'on s'attachera, dans les réformes que pourra exiger l'état de la magistrature, à lui assurer plus de moralité et d'indépendance.

Quant au système financier, il aura à subir des modifications profondes, par suite même de l'assimilation de toutes les terres relativement à l'impôt; la capitation pourra être supprimée et transformée; les monopoles établis au profit des grands propriétaires seront abolis. Les biens des monastères nationaux seront taxés comme les propriétés laïques; il y aura lieu d'examiner si ceux des monastères dédiés, et dont les revenus considérables passent aux couvents du Mont Athos et de la Palestine, ne doivent pas être réunis aux domaines de l'Etat, selon le vœu du pays.

4. Les rapports de l'Eglise avec l'Etat pourront également être l'objet de l'attention de la Commission.

Dans toutes les mesures qui concerneront l'Eglise Moldo-Valaque il y aura lieu de prendre en considération sa tendance à le soustraire à l'action directe du Patriarchat Grec de Constantinople. En confiant au Prince l'élection du Métropolitain, qui appartient aujourd'hui, ainsi que celle des Evêques, aux grands Boyards, on supprimera une source d'intrigues, et dans le cas où l'Eglise tînirait un jour par se séparer entièrement de celle de Constantinople, cette disposition sera une garantie assurée d'avance de l'accord du pouvoir temporel et du pouvoir spirituel.

Quant à la Servie, sa position vis-à-vis de la Porte et de l'Europe ne réclame point les mêmes modifications que celle des deux autres Principautés. Les Plénipotentiaires n'auront donc qu'à déclarer que les rapports actuels de cette Province avec la Puissance Suzeraine sont maintenus. L'examen des réformes que comporte son administration intérieure sera confié à la Commission des Représentants des Puissances et de la Porte, dans le sein de laquelle les deux membres Moldo-Valaques seront remplacés par un député Serbe. La tâche principale de cette Commission sera de régler les attributions respectives du Sénat et du Prince, de manière à faire cesser les conflits qui sont devenus permanents entre les deux Pouvoirs.

L'ensemble des réformes dont la condition des Principautés aura été l'objet et les parties de leur législation antérieure qui auront été conservées après révision, formeront des Statuts Organiques qui seront promulgués par le Sultan et communiqués par la Porte aux Puissances signataires de la paix.

Inclosure 2 in No. 391.

Memorandum on the Possibility of conferring the Sovereignty of the Principalities upon an Italian Prince.

SI l'idée de mettre un Prince étranger à la tête de la Moldavie et de la Valachie est adoptée, il y aura à tenir compte du vœu des populations dans le choix de ce Prince. Elle désireront qu'il appartienne, comme elles, à la race Latine, et à ce titre il y a lieu de croire qu'un Prince Italien aurait leur agrément. Si, de plus, les convenances de l'Europe s'accommodaient au choix d'un des Princes de la Péninsule, il y aurait un double motif de le prendre en considération. Tels paraissent être les avantages qu'offrirait la candidature du Duc régnant de Modène. Il est à présumer qu'il serait favorablement accueilli dans les Principautés. D'autre part, en lui conférant une souveraineté nouvelle, les Puissances trouveraient dans le territoire qu'il laisserait vacant un appoint pour une combinaison qui ne serait pas sans importance au point de vue des intérêts généraux; le Gouvernement de l'Etat de Parme travaillé par l'esprit révolutionnaire présente des difficultés qui semblent beaucoup moins grandes à Modène; et la régence actuelle de Parme n'aurait pas d'objection légitime contre un échange de territoires qui lui donnerait celui de Modène avec ses dépendances. Dans ce cas, le territoire de Parme pourrait être annexé au Piémont, qui serait en position d'y maintenir l'ordre. A cet égard, les Etats de la Péninsule ne pourraient qu'approuver une combinaison de ce genre, et nous y trouverions, quant à nous, un moyen de dédommager le Gouvernement Piémontais de son concours et de ses sacrifices.

Inclosure 3 in No. 391.

Memorandum on Servia.

LA Servie n'est pas vis-à-vis de la Porte et de l'Europe dans les mêmes conditions que la Moldavie et la Valachie. Les Serbes ont été réunis et incorporés à l'Empire Ottoman par le fait de la conquête. L'Article VIII du Traité de Bucharest, l'Article V de celui d'Akerman, se bornent à constater que ces populations ont droit à la faveur et à la magnanimité de la Porte, et que cette Puissance devra s'entendre avec leurs députés pour leur assurer une administration indépendante. L'Article VI du Traité d'Andrinople ne fait que presser l'exécution des engagements pris à cet égard par le Sultan dans le Traité d'Akerman. Soumis par la force, les Serbes n'ont d'autres droits écrits à revendiquer que ceux qu'ils ont reconquis par le même moyen et que la Russie s'est attachée à leur faire reconnaître dans le but de se réserver les avantages moraux de la garantie. Il importe que les Serbes n'aient, comme les Moldo-Valaques, rien à regretter du Protectorat Russe, et qu'aucun des priviléges qui leur sont assurés par les Traités conclus entre la Porte et la Russie, ne leur soit enlevé. Plus belliqueux que les Moldo-Valaques, plus en position de nuire à la Porte, ils doivent être traités avec ménagement, et il serait extrêmement périlleux de leur imposer le système de la nomination directe de l'Hospodar par le Sultan. Mais si l'on ne peut songer à restreindre leurs priviléges, est-il nécessaire de les étendre?

La Servie est à l'égard de la Porte, sous beaucoup de rapports, dans la même situation que la Grèce.

L'assimilation que les instructions d'Aali Pacha aux Conférences de Vienne établissaient entre ce pays et les trois Principautés du Danube, essentiellement fausse pour celle de la rive gauche, est parfaitement vraie pour l'autre. La Servie a des liens de race et de langue avec la Bulgarie et la Bosnie; elle y exerce même dès à présent une certaine influence. Cette influence s'accroîtra inévitablement à mesure qu'il y aura plus de frottement entre la Principauté, déjà constituée sur un pied d'autonomie, et les deux autres Provinces voisines. Cet avantage de position ne manquera pas d'être pour elles un objet d'envie; les Serbes pourront s'en faire, à un moment donné, un action très puissant. Il y aurait donc dans une constitution de la Servie aussi forte que celle qu'il s'agit de donner à la Moldavie et à la Valachie, une source de difficultés très grandes pour la Porte,

et ses craintes à ce sujet sont légitimes. Ces considérations suffisent pour expliquer qu'il n'y ait à accorder à la Servie ni l'hérédité dans le pouvoir, bien qu'elle lui ait été conférée sous Milosch, ni l'évacuation des forteresses occupées encore aujourd'hui par les Turcs sur son territoire, bien qu'elle soit désiré par les populations.

Ne devant pas étendre les priviléges de la Servie, on ne saurait non plus accroître ses obligations. Le tribut qu'elle paie à la Porte est modéré, mais le pays ne possède ni les mêmes sources de richesse que le Moldo-Valachie, ni les mêmes moyens d'augmenter ses revenus. Il paraîtrait naturel qu'avec ces mœurs belliqueuses, la Principauté prêtat au Sultan un concours militaire qui n'aurait rien que de conforme aux devoirs de la vassalité. Mais la Porte elle-même renoncera volontiers évidemment aux avantages qu'elle en retirerait, afin d'éviter les inconvénients du développement d'un état militaire qui, arrivé à un certain degré, pourrait être dangereux pour elle. Il ne faut donc que maintenir dans ses conditions actuelles la position respective des vassaux et du Suzerain, en établissant bien nettement la cessation absolue du protectorat exclusif de la Russie.

Il restera à examiner si les attributions respectives du Sénat et du Prince, telles qu'elles résultent du hatti-scherif de 1838, répondent aux besoins du pays et donnent des garanties suffisantes d'une bonne administration. Le Sénat possède des attributions fort étendues; sans son consentement aucune loi ne peut être décrétée ni aucun impôt levé. Il est libre de proposer et de voter telle loi qu'il juge convenable, et le Réglement ne stipule aucun droit d'ajournement ou de veto en faveur du Prince. Cette dernière disposition est peu compatible avec l'existance d'un pouvoir sérieux. A la vérité, le Prince nomme directement les membres du Sénat, et il trouve dans ce privilége une garantie. Cette garantie toutefois est plutôt nominale que réelle, puisque le nombre des sénateurs est très limité et qu'ils jouissent de l'inamovibilité, sans l'appel à la Porte, qui ne peut d'ailleurs avoir lieu que pour quelque grand crime envers le Sultan ou envers les lois du pays. Aussi les deux autorités sont-elles en conflit perpétuel, et leur histoire, depuis leur institution, n'est que le récit de luttes endémiques et de perpétuels conflits. Il y aurait donc à revenir à cet égard sur les dispositions du hatti-schérif de 1838 et à rechercher une combinaison plus propre à atténuer des frottements qui, depuis cette époque encore récente, se sont si souvent traduits en révolutions.

Nous adoptons en conséquence l'opinion exprimée par le Cabinet de Vienne dans la note communiquée par M. de Hübner, que le Sénat Serbe peut-être modifié dans sa composition et ses attributions en prenant pour point de départ le principe de l'administration nationale et indépendance du pays.

Les institutions de la Servie modifiées en ce sens seraient placées comme celles de la Moldo-Valachie sous la garantie des Grands Puissances. Cette garantie ferait l'objet d'un acte distinct et séparé entre les Puissances et la Porte.

Inclosure 4 in No. 391.

Project of Renewal of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, if Prussia should not become a Party to the General Treaty.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur des Français,

désirant renouveler le Traité conclu à Londres le 13 Juillet, 1841, en vue de constater en commun, par un acte formel, leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman d'après laquelle le passage des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtiments de guerre étrangers tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, et voulant, en même temps, établir que la Turquie participe au bénéfice des principes qui forment la base du droit public Européen, les dites Majestés, d'une part, et Sa Majesté le Sultan, de l'autre, ont résolu de conclure entre elles une Convention destinée à consacrer leur résolution relative à l'un et l'autre de ces deux points, et à cet effet elles ont nommé, &c.

Article I.—Les Hautes Parties Contractantes désirant que l'Empire Ottoman participe aux avantages du système établi entre les divers Etats de l'Europe,

déclarent que les Conventions ou Traités conclus, ou à conclure à l'avenir, entre elles et la Sublime Porte feront désormais partie du droit public Européen; et que dans le cas où une mésintelligence viendrait à surgir entre la Porte et l'une des susdites Puissances, les deux Etats, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devront mettre les autres Parties Contractantes en mesure d'interposer leurs bons offices afin de prévenir une rupture.

Art. II.—Sa Majesté le Sultan, d'une part, déclare qu'il a la ferme résolution de maintenir, à l'avenir, le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, et en vertu duquel il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtiments de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et que, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Majesté n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits Détroits;

Et leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français,

de l'autre part, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

Art. III.—Il est entendu qu'en constatant l'inviolabilité de l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, le Sultan se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtiments légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés, comme il est d'usage, au service des Légations des Puissances amies.

Art. IV.—La même exception s'applique aux bâtiments désignés dans l'Article du Traité conclu entre les dites Majestés le et destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.

Art. V.—Sa Majesté le Sultan se réserve de porter la présente Convention à la connaissance de toutes les Puissances avec lesquelles la Sublime Porte se trouve en relation d'amitié en les invitant à y accéder.

Art. VI.—La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangés, &c.

Inclosure 5 in No. 391.

Project of Renewal of Treaty of July 13, 1841, if Prussia should become a Party to the General Treaty.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur des Français,

désirant renouveler le Traité conclu à Londres le 13 Juillet, 1841, en vue de constater en commun, par un acte formel, leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman d'après laquelle le passage des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtiments de guerre étrangers tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, les dites Majestés, d'une part, et Sa Majesté le Sultan, de l'autre, ont résolu de conclure entre elles une Convention à ce sujet.

(Suivent les Articles semblables à ceux du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, y compris un Article stipulant une exception en faveur des bâtiments destinés à assurer l'exécution des réglements relatifs à la liberté du Danube.)

Inclosure 6 in No. 391.

Project of Convention between the Porte and Russia, relative to Ships to be permitted in the Black Sea.

SA Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté le Sultan, prenant en considération le principe de la neutralisation de la Mer Noire, consacré dans le Traité Général, en date du , auquel elles sont Parties Contractantes, et voulant en conséquence régler d'un commun accord le nombre et la force des bâtiments qu'elles se sont réservé d'entretenir dans la Mer Noire pour le service de leurs côtes, ont résolu de signer dans ce but une Convention Spéciale et ont nommé à cet effet, &c.

Article I.—Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à n'avoir dans la Mer Noire d'autres bâtiments de guerre que ceux dont le nombre, la force et les dimensions sont stipulées ci-après.

Art. II.—Chacune des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes pourra entretenir dans cette mer [nombre] avisos à vapeur, de [nombre] mètres de longueur à flottaison, dont l'armement ne pourra jamais excéder [nombre et calibre] bouches à feu.

Art. III.—A ces navires les Hautes Parties Contractantes pourront joindre [nombre] transports à voile [ou à vapeur], pouvant prendre à leur bord chacun [nombre] hommes et ayant [nombre] mètres de longueur à la flottaison.

Art. IV.—Il ne pourra être rien changé ni modifié, dans aucun cas et sous aucun prétexte, à l'armement et à la destination des bâtiments dont le nombre et la dimension restent invariablement fixés par la présente Convention.

No. 392.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 14.*)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 13, 1856.*

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me to-day that he had received from Baron Brunnow the official notification of his arrival in Paris. His Excellency said he had not yet seen him, and that he did not know on what day Count Orloff was to arrive.

Count Walewski thought that the Turkish Plenipotentiary could not reach Paris before Thursday next, and that the Conference might therefore be opened on Saturday, the 23rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. G. HOWARD.

No. 393.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 15.*)

(No. 129.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 4, 1856.*

INCLOSED herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, is a letter addressed by me to Brigadier-General Mansfield on the 27th ultimo, and a report from him to me, bearing date the 29th. This correspondence relates to sundry pending questions concerning eventual operations on the Asiatic frontier, and the wants of the Contingent.

Your Lordship can hardly fail to observe with regret the transparent inactivity of the Turkish Ministers in matters of pressing interest; and particularly the difficulties placed in so prominent a position by Fuad Pasha, as to the employment of Christians in the Turkish army. The language held by the Seraskier to me some days before was by no means so discouraging.

With regard to Tahir Pasha, who has lately returned from Erzeroom, there is an embarrassing contradiction. He is strongly recommended by Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom, and also by some of the British officers there; but, on the other hand, he has been complained of by the Embassy, under instructions from your Lordship.

The Seraskier's illness, which has lasted about ten days, and may still continue, is anything but favourable to the progress of military affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 393.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Brigadier-General Mansfield.

Dear Sir, *British Embassy, January 27, 1856.*

YOUR last communications with the Seraskier, compared with my own, and a review of the various points which formed the subject matter of your conversation this evening, taken in connection with recent advices from Erzeroom, increase my anxiety to press forward every preparatory measure bearing on the prospects of another campaign, and at all accessible to the influence of this Embassy.

Whatever may be the result of the late diplomatic occurrences at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, it stands to reason that no relaxation can, with common prudence, be allowed to take place in our endeavours to prepare for the continuance of the war. Such, I am persuaded, is the feeling in England, and I am gratified to observe that the Turkish Ministers are not backward in making a similar profession. But more than profession is wanting. Time is on the wing, and our Mussulman allies have need of every stimulant to overcome their natural reluctance to take time by the forelock.

It is therefore my earnest wish, fully, I know, partaken by yourself, that you should repeat and keep up on my behalf your personal communications with Fuad Pasha and the Seraskier, not omitting the Grand Vizier when necessary.

The points of most urgent interest are those which have been pressed repeatedly on their attention:—

1. The provisioning of Erzeroom and its increasing army.

2. The preparing and forwarding, as weather and circumstances admit, the additional supplies of all kinds, including artillery and ammunition, required either for defence or future operations in the field.

3. The recall, without further delay, of Selim Pasha, and the departure of a trustworthy General to supply his place.

4. The adoption of further measures for restoring order among the troops at Erzeroom.

5. The return of Tahir Pasha to that place, and a diminution of the number of useless Pashas already there.

It may be presumed that the Porte is waiting for a definitive answer from Omer Pasha; but whatever the Generalissimo's decision may be as to taking the command at Erzeroom, no time should be lost in making a provisional arrangement, and correcting those recognised abuses which retard the progress of improvement.

You are aware that Ismail Pasha still retains the nominal appointment of Commander-in-chief on the side of Erzeroom, and that the preference is justified by his general reputation. He ought, I conceive, to be sent to the scene of his intended command without further delay; or, if he cannot go, it is evident that the most efficient General at the Porte's disposal should be sent in his stead.

The Contingent is another object of deep interest with reference to the eventualities of an approaching campaign. It is long since I gave instructions to apply for ground on which to establish its depôt, and the question of its recruitment has been for a still longer period before the Porte and the Seraskier. Difficulties of real force exist, no doubt, in this respect; but I trust that they will be made to yield to the necessities of the case. The first experiment of Christian conscription might be made in favour of the Contingent; and ordinary casualties may, I presume, be provided for by supplying it with recruits from the annual amount of conscripts for the Nizam.

I take this occasion to record your own suggestion as to the expediency of attending to the Turkish Regular Cavalry—an arm in which unfortunately the enemy is so superior. The Porte cannot be urged too strongly for the deficiency apparent on that side.

Two or three minor points remain to be noted. It is desirable, for instance, to know whether the foreign officers returned from Kars may not be employed with advantage at Erzeroom, and whether those British officers now here, who have lately served with Omer Pasha, might not be usefully transferred to the same quarters. I allude in particular to Colonel Hinde and Captain Cadell. It appears also that cavasses are wanted for the Russian Embassy-house and gardens at Buyukdere.

I have thought of what you said about a medal for Kars. The army and garrison of that unfortunate place are worthy of every distinction; but it is worth considering whether a medal could be struck with propriety for the defence of a fortress taken by the enemy; and whether the Sebastopol medal could be extended to those who were not concerned in the reduction of that fortress. If anything were to be done, it should rather refer to the splendid repulse which the Russians underwent on the 29th of September.

I approve entirely of your suggestion that Major Cathcart should be employed in examining the positions and communications, including that by the Chooroocksoo, from Batoom to Artvin, and thence in the direction of Erzeroom. As the interpreter selected to accompany him turns out to be unfit for the occasion, I have in view a trustworthy native messenger whom I will send to you for examination. The service in question ought, I conceive, to be undertaken with the least practicable delay.

I am under an impression that we must wait to hear from General Shirley before anything further can be done with respect to offences committed by Irregular Cavalry in Her Majesty's pay.

I should like to obtain some clearer information as to the result, efficiency, and position of the Egyptian troops sent on from Trebizond.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No 393.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, January 29, 1856.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I yesterday paid a long visit to Fuad Pasha, and urged the several subjects referred to in your Excellency's instructions, dated January 27. I found his Excellency disposed to take the part of Selim Pasha, while he declared, however, that his final removal was a thing decided on; but as yet without an answer from Omer Pasha, and no communication having been received from Dervish Pasha, the Government had not been able to nominate his successor.

Dervish Pasha had received orders to inquire whether Omer Pasha's army was required by the allies for an invasion of Georgia, or if it could be directed altogether to the defence of Erzeroom.

If the former should be the intention, it would be useless to move the army, &c., for the purpose of bringing it back hereafter.

Such plausible excuses can hardly be accepted as sufficient for the satisfaction of your Excellency, and I impressed on Fuad Pasha, by every argument in my power, that something definite regarding Selim Pasha is required by your Excellency, for communication to Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency said he would certainly bring the subject before the Council at its first meeting.

I then desired that the attention of the Government should be turned seriously to the road between Trebizond and Erzeroom.

His Excellency admitted all that was said in its disfavour; that 50,000 packages of all sorts of military stores were now waiting at Trebizond, &c., &c.; that its repairs formed part of their plans; but I could not discover that any positive directions had been given, or that his Excellency is more impressed with the absolute necessity of improving the communications than his less enlightened countrymen.

For what passed relative to Tahir Pasha, I would beg to refer your Excellency to my memorandum on Mr. Brant's despatches.

On the important question of the enlistment of Christians to serve in the ranks of the army, I found his Excellency absolutely recoil from any favourable answer.

Admitting, as he cannot avoid, the wants of the Turkish population; fully alive to the circumstances through which the Christians at present evade both

military service and taxation, he yet feels the greatest alarm at the idea even of attempting to carry the law into execution. He says a time of war is not a fitting one to enforce a measure which must cause resistance; that when it was first promulgated there was a tendency to armed opposition in Bosnia and Servia; that they had no available means to overcome it.

On the day after peace was proclaimed they might make the attempt, but now he did not think it was possible. Again, the opinion of Europe would be excited against them. What would be said against the Government of the Sultan, if the law of recruitment were properly enforced in spite of all resistance, at the very time that they were seeking to raise the Christians? &c., &c.

To all this, the plausibility of which cannot be denied, I contented myself with the obvious answer, that every day of delay increased the difficulty, as a tardy enforcement of a law the principle of which is compensation—the population having already availed itself of the advantage gained—serves to convert an encroachment into a right.

He then enlarged on the difficulty of the Christian recruits, and it is evident he would rather refrain from encountering the dangers and obstacles of such an experiment altogether, than seriously devise methods by which they may be met and overcome.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

No. 394.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 133. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 4, 1856.

M. THOUVENEL has put into my hands an instruction addressed to him by Count Walewski on the subject of religious persecutions in Turkey and liberty of conscience in religious matters. A copy of it is inclosed herewith.

It certainly justifies my colleague in not supporting me to the extent of your Lordship's instructions on that subject.

I have been since reduced to the necessity of making a single stand for the great principles in question, with what success your Lordship will learn from other parts of my correspondence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 394.

Count Walewski to M. de Thouvenel.

Paris, le 17 Janvier, 1856.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 3 de ce mois, et qui m'annonce que Lord Redcliffe était dans l'intention, conforme d'ailleurs à ses instructions, de demander au Gouvernement du Sultan l'abolition immédiate de pénalités que la loi Ottomane prononce contre les Musulmans qui se convertissent au Christianisme.

Je vous ai informée le 23 Octobre dernier, au désir que m'avait fait exprimer le Gouvernement Anglais, que vous fussiez invité à joindre vos efforts à ceux de Lord de Redcliffe pour obtenir cette réforme de la législation Musulmane. Je répondis alors à Lord Cowley que je vous ai également mandé dans la même dépêche, qu'il nous paraîtrait inopportun d'insister sur une réforme immédiate et radicale en une matière aussi délicate. Quelques explications furent, vers la même époque, échangées entre l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale à Londres et Lord Clarendon, sur le même sujet, et il fut convenu que cette question devant naturellement trouver place parmi celles qui se rattachent à l'examen de la quatrième garantie, Lord de Redcliffe s'abstiendrait jusque là de toute démarche officielle auprès de la Porte. Quant aux dispositions du Gouvernement de la Reine sur le fond même de la question, la

correspondance de M. de Persigny ne m'a pas fait connaître si elles se sont rapprochées de notre propre manière de voir; mais il semble résulter de l'entretien que vous avez eu avec Lord de Redcliffe, que les instructions antérieures auraient été confirmées ou du moins n'auraient point été modifiées.

Dans cette situation j'invite l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale à Londres à aborder de nouveau le sujet avec Lord Clarendon et à lui représenter que nous verrions les plus graves inconvénients à solliciter de la Porte une réforme qu'elle ne pourrait nous accorder qu'au risque de blesser profondément les sentiments et les préjugés des ulémas et des populations Musulmanes et de provoquer des troubles dans l'intérieur de l'Empire Ottoman. Je pense d'ailleurs, Monsieur, et c'est dans ce sens que j'écris à Londres, qu'il y a une distinction essentielle à faire entre les Musulmans d'origine qui se convertiraient au Christianisme et les renégats ou anciens Chrétiens devenus Musulmans qui voudraient redevenir Chrétiens. En fait, les peines sévères qui punissaient le retour de ces derniers au Christianisme sont depuis longtemps abolies; il ne saurait donc y avoir de difficulté à ce que cette abolition fut à jamais consacrée par un acte formel émané de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Mais je suis tout-à-fait d'avis avec vous, Monsieur, qu'il serait dangereux d'aller plus loin et qu'il faut abandonner aux progrès du temps et à l'influence de la civilisation en Orient l'accomplissement d'une réforme plus complète de la législation en matière de prosélytisme.

Vous trouverez ci-joint un paquet contenant quatre boîtes que l'Empereur envoie en cadeau à ceux des grands-officiers de la maison du Sultan que vous aviez désignés comme ayant des titres à cette marque de la munificence de Sa Majesté.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 395.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 134.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 4, 1856.

I AM not yet at liberty to announce the formal settlement of the questions treated in connection with the fourth point of negotiation. The Council has agreed to the series of Articles adopted in conference by the three Representatives and their Turkish colleagues, with the insertion of a few words respecting police, of small apparent importance, and an additional clause relating to the development of national resources in Turkey, with the aid of foreign capital, science, and skill.

The Porte's answer to my official note remains to be completed satisfactorily, as the condition of my accepting the altered version of that paragraph in the series which relates to the free exercise of religion according to conscience. I have rejected the draft communicated to me by Fuad Pasha, but, unwilling to embarrass the Sultan by insisting on forms repugnant to his feelings or ideas of duty, and anxious at the same time to bring the fourth point to an early conclusion, agreeably to your Lordship's desire, I have endeavoured to render the proposed note acceptable by dint of amendments and insertions. My version of it, thus altered, is now in the hands of the Turkish Government, and I am led to expect that it will meet, on the whole, with a favourable reception on the part of the Ministry and Council.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 396.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 228.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1856.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve your having informed Count Walewski of the language held by the French Minister at Berlin, with respect to the admission of Prussia to the negotiations for peace, as reported in your despatch No. 230 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 397.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 118.)

Vienna, February 10, 1856.

My Lord,

I THINK it right to acquaint your Lordship that a person, who assures me that his information is derived from a certain source, states that the Foreign Department have been thrown into some alarm by a memorandum drawn up by a lawyer, which endeavours to prove that the ultimatum annexed to the Protocol signed at Vienna on the 1st instant is drawn up so loosely as to be liable to misconstruction.

The memorandum—if my informant has received correct intelligence—observes that the heading "Principautés Danubiennes" may seem to intimate that Servia is not to be comprised in the arrangements to be made by the Porte, and, further, suggests doubts as to whether the six Turkish fortresses are to be maintained.

A more serious doubt, however, is raised as to the bearing of the sentence, "Aucune entrâve ne saurait être apportée aux mesures extraordinaires de défense qu'elles seraient appellées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère."

Under this stipulation, it is argued that the Principalities might, in combination with Russia, make extensive warlike preparations, without any fear of having their proceedings checked by foreign remonstrances; whilst, at the same time, doubts are raised whether, under the Treaty of Bucharest, Russia might not claim the right of sending up vessels of war to the confluence of the Pruth and Danube.

The objections appear to me to possess no great weight; but the person who has drawn my attention to the subject assures me that they are not so considered by the Imperial Chancellerie, and that there have been some deliberations as to the safety of preserving the proposed preliminaries in their present shape.

My object in making this statement to your Lordship is, that, should its correctness be confirmed, and should the Austrian Government endeavour to procure some alterations in the preliminaries of peace, Her Majesty's Government may be prepared with such further amendments as may be considered desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 398.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Vienna, February 10, 1856.

IT has been with some satisfaction that I have learned that the unfriendly feelings of the Court of St. Petersburgh towards that of Vienna have been manifested by the Emperor of Russia having allowed several weeks to pass before he noticed Count Esterhazy's demand for an audience.

The Portuguese Minister, who arrived at St. Petersburgh twenty days later than the Austrian Envoy, was received some days sooner than his colleague, whose reception took place, I believe, only on the 6th instant.

This sort of slight, which is deeply felt by a Court which weighs every diplomatic movement and form as scrupulously as that of Vienna, is, no doubt, the prelude to many others of the same description; and the effect of such demonstrations can hardly fail of being that of keeping up estrangement, and of disposing Austria to feel that the countenance and goodwill of England is the more necessary to her.

I say England, and not the Western Powers, because as regards the intimacy between France and Austria, it is already at least as close as can be suitable for general interests.

The whole attitude of Austria shows her to have grown into an *espatier* Power, which feels the necessity of looking in one direction or another for support. I do what lies in my power to convince Count Buol and any of the other Ministers with whom I have the opportunity of conversing, that the strength of Russia, always over-estimated, has been so impaired that peace is absolutely essential to her; and that it depends solely upon the unity and confident bearing of the allies whether that peace shall be near at hand, and of a nature to provide for years to come against any danger which may approach Europe from the north: and I lose no occasion for showing that, after the exertions made by France and England, the demands made under the fifth Article should be considered even by Russia as evidences of their extreme moderation. It is possible that they would have been so regarded if Russia had been led to expect that a heavy pecuniary indemnity, as well as a territorial cession, was to be wrung from her.

However this may be, I make no secret of its being my conviction that should Russia now allow peace to slip through her hands she will have to purchase it later on more severe terms than those now within her reach.

I have been assured in strict confidence that my professed opinions are borne out by those expressed in intimacy by the Minister of Wurtemberg, who, although representing a Court completely devoted to Russian interests, has been heard to admit the necessity felt by Russia for concluding the war.

My colleague of Stuttgardt, if his words have been correctly reported to me, stated that he believed Russia to be better prepared to make fresh financial efforts than she was commonly held to be; that he believed that she was capable even of taking the field again in a creditable manner; but that there was too much reason to fear that a third campaign would leave her in such a state of prostration as would disqualify her from concluding any but a very disastrous peace.

I understand likewise that the Wurtemberg Minister is one of those persons who has reason to believe that the supply of saltpetre is running short in Russia. Here then is a fresh reason, were any requisite, for adhering to the intention of Her Majesty's Government of not suspending blockades during the progress of negotiation.

I will not conclude my despatch without remarking, as I have alluded to Stuttgardt, that I have some reason for suspecting that that capital is again made the channel for private communications between the Winter Palace and the Tuileries. I can offer no proof of what I feel obliged to hint at, but I have grounds for supposing that persons who have already been employed in this service have lately been made use of for carrying any friendly messages from St. Petersburgh to Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 399.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 125. Confidential.

Vienna, February 11, 1856.

My Lord,

IT may be that anxiety gives rise to suspicions that have no foundation, but certain it is that it appeared to me that at our last meeting Count Buol, who has been for some days without the wholesome restraint exercised upon him by M. de Bourquency, while at the same time he has been exposed to the daily representations of Colonel Manteuffel, was less explicit in his declarations of the support upon which your Lordship may reckon upon receiving from him at Paris than I have hitherto found him.

An expression which he employed as to the inexpediency of allowing any exorbitancy of demands to interfere with the prospects of peace, sounded, I thought, ill at this moment. I caught accordingly at the words, and observed, that I was as eager for peace as any one could be, and believed it to be certain were the proper means for obtaining it to be adopted; but, I added, if the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers are to be divided, if there is any appearance of want of union in their demands, and want of firmness in insisting upon them, then, indeed, your chances of obtaining peace will become very faint. I am willing to believe that the hesitations which I suspect to be crossing Count Buol's mind, will disperse when he is removed from a German atmosphere and from the never-ceasing threats, entreaties, supplications, and representations, varying in kind, but all tending to the same object, which continue to be made to him by the Representatives of the various Federal Courts.

It is obvious that that most mischievous diplomacy, of which the head-quarters are at Berlin, and the fruits of which have been an enormous amount of human misery, to have been all avoided at the cost of a little firmness and straightforwardness, is most actively employed at the present moment, and that the greater number of the German Courts are deeply intent upon two points which are clearly incompatible—peace, and that peace divested of some of the conditions the most requisite for guarding against the further encroachments of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 400.

Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 126.)

Vienna, February 12, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your despatch of the 5th instant, marked No. 72, I should inform your Lordship that upon my remarking to Count Buol the wish entertained by Her Majesty's Government for the deposition of the Prince of Servia, his Excellency showed very little inclination to converse upon the subject.

Upon my reverting to it, however, I was not left to infer disapprobation from silence—disapprobation was plainly expressed.

Count Buol stated that he thought the measure unnecessary in itself, and one that tended to establish a bad precedent.

That which was not expressed in such clear language, but which has on more than one occasion been apparent to me, is the notion entertained by the Austrian Government of their being entitled, in virtue of close neighbourhood, to at least a full share of the influence to be exercised by foreign Powers in the Principalities. This assumption leads to a feeling of soreness on the part of the Austrian Government at any measure with regard to those provinces being brought forward by foreign Governments without their concurrence.

My object was not, within a few days of the meeting of the Paris Con-

ferences, to be drawn into dispute with the Austrian Plenipotentiary upon a point respecting which I knew much sensitiveness exists, and there was the less occasion for disputing, as the example of the late meetings at Constantinople enabled me to show that the Representatives of England and Austria might discuss matters of equal interest to both of them, with considerable agreement of opinion as well as of friendliness of communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 401.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 16, 1856.

YOUR Lordship will doubtless have already been informed by Her Majesty's Minister at Frankfort, of the result of the late Austrian communication to the Diet, and of the obstacles raised by M. de Bismark, the Prussian Minister, to a satisfactory reply being prepared by the Commission. I understand that the sense of the resolution is as follows:

The Confederation thanks Austria for her efforts in the work of peace; declares that she will adhere to the four points, and maintain them; and that she will associate herself to the fifth point when she has examined its details.

Two days ago intelligence was received here from Frankfort, that M. de Bismark had declined agreeing to the resolution, as proposed, without fresh instructions from Berlin. This was evidently done for the purpose of gaining time, and seeing whether it would not be possible to create further embarrassments, for I am assured that the Representatives of the smaller States were agreed, and that even M. de Bismark was in possession of the necessary instructions to subscribe to the proposition.

On the arrival of his report here, more precise orders were transmitted to Frankfort, and unless some fresh difficulties are created by the Prussian Minister this week, an insignificant resolution will have passed.

In this proceeding your Lordship will find a further proof, if any is wanting, of the spirit of bitter opposition with which this Representative of Prussia is always animated, and his readiness to arrest the progress of any measure which may have a tendency to compromise the relations of Germany with Russia.

M. de Bismark on this, as on other occasions, acts frequently without, and sometimes contrary to his instructions; his object is to create and maintain disunion in Germany, and to place Prussia and the smaller States on one side, and Austria on the other, whilst his unceasing desire is to isolate the latter country.

What has just occurred at Frankfort may be considered another Prussian triumph, and will probably be hailed with a certain degree of satisfaction at St. Petersburgh, because it will furnish Austria with a ready excuse for holding back from the Western Powers at the approaching Conferences. She still clings to the desire that Prussia should be admitted to these Conferences, and Count Buol gave this assurance to Count Georges Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, who went to see his Excellency on his passage three days ago through Dresden.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 402.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 16, 1856.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 59 of the 12th instant, in reply to one which I had addressed to your Lordship alluding to language held by the Marquis de Moustier to Baron Manteuffel just before his departure for

Paris. I beg leave to observe that, although the Representatives of France in Germany may never have been instructed as to the precise language which they were to hold when alluding to the admission of Prussia to the Conferences, there is no doubt, that from their Missions has gone forth the impression that England was more desirous to exclude Prussia from these Conferences than France. The feeling on this subject is general, and is made use of by other foreign Missions to injure our position in Germany.

I saw Baron Manteuffel yesterday, and alluded to the subject. I stated that I had just observed an article in the "Zeit" newspaper to the effect that England had been the prime mover in the question of the exclusion of Prussia from the Conferences, and that I was in possession of official information that no difference of opinion had ever existed between the Governments of England and France on the point, and that instead of our being first and foremost in the matter, I could now state to him that before France knew our intentions, hers were signified to us, and that the most complete unanimity of opinion has throughout existed between the two Governments on this point.

Baron Manteuffel said that he could only repeat what he had already told me were his own impressions (alluding probably to our conversation last week reported in No. 74 of the 9th instant), and that although these impressions might be unfounded they were general.

I have spoken to other persons in the same sense as to Baron Manteuffel, but unless the French Government chooses to send a circular, or publish a denial of any difference of opinion existing between them and Her Majesty's Government, it will be next to impossible to remove the false impression that has got abroad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 403.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 189.)
Foreign Office, February 18, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings relative to the fourth point, as reported in your despatch No. 134 of the 4th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 404.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 192.)
Foreign Office, February 18, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 133 of the 4th instant, inclosing a copy of Count Walewski's instructions to M. Thouvenel of the 17th of January, respecting religious persecutions in Turkey.

I informed Count Persigny, when he read to me the instruction in question, that the arguments which it contained respecting the prejudices and fanaticism of the Turks, would be equally good against every species of reform; that Her Majesty's Government could not depart from their instructions to your Excellency regarding religious persecutions, which was a subject to which they attached the greatest importance; but as the fourth point was under discussion, and as the matter in question might not improperly be treated at the same time, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that it need not be separately dealt with.

A further despatch was read to me by M. de Persigny from Count Walewski, who represented urgently that the concessions which the Porte was ready to

make upon the fourth point would be endangered if your Excellency persisted in the demand which you had been instructed to make; and Her Majesty's Government were induced to send you the despatch of the fourth instant by telegraph.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 405.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 193.)
Foreign Office, February 18, 1856.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the question of religious persecutions in Turkey, and the efforts which your Excellency, as stated in your despatch No. 100 of the 28th of January, very properly continues to make to effect the abolition of the punishment of death as applied to apostates from Islamism, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it might be strongly represented to the Porte that, as the Turkish Empire is by Treaty stipulations to be declared part and parcel of the European system, it is quite impossible for the Powers of Europe to acquiesce in the continuance in Turkey of a law and a practice which is a standing insult to every other nation in Europe. If Turkey is to gain the great and important advantage of being deemed part of the European family of nations, she must by necessity adapt her laws and practices so as to make them compatible with her association with the community of States into which she desires to be admitted.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 406.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 202.)
Paris, February 19, 1856.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that Count Orloff is expected to arrive here on Thursday, and Aali Pasha on Saturday or Sunday; and his Excellency therefore proposes that the first Conference should meet on Monday next, the 25th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 407.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 18.)
Foreign Office, February 14, 1856.

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a despatch* from Baron Stierneld to the Swedish and Norwegian Minister at this Court, and which has been placed in my hands by Baron Hochschild.

I have to instruct you to state to Baron Stierneld that his despatch to Baron Hochschild has been considered by Her Majesty's Government with all the attention commanded by the importance of the subject to which it relates.

At this moment it is impossible to state with certainty what course Her Majesty's Government may be able, in conjunction with Her Majesty's allies, to adopt at the approaching Conferences, in regard to Scandinavian interests; but Baron Stierneld may rest assured that Her Majesty's Government take a deep interest in the welfare and security of the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, and that no opportunity will be omitted for promoting those objects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

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* No. 408.

No. 408.

Baron Stierneld to Baron Hochschild.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Hochschild, February .)

Stockholm, le 26 Janvier, 1856.

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous prévenir que j'allais vous expédier incessamment les ordres du Roi par rapport à la manière dont il nous importe que soit résolu le cinquième point des préliminaires de paix, où les Puissances alliées se sont réservé le droit de présenter à la Russie, dans un intérêt Européen, des conditions particulières. Ayant eu l'honneur de prendre à ce sujet les ordres de notre auguste Souverain, je vais vous exposer les vues de Sa Majesté en vous engageant à en entretenir confidentiellement le Ministère Britannique et à tacher de les lui faire partager.

Dans sa sollicitude pour l'avenir de ses peuples le Roi n'a pas perdu un moment pour peser les conséquences naturelles de la conclusion de la paix, aux conditions présentées par les alliés, et adoptées, à ce qu'il paraît, sans réserve par la Russie. Le Roi n'a pu se cacher que la puissance de la Russie, sensiblement diminuée dans la Midi, restera aussi formidable dans le Nord. Elle le deviendra même encore plus, puisque, ne pouvant avoir une marine dans la Mer Noire, la Russie portera naturellement tous ses soins, employera tous ses moyens réunis, au développement de ses forces dans la Baltique; et notre indépendance, même malgré notre alliance défensive avec la France et l'Angleterre, en sera sérieusement menacée. Il serait imprudent de ne pas vouloir admettre l'existence de ce danger; et c'est un devoir sacré, autant pour le Roi que pour les Puissances alliées, de ne négliger aucun moyen propre à le conjurer.

Le cinquième point paraît avoir été rédigé dans une vue moins exclusivement Orientale, mais il est alors urgent de lui donner, dans sa rédaction finale, une extension qui embrasse les garanties ultérieures dont l'Europe a besoin dans le Nord aussi bien que dans le Midi.

Afin de soumettre au jugement éclairé des Puissances alliées un ensemble complet des garanties qui, pour l'avenir du Nord, sont de la plus haute importance, le Roi fit appeler les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France, aussitôt que la nouvelle de l'acceptation des cinq points nous fût connue, et leur remit un mémoire confidentiel contenant les vues de Sa Majesté, et les considérations sur lesquelles elles sont basées, en priant ces Ministres de le porter à la connaissance de leurs Gouvernements respectifs. Trop intimement uni à ses alliés, le Roi n'a voulu donner à cette communication qu'un caractère purement confidentiel, pour ne pas élever des complications qui pourraient entraver leur politique, ou, en aucune manière, gêner leurs vues. Par la copie ci-jointe de ce memorandum, vous aurez connaissance des demandes que le Roi a cru de son devoir de recommander à ses alliés, en leur laissant toutefois d'apprécier si elles doivent être adoptées en tout ou en partie.

Le Roi a voulu les présenter dans un ensemble complet; bien qu'il ne se dissimule nullement les graves difficultés que rencontrera le premier point surtout, suffisamment motivé du reste par l'immense activité qui règne aux chantiers de Cronstadt et d'Archangel, ou, malgré la guerre et l'imminence d'une attaque des alliés, la Russie est occupée à créer une redoutable marine-à-vapeur. Une fois achevée elle pourra transporter dans les vingt-quatre heures, sur nos côtes, des forces suffisantes pour l'occupation des positions les plus importantes dans le voisinage de notre capitale. Ceci est évident, même pour ceux qui n'auraient qu'une idée vague de notre situation géographique, et ne sera certainement pas perdu de vue par les hommes d'Etat qui sont appellés à raffermir pour les temps à venir, l'équilibre et la tranquillité de l'Europe.

La seconde demande ayant pour objet d'éliminer le danger qui nous menace, tant que les Iles d'Aland n'ont pas cessé d'appartenir à la Russie, c'est d'une égale importance pour nous et pour nos alliés. Le plus désirable sous tous les rapports serait, sans doute, que ces îles fussent rendues à leur ancienne patrie; mais si elles ne le peuvent pas maintenant, il serait au moins d'une grande importance qu'elles fussent déclarées neutres, et placées sous notre protection, ou bien sous celle de la France et de l'Angleterre. Vous savez, Monsieur, que la population Alandaise est complètement Suédaise; qu'elle a conservé les mêmes lois, les mêmes mœurs, la même langue que ses anciens frères: l'arrangement

proposé n'offrirait donc aucune difficulté locale; et le Roi est intimement convaincu qu'il lui réussirait à règler leur mode de gouvernement d'une manière également avantageuse et rassurante.

Mais si, par des considérations que le Roi n'est pas à même d'apprécier, l'on désire éviter les conséquences que ces deux propositions, fermement soutenues, pourraient amener, et que l'on préfère conclure maintenant la paix sans avoir obtenu toutes les garanties matérielles qu'en continuant la guerre on aurait eu la certitude de saisir, et dont la nécessité est assez démontrée par une longue expérience, le troisième des points indiqués dans le memorandum du Roi en contient une trop évidente pour qu'il soit permis de penser qu'elle ne serait pas appréciée. Par vos rapports, aussi bien que par les journaux, le Roi a appris que les alliés ont l'intention de stipuler que les fortifications de Bomarsund ne pourront pas être relevées, mais il est de la dernière évidence qu'une stipulation pareille n'aurait pas la valeur pratique qu'on semble y attacher, rien n'empêchant la Russie d'élever une forteresse aussi formidable sur un autre des îlots nombreux de l'Archipel d'Aland. Aussi Sa Majesté aime-t-elle à croire que les alliés, en disant Bomarsund, veulent donner à entendre qu'aucune forteresse ou établissement militaire quelconque ne pourra être créé dans les Iles d'Aland. Cela est le minimum de ce qui devrait être stipulé, afin de gagner le but qu'on se propose. Pour rendre cette garantie suffisante il serait même désirable qu'on put l'étendre de manière à empêcher la Russie de créer de nouveaux établissements militaires le long du littoral Finlandais, où, à partir de Sveaborg, elle n'en possède maintenant aucun; et le Roi regarde l'insertion d'une stipulation claire et précise à ce sujet, comme une question de la plus grande importance pour la sûreté de la presqu'île Scandinave. Vous aurez donc, Monsieur, à en faire valoir toute la portée.

C'est pour la première fois, depuis le commencement de la guerre actuelle, que la question, jusqu'ici purement Orientale, reçoit, par l'extension du cinquième point, un caractère plus Européen, et embrasse les intérêts du Nord. Cette nouvelle phase impose au Roi l'obligation, et lui donne le droit de s'adresser avec franchise à ses alliés, afin de leur soumettre les garanties qui pour la sécurité et l'indépendance de ses Etats sont d'une haute gravité. Si les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris croient devoir les prendre en considération, soit dans leur ensemble, soit en partie, ils nous le feront probablement connaître, et le Roi se déclare prêt à adopter l'attitude et les mesures qui seraient jugées les plus convenables pour contribuer à la réalisation des engagements qui mutuellement seraient pris.

Le moment est solennel et décisif. Les bases et les stipulations de la paix qui bientôt va se conclure, assureront la tranquillité de l'Europe, ou porteront dans leur sein la germe des complications futures et des luttes désastreuses qui de nouveau viendront peut-être affliger l'humanité. Plaçant une confiance illimitée dans la haute sagesse des Cabinets alliés, et dans leurs vues aussi éclairées que bienveillantes, le Roi vient de leur développer les espérances et les besoins du Nord. Il attend avec calme leur décision, heureux d'avoir rempli son devoir envers les nobles nations Scandinaves, dont la prospérité et l'indépendance forment le but de sa constante sollicitude et sur lesquelles la protection Divine a veillé.

(Signé) STIERNELD.

No. 409.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 17.)

(No. 145. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 7*, 1856.

TWO or three days after I had received your Lordship's telegraphic message terminating with the expression of a wish that the appointment of Turkish Plenipotentiary to the negotiations at Paris might fall on Aali Pasha, I received from Lord Cowley a telegraphic message intimating that Reshid Pasha, if he were appointed to the same functions, would be well received.

The former of the two messages I communicated in person to the Grand Vizier, who lost no time in taking the Sultan's pleasure, and obtaining the

appointment of Plenipotentiary without relinquishing his dignity of Grand Vizier. The latter I thought it more prudent to convey to the Sultan myself, and by a succession of accidents or intrigues, probably both, I had no opportunity of doing so till after the appointment of Aali Pasha had been publicly announced.

In the afternoon of Saturday the 2nd instant, the Sultan's principal Aide-de-camp, Edhem Pasha, called with a message from His Majesty expressing regret that he had been absent from his palace when I had gone there to see him in the morning, and the day before. In returning my thanks for this condescension, I requested Edhem Pasha to acquaint His Majesty with the purport of Lord Cowley's telegram, which, according to his own statement, he appears to have done.

The Sultan has since sent a gracious message to Reshid Pasha, explaining the motives for sending Aali Pasha to Paris; expressing an interest in Reshid's welfare; and intimating an intention of recalling him to his service at no distant period.

The ex-Grand Vizier, though far from being pleased at the preference given to his successor, has sent me word that he is content to remain unemployed for the present. According to my impressions he foresees that whether the approaching negotiations terminate in peace or in war, they would yield him little honour or advantage, and that if he were to resume his former office under the present circumstances he would not retain it long.

I have reason to believe that the Sultan would have commanded his services at an earlier period, if the French Embassy had not given it to be understood that an administration with Reshid for its President would be viewed with little satisfaction at Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 410.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 17.)

(No. 146.) *Constantinople, February 7, 1856*

My Lord,

I HAVE nothing essential to add on the subject of the two points respecting which we are holding preparatory interviews. The fourth is, I trust, to be considered as virtually concluded. We are to enter upon the first at a meeting appointed to-morrow. Some delay may arise out of the Grand Vizier's departure, and the French Ambassador's weak state of health. But I do not apprehend any serious delay or obstruction calculated to defeat what, with some shade of difference, appears to be our common purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 411.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 17.)

(No. 150.) *Constantinople, February 7, 1856.*

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, in copy for your Lordship's information, is a report I have just received from Mr. Pisani, relating to the official answer which I am expecting to my note to Fuad Pasha on the subject of religious persecutions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 411.

Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Sublime Porte, February 7, 1856.*

I HAVE just seen the Grand Vizier and Fuad Pasha on the subject of the Porte's note respecting religious persecution. They requested me to tell your Excellency that they submitted it last night to the consideration of the Council, and that the decision will prove satisfactory both to your Excellency and to Her Majesty's Government.

They beg to abstain for the present from communicating the decision of the Council without previously ascertaining the Sultan's pleasure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 412.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 158.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 11, 1856.*

I AM unable to write as fully to your Lordship to-day as I had wished, being obliged to attend at a conference appointed to take place this morning at the Grand Vizier's house, previous to his Highness' departure for Paris to-morrow.

I have, however, the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a paper containing certain Articles agreed upon yesterday by M. Thouvenel, Baron Prokesch, and myself, with respect to the first point. This paper was communicated yesterday to the Turkish Ministers, and we shall, I hope, be able to obtain their acceptance of it to-day, though probably not without some modifications.

I reserve all necessary remarks and explanations for the next opportunity, which I hope will occur to-morrow.

The firman respecting the rights and privileges of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, will be forwarded to your Lordship by the next opportunity. It has received the Sultan's sanction, and there is every reason to expect that it will be promulgated with due solemnity in two or three days. It is a mere translation of the Articles agreed upon, with an addition suggested by me, as to the encouragement of agriculture and trade, and the employment of foreign capital and industry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 412.

Memorandum relative to the First Point.

1. LES Traités conclus entre la Russie et la Porte relativement à la Moldavie et à la Valachie ayant cessé d'être en vigueur par suite de la guerre, les Réglements Organiques qui en découlaient, ne seront plus la loi fondamentale de ces deux pays.

Dans cet état de choses la Sublime Porte confirme de nouveau les immunités et privilèges dont les dites Principautés ont joui sous sa suzeraineté depuis les Capitulations qui leur ont été accordées par les Sultans Bajazet I et Mahomed II.

Elle veut leur en assurer la jouissance d'une manière équitable et solide, en les mettant complétement en harmonie avec les progrès du temps, les besoins et les vœux de toutes les classes de la population, et les rapports établis dans un intérêt commun avec l'Empire Ottoman.

2. La Valachie et la Moldavie, dont les territoires respectifs font partie intégrante de l'Empire Ottoman, auront, chacune, comme par le passé, une

administration séparée et indépendante, sous la suzeraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Les Hospodars seront nommés à vie parmi les familles les plus distinguées du pays. Leur pouvoir sera entouré d'institutions propres à y maintenir le bon ordre dans les Principautés et à fixer sur des bases convenables le bien-être de toutes les classes.

3. Les Principautés seront indépendantes de tout protectorat étranger, et entretiendront par des Chargés d'Affaires nommés par les Hospodars et révocables à leur volonté, des rapports directes avec le Gouvernement Impérial de Turquie.

4. Dans leurs relations avec les Puissances étrangères elles ne seront représentées que par la Sublime Porte.

5. Les Traités conclus par la Sublime Porte seront exécutoires dans les Principautés.

6. La Valachie et la Moldavie payeront, chacune, annuellement au Gouvernement Impérial un tribut déterminé qui sera fixé à une somme équitable et modérée. Par contre elles ne seront, sous aucun prétexte, soumises à d'autres charges de quelque espèce que ce soit, ni astreintes à des livraisons en nature par voie de réquisition ou d'achat forcé.

7. Les Principautés auront le droit d'entretenir les forces qui leur paraîtront nécessaires pour assurer la police et le maintien de l'ordre public. Elles fixeront, d'accord avec la Sublime Porte, la quantité de leurs forces militaires, proprement dites, et le chiffre de l'armée une fois arrêtée ne pourra être augmentée sans une nouvelle entente. Aucune Puissance, d'ailleurs, n'aura qualité pour s'opposer à l'exécution des mesures défensives que la Sublime Porte et les Principautés croiraient devoir combiner pour leur sûreté commune.

8. Les bâtiments Moldaves et Valaques continueront à naviguer librement sous le pavillon privilégié qui leur a été accordé par la Sublime Porte.

9. Dans le cas où l'ordre viendrait à être troublé, il n'appartiendra qu'à la Sublime Porte de le rétablir, mais elle ne recourrait à une intervention armée qu'après s'en être entendue avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes quant au mode et à la durée de cette intervention.

10. Aucune forteresse ne sera construite sur la rive gauche du Danube, ni sur aucun point du territoire Molde-Valaque, sans qu'une entente préalable ne soit intervenue entre l'une ou l'autre Principauté et la Puissance Suzeraine. Toutes les questions relatives à ces forteresses, en temps de paix, seront également réglées d'un commun et libre accord. La Sublime Porte, en temps de guerre, pourra faire occuper par des troupes Ottomanes celles de ces forteresses qui auront été élevées à ses frais exclusifs.

11. Si l'établissement d'un système permanent de quarantaines entre les deux rives du Danube était, contre toute attente, reconnu nécessaire à l'avenir, l'administration sanitaire en Valachie et en Moldavie ne relèverait que du Gouvernement des Principautés. Le principe de toute quarantaine, avant d'être mis en exécution, sera discuté avec la Sublime Porte.

12. Conformément aux privilèges reconnus *ab antiquo* à la Moldavie et à la Valachie, Sa Majesté le Sultan reconnaît et protège l'indépendance de l'administration intérieure des Principautés, et la Sublime Porte est résolue à s'abstenir de toute ingérence, sous quelque forme que ce puisse être, dans les actes de l'autorité indigène, à moins qu'ils ne soient manifestement contraires au présent Acte et au Statut Fondamental, qui en sera le complément, ou attentatoires aux Traités conclus avec les Puissances étrangères, et aux intérêts légitimes qui en dérivent.

13. Tous les cultes, et ceux qui les professent, jouiront d'une égale liberté et d'une égale protection dans les deux Principautés.

14. Aucun individu ni aucune corporation ne pourra être exproprié, pour quelque motif que ce soit, sans une juste indemnité arbitrée par une Commission Mixte donnant aux parties en cause toutes les garanties désirables.

15. Les étrangers pourront posséder des biens fonds en Moldavie et en Valachie en acquittant les mêmes charges que les indigènes et en se soumettant aux lois.

16. Tous les Moldaves et tous les Valaques seront, sans exception, admissibles aux emplois.

17. Les rapports entre les propriétaires et les paysans seront réglés d'une manière équitable, et autant que possible de gré à gré. Les corvées et servitudes personnelles, encore existantes, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, seront

déclarées rachetables par une loi spéciale, qui devra être rendue et exécutée au plus tard dans un an, de manière à les faire cesser entièrement à une époque rapprochée.

18. Toutes les classes de la population, sans aucune distinction de naissance ni de culte, jouiront de l'égalité des droits civils, et particulièrement du droit de propriété sous toutes les formes, mais l'exercice des droits politiques sera suspendu pour les indigènes placés sous une protection étrangère.

19. Les propriétés foncières, quelques soient leurs détenteurs, seront imposées comme les autres. La capitation sera totalement supprimée.

20. Toutes les industries seront libres, et les monopoles, de quelque nature et espèce qu'ils soient, dans les villes et dans les campagnes, seront radicalement supprimés.

21. Les Hospodars sont électifs et à titre viager. La Porte ne les révoquera jamais que dans le cas de haute trahison judiciairement constaté dans des formes qui seront déterminées.

22. Le candidat choisi sur une liste de trois noms élus d'après des règles convenues, et approuvé par Sa Majesté le Sultan, sera Hospodar.

23. Aussitôt que les bases essentielles de la nouvelle organisation des Principautés auront été posées, il sera procédé à l'élection des nouveaux Hospodars.

Jusque-là les deux Principautés seront administrées, chacune, par un Gouvernement Provisoire ou Caimacamie, pour la composition duquel la Sublime Porte s'entendra avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire jouissant de l'autorité attribuée aux Hospodars, procédera dans le plus bref délai possible, et en présence d'un Commissaire Ottoman, à la nouvelle organisation respective des deux Provinces.

24. La liste civile des Hospodars sera fixée, une fois pour toutes, à chaque entrée en fonctions.

25. Ils auront le droit de nommer et de congédier leurs Ministres. Ils auront la disposition des forces armées conformément aux lois. Ils feront présenter le budget annuel et rendre compte des dépenses à la législature. Ils mettront les lois à exécution. Ils auront le droit de grâce. Ils convoqueront la législature, et cloîtront les sessions d'après les formes établies par la loi. Leur initiative et leur sanction seront réglées par une loi.

26. La législature sera constituée de façon à être indépendante dans sa composition et dans son ensemble, à sauvegarder les intérêts de toutes les classes de la population, de satisfaire à leurs vœux légitimes, et de contrôler efficacement les actes de l'administration. Elle votera également toutes les lois relatives à l'organisation de l'armée, à l'administration proprement dite, à celles des finances, de la justice, de l'instruction publique, des biens de l'État et des monastères ainsi que les grandes concessions de travaux publics. Les lois votées par la législature et promulguée par les Hospodars seront obligatoires pour tous les indigènes et les sujets de la Sublime Porte établis dans les Principautés ou y possédant des propriétés foncières.

27. Quelle que puisse être en définitive la modalité de la législature elle comprendra un Sénat, composé des notabilités les plus marquantes du pays.

28. La législation constitutive des deux Principautés devant être uniforme, une Commission, moitié Valaque, moitié Moldave, désignée par les Caimacams d'accord avec le Commissaire Ottoman, se rendra incessamment à Constantinople pour substituer au Réglement Organique non seulement les nouvelles combinaisons nécessités par les Articles précédents, mais toutes celles dont l'expérience aurait démontré l'utilité, et spécialement ce qui regarde l'organisation du pouvoir législatif.

29. Le travail de la Commission sera soumis à la Sublime Porte et aux Hautes Parties Contractantes. Il sera revêtu de l'approbation solennelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan et publié et son nom à Bucharest et à Jassy, dans le délai de trois mois.

No. 413.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Paris, February 23, 1856.

Sir,

A MEETING was held two days ago at the Foreign Office here, to settle the mode of proceeding to be pursued at the Conferences, and I expressed my regret that Count Cavour had not been summoned.

A long conversation then took place respecting the *locus standi* of Sardinia, in which Count Buol took the principal part, but, I must do him the justice to say, in a most respectful and friendly tone towards Sardinia. He argued that we should be erecting Sardinia into a first-rate Power, which would disturb the settled order of things in Europe, and create a precedent which might be inconvenient hereafter; and that moreover the very Treaty about to be negotiated might entail obligations as well as charges upon her which might be onerous to her to fulfil, such as maintaining vessels to watch the Danube.

There was truth as well as fairness in some of Count Buol's observations, but I maintained that without having any wish to give to Sardinia a European importance to which she did not herself pretend, that she must at the approaching Conferences be treated on a footing of perfect equality. I said that Sardinia had behaved towards us with chivalrous boldness. She had at once accepted our invitation to join the Western Alliance, and had launched into the war without inquiring about principles, or caring for consequences; and that we would never abandon our friend or permit any slight to be put upon him, because we might not stand in want of him at the moment.

No formal proposition was definitively made about interfering with Sardinia, and all that Lord Cowley and I would admit was, that if Count Cavour considered that any particular question did not concern Sardinia, he would be at liberty to attend the Conferences or not, as he thought fit, while that particular question was under discussion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 414.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1856.

YOUR Excellency inclosed to me in your despatch No. 1,095 of the 31st of December, a copy of a despatch which you had addressed on the 30th of that month to Mr. Consul Brant, stating that you had obtained from the Porte a promise that Mehemet and Selim Pashas, the two respective Mushirs of Erzeroom and of the army, should be forthwith superseded; but it would seem from your subsequent despatches that although the Porte, without admitting Selim Pasha's criminality, continues to hold out the expectation that he will be superseded in his command at Erzeroom, no successor has yet been appointed to him.

In the meanwhile it appears by a Report, dated January 22, from Mr. Brant, that Selim Pasha was "every day doing incalculable injury at Erzeroom, either by his venality, his carelessness, or his perverse determination to undo all the good that General Sir William Williams had effected, in removing officers who did not perform their duty;" and under these circumstances I have to instruct your Excellency, if the recall of Selim Pasha has not been sent, to remonstrate with the Porte against retaining him in office, as it would otherwise really seem that the Turkish Government desire that the disaster of Kars should be repeated at Erzeroom. You will therefore state to the Porte that Her Majesty's Government expect and require the immediate removal of Selim Pasha.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 415.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 20, 1856.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatches Nos. 59 and 65 of the 12th instant, inclosing copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, respecting the language which I reported M. de Moustier to have held to Baron Manteuffel a fortnight ago, and which had given rise to a conversation between Lord Cowley and Count Walewski, resulting in the declaration by the latter that there was no difference of opinion between the French and English Governments on the question of the admission of Prussia to the Conferences, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that I have conversed on this affair with M. de Moustier, since his return from Paris. His language pourtrayed the strongest desire that a complete understanding should exist between our two Governments at the approaching Conferences; and on my alluding to the question of the admission of Prussia, he informed me that Count Walewski had told him, when taking leave, that he was most anxious for your Lordship's arrival at Paris, in order to discuss the whole bearing of the question with you, and see whether something might not be done to facilitate an arrangement with Prussia; but that he looked upon the matter as one of minor importance, and on which no trifling difference of opinion that might exist would have the least influence on the cordial understanding which it was so essential to maintain between the two Governments on the great points which were soon to be discussed at Paris.

M. de Moustier added that he should probably hear something on this matter by his next messenger, but this messenger, who has just arrived, has brought nothing.

Your Lordship will perceive from the foregoing, that although the French Government refused to acknowledge the existence of any difference of opinion with Her Majesty's Government, there is still a strong tendency to listen to the counsels of Austria, and the arguments which Count Buol has been lately pressing on the consideration of the Cabinet of the Tuileries. This was evident from the conduct and language of the Marquis de Moustir before his journey to Paris; and to judge from what he has confidentially said to me since his return, I am but strengthened in the opinion that the French Government is much more favourable to the admission of Prussia to the Conferences than that of Her Majesty. At the same time I cannot speak too highly of the personal desire of my French colleague to act with me, but it is not to be denied that his impression as to the opinions of Count Walewski on this matter are far less decided than those which I have received from your Lordship's despatches.

I shall naturally be most careful to avoid anything like the appearance of the existence of a difference of opinion between our Governments on this or any other point connected with the Eastern question, for nothing would at this moment be hailed with so much satisfaction by our enemies as a marked difference in the appreciation by England and France of any of the important occurrences of the day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 416.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 20, 1856.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 66 of the 12th instant, in reply to one which I had addressed to you respecting the state of feeling in Germany with regard to the claim of the smaller States to take part in the negotiations for peace.

The language which I held here on this subject before the arrival of your Lordship's despatch has been, that as Germany had all along declined taking any active part in the war, and had pursued a policy which only caused embarrassment to the Western Powers, I could not see what argument she could possibly put forward in support of the claim to participate at the Paris Conferences, where no Powers would be represented but belligerents, and Austria, whose policy at all events bespoke an approach towards ours, and who had exposed herself to the risks of war if Russia had rejected the five points.

Prussia's pretension to assist at the Conferences is not based on her desire to become the protector of German interests; but on her being one of the Great Powers, and on her right as such to be represented at the approaching revision of Treaties to which she is a party, and more especially of that of 1841 respecting the Dardanelles. She pretends also that her being a party to a future Treaty would render it a greater security for Europe.

The claim of the smaller States to be represented at the Paris Conferences appears to have had only an ephemeral existence; it was produced by Baron de Beust, and ceased almost with his departure from Berlin, except in the minds of a few of the "exalted," who are always planning to make Germany more active, and give her the rights of a great Power.

The only argument which the smaller States can possibly bring forward in support of the idea of a special Representative of the Diet is to be found in the 49th Article of the Final Act of Vienna, 1820, wherein it is stated "that when there arises a question of a negotiation for peace, or an armistice, the Diet will appoint a special Committee to consider the question, the Diet will name at the same time Plenipotentiaries to conduct the negotiation, &c.;" but this argument is not tenable for a moment, as the smaller States seem to forget that they have not been belligerents, and that Germany, not having been involved in war, can have no claim to be represented at Paris. There have, I believe, been only two occasions on which the Diet has been represented abroad; the one was at the London Conferences on the Hollando-Belgian question, and for the express purpose of discussing an exchange of territory, and the annexation of Luxembourg to the Confederation. The second was when a special Envoy of the Diet was sent to London during the Revolution of 1848. The subject, however, has now lost all immediate interest, the hopelessness of the attempt meeting with success has been demonstrated, and the question will now be allowed to rest and wait for better days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 417.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 96.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 22, 1856.*

NOTHING has transpired respecting any communications which may have been made by Count Orloff to the King of Prussia or his Government, during the two days which he passed at Berlin. He is described to me as having been generally reserved as to the mission with which he is charged, and by no means expansive towards this Government in expressions of goodwill or acknowledgments for the services which they have rendered to Russia during the war.

Baron Manteuffel, whom I have seen this evening, told me that Count Orloff would have much preferred not to have been employed on this service; that he declined the first proposal on the subject which had been made to him by Count Nesselrode, but that he was unable to refuse the Emperor. In reply to my inquiry as to the opinions which Count Orloff had expressed as to the approaching negotiations, and as to any difficulties which he foresaw as likely to impede them, Baron Manteuffel said that he had not alluded to any that were likely to be serious, except in the question of the rectification of the Asiatic frontier, and that he had declared that Russia would refuse any cession of territory in that quarter; that he had conversed with him about Kars, and that

he seemed to attach great value and importance to that district, but did not say what were the intentions of Russia respecting it.

His Excellency said, that shortly before Count Orloff left St. Petersburgh, the Emperor had received a letter from Schamyl, containing assurances that he would continue to remain quiet, and not to molest the Imperial troops, and thanks for the kindness which had been shown to his son, who, your Lordship is aware, was educated in one of the cadet corps at St. Petersburgh. On the whole, Baron Manteuffel did not seem to me to be much gratified by what he had heard from Count Orloff, or to be impressed with the idea that Russia would be found as well-disposed to meet all the demands of the allies as he could have wished. I asked if he was aware whether Russia would make difficulties about the Aland Islands. He said that he believed not, neither about the question of Consuls in the ports of the Black Sea; and that he had no reason to suppose that there would be any serious ones raised, except, as he had already told me, on the question of the Asiatic frontier.

Baron Manteuffel spoke in nearly the same tone to the Marquis de Moustier last night, and that Minister has already sent off a report on the subject to Count Walewski. His Excellency appears to have said further to my French colleague, that Count Orloff wished Prussia to remain in her present attitude; and had observed that if peace did not result from the Paris Conferences, Russia could, without difficulty, go on for three years longer with the war; that her paper-money was not depreciated; and that, although the commerce of St. Petersburgh was sadly crippled, that of the interior was flourishing; that Russia was desirous for peace, but not to the extent erroneously believed by many persons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 418.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 160.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 11, 1856.*

EVERY practicable exertion has been made by me and my colleagues to bring the preparatory arrangement of the first and fourth points, as they are called, of the impending negotiation to a close before the departure of Aali Pasha for Paris. We have succeeded with respect to the latter, and I entertain a sanguine hope of being able to complete the former also in time, though we have now only twenty-four hours at our disposal for the purpose. Our difficulties have been greatly increased by the want of instructions bearing on the particulars, or even on the principles, to which it is desirable that our proceedings should be adapted in providing for the future condition of Wallachia and Moldavia. The field is wide, and offers many difficult and entangled questions for consideration.

Your Lordship is aware that there are, chiefly, two principles, either of which presents a clear point to set out from, though in different directions. One is that of a material, the other of a moral, barrier against foreign encroachment. Could a strong frontier line be obtained against Russia, such, for instance, as the course of the Dniester, with its long-established fortresses, it might be well worth while to unite the two Provinces under a single Government; to give to its Administration a vigorous and decisive character; to place a foreign Prince at its head; and to entrust him with the command of sufficient forces for the defence of the frontier. More than one Power might object to so determined an arrangement, but the real European interest attached to it would probably overrule the objections, as well at Constantinople as elsewhere.

The idea of a moral barrier, without excluding the employment of military means for defence, addresses itself more particularly to the social and administrative condition of the Principalities, and to the welfare of the inhabitants at large as resulting from that condition. In the supposed case the institutions of the country should be such as to content all classes of the population, and their contentment would naturally operate as a bond of union, confidence and goodwill between the Porte and her grateful dependents.

If I may be allowed, in the absence of instructions, to express a personal opinion, I confess that the adoption of the former principle would have been preferable in my judgment; but, under the circumstances, it would have been useless for me to take my stand on that ground, and the only result of such an experiment would have been the failure of our endeavours to send a basis of arrangement to Paris before the commencement of the negotiations.

I felt myself, therefore, compelled to abandon the course which I should have preferred, and to join simply with my colleagues and the Sultan's Ministers in putting forward such principles and institutional forms for each Principality as might hereafter secure the welfare of its inhabitants, and bind them both more closely to the Sultan's Empire.

The result of our discussions, as between the three Representatives, has been already transmitted to your Lordship. It remains for us to obtain the assent of the Turkish Ministers, and to combine our ideas with theirs on the subject of Servia.

Your Lordship will observe that the proposition relating to Moldavia and Wallachia sets aside the Organic Statutes, and grounds the future institutions of the two countries on a modified confirmation of their ancient privileges. It has the salutary effect of substituting the Sultan's charter for Russian dictation, and of being on that account more acceptable to the Principalities. In the remaining Articles we have endeavoured to combine a proper dependence of the Principalities on the Porte, with securities for the maintenance of their privileges, for the administration of justice, for the abolition of abuses, for placing all classes of the population on an equal footing, and, finally, for investing the Prince with a suitable amount of authority.

With respect to the defences of the country, and a Legislature founded on national representation, I had not the good fortune to take the same view as my colleagues of France and Austria. On the former point it was my wish to define the Sultan's right of sending an army into the Principalities for the defence of the frontier, or erecting fortresses on their territory, in such manner as to guard, in their interest, against abuse without crippling the action of the Sovereign in cases of real necessity. On the second, I was desirous of obtaining a Representative body, capable of exercising a wholesome control over the Executive without opening too much room for popular excitement.

Inclosed herewith are the conflicting paragraphs, which appeared respectively in my draft of the propositions, and in that presented by M. Thouvenel, and supported by Baron Prokesch. A mutual wish to agree, and want of time for prolonged discussion, induced us to adopt the version as it now stands in the series of numbered articles.

On the whole, my Lord, I trust that, although my position was in almost every case of disagreement that of a minority, our work, however imperfect, will be found sufficient for the main object immediately in view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 418.

Conflicting Paragraphs in the Projects respecting the First Point.

M. Thouvenel's Project.

DANS le cas où l'ordre viendrait à être troublé il n'appartiendra qu'à la Sublime Porte de le rétablir, mais elle ne reconnaît à une intervention armée qu'après s'en être entendue avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes quant au mode et à la durée de cette intervention.

Lord Stratford's Project.

LE Sultan se réserve toutefois la faculté d'introduire des troupes Ottomanes dans les Principautés pour en défendre les frontières au cas qu'elles viendraient être menacées, bien entendu que la Porte en donnera avis d'avance au Gouvernement Princier, qu'elle ne les soumettra à aucune charge à cet égard, et qu'elle réglera l'occupation selon la stricte nécessité des circonstances constatées.

No. 419.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1856.*

AT the final Conference, which took place yesterday at the Grand Vizier's house, the propositions respecting Wallachia and Moldavia, which had been previously adopted by my two Christian colleagues and myself, were reconsidered in concert with the Turkish Ministers.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that with some few amendments, and the addition of an Article, which I have suggested with reference to the Judicial Department, they were accepted by the Porte's Representatives. A copy of the entire series, comprised in Articles to the number of thirty, is inclosed herewith.

A paragraph respecting the construction and occupation of fortresses in either Principality was reproduced by the French Ambassador, and adopted as a separate proposition, not annexed to the Articles, by the Grand Vizier and his colleagues. A copy of it is submitted herewith to your Lordship's examination.

We did not separate without noting down our joint opinions respecting Servia, its future relations with the Porte, and the revisal of its constitution. Our opinions, such as they were ultimately settled after some discussion, are recorded in a separate paper containing four Articles, and transmitted, in copy, herewith.

The propositions relating to Servia, as well as those which concern the two other Principalities, were neither signed nor dated. The French Ambassador stated that his instructions confined him to an officious interference, unaccompanied with formalities, and your Lordship is aware that I had no authority to insist upon a different course of proceeding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 419.

Memorandum agreed upon relative to Moldavia and Wallachia.

1. LES Traités conclus entre la Porte et la Russie relativement à la Moldavie et à la Valachie ayant cessé d'être en vigueur par suite de la guerre, les Réglements Organiques, qui en découlaient, ne seront plus la loi fondamentale de ces deux pays.

Dans cet état de choses la Sublime Porte confirme de nouveau les immunités et privilèges dont les dites Principautés ont joui sous sa suzeraineté depuis les Capitulations qui leur ont été accordées par les Sultans Bajazet I et Mahomed II.

Elle veut leur en assurer la jouissance d'une manière équitable et solide, en les mettant complètement en harmonie avec les progrès du temps, les besoins et les vœux de toutes les classes de la population, et les rapports établis dans un intérêt commun avec l'Empire Ottoman.

2. La Valachie et la Moldavie, dont les territoires respectifs font partie intégrante de l'Empire Ottoman, auront, chacune, comme par le passé, une administration séparée et indépendante, sous la suzeraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Les Hospodars seront nommés à vie parmi les familles les plus distinguées du pays. Leur pouvoir sera entouré d'institutions propres à maintenir le bon ordre dans les Principautés et à fixer sur des bases convenables le bien-être de toutes les classes.

3. Les Principautés seront indépendantes de tout protectorat étranger, et dans leurs relations avec les Puissances étrangères elles ne seront représentées que par la Sublime Porte.

4. Les Traités conclus par la Sublime Porte continueront d'être exécutoires dans les Principautés.

5. Les Principautés entretiendont par des Capou-Kéhayias ou agents nommés par les Hospodars, revocables à leur volonté, et agréés par la Sublime Porte, des rapports directs avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

6. La Valachie et la Moldavie payeront, chacune, annuellement au Gouvernement Impérial un tribut déterminé, qui sera fixé à une somme équitable et modérée. Par contre elles ne seront soumises à aucun autre charge, de quelque espèce que ce soit, ni astreintes à des livraisons en nature par voie de requisition ou d'achat forcé.

7. Les Principautés auront le droit d'entretenir les forces qui leur paraîtront nécessaires pour assurer la police et le maintien de l'ordre public. Elles fixeront, d'accord avec la Sublime Porte, la quantité de leurs troupes militaires, proprement dites, et le chiffre de l'armée une fois arrêtée ne pourra être augmentée sans une nouvelle entente. Aucune Puissance d'ailleurs n'aura qualité pour s'opposer à l'exécution des mesures défensives que la Sublime Porte et les Principautés croiraient devoir combiner pour la sécurité commune de l'Empire.

8. Les batiments Moldaves et Valaques continueront à naviguer librement sous le pavillon privilégié qui leur a été accordé par la Sublime Porte.

9. Dans le cas où l'ordre viendrait à être troublé, il n'appartiendra qu'à la Sublime Porte de le rétablir, mais elle ne recourrait à une intervention armée qu'après s'en être entendue avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes quant au mode et à la durée de cette intervention.

10. Aucune forteresse ne sera construite sur la rive gauche du Danube ni sur aucun point du territoire Moldo-Valaque sans qu'une entente préalable ne soit intervenue entre l'une ou l'autre Principauté et la Puissance Suzeraine. Toutes les questions relatives à ces forteresses, en temps de paix, seront également réglées d'un commun et libre accord. La Sublime Porte, en temps de guerre, pourra faire occuper par des troupes Ottomanes celles de ces forteresses qui auront été élevées à ses frais exclusifs.

11. Si l'établissement d'un système permanent de quarantaines entre les deux rives du Danube était, contre toute attente, reconnu nécessaire à l'avenir, l'administration sanitaire en Valachie et en Moldavie ne relèverait que du Gouvernement des Principautés. Le principe de toute quarantaine avant d'être mis en exécution sera discuté avec la Sublime Porte.

12. Conformément aux priviléges reconnus *ab antiquo* à la Moldavie et à la Valachie, Sa Majesté le Sultan reconnaît et protège l'indépendance de l'administration intérieure des Principautés, et la Sublime Porte est résolue à s'abstenir de toute ingérence, sous quelque forme que ce puisse être, dans les actes de l'autorité indigène, à moins qu'ils ne soient manifestement contraires au présent Acte et au Statut Fondamental, qui en sera le complément, ou attentatoires aux Traités conclus avec les Puissances étrangères, et aux intérêts légitimes qui en découlent.

13. Tous les cultes, et ceux qui les professent, jouiront d'une égale liberté et d'une égale protection dans les deux Principautés.

14. Aucun individu ni aucune corporation ne pourra être exproprié, pour quelque motif que ce soit, sans une juste indemnité arbitrée par une Commission Mixte donnant aux parties en cause toutes les garanties désirables.

15. Les étrangers pourront posséder des biens fonds en Moldavie et en Valachie en acquittant les mêmes charges que les indigènes et en se soumettant aux lois.

16. Tous les Moldaves et tous les Valaques seront, sans exception, admissibles aux emplois publics.

17. Les rapports entre les propriétaires et les paysans seront réglés d'une manière équitable, et autant que possible de gré à gré. Les corvées et servitudes personnelles, encore existantes, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, seront déclarées rachetables par une loi spéciale, qui devra être rendue et exécutée au plus tard dans un an, de manière à les faire cesser entièrement à une époque rapprochée.

18. Toutes les classes de la population, sans aucune distinction de naissance ni de culte, jouiront de l'égalité des droits civils, et particulièrement du droit de propriété sous toutes les formes, mais l'exercice des droits politiques sera suspendu pour les indigènes placés sous une protection étrangère.

19. Les propriétés foncières, quelques soient leurs détenteurs, seront sujettes à l'impôt comme les autres. La capitation sera totalement supprimée.

20. Toutes les industries seront libres, et les monopoles, de quelque nature

et espèce qu'ils soient, dans les villes et dans les campagnes, seront radicalement supprimés.

21. Les Hospodars sont électifs et à titre viager. La Porte ne les revoquera jamais que dans le cas de haute trahison judiciairement constaté dans les formes qui seront déterminées.

22. Le candidat choisi sur une liste de trois noms élus d'après des règles convenues, et approuvé par Sa Majesté le Sultan, sera Hospodar.

Aussitôt que les bases essentielles de la nouvelle organisation des Principautés auront été posées, il sera procédé à l'élection des nouveaux Hospodars

23. Jusque-là les deux Principautés seront administrées, chacune, par un Gouvernement Provisoire ou Caïmacamie, pour la composition duquel la Sublime Porte s'entendra avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire, jouissant de l'autorité attribuée aux Hospodars, procédera dans le plus bref délai possible, et en présence d'un Commissaire Ottoman, à la nouvelle organisation respective des deux Provinces.

24. La liste civile des Hospodars sera fixée, une fois pour toutes, à chaque entrée en fonctions.

25. Ils auront le droit de nommer et de congédier leurs Ministres. Ils auront la disposition des forces armées conformément aux lois. Ils feront présenter le budget annuel et rendre compte des dépenses à la législature. Ils mettront les lois à exécution. Ils auront le droit de grâce. Ils convoqueront la législature, et cloîtront les sessions d'après les formes établies par la loi. Leur initiative et le mode de leur sanction seront réglées par une loi.

26. La législature sera constituée de façon à être indépendante dans sa composition et dans son ensemble, à sauvegarder les intérêts de toutes les classes de la population, de satisfaire à leurs vœux légitimes, et de contrôler efficacement les actes de l'Administration. Elle votera également toutes les lois relatives à l'organisation de l'armée, à l'administration proprement dite, à celles des finances, de la justice, de l'instruction publique, des biens de l'Etat et des monastères, ainsi que les grandes concessions de travaux publics. Les lois votées par la législature et promulguées par les Hospodars étant d'une application générale pour les indigènes, seront aussi obligatoires pour les autres habitants de l'Empire Ottoman, établis ou qui s'établiraient dans les Principautés ou y possédant des propriétés foncières.

27. Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai possible, à l'établissement d'une organisation judiciaire indépendante et donnant toutes les garanties nécessaires.

28. Quelle que puisse être en définitive la modalité de la législature, elle comprendra un Sénat, composé des notabilités les plus marquantes du pays.

29. La législature constitutive des deux Principautés devant être uniforme, une Commission, moitié Valaque, moitié Moldave, désignée par les Caïmacamies d'accord avec le Commissaire Ottoman, se rendra incessamment à Constantinople pour substituer au Réglement Organique non seulement les nouvelles combinaisons nécessitées par les Articles précédents, mais toutes celles dont l'expérience aurait démontré l'utilité, et spécialement ce qui regarde l'organisation du pouvoir législatif.

30. Le travail de la Commission sera soumis à la Sublime Porte et communiqué par elle aux Hautes Parties Contractantes. Il sera revêtu de l'approbation solennelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan et publié en son nom à Bucharest et à Jassy dans le délai de trois mois.

Inclosure 2 in No. 419.

Propositions of the Ottoman Ministers relative to Fortresses on the Danube.

LA Sublime Porte, à la condition de ne gêner ni entraver en aucune façon la navigation des bâtiments de commerce, aura également le droit, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, de mettre des garnisons dans les forteresses actuellement existantes sur la rive gauche du Danube, à partir du confluent de ce fleuve avec le Pruth, et de faire garder, soit par ses propres troupes, soit par les troupes Moldaves, les autres places qu'elle jugerait nécessaire d'établir à ses frais sur la ligne extrême de la frontière contigue à l'Empire Russe et dont le rayon militaire serait exactement déterminé.

L'autorité civile dépendra uniquement du Gouvernement et s'exercera en pleine et entière liberté.

Inclosure 3 in No. 419.

Propositions relative to Servia.

1. LES Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, et 15, relatifs à la Moldavie et à la Valachie, sont également applicable à la Servie.

2. La Sublime Porte pourra librement combiner, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la Principauté, toutes les mesures défensives qui seraient jugées nécessaires dans l'intérêt commun, et la Sublime Porte continuera à entretenir, comme par le passé, des garnisons dans les forteresses qu'elle occupe aujourd'hui.

3. La constitution actuellement en vigueur en Servie conformément aux vœux et aux besoins des populations, sera révisée par une Commission de Serbes qui se réunira sans délai à Constantinople. Son travail sera soumis à la Sublime Porte et communiqué aux Parties Contractantes. La constitution révisée sera approuvée par Sa Majesté le Sultan de la même manière dont le Réglement Organique y a été promulgué.

No. 420.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1856.*

AS M. Thouvenel announced his intention of sending home a copy of the draft which he read at our meeting of three, respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, I think it right to transmit herewith a copy of it to your Lordship, having had occasion to take one. The paragraphs entirely omitted in the adopted version are marked with a line along the margin. A paper communicated by the Porte, and another brought forward by the Internuncio, are forwarded to your Lordship herewith. I have only to add such passages of my own draft as are objected to by my colleagues, and either essentially modified, or entirely set aside, with my consent.

These several papers may, possibly, be of use to your Lordship, as helping to throw light on doubtful points which are not unlikely to be raised, though not by the Porte, for further discussion during the negotiations at Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 420.

M. de Thouvenel's Project relative to the First Point.

LES Traités relatifs à la Moldavie et la Valachie ayant cessé d'être en vigueur par suite de la guerre entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, les Réglements Organiques qui découlaient de ces Traités ne seront plus la loi fondamentale des deux pays.

La Sublime Porte confirme les immunités et les privilèges dont les dites Principautés ont joui sous la suzeraineté depuis les Capitulations qui leur ont été accordées par les Sultans Bajazet I et Mahomet II, et qui seront mises en harmonie avec les progrès du temps, les besoins et les vœux des populations, et les rapports établi dans un intérêt commun avec l'Empire Ottoman. Leur territoire fait partie intégrante de cet Empire et se trouve placé sous la même garantie.

2. Elles seront indépendant de tout Protectorat étranger et entretiendront, par des Chargés d'Affaires nommés par les Hospodars et revocables à leur volonté, des rapports directs avec la Sublime Porte.

3. Elles ne seront représentées que par la Sublime Porte dans leurs relations avec les Puissances étrangères.

4. Tous les Traités conclus par la Sublime Porte seront exécutoires dans les Principautés.

5. La Valachie et la Moldavie paieront annuellement à la Sublime Porte un tribut de pour la première de ces Principautés et de pour la

seconde. Elles ne seront, sous aucun prétexte, soumises à d'autres charges de quelque espèce que ce soit, ni astreintes à des livraisons en nature par voie de requisition ou d'achat forcé.

6. Aucune forteresse ne sera construite sur la rive gauche du Danube ni sur aucun point du territoire Moldo-Valaque limité au sud par le Thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'à son confluent avec le Pruth, sans qu'une entente préalable ne soit intervenue entre l'une ou l'autre Principauté et Puissance Suzeraine. Les questions relatives à l'edification, à l'entretien, à l'inspection et à la garde de ces forteresses en temps de paix, seront également réglées d'un commun et libre accord. La Sublime Porte, en temps de guerre, pourra faire occuper par des troupes Ottomanes celles de ces forteresses qui auront été élevées à ses frais exclusifs.

La Sublime Porte, à la condition de ne gener ni entraver d'aucune façon la navigation des bâtiments de commerce, aura également le droit, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, de mettre des garnisons dans les forteresses actuellement existantes sur la rive gauche du Danube, à partir du confluent de ce fleuve avec le Pruth, et de faire garder, soit par ses propres troupes, soit par les troupes Moldaves, les autres places qu'elle jugerait nécessaire d'établir à ses frais sur la ligne extrême de la frontière contigue à l'Empire Russe et dont le rayon militaire serait exactement déterminé.

L'autorité civile dépendra uniquement du Gouvernement Moldave et s'exercera en pleine et entière liberté.

7. Le nombre des troupes régulières, sauf les corps destinés à la police intérieure qu'entretiendront désormais la Moldavie et la Valachie, sera déterminé d'un commun accord avec la Sublime Porte et ne pourra être augmenté sans son assentiment. Aucune Puissance d'ailleurs n'aura qualité pour s'opposer à l'exécution des mesures défensives que la Sublime Porte et les Principautés jugeraient devoir combiner pour leur sûreté.

8. Si l'établissement d'un système permanent de quarantaine entre les deux rives du Danube était reconnu nécessaire à l'avenir, l'administration sanitaire en Valachie et en Moldavie ne relèverait que du Gouvernement des Principautés. Les réglements de cette administration seraient, avant leur mise en pratique, communiqué à la Sublime Porte.

Conformément aux privilèges reconnus à l'antique à la Moldavie et à la Valachie, Sa Majesté le Sultan reconnait et protège l'indépendance de l'administration intérieure des Principautés, et la Sublime Porte est résolue à s'abstenir de toute ingérence, sous quelque forme que ce puisse être, dans les actes de l'autorité indigène, à moins qu'ils ne soient manifestement contraire au présent acte et au statut fondamental qui en sera le complément, ou attentatoires aux Traités conclus avec les Puissances étrangères, à la sécurité des Etats limitrophes, et aux intérêts légitimes des sujets étrangers.

9. Dans le cas où l'ordre viendrait à être troublé il n'appartiendra qu'à la Sublime Porte de le retablir, mais elle ne recourrait à une intervention armée qu'après s'en être entendue avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes quant au mode et à la durée de cette intervention.

10. Tous les cultes jouiront d'une égale liberté et d'une égale protection dans les deux Principautés.

11. Les Hospodars sont électifs et à titre viager. Ils ne pourront se démettre de leurs fonctions sans l'assentiment de la Sublime Porte, et la Sublime Porte elle-même ne les révoquera jamais que dans le cas de haute trahison judiciairement constaté dans les formes qui seront déterminés.

Ils seront choisis par Sa Majesté le Sultan sur une liste de trois candidats nommés d'après des régles convenues.

12. Les réglements actuellement en vigueur pour la nomination des Hospodars exigeant une refonte, il sera procédé, aussitôt que les bases essentielles de l'organisation des Principautés auront été posées, à l'élection des nouveaux Princes.

Jusque-là la Moldavie et la Valachie seront administrées chacune par un Gouvernement Provisoire, ou Caimmacamie, pour la composition duquel la Sublime Porte s'entendra avec les Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire, jouissant de l'autorité attribuée aux Hospodars, procédera dans le plus bref délai possible, et en présence d'une Commissaire Ottoman, à la nouvelle organisation des deux Provinces.

Le commandement suprême des forces militaires et la nomination à tous

les emplois conformément à des réglements approuvés par le Sénat appartiennent aux Hospodars. Il leur est interdit de conférer des titres sans fonctions sous quelque dénomination que ce soit. Les titres provenant des fonctions ne seront pas transmissibles.

14. Une loi spécifiera le cas de responsabilité des Hospodars, soit envers la Puissance Suzeraine, soit envers le Sénat de Moldavie et de Valachie. La même loi indiquera la composition de la haute Cour qui serait chargée de son application.

15. La liste civile des Hospodars sera fixée une fois pour toutes à chaque avénement par le Sénat. La moitié d'une annuité sera offerte à titre d'hommage à Sa Majesté le Sultan à l'époque d'investiture.

16. Le pouvoir législatif sera exercé conjointement par l'Hospodar représenté par ses Ministres, qui prêteront serment de fidélité à sa personne et d'obéissance aux lois, et par un Sénat formé:

(1.) De membres appelés de droit à siéger en vertu de leur fonctions, ces fonctions étant elles-mêmes inamovibles.

(2.) De membres nommés à vie par l'Hospodar sur des listes de catégorie.

(3.) De membres nommés pour un an, rééligibles et désignés dans leur sein par les Conseils de District, de façon à ce que chaque province ait toujours un délégué dans le Sénat.

Le nombre total de membres du Sénat sera de trente-deux pour la Valachie et de vingt-cinq pour la Moldavie.

17. Les sénateurs des deux catégories reçevront les premiers un traitement, les autres une indemnité. Les Sénateurs nommés par l'Hospodar n'occuperont aucun emploi salarié.

18. Le droit d'initiation est exclusivement réservé à l'Hospodar, mais aucun impôt ne pourra être perçu sans le vote préalable du Sénat, qui devra également sanctionner toutes les lois relatives à l'organisation de l'armée, de l'administration proprement dite, des finances, et de la justice, des biens de l'Etat et du clergé, ainsi que les concessions des travaux publics. Les lois adoptées par le Sénat seront obligatoires pour tous les indigènes, et les sujets de la Sublime Porte établis dans les Principautés ou y possédant des propriétés foncières.

19. Aucun individu, ni aucune corporation, ne pourra être exproprié pour quelque motif que ce soit, sans une juste indemnité arbitrée par une Commission Mixte, donnant aux parties en cause toutes les garanties désirables.

20. Les étrangers pourront posséder des biens fonds en Moldavie et en Valachie en acquittant les mêmes charges que les indigènes et en se soumettant aux lois.

21. Il sera formé dans chaque district, un Conseil composé de sept membres qui s'assemblera à des époques fixes pour s'occuper des intérêts locaux et veillera à la répartition et au prélèvement des impôts et en général à l'équitable distribution des charges entre toutes les classes de la population. Ces Conseillers seront désignés par le Sénat pour trois ans sur une liste de vingt-cinq éligibles, nommés aussi tous les trois ans par des électeurs payant un certain cens, sans autre distinction. Les éligibles au Conseil payeront un cens double de celui des simples électeurs.

22. Les candidats à l'Hospodarat seront nommés par le Sénat, auquel on joindra en outre pour cette circonstance, en sus des délégués ordinaires, un autre délégué choisi *ad hoc* par le Conseil de chaque district.

23. Les propriétés foncières, quels que soient leur dimensions, seront imposées comme les autres. La capitation sera supprimée totalement ou remplacée par un impôt personnel et étendu sans exception à toutes les classes de la population entre lesquelles les charges de l'Etat seront également réparties sans que personne puisse se soustraire, sous un prétexte quelconque, à l'obligation de les acquitter comme l'avait déjà prescrit le Hat de 1802. Toutes les industries seront libres et les monopoles de quelques nature et espèces qu'ils soient dans les villes et dans les campagnes seront radicalement supprimés.

24. Toutes les classes de la population, sans aucune distinction de naissance ni de culte, jouiront des mêmes droits civils et particulièrement du droit de propriété sous toutes les formes, mais l'exercice des droits politiques sera suspendu pour les indigènes placés sous une protection étrangère.

Tous les Moldaves et tous les Valaques seront sans exception admissibles aux fonctions publiques.

25. Les rapports des paysans et des propriétaires seront réglés de gré à gré par des contrats passés devant l'autorité et sans que la loi en pareille matière puisse

à l'avenir supposer d'un côté ou de l'autre un consentement tacite, si ce n'est pour le renouvellement des taux qui n'auraient pas été dénoncés par l'une des parties dans les délais convenus.

Les corvées et servitude personnelles encore existantes sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, seront déclarés rachetable par une loi spéciale qui devra être rendue et exécutée au plus tard dans un an.

26. La législation constitutive des deux Principautés devant être uniforme, une Commission, moitié Valaque, moitié Moldave, désignée par les Caimacams d'accord avec le Commissaire Ottoman, se rendra sans délai à Constantinople pour apporter au Réglement Organique non seulement les modifications nécessités par les Articles précédents, mais toutes celles dont l'expérience aurait démontré l'utilité. Le travail de la Commission sera soumis à la Sublime Porte et aux Hautes Parties Contractantes. Il sera revêtu de l'approbation solennelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan et promulgué en son nom à Bucarest et à Jassy par l'organe des Caimacams dans le délai de trois mois.

Inclosure 2 in No. 420.

The Porte's Project relative to the First Point.

LES Principautés de Valachie, de Moldavie, et de Servie, restent sous la suzeraineté de la Sublime Porte, en faisant chacune avec tout son territoire partie intégrante de l'Empire Ottoman. Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan leur assure la jouissance de tous les priviléges accordés à chacune d'elles pour son administration intérieure, privileges actuellement revus et consolidés.

Un firman Impérial revêtu du Hatt-Humaydun sera émané constatant les priviléges accordés aux trois Principautés et qui forment la base fondamentale de leur administration intérieure.

Ces priviléges sont limités à l'administration intérieure des Principautés, qui, quant aux relations extérieures, devront toujours se conformer aux Traités existants entre la Sublime Porte et les Puissances de l'Europe.

Il y aura un chef du Gouvernement en Valachie et en Moldavie sous la dénomination de Hospodar, et en service sous celle de Kénez, qui sera nommé à vie par la Sublime Porte parmi les indigènes. A moins d'une cause majeure qui rende nécessaire pour des raisons d'Etat tant vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Impérial que vis-à-vis du pays la destitution de ce fonctionnaire, ou bien à moins qu'il ne donne sa démission, la condition de l'Hospodariat à vie sera exactement observée.

En cas de vacance Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan nommera à ce poste une personne choisie dans les anciennes familles dont la noblesse et l'indigénat remonte à l'aieul; âgée au moins de quarante ans, de capacité, de probité, et de fidélité reconnue et dont les antécédents prouvent le patriotisme et le dévouement au bien public.

Chacune des trois Principautés payera annuellement au Gouvernement Impérial un tribut déterminé, fixé à une somme équitable qui, sans peser lourdement sur le pays de manière à entraver son administration intérieure, soit néanmoins portée à un chiffre équitable.

Les Hospodars et Kénez administreront le pays en conformité aux lois fondamentales et tous les ordres seront émanés en leur nom.

Le choix, la nomination, et la destitution de tous les employés de ces Principautés, en conformité aux lois fondamentales, dépendra du chef du Gouvernement.

Le Conseil Administratif des Hospodars et du Kénez se composera des directeurs des différents départements et ils seront responsables de l'administration du pays.

Il y aura en Valachie et en Moldavie un Divan général ordinaire composé de quarante membres, propriétaires fonciers et hommes de capacité. La moitié de ces membres sera choisie et nommée par les Hospodars; l'autre moitié sera nommée en conformité aux formes qui seront discutées et arrêtées par les propriétaires fonciers.

Chaque cinq années la moitié des membres de ces deux classes sortira au sort et sera remplacée par d'autres membres nommés également, moitié par le chef du Gouvernement et moitié par les électeurs. Les membres de ce Divan général seront rétribués d'une manière équitable.

La discussion des lois administratives, la distribution des impôts, l'examen des comptes, appartiendront à ce Divan, qui sera tenu de se conformer toujours aux lois fondamentales. La mise en exécution des lois administratives ne pourra avoir lieu que sur l'approbation de ce Divan et du chef du Gouvernement.

Il y aura dans chacune de ces trois Provinces, pour le maintien de la tranquillité publique, une force militaire indigène déterminée, qui ne pourra être ni augmentée ni déterminée sans le consentement de la Sublime Porte. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan pourra ordonner l'emploi de cette milice pour repousser toute attaque du dehors contre une des trois Provinces; et dans le cas d'une guerre sur les frontières de ces Provinces, la force militaire indigène de chaque Province devra se réunir aux troupes Impériales Ottomanes qui se trouveront sur les lieux. De même que les forteresses qui existent actuellement en Servie, et qui sont directement entre les mains du Gouvernement Impérial, l'on formera, sur la rive gauche du Danube, une ligne de défense par la construction dans les positions que désignera la Sublime Porte de forteresses qui seront entre les mains d'une garnison de troupes Ottomanes. Ces troupes ne se trouveront que dans les forteresses, et n'interviendront en rien dans les affaires du pays. Le Gouvernement Impérial ne demandera rien aux Principautés, soit pour la construction de ces forteresses, soit pour l'entretien des troupes qui en formeront la garnison. En cas que la Sublime Porte le désire, elle pourra demander aux Principautés une partie de leurs troupes pour y tenir garnison conjointement avec les troupes Impériales.

Le nombre de troupes que le Gouvernement Impérial employera dans tous les temps de paix à former la garnison des forteresses qui se trouveront dans les trois Principautés sera fixé. Si la tranquillité du pays était compromise, et qu'il fût nécessaire de porter secours à l'administration locale, ou bien si un attaque du dehors avait lieu sur ces Principautés, la Sublime Porte pourra y envoyer le nombre des troupes qu'elle jugera nécessaire.

Les habitants des trois Principautés pourront voyager et faire le commerce en toute sûreté, dans toutes les autres provinces de l'Empire; leurs bâtiments pourront librement naviguer sous le pavillon privilégié qui leur a été accordé, et ils seront protégés dans les pays étrangers, par les agents de la Sublime Porte.

Les habitants, Musulmans ou non-Musulmans, de toutes les classes des autres provinces de l'Empire pourront librement aller dans les trois Principautés pour y exercer le commerce, y résider et y acquérir des propriétés; pendant tout le temps de leur séjour ils y seront soumis aux lois du pays, et ne pourront réclamer aucune exception ou privilége quelconque.

Les réglements actuels des Principautés seront revus et corrigés en conformité à la position nouvelle du pays, et l'on y introduira les réformes nécessaires pour tout en sauvegardant les intérêts des propriétaires assurer le bien-être des cultivateurs, l'augmentation des revenus de l'administration locale, et pour faire peser également les impôts sur les propriétés foncières des habitants de toutes les classes. Dans ce but l'on fera venir à Constantinople de chacune des Principautés des hommes distingués par leur aptitude et leur probité, et l'on formera une Commission spéciale pour chaque Principauté. L'on fixera à ces Commissions les points dont elles auront à s'occuper et l'on veillera à ce qu'elles travaillent activement au but désiré. Les améliorations qu'après mûre discussion elles auront adoptées, seront soumises à l'approbation de la Sublime Porte, et ce nouveau réglement pour ces Provinces sera arrêté *ne varietur* en vertu d'un hatti-humaydun de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 420.

Baron Prokesch's Project relative to the First Point.

IL est de l'intérêt des Puissances alliées de renforcer l'autorité du Sultan; il n'est pas moins de leur intérêt, et il est de leur honneur, de ne pas empirer la position des Principautés.

Ces deux points de vue auront à servir de guide dans la solution du première points.

Etant établi que tout protectorat cesse et que les Principautés releveront de la Sublime Porte en vertu de leurs anciens privilèges et capitulations, nous

n'avons pas à nous occuper d'innovations qui renverseraient le passé; nous avons à le rétablir en tout ce qu'il a de vraiment utile pour ces pays et à le corriger en tant que la faiblesse des institutions et les passions des hommes ont invalidé les intentions toujours bienveillantes des Sultans.

Les maux qui, malgré les scapitulations, les hatti-schérifs et les stipulations des Traités, n'ont cessé d'affliger ces pays, ont pour sources principales:—

1. L'élection des Princes et l'instabilité de leur position.
2. L'organisation et la conduite des Assemblées nationales et générales.
3. La corruption favorisée par des institutions fautives et par une organisation sociale détestable.
4. Le manque absolu d'équité dans l'assiette des impôts et l'exploitation déréglée du contribuable.
5. L'absence de lois saines relativement à la propriété.

On ne parviendra à tarir ces sources du mal, qu'en opérant des changements essentiels dans le Statut Fondamental. Le projet qui va suivre en renferme les plus nécessaires. Il n'a pour pour le moment d'autre but que de fournir matière à une discussion sérieuse et approfondie.

Dispositions générales.	*Developpement et Motifs.*
I. Point de Protectorat, ni exclusif ni collectif.	La Russie n'est parvenue que peu à peu au Protectorat. Elle obtint d'abord par le seizième Article du Traité de Kainardji, le droit peu signifiant d'intercession, et par l'Acte d'Ackermann, 1826, le droit de représentation. Le Traité d'Andrinople, 1829, lui conféra le droit de surveillance et d'une occupation temporaire. Ce n'est que par une disposition du Réglement Organique de 1831, qu'elle a pû stipuler de fait le Protectorat exclusif. Ce Protectorat a causé le bouleversement de 1848, au point que le Sénat de Balti-Liman, 1849, était devenu nécessaire, portant suspension des principales dispositions politiques de ce Réglement, avec l'autorisation d'occuper les Principautés éventuellement. Quatre occupations militaires ont été, dans le laps d'un demi-siècle, le résultat de la prépondérance Russe. Les Moldo-Valaques, connaissant les fruits immanquables de tout Protectorat, désirent dans leur plus grande majorité, de se rapprocher du Sultan.
II. Stipulations à renouveler avec la Sublime Porte et à garantir collectivement par les Puissances.	Elles devraient contenir les engagements pris à différentes époques et être reproduites dans les Traités que les Puissances vont conclure avec la Sublime Porte, ainsi que cela s'était pratiqué en vertu du cinquième Article du Traité d'Andrinople. En voici une ponctuation: 1. Les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, placées en vertu d'une capitulation sous la suzeraineté de la Sublime Porte, continueront d'en jouir sous la garantie des Hautes Puissances Contractantes. 2. La Sublime Porte respectera et fera respecter le Pacte Fondamental,

Développement et Motifs.

d'après lequel ces Principautés seront régies à l'avenir.

3. Elle maintiendra et fera maintenir l'ordre des choses établi par le Hatti-Houmayoun du mois de Djemazi-ul-akhir, 1217 (1802), nommément, à coopérer avec les autorités constituées dans les Principautés, à établir un mode de dégrèvement des paysans, un système d'impôts et de contribution foncière basé sur les besoins du pays et sur la fortune des contribuables. Elle supprimera la capitation, les immunités des terres de la contribution foncière, et d'autres impôts autorisés par les lois.

4. Elle maintiendra la prohibition des prélèvements en comestibles et en d'autres produits du sol pour l'approvisionnement de Constantinople et pour les forteresses du Danube.

5. Elle défendra l'entretien des établissements, soit civils soit militaires, appartenans aux sujets Turcs sur le territoire des Principautés. Sans une autorisation spéciale, les Turcs ne pourront pas passer en ces pays, ne fût ce que pour faire le commerce.

6. Elle maintiendra la défense de rétablir les fortifications existantes sur la rive gauche du Danube. Celles qui ont été construites pendant la présente guerre, ou qui sont en construction, seront consignées à la force armée des Principautés. Elle poursuivra toute incursion de partisans Turcs sur le territoire Moldo-Valaque et le punira sévèrement.

7. Elle admettra en cas de litige le témoignage des Chrétiens contre les Mahométans, et *vice versâ*, par les tribunaux Moldo-Valaques, et le fera accepter par les sujets Ottomans.

8. Elle autorisera, en cas de décès, l'Hospodar à disposer de la succession du Métropolitain et des moines non-réguliers, et les couvents des moines réguliers à recueillir les hoiries des moines décédés dans leur couvent.

9. Hors le tribut annuel et les frais d'installation, qui ne pourront pas dépasser le montant du tribut annuel, elle ne prétendra aucun droit, gabelle ou cadeau, soit de l'Hospodar soit du peuple.

10. Elle maintiendra que les îles attenantes à la rive gauche du Danube et le Thalweg de ce fleuve, formeront la limite des Principautés.

11. Elle déclarera que les Gouvernements de Valachie et de Moldavie pourront établir des quarantaines le long du Danube et au besoin ailleurs, et

Dispositions générales. *Développement et Motifs.*

qu'il est réservé à leur autonomie de règler ce service.

12. Elle stipulera que pour le service des quarantaines, pour la sûreté et la police de l'intérieur, pour la garde et la défense des frontières, les Principautés ayant à entretenir une force armée, proportionnée aux besoins réels et aux ressources du pays, elle ne se mêlera pas de l'organisation de cette force et ne mettra aucun obstacle à ce que les Principautés complètent, comme bon leur semble, leur système de défense envers l'extérieur. Elle déclarera :

13. Que le commerce d'exportation des produits du sol est libre, hormis le cas où l'approvisionnement du pays en exigeait une restriction. Dans ce cas ce sera aux autorités Moldo-Valaques de prendre les mesures nécessaires.

14. Elle ordonnera que les droits de douane, soit d'exportation soit d'importation, fixés par les Traités en vigueur, soient maintenus.

15. Finalement elle renouvellera la permission que les habitants des Principautés, munis des documents de bord d'usage, puissent si livrer librement à la navigation du Danube et relâcher dans les échelles Ottomanes sous être assujettis aux droits et gabelles non-dépendants des droits de navigation.

III. Les Assemblées Nationales et Générales seront remplacées par un Sénat et des Comités Départementaux.

D'après le Traité d'Andrinople la Sublime Porte a laissé à la Russie le soin de régler l'administration intérieure des Principautés. La Russie s'en est occupée collectivement avec un Comité de Boyars. Il en est résulté la forme actuelle du Gouvernement, qui a fait des Principautés un vaste champ d'intrigues et de luttes éternelles pour s'emparer du pouvoir. Les Assemblées n'ont approfondi aucune question, elles ont dénaturé les projets du Gouvernement au lieu de les amender. La division des pouvoirs a causé les malheurs de 1848.

IV. La capitation et les servitudes corporelles seront supprimées.

V. L'administration intérieure sera nationale et indépendante.

VI. La propriété foncière sera impossible.

VII. Les immunités et monopoles sur les objets de première nécessité, exploités sans contrôle par les propriétaires, seront supprimés.

VIII. Nul ne sera Boyar titré que les fonctionnaires nommés par l'Hospodar. Les grades ne seront pas transmissibles aux descendants.

Les anciens nobles, les seuls qui aient les droits héréditaires, sont pauvres et presque tous à la charrue. Quiconque sert le Gouvernement est Boyar. Ce n'est donc pas une caste close, c'est une

Dispositions générales.

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aristocratie bureaucratique et militaire. La transmission des grades aujourd'hui en usage est une modification empruntée au système Russe et ne date que depuis la mise à exécution du Réglement Organique.

En Valachie de trente familles des grands Boyars il n'y en a qu'une vingtaine qui date au delà de vingt ans.

En Moldavie on trouvera à peine une famille sur dix qui date de plus haut que de 1828.

Le nombre de Boyars sans fonctions (qui ont acheté le titre) compte par milliers. C'est le véritable prolétariat de ces pays. Le trafic des grades a en peu d'années produit les effets les plus funestes sous le rapport de la morale publique.

Du Pouvoir Suzerain.

I. Les Principautés s'étant placées anciennement et volontairement sous la suzeraineté de la Sublime Porte, le Sultan couvre de sa haute suprématie la souveraineté de la Moldavie et de la Valachie.

II. Lorsque les Principautés auront à négocier avec d'autres nations le Grand Seigneur est leur seul représentant.

Cette prérogative du Suzerain a été toujours respectée par les Moldo-Valaques.

III. Le Grand Seigneur nomme les Hospodars à vie sur la proposition du Sénat et leur accorde l'investiture.

IV. Le Grand Seigneur peut déposer l'Hospodar pour félonie constatée par le Suzerain et reconnue par les Puissances garantes.

V. Les Hospodars payeront au Suzerain un tribut annuel et un droit d'investiture à leur avènement à l'Hospodarat.

VI. Le Grand Seigneur reconnait et protège l'indépendance de l'administration intérieure.

De l'Hospodar.

I. L'Hospodar sera nommé à vie par le Grand Seigneur sur la proposition du Sénat.

Le chiffre sera à discuter.

Cette clause renferme la prérogative la plus importante pour le bien-être des Principautés. Aussi a-t-elle été constamment un des points saillants dans tous les Hats et Traités.

La nomination à vie est un vœu presque général des habitants des Principautés. Ils y voient un commencement de stabilité et la restauration d'un pouvoir énergique.

D'ailleurs la nomination à vie est la plus ancienne forme. Celle pour un temps déterminé a été imposé d'abord par la Russie. Le Traité d'Andrinople a rétabli l'ancien droit que le Séned de Balta-Limun a de nouveau suspendu.

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On réserve la proposition au Sénat, précisément pour exclure les électeurs désignés par le Réglement Organique et tarir par cela une des sources les plus fécondes d'éternelles intrigues et désordres.

La demande en abdication ne sera admise par le Suzerain qu'après entente avec les hautes Puissances garantes.

II. L'Hospodar est le chef de l'Etat. Il est responsable pour tout acte contraire au présent statut.

III. Il gouverne au moyen du haut Divan administratif et du Sénat.

IV. Il exerce la puissance législative collectivement avec le Sénat. Il est responsable devant ce corps conservateur et législatif. Il a seul l'initiative des lois.

Il est chargé de la suprême direction des affaires correspondant à l'étendue de son mandat.

Les deux grands corps doivent se rallier à l'Hospodar par les liens les plus étroits. L'étendue de son mandat lui accorde cette part d'initiative à côté de la responsabilité qu'il assume envers le Sénat. Le point d'appui qui servit de base pour l'équilibre des pouvoirs, doit graviter désormais sur les sénateurs. Les assemblées au lieu d'aider le pouvoir administratif, lui ont créé des entraves inextricables et lui ont préparé une attitude hostile vis-à-vis de ses administrés.

V. Il nomme à tous les emplois.

Il nomme collectivement avec le Sénat, l'Evêque Métropolitain, et les Evêques.

VI. Il lui sera alloué une somme à titre de Liste Civile, pour la durée de son règne.

D'après le Réglement Organique les élections étaient réservées aux grands Boyars. Il en résultait la simonie la plus scandaleuse.

D'après le Réglement Organique 1,600,000 piastres pour l'Hospodar de la Valachie ; 1,200,000 piastres pour celui de la Moldavie. Ces sommes seraient à discuter.

Du Haut Divan Administratif (Ministère).

I. Les chefs du Haut Divan Administratif sont conservés, comme pour le passé, au nombre de six.

L'organisation de ce haut rouage administratif, institué par le Réglement Organique de 1831, répond aux besoins du service.

II. Les chefs ainsi que tous les employés prêtent serment d'obéissance aux lois du pays et de fidélité à l'Hospodar.

Du Sénat.

1. Le Sénat, dont les membres seront au nombre de dix-huit pour la Valachie et de douze pour la Moldavie, se compose :—

1. De l'Evêque Métropolitain et des Evêques Diocésains.

2. Des deux Bans et des trois Vornikes les plus anciens pour la Valachie et de quatre Grand Logothètes les plus anciens pour la Moldavie.

Ce corps renfermant ce qu'il y a de plus distingué par la position, la fortune et les services rendus, sera à même de contenir l'arbitraire par le libre examen des actes du Gouvernement, par les discussions graves et réfléchies que les Sénateurs, en hommes expérimentés et indépendants, peuvent incontestablement soulever dans le Conseil. Le Sénat est le Conseil du Prince, le

Dispositions générales.

3. Des indigènes les plus imposés et les plus distingués.

Les Sénateurs des deux premières catégories le sont de droit; ils sont inamovibles et à vie. Ceux de la troisième sont nommés par l'Hospodar et n'obtiendront le brevet d'inamovibilité qu'après trois ans de service louable et approuvé par l'Hospodar.

II. Les fonctions des Sénateurs de la première catégorie sont gratuites.

Les Sénateurs de la deuxième et troisième catégorie jouiront d'un appointement annuel à fixer par l'Hospodar collectivement avec le Haut Divan Administratif et avec les Sénateurs de la première catégorie.

Les Sénateurs de la seconde et troisième catégorie ne pourront accepter d'autres emplois publics.

Le Sénat sera présidé par l'Hospodar, et en cas d'empêchement par le Métropolitain.

Le plus ancien des Bans pour la Valachie, et le plus ancien des Grandes Logothètes pour la Moldavie, en sera le Vice-Président.

III. Le Sénat proposera au Sultan trois individus des plus distingués par leur rang, leur fortune, le talent, et les services rendus, pour en tirer l'Hospodar.

IV. Le Sénat propose à la nomination par l'Hospodar les candidats pour l'Archevêché et pour Evêchés.

V. Le Sénat est appelé à surveiller le maintien des lois et libertés civiles et politiques de la Principauté.

Il intervient en cas de conflit, pour résoudre toute difficulte que les Divans pourraient élever sur le sens des lois.

VI. Il exerce le contrôle sur la marché de l'administration civile et financière.

VII. Il règle les dépenses collectivement avec le Divan Administratif.

VIII. Il fixe la Liste Civile d'accord avec le Haut Divan Administratif.

IX. Il vote, en prévision de la dépense probable, l'impôt collectivement avec l'Hospodar et le Divan Administratif.

Développement et Motifs.

défenseur des droits du peuple, l'organe des améliorations à apporter à la législation. Il remplace d'une manière naturelle les assemblées et en évite les inconvénients. Quant au choix des Sénateurs de la troisième catégorie, l'Hospodar n'est point limité à une caste privilégiée. Il pourra profiter de toutes les spécialités et redresser l'injustice commise par les Hospodars du Phanar contre l'ancienne noblesse du pays.

Le programme ne soumet le choix à aucune condition de cens, de sorte que la gratuité éloignerait du Sénat des hommes honorables et utiles auxquels un patrimonie modeste ne permet pas des dépenses extraordinaires.

Dans le but d'écarter les candidats Grecs, l'Acte spéciale d'Ackerman a disposé que l'Hospodar doit être choisi parmi les grands Boyars indigènes. Les anciennes capitulations ne limitaient point le mandat des Assemblées Electives à cette classe de Boyar peu nombreuse et peu apte. Par cet Article l'ancien privilège d'éligibilité du Prince restera intact sans qu'on encourre les dangers attachés au mode actuel de l'élection.

Le Sénat remplace en ceci l'Assemblée des Grands Boyars.

Le cercle des attributions du Sénat ne serait pas complet, si l'une ou l'autre de ces prérogatives lui venait à manquer. Il est le médiateur légal entre les autorités constituées.

Il remplace en cela l'Assemblée, où les avocats, à force de discussions, ne parvenaient jamais à une conclusion.

Egalement en remplacement de l'Assemblée.

De même.

A l'exception de la douane, les impôts pèsent exclusivement sur les paysans. Ils payent la capitation trois et quatre fois dans une année.

A la place d'une capitation, nous

Dispositions générales.

X. Il vote les lois qui président à la possession des terres; il régle les conditions auxquelles la propriété peut en être acquise, transmise et assujettie à la contribution.

XI. Le Sénat peut, de concert avec le pouvoir administratif, modifier tout ce qui n'est pas fondamental dans le statut du pays.

XII. Il a le droit d'annuler tout acte illégal du pouvoir administratif.

Haut Divan de Justice.

Les attentats contre l'Hospodar et la sûreté publique seront reprimés par le Haut Divan de Justice.

Des Comités de District ou Départementaux.

I. Il y aura dans chaque district un Comité, composé de grands et petits propriétaires, des industriels, négociants et autres pris parmi les plus imposés.

II. Pour la composition du Comité, l'Ispravnik formera annuellement une liste des électeurs; ceux-ci auront à dresser un tableau des éligibles; le Haut Divan Administratif nommera les membres du Comité.

III. Le nombre des membres sera fixé par l'Hospodar.

Développement et Motifs.

proposons la contribution foncière applicable à toutes les terres sans exception. Le Suzerain doit octroyer cette grande mesure en vertu des stipulations avec les Puissances garantes. Le Hat de 1802 l'a déjà prévu en établissant le principe de la contribution générale. La bonne volonté du Sultan n'a pas eu de suite et n'en aura pas plus à l'avenir sans l'aide des Puissances.

Cette question était au fond de toute perturbation plus ou moins sérieuse. Il serait trop long d'entrer ici dans le détail de la question qui mérite la plus sérieuse attention. Elle est compliquée par le droit de rachat, par la Loi Agraire de 1816, par la dîme et les monopoles sur tous les objets de consommation, par le Réglement Organique et par le Sened de Balta-Liman.

Sans l'intervention du Suzerain cette question n'est pas à régler. Il n'est pas de progrès possible sans qu'elle soit réglée. Les principes fondamentaux doivent être octroyés; le Sénat serait chargé d'élaborer le détail.

Ces attentats ont été toujours ourdis par les rivaux des Hospodars. Les accusations passaient à la Mission Russe à Constantinople et au Divan du Grand Seigneur. La destitution de l'Hospodar était dans la main des intrigants.

La Moldavie est divisée en treize districts, la Valachie en dix-sept. A la tête de chaque district il y a un Ispravnik (Administrateur) dépendant du Haut Divan Administratif.

Les Comités remplacent les Assemblées Générales dans les districts.

Le but qu'on se propose est d'amener une union plus intime entre le peuple et l'administration.

Dispositions générales.

Développement et Motifs.

IV. Les élections seront renouvelées annuellement par cinquièmes.

V. Seront électeurs les grands et petits propriétaires, industriels, négociants et autres notables de la classe des contribuables ou payant une taxe et demeurant dans le district.

VI. Seront éligibles les plus distingués par leur fortune, talent ou services rendus. Le montant de la taxe ou contribution à payer pour être électeur ou éligible, sera fixé par l'Hospodar sur l'avis du Sénat.

VII. Le Comité sera convoqué par l'Ispravnik sur l'avis du Haut Divan Administratif, qui fixera l'époque de la convocation et la durée des séances.

VIII. Le Comité sera présidé par l'Ispravnik. En cas d'empêchement, il nommera son substitut avec l'approbation du Haut Divan Administratif.

IX. L'Ispravnik sera chargé de l'exécution des décisions de la majorité du Comité. En cas de collision l'Ispravnik a le droit de suspendre l'exécution jusqu'à ce que le Haut Divan Administratif aura décidé.

X. L'activité du Comité est requise:

1. Pour sauvegarder l'assiette et la perception des impôts.

2. Pour contrôler l'emploi du denier des communes et des fonds spéciaux.

3. Pour surveiller l'application des lois relatives à l'agriculture, à l'industrie, au commerce, aux ponts et chaussées, &c.

4. Pour la direction de l'instruction publique et des établissements de bienfaisance.

XI. Les Comités ont le droit de nommer à toutes les places du département qui ressortissent de leur mission et qui ne sont pas dans les attributions de l'Ispravnik.

Dispositions provisoires.

Les codes des lois et réglements existants restent en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il y soit légalement dérogé.

Les Articles du Réglement Organique concernant les immunités des étrangers seront modifiés d'une manière compatible avec les Traités et mis en harmonie avec le présent Statut Organique.

Les principes posés, le détail doit être abandonné à la sagesse de l'Hospodar et du Sénat.

Les Articles 71, 91, 93, 94, 158, et 379 du Réglement Organique sont plus ou moins nuisibles aux étrangers et dérogatoires aux anciennes Capitulations. La modification de ces Articles sera un travail à part et qui se rattache à la révision générale du Réglement et même des Capitulations en vigueur.

No. 421.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 169. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1856.*

I CALLED on Aali Pasha at his house this morning, before he proceeded to embark for Marseilles in the French steam-frigate placed at his disposal by M. Thouvenel. He had just returned from taking the Sultan's last commands. Our conversation was naturally brief. I tried to discover in what spirit he was likely to act in any case of difference between England and France respecting the terms of peace. I infer from his language, which was, however, guarded, that he is inclined to view any eventual demand maintained by England as favourable to the Porte's interests, and he requested me to state that your Lordship will find him disposed to be useful. I encouraged this sentiment, by assuring him that he would be treated, I felt certain, with confidence by the British negotiators. His personal cast of thought is for peace, and I am well convinced that in this respect he enjoys the Sultan's sympathy; but I have heard nothing to warrant a belief that he is for peace at any price. The spirit of his administration is at the same time French, and I consider him a main element of M. Thouvenel's one-sided influence, and also the chief instrument of Reshid Pasha's exclusion from power. In cases where no difference of opinion exists between England and France, the Porte's Representative is very unlikely to have instructions empowering him to resist. In reply to my inquiry whether any points connected with the Principalities would be subjected to fresh discussions by him at Paris, he gave me to understand that no such instruction existed.

We talked over some other matters of separate interest, which will be reported to your Lordship elsewhere.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 422.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1856.*

I HAVE received from Fuad Pasha the note which he had promised in reply to my representations and demands on the subject of religious opinions, and the impunity of renegades. Inclosed herewith is an English translation of it, made by Mr. Smythe, who assures me that its correctness may be perfectly relied on. Your Lordship will perceive that the Porte acknowledges and confirms its former declaration respecting renegades, and extends it expressly to all, including Mussulmans, though not mentioned by name. It is an official note signed by the Secretary of State, and given expressly with the Sultan's sanction. Taken in connection with the Article recommended by the three Representatives, adopted by the Porte, and inserted in the Sultan's firman, invested with a hatti-sherif, it may be viewed as covering the whole of your Lordship's requisition. If this impression of mine should not be confirmed by Her Majesty's Government, the door is open for a return to the question; but if no one is to be molested on account of the religion he professes, and no one to be punished as a renegade, whatever form of faith he denies, I do not see what room there can possibly be for any practical persecutions in future within the limits of the Sultan's Empire.

The law of the Koran is not abolished, it is true, respecting renegades, and the Sultan's Ministers affirm that such a stretch of authority would exceed even His Majesty's legal power. But, however that may be, the practical application of it is renounced by means of a public document, and Her Majesty's

Government would at any time be justified in complaining of a breach of engagement if the Porte were to authorize or to permit any exception to its own official declaration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 422.

Fuad Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

February 12, 1856.

(Translation.)

THE official communications made formerly and recently by your Excellency, both in writing and verbally, upon the subject of religious matters, have been taken into minute consideration. The important and friendly services which the Porte has at all times, and more particularly of late, experienced on the part of her illustrious allies the English and other Governments, are appreciated in the highest degree by His Majesty the Sultan; and the feelings of gratitude inspired by them will remain for ever impressed upon the heart of the Ottoman nation. In addition to the sincere desire entertained by the Porte to meet, as far as is possible, the friendly representations of her allies by satisfactory measures, she is also well acquainted with the spirit of the age; and she hastens accordingly, with the Imperial sanction, to communicate the decision adopted regarding the above point. In consequence, the assurances formerly given to the British and French Governments with reference to the question of renegades are at present renewed and confirmed afresh, while an additional assurance is declared and made known that the terms of the decision at that time adopted will be held to comprise absolutely all renegades. It is sincerely hoped that this decision, which is a new and practical proof of the Porte's refraining on all occasions from senselessly thwarting or opposing measures of a practicable nature, will meet with the satisfaction of your illustrious allies.

(Signed) MEHEMET FUAD.

No. 423.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 171. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 13, 1856.

I HAVE reason to believe that M. Thouvenel, though not at liberty to proceed in our discussions respecting the Principalities on the ground of considering them in the light of a strong material barrier against Russia, entertains a personal opinion in favour of that view, and that he has pressed his convictions in the same sense on his Government.

I have already submitted to your Lordship the considerations which weigh with me on that question, and according to my impressions it would be satisfactory to find that, founded in justice as a claim to the Dniester for boundary would be, the necessities of the present position, with reference to negotiation, were such as to admit of our insisting on that concession by Russia in lieu of a pecuniary indemnity to the Porte. The idea of a material barrier might there, I imagine, be realized in an efficient manner without exposing the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia to the risks and vexations of military occupation, or the frequent passage of Turkish troops through their territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 424.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 175.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 13, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in copy, the memorandum finally agreed upon at the Conference by my colleagues and myself on the subject of the fourth point, relative to the rights and privileges of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 424.

Memorandum agreed upon relative to the Fourth Point.

1. DES mesures efficaces seront prises pour que les garanties promises tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan par le hatti-scherif de Gulhané et l s lois du Tanzimat, sans distinction de classe ni de culte, reçoivent leur plein et entier effet. Ces principes seront rappelés et consacrés de nouveau par un Acte solennel émané du Souverain.

2. La Sublime Porte proclame la reconnaissance et le maintien de tous les privilèges spirituels accordés *ab antiquo*, et à des dates postérieures, à toutes les communautés non-Musulmanes établies dans l'Empire, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

3. Chaque communauté non-Musulmane sera tenue, dans un délai fixé et avec le concours d'une Commission formée *ad hoc* dans son sein, de procéder, avec la haute approbation de Sa Majesté le Sultan, dont un délégué assistera aux délibérations, à l'examen de ses immunités et privilèges actuels, et d'y discuter et soumettre à la Sublime Porte les réformes exigées par le progrès des lumières et du temps. Les pouvoirs concédés aux Patriarches et aux Évêques des rits Chrétiens par le Sultan Mahomet II et ses successeurs, seront mis en harmonie avec la position nouvelle que les intentions généreuses de Sa Majesté le Sultan assurent à ces communautés. Le principe de la nomination à vie des Patriarches, après la révision des réglements d'élection aujourd'hui en vigueur, sera exactement appliqué conformement à la teneur de leurs firmans d'investiture. Les Patriarches, les Métropolitains, Archévêques et Evêques seront assermentés à leur entrée en fonctions d'après une formule concertée en commun entre la Sublime Porte et les chefs spirituels des différentes communautés. Les redevances ecclésiastiques, de quelque forme et nature qu'elles soient, seront supprimées, et remplacées par la fixation des revenus des Patriarches et Chefs des communautés, et par l'allocation de traitements et de salaires équitablement proportionnés à l'importance, au rang, et à la dignité des divers membres du clergé. Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux propriétés mobilières et immobilières des divers clergés Chrétiens. Toutefois l'administration temporelle des communautés non-Musulmanes sera placée sous la sauvegarde d'une assemblée, choisie dans le sein de chacune des dites communautés parmi les membres du clergé et des laïques.

4. Dans les villes, bourgades, et villages où la population appartiendra en totalité au même culte, il ne sera apporté aucun entrave à la réparation, d'après leur plan primitif, des édifices destinés au culte, aux écoles, aux hôpitaux, et aux cimitières. Les plans de ces divers édifices en cas d'érection nouvelle approuvés par les Patriarches ou Chefs de communautés seront simplement soumis à la Sublime Porte, qui devra les approuver ou faire ses observations dans un délai déterminé.

Chaque culte, dans les localités où ne se trouveront point d'autres confessions religieuses, ne sera soumis, dans ses manifestations extérieures, à aucune espèce de restriction. Dans les villes, bourgades, et villages où les cultes sont mélangés, chaque communauté, habitant un quartier distinct, pourra également, en se conformant aux prescriptions ci-dessus indiquées, réparer et consolider ses églises, ses hôpitaux, ses écoles, et ses cimitières.

Lorsqu'il s'agira de la construction d'édifices nouveaux, l'autorisation nécessaire sera demandée à la Sublime Porte par l'organe du Patriarche-en-chef de communauté à la Sublime Porte, qui prendra une décision souveraine en accordant cette autorisation à moins d'obstacle administratif. L'intervention de l'autorité administrative dans tous les actes de cette nature, sera entièrement gratuite. Le Gouvernement prendra des mesures pour assurer à chaque culte, quelque soit le nombre de ses adhérents, la pleine liberté de son exercice.

5. Vu que tous les cultes sont et seront librement pratiqués dans les Etats Ottomans, aucun sujet de Sa Majesté le Sultan ne sera gêné dans l'exercice de la religion qu'il professe, et ne sera en aucune manière inquiété à cet égard. Personne ne pourra être contrainte à changer de religion.

6. Toute distinction ou appellation tendant à rendre une classe quelconque des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan inférieure à une autre classe à raison du culte, de la langue, ou de la race, sera à jamais effacée du Protocol administratif. Les lois séviront contre l'usage entre particuliers, ou de la part des autorités, de toute qualification injurieuse ou blessante.

7. Tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans distinction de nationalité, seront admissibles aux emplois publics et aptes à les occuper selon leur capacité et leur mérite, et conformément à des règles d'une application générale.

8. Tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan seront indistinctement reçus dans les écoles civiles et militaires du Gouvernement, aujourd'hui existantes, ou qui seraient créés à l'avenir, s'ils remplissent d'ailleurs les conditions d'âge et d'examen spécifiées dans les Réglements Organiques des dites écoles.

De plus, chaque communauté est autorisé à établir des écoles publiques de science, d'art, et d'industrie, seulement le mode d'enseignement et le choix des professeurs dans les écoles de cette catégorie seront sous le contrôle d'un Conseil Mixte d'Instruction Publique dont les membres seront nommés par Sa Majesté Impériale.

9. Comme il est décidé que des tribunaux mixtes et spéciaux seront institués pour juger les procès criminels entre des Musulmans et des non-Musulmans, ou des non-Musulmans de rits différents, et que des tribunaux de commerce mixtes existent déjà pour les affaires commerciales, un code pénal, un code commercial, et des codes de procédure relatifs à ces tribunaux sont sur le point d'être complétés et le seront au plutôt. Les procès ayant trait aux affaires civiles continueront à être jugées d'après les lois et les réglements par devant les Conseils Mixtes des Provinces en présence du Gouverneur et du juge du lieu. Les procès civiles spéciaux, comme ceux de succession ou d'autres de ce genre, entre les sujets de même rit, pourront à leur demande être renvoyés par les Conseils des Patriarches ou des communautés.

L'audience de ces tribunaux sera publique. Les parties y seront mises en présence et produiront leurs témoins dont les dépositions seront reçues indistinctement sous un serment prêté selon la loi religieuse de chaque culte.

Les lois pénales, correctionnelles et commerciales et les régles de procédure à appliquer dans les tribunaux mixtes, seront complétées le plus tôt possible et codifiées. Il en sera publié, sous les auspices de la Porte, des traductions dans toutes les langues en usage dans l'Empire.

10. Il sera procédé, dans le plus bref délai possible, à la réforme du système pénitentiaire dans son application aux maisons de détention, punition, ou de correction, et d'autres établissements de même nature afin, de concilier les droits de l'humanité avec ceux de la justice. Aucune peine corporelle, même dans les prisons, ne pourra être appliquée que conformément à des réglements disciplinaires émanés de la Porte, et tout ce qui ressemblerait à la torture sera radicalement aboli. Les infractions à ce sujet seront sévèrement réprimées et entraineront en outre de plein droit la destitution des autorités qui les auraient ordonnées et des agents qui les auraient commises.

11. L'organisation de la police, dans la capitale, dans les villes de province et dans les campagnes, sera révisée de façon à donner à tous les sujets paisibles de Sa Majesté le Sultan les garanties désirables de sécurité quant à leurs personnes et à leurs biens.

12. L'égalité des impôts entraînant l'égalité des charges, comme celle des devoirs entraîne aussi celle des droits, les non-Musulmans devront, comme les Musulmans, satisfaire aux obligations de la loi de recrutement. Le principe du remplacement ou du rachat sera admis.

Il sera publié, dans le plus bref délai possible, une loi complète sur le

mode d'admission et de service des sujets non-Musulmans dans l'armée, de manière à leur assurer la position la plus convenable.

13. Il sera procédé à une réforme dans la composition des Conseils provinciaux et communaux pour garantir la sincérité des choix des délégués des communautés Musulmanes et non-Musulmanes et la liberté des votes dans les Conseils. La Sublime Porte avisera à l'emploi des moyens les plus efficaces de connaître exactement et contrôler le résultat des délibérations et des décisions prises.

14. Comme les lois qui régissent l'achat, la vente et la disposition des propriétés immobilières sont communes à tous les sujets du Sultan, Sa Majesté est aussi disposée à permettre aux étrangers de posséder des propriétés foncières dans ses Etats, en se conformant aux lois et en acquittant les mêmes charges que les indigènes, et après les arrangements qui auront lieu avec les Puissances étrangères.

15. Les impôts sont exigibles au même titre de tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans distinction de classe ni de culte; on avisera aux moyens les plus promptes et les plus énergiques de corriger les abus dans la perception des impôts et notamment des dîmes. Le système de la perception directe sera successivement, et aussitôt que faire se pourra, substitué au régime des fermes dans toutes les branches des revenus de l'Etat.

Tant que ce système demeurera en vigueur, il sera interdit sous les peines les plus sévères à tous les agents de l'autorité et à tous les membres des Medjlis de se rendre adjudicatoires des fermes qui seront annoncées avec publicité et concurrence, ou d'avoir une part quelconque d'intérêt dans leur exploitation.

Les impositions locales seront autant que possible calculées de façon à ne pas affecter les sources de la production ou à entraver le mouvement du commerce intérieur.

16. Les travaux d'utilité publique recevront une dotation convenable, à laquelle concourront les impositions particulières et spéciales des provinces appelées à jouir de l'établissement des voies de communication par terre et par eau.

17. Le budget des recettes et dépenses de l'Etat sera communiquée à une époque périodique, et autant que possible par prévision d'une année, au Grand Conseil de Justice. Le budget sera annuellement publié, et l'on procédera à la révision des traitements affectés à chaque emploi.

18. Les Chefs et un Délégué de chaque communauté désignés par la Sublime Porte, seront appelés à prendre part aux délibérations du Conseil Suprême de Justice dans toutes les circonstances qui intéresseraient la généralité des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Ils seront spécialement convoqués à cet effet par le Grand Vizir. Le mandat des Délégués sera annuel. Ils prêteront serment en entrant en charge.

Tous les membres du Conseil dans les réunions ordinaires et extraordinaires émettront librement leurs avis et leurs votes sans qu'on puisse jamais les inquiéter à ce sujet.

19. Les lois contre la corruption, la concession, ou la malversation seront appliquées d'après les formes légales, à tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, quelle que soit leur classe et la nature de leurs fonctions.

20. Il est à désirer que la Sublime Porte annonce l'intention de s'occuper au plutôt de la réforme de son système monétaire, et de la création d'institutions de crédit public.

No. 425.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 176.)

Constantinople, February 13, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE ascertained that the Turkish version, as prepared for the Sultan's firman, of the concerted articles relating to privileges and reforms, agrees completely with the original, in French, transmitted to your Lordship. Although the Sultan has given his consent, the promulgation of the firman, translation of

which is herewith inclosed, may still be delayed for three or four days. The instrument itself is to be invested with the Sultan's hatti-sherif, and read solemnly at the Porte in presence of the Ministers, the grand functionaries of the Empire, and the heads of religious communities. It is also to be communicated to the whole diplomatic body, as well as to those Representatives who took a direct part in preparing the groundwork of it. Finally, it is to be sent into the provinces for publication according to custom.

I have urged the Turkish Ministers not to shrink from giving the utmost solemnity and publicity to this final act of reform. It has been deliberately adopted as indispensable for the existence of the Empire, and the Turkish Government cannot therefore neglect its communication to the people and its effective enforcement without exposing themselves to the severest reproaches. Much will depend, however, on the zeal and spirit with which the measures in preparation, and, generally, the means of execution, are stimulated and directed. The change in prospect is as great as it is beneficial, and proportionate efforts are required to keep it alive, and to carry it into effect, so as to produce decisive and durable results.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 425.

Draft of Firman.

(Traduction.)

MON présent firman Impérial est adressé à toi, mon illustre Grand Vizir et mon *alter ego*, distingué par les belles qualités, et décoré du Noble Nishan de Medjidiyé de la première classe, Mehemed Emin Aali Pasha

Depuis le jour de mon avènement au Trône, je n'ai eu qu'une pensée, celle de faire, par toutes sortes de moyens, et d'une manière complète, le bonheur de toutes les classes de mes sujets, qui sont un dépôt confié par le Ciel entre nos mains. Dieu soit loué! mes efforts à cet égard ont produit des fruits très-utiles, comme on a vu, et mon Empire et ma nation font de plus en plus des progrès dans la voie de la prospérité. Mais je veux donner une nouvelle vigueur et plus d'extension aux réformes que j'ai réussi de faire jusqu'ici, et cela afin de ne laisser rien à désirer par rapport à la dignité de ma Sublime Porte, et à la haute et importante position qu'elle occupe parmi les nations du monde social.

Par un effet des efforts pleins de zèle de tous mes sujets, et de la sollicitude et de l'assistance des Grandes Puissances, mes fidèles et sincères alliées, les droits de ma Sublime Porte, quant à l'extérieur, viennent, grâces à Dieu, d'acquérir une nouvelle force et c'est l'aurore de beaux jours pour ma Sublime Porte. Dans l'intérieur, aussi, mes vœux sont de voir la force de mon Empire augmenter; le bonheur de toutes les classes de mes sujets bien établi, attendu qu'attachées les unes aux autres par les liens d'une entente cordiale et par le même patriotisme, elles sont à mes yeux, ainsi que ma sollicitude fraternelle l'exige, toutes égales; et les mesures calculées à faire prospérer mes Etats, prendre un essor toujours croissant. Telle est ma volonté pleine de bonté. Cela étant, j'ordonne, et mes ordres sont dictés par la justice même, que l'on mette en exécution les points suivants, savoir:

Les assurances que j'ai données et accordées par le hatti-chérif qui a été lu à Ghiul-Kané, sur les réformes, par rapports à la sûreté de la fortune, et à la conservation de l'honneur de toutes les classes de mes sujets, sans distinction, de quelque religion qu'ils soient, sont cette fois-ci aussi confirmées, et conséquemment, il faut qu'elles soient ponctuellement mise en pratique en prenant pour cela des mesures énergiques.

Tout les privilèges, toutes les immunités, qui ont été octroyés aux communautés Chrétiennes et autres qui se trouvent dans mes Etats sous ma protection souveraine par mes augustes ancêtres, et dans les dernières années, sont cette fois-ci aussi confirmés. Seulement, on procédera à la révision, dans un délai fixé, des priviléges et des immunités actuels de chaque communauté Chrétienne et autre; et les améliorations exigées par les temps qui courent, par l'état actuel de la société, et par les lumières acquises, seront faites avec mon

approbation souveraine; mais les Conseils qui seront créés exprès aux Patriarcats, sous l'inspection de ma Sublime Porte, seront en devoir de discuter ces améliorations et de les représenter à ma Sublime Porte. Le pouvoir qui a été donné par le conquérant Sultan Mehemed II et par mes augustes ancêtres aux Patriarches et aux Evêques Chrétiens, sera combiné avec la nouvelle position que, par un effet de mes intentions généreuses, je viens de faire et d'assurer aux communautés, et après que le mode d'élection qui existe actuellement à l'égard des Patriarches aura été amélioré, un Patriarche conservera son poste à vie en vertu de son diplôme: système qui doit être complètement et réellement maintenu.

Conformément à un mode qui sera convenu entre ma Sublime Porte et les chefs spirituels des différentes communautés, les Patriarches, les Archévêques, les Vicaires, les Evêques, et les Rabbins seront assujettis à la prestation de serment, suivant les règles usitées, lors de leur nomination.

Tous les revenants-bons, tous les profits casuels qui sont, pour un motif ou pour un autre, donnés aux prêtres, sont prohibés. Il sera assigné aux Patriarches et aux chefs des communautés, au lieu de ces revenants-bons et de ces profits casuels, des revenus fixes. Il sera assigné aussi, d'une manière juste et équitable, des salaires aux prêtres et à d'autres suivant leurs rangs et l'importance de leurs postes, et d'après ce qui aura été décidé plus tard. Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux biens meubles des prêtres.

Un Conseil composé des membres élus par les prêtres et la multitude de chaque communauté, sera chargé de diriger les affaires nationales de cette communauté Chrétienne ou autre.

Il ne sera fait aucune opposition aux réparations à faire, sur les plans primitifs et existans, aux édifices destinés au culte, écoles, hôpitaux, cimitières, et autres semblables dans les bourgs et villages. Et lorsqu'il deviendra nécessaire d'élever pour la première fois de pareils édifices, si le Patriarche, ou bien si les chefs de la nation approuvent l'érection d'un nouvel édifice, il faudra montrer à ma Sublime Porte le plan de l'édifice projeté, afin que la bâtisse se fasse investir de la permission souveraine, que je donnerai, ou bien, afin que, dans un délai donné, on fasse voir les objections qu'il y a à cette érection.

S'il se trouve dans quelque endroit une communauté à part, c'est-à-dire, sans qu'il y ait parmi elle des gens d'une autre religion, cette communauté pourra, sans aucune réserve, y exercera son culte publiquement; mais dans les villes, les bourgs, et les villages dont les habitants forment des communautés de différentes communions, chaque communauté pourra, dans le quartier séparé qu'elle habite, et en s'adaptant au principe susénoncé, réparer et consolider ses propres églises, ses écoles, ses hôpitaux et cimitières.

Quant à l'érection d'un nouvel édifice, le Patriarche, ou bien le Synode, demandera pour cela la permission de ma Sublime Porte, qui l'accordera, s'il n'y a-là aucun obstacle sous le rapport de sa politique intérieure.

Dans ces sortes d'affaires, ce que l'autorité fera, elle doit le faire purement par charité.

On prendra les mesures nécessaires, des mesures énergiques, pour assurer à ceux qui professent une religion l'exercice de leur culte avec la plus grande liberté.

Sont à jamais abolis dans les écrits de la Chancellerie Impériale, tous les termes, toutes les épithètes, toutes les distinctions qui emportent l'idée de vouloir tenir une classe de sujets de mon Empire plus bas qu'une autre, pour des motifs de religion, de langue, et de nationalité. Il sera défendu par la loi aux particuliers, et aux employés aussi, de se servir d'une espèce quelconque de termes offensants et déshonorants parmi eux.

Attendu que dans mes Etats tous les cultes s'exercent librement, aucun de mes sujets ne sera empêché d'exercer la religion dans laquelle il se trouve ni être molesté quand il l'exerce. Nul ne sera forcé de changer de religion.

Comme le choix et la nomination des autorités et des employés de ma Sublime Porte dépend de ma volonté souveraine, tous mes sujets, de quelque nation qu'ils soient, seront reçus au service et aux emplois du Gouvernement et employés conformément aux réglements qui sont applicables à tous, en général, suivant leur capacité. Et s'ils remplissent les conditions voulues par les réglements qui régissent mes écoles Impériales en ce qui regarde l'âge et l'examen, tous, sans distinction, seront reçus au service militaire ainsi qu'au service civil de ma Sublime Porte.

En outre, chaque communauté aura la permission d'établir des écoles nationales pour les sciences et les arts. Seulement les études de ces écoles publiques, et le choix des précepteurs, seront sous l'inspection et la censure d'une Comité Mixte et Polytecnique dont les membres seront nommés par ma Sublime Porte.

Tous les procès touchant les causes mercantiles ou criminelles qui surviendront entre les Musulmans et les sujets Chrétiens ou autres, ou bien, entre des Chrétiens et autres professant des religions différentes, seront référés à des Cours Mixtes. Les séances pour entendre ces causes seront publiques; le demandeur et le défendeur seront confrontés, et les témoins qu'ils produiront devront prendra serment de ne dire dans leur témoignage que la pure vérité, serment qu'il faut qu'ils prennent toujours et cela suivant leur religion. Des procès ordinaires dans les Provinces et dans les Sandjacks seront examinés en présence du Vali et du Cadi dans les Cours Mixtes de ces pays-là, ou suivant les réglements, et dans ces tribunaux et ces Medjlis les séances seront publiques.

Dans les procès d'une nature particulière, comme, par exemple, un procès entre deux sujets, Chrétiens et autres, relativement à une succession, si les parties contestantes le veulent, leur cause sera portée devant les Chefs et son Medjlis pour y être examiné et jugé.

Le code de commerce, le code pénal, et le système à suivre dans les Cours Mixtes, ainsi que les réglements sur les discussions judiciaires, seront terminés dans le plus cour délai possible, puis rédigés, traduits dans plusieurs langues usitées dans mes Etats et publiés.

Afin de combiner les droits de l'humanité avec ceux de l'équité on procédera à l'amélioration, dans le plus court délai possible, des prisons et des autres lieux de détention des prévenus, ou de ceux qui ne méritent qu'une punition légère, et du système d'emprisonnement; et à l'exception des réglements de police établis par ma Sublime Porte à l'égard même des prisons, toute espèce de mauvais traitement, tel que punition corporelle et question, est complétement abolie; et comme toutes les violences qui auront lieu, contrairement à cette abolition, sont prohibées, les autorités qui auront ordonné l'application de la question, seront punis, ainsi que ceux qui l'auront exécutée, conformément au code pénal.

La police à établir, tant dans la capitale que dans les provinces, dans les villes, et dans les villages, doit être établie de manière à assurer véritablement et énergiquement la vie et les biens de tous les habitants paisibles.

*L'égalité des taxes, les sujets Chrétiens et autres aussi doivent fournir, comme les sujets Musulmans, leur contingent de troupes; ainsi ils sont obligés de se soumettre à la décision qui a été prise à cet égard dernièrement. Mais dans cette question on suivra le système de donner un équivalent en argent ou bien donner de l'argent et s'exempter ainsi de service actif.

On fera des réglements sur la manière d'employer les sujets dans les rangs de l'armée indépendamment des Musulmans; et ces réglements seront publiés dans le plus court délai possible.

On procédera à réformer les réglements sur la formation des Medjlis des Provinces et des Sandjacks, afin de mettre l'élection des membres Musulmans, Chrétiens et autres, sur un bon pied, d'assurer la manifestation des opinions franchement et candidement, afin que ma Sublime Porte, connaissant exactement le résultat des opinions, la décision qui a été prise et le jugement qui a été fait, elle prenne en conséquence les mesures énergiques qui sont nécessaires.

Attendu que dans les affaires commerciales et par rapport au droit de posséder des biens, les lois sont égales à l'égard de tous mes sujets, après que ma Sublime Porte aura fait un arrangement avec les Puissances étrangères ayant pour but que les étrangers se soumettent à cet égard aux lois de ma Sublime Porte et aux réglements locaux, et qu'ils payent les mêmes impôts que les indigènes, le droit de posséder des immeubles sera accordé aux étrangers aussi.

Comme les impôts et les taxes qui sont levés sur tous les sujets de mon Empire, sont perçus sur un pied d'égalité, sans différence de classe et de religion, il faut songer aux moyens les plus prompts à faire cesser les abus qu'il y a sur la perception de ces impôts, et particulièrement sur la perception de la dime, tant qu'il est possible de percevoir sans cesse directement les revenus de ma Sublime Porte, à la place du système de les affermer, il faut les percevoir

* Le traducteur ne comprend pas ce passage.

directement. Mais tant que le système actuel est suivi, si quelques uns parmi les membres du Medjlis prend à ferme quelque chose qui est criée aux enchères publiques, ou s'ils en prennent une action, cela leur sera défendu sous de peines sévères.

Les taxes locales doivent, autant qu'il est possible, être assises de manière à ne pas faire du tort aux produits, et à ne pas empêcher le commerce intérieur.

L'argent convenable qui sera destiné à des objets utiles sera exigé des Provinces et des Sandjacks qui tireront l'avantage des routes par terre et par mer. On ajoutera à cela d'autres taxes.

Comme ma Sublime Porte a fait dernièrement un budget sur ses revenus et ses dépenses, il faut que l'on mette ses soins à le mettre complètement à exécution.

Il faut que l'on commence à payer les appointements qui ont été fixés à chaque emploi.

Un employé sera destiné de ma part pour chaque communauté afin de conférer avec les Chefs de la communauté sur les affaires qui concernent la généralité de mes sujets, et pour assister au Conseil d'Etat. Cet employé a été pris exprès du Ministère du Grand Vizirat. Ces employés sont nommés pour un an, et lors de leur nomination on leur fera de suite prendre serment.

Les membres du Conseil d'Etat, tant dans les séances ordinaires que dans les séances extraordinaires, manifesteront vraiment leur avis et leurs opinions, et ils ne seront en aucune manière molestés pour cela.

Les dispositions, les lois sur les intrigues, sur la corruption, seront exécutoires envers tous les sujets de ma Sublime Porte, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent, conformément au principe susénoncé.

La Sublime Porte instituera des choses qui sont propres à donner du crédit à son système monétaire, comme, par exemple, une banque, et elle destinera des capitaux nécessaires pour ces objets qui sont la source de la richesse.

Ma Sublime Porte fera les routes et les canaux nécessaires pour le transport des produits de l'Empire, et elle donnera des facilités réelles pour donner plus d'extension à l'agriculture en faisant disparaître tout ce qui y met obstacle.

No. 426.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 177.)

Constantinople, February 13, 1856.

My Lord,

REFERRING to your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 24th ultimo, I think it right to state that the Jews were included from the very first in all arrangements made towards the fourth point, and that the Turks never made any difficulty on that head.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 427.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.

(No. 178.)

Constantinople, February 13, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE just communicated with Fuad Pasha, who sends me word that Aali Pasha is in possession of double full powers and instructions. He has powers for treating with the allies and others; he has powers also for treating with Russia. His instructions, which it seems that he insisted on having from the Council, are relative to the points of the ultimatum. In case of any difference of opinion, Mr. Pisani infers, from what he has heard, that the Turkish Plenipotentiaries would probably side with your Lordship. In other cases they are not likely to take a different course from the allies.

I find that Aali Pasha is charged with presents for the French Empress, and also for Her Majesty. There is a diadem in brilliants for the Queen, and the Order of the Medjidiyé, also in brilliants, for His Royal Highness Prince Albert and Prince Napoleon or Jerome.

The firman and hatti-sheriff are to be promulgated on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 428.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 179.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 13, 1856.*

IT has come to my knowledge that after the Sultan learnt from me, on Lord Cowley's authority, that Reshid Pasha would be favourably received at Paris, he sent to consult M. Thouvenel, who discouraged the idea, and intimated an opinion that it would be better not to send him.

It appears to have been in consequence of this advice that the Sultan sent a gracious message to Reshid, inquiring after his health, assuring him of his favour, and holding out a prospect of early reinstatement in office.

I cannot say with whom the idea of employing a French steam-frigate for the conveyance of Aali Pasha to Marseilles originated. I have abstained, for obvious reasons, from busying myself upon the subject; but I confess to your Lordship my regret that the highest subject in the Empire, going forth on so solemn an embassy, should have embarked in any vessel but one belonging to his Sovereign, and bearing of right the national flag. I am assured that Turkish vessels fit for the purpose were at the disposal of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 429.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 180 Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 13, 1856.*

I AM privately informed that an instruction addressed to M. Thouvenel about three weeks ago directed that Ambassador to act entirely in concert with the Austrian Internuncio as to those questions which we have lately had under discussion. I cannot vouch for the correctness of this information, but it came to me from a respectable source, and it agrees with appearances which drew my attention before it reached me.

I may add, as derived from the same source, that M. Musurus wrote lately to his Government, affirming that your Lordship had expressed a decided wish that the nomination of the Hospodars should proceed directly from the Porte, and authorizing him to recommend that mode of proceeding.

I am inclined not to give credit to this statement—first, because I have received no instruction of the same purport from your Lordship; and secondly, because for the prevention of intrigue and corruption, I conceive the mode of nomination proposed in our concerted articles to be very much preferable.

Still I think it my duty not to leave your Lordship in ignorance of what has been stated to me in positive terms on a subject of considerable importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 24.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 14, 1856.*

I HAVE announced by telegraph your Lordship's message respecting the disputed district of Tchorooksoo. I have now the honour to inclose a statement which I trust will complete your Lordship's information on the subject. I am indebted to the Honourable Percy Smythe for the clear and succinct manner in which the case has been extracted from documents communicated to me by Cabouli Effendi, who was formerly charged with the task of inquiring into its merits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 430.

Memorandum.

THE question at issue between Russia and Turkey relative to the Tchoorooksoo frontier depends for its solution upon the settlement of the ancient frontier of Gouriel, from the Black Sea to Imeritia, which is adopted as the definite boundary between the two countries by the Treaty of Adrianople. The actual territory in dispute may be defined as the triangle formed by the little Rivers Cholok and Chirapunia, and the mountain range containing their head waters. The Russian claim rests upon the alleged authority of ancient Khans or Chiefs of Gouriel over the territory in question, as supported by evidence, oral and documentary. Evidence of a similar nature, consisting of berats, title-deeds of landed property, &c., is equally brought forward by the people of Tchoorooksoo on their side; but neither party admits the validity of the other's statements. In the year 1835 the district was provisionally made over to the people of Gouriel, to be possessed and occupied by them until the final settlement of the question, by Abdullah Pasha, the then Governor of Trebizond, and this fact in itself denotes previous possession on the part of the Turks.

No. 431.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 214.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 25, 1856.*

THE French Government having communicated to me the accompanying instruction which they intend to send to their Consular Agents in the East, and having suggested the advantage of similar instructions being given to British Consuls for the guidance of their conduct towards their French colleagues and the authorities of the Sublime Porte, I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consular Agents in the East the despatches on this subject of which I inclose copies for your Excellency's information.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 432.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 25, 1856.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the reports which Her Majesty's Government continue to receive of the state of affairs at Erzeroom are such as to make them seriously uneasy for the fate of that fortress unless timely measures are taken for placing it in a proper state of defence, by reinforcing its garrison and by laying in an ample stock of provisions and ammunition; and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that unless Omer Pasha should himself go to Erzeroom, it will be absolutely necessary that the military command there should be given to a British officer of superior rank, who will see that justice is done to the soldiers, that the system of wholesale peculation practised by the Turkish officials shall be put an end to, and that all the requisite arrangements for the organization of the troops, and for the defence of the place, shall be made without delay. I have accordingly to instruct your Excellency to make a communication to the above effect to the Porte, and to obtain its acquiescence in the proposed arrangement.

At present there is no British officer at Erzeroom of sufficient rank for so responsible a situation. If the health of Major-General Williams, whose release Her Majesty's Government are endeavouring by all means to effect, shall be sufficiently strong to admit of his undertaking the duty, he would be unquestionably selected for it. But should that unfortunately not be the case, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to name another officer of suitable rank whenever your Excellency may deem it necessary to apply for one.

Your Excellency will clearly explain to the Porte that such officer, whoever he may be, must be invested with full military powers, if not directly at least virtually, although the chief command may nominally rest in the hands of a Turkish officer.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 433.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 26, 1856.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, an extract of a Protocol agreed to by the Plenipotentiaries yesterday assembled in conference, and which relates to the armistice.

It would be desirable that the Porte should send the intelligence of the armistice without delay to Omer Pasha and to its other officers commanding in Asia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 434.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 27, 1856.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 90 of the 20th instant, respecting a supposed difference of opinion between the Governments of France and of England, as to the admission of Prussia to the Conferences, I have the satisfaction to inform you that a complete agreement exists between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French upon that and upon every other question that can come under discussion at the Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 435.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 224.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 28, 1856.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 176 of the 13th instant, inclosing a translation of the Sultan's firman as to privileges and reforms.

Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which you have given to the Porte, that the utmost publicity should be given to the hatti-sherif, and they entirely concur with your Excellency in the opinion that much will depend upon the zeal and good faith with which these measures are executed by the agents of the Porte, and upon the vigilance used by the Turkish Government in stimulating and directing their agents.

Your Excellency will, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, congratulate the Porte on having adopted these wise and salutary reforms, and you will express the hope, not alone for the advantage of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, but for the future welfare and progress of the Ottoman Empire, that no effort will be spared for carrying these measures into effect.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 436.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(No. 200.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 18, 1856.*

AT our last united interview respecting the Principalities I took occasion to propose that a general amnesty should be recommended. The persons still in exile are few in number, not exceeding ten or twelve, and exclusively from Wallachia; those from Moldavia having been allowed to return to their homes. It seems to me that so obvious an act of clemency would be in keeping with the benevolent intentions which preside over the proposed arrangements for the Principalities, and that a new and improved state of things would be defective without so natural and seasonable a complement.

The Turkish Ministers were not, I think, unwilling to accept my suggestion, but the French and Austrian Representatives—particularly the former—opposed it, as having no immediate or necessary connexion with our actual proceedings. Under the circumstances I did not think it advisable to insist, but I hope that your Lordship will bear in mind the just claim which the exiles in question possess to an indulgent consideration of their case. M. Ghika, the new Prince of Samos, is one of them, and if his colleagues in misfortune entertain no opinions more dangerous than his, I am confident that any errors which they may have committed in 1849—a year of general revolutionary excitement—would not be repeated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 437.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(No. 202.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 18, 1856.

INCLOSED herewith, in copy, for your Lordship's information, are despatches which I have recently addressed to Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Alison respectively, on the subject of the Principalities.

The selection of persons for the Provisional Government and the constituent Commission, is a matter of vital importance. The appointment of the Porte's Commissioner, whether for both Provinces or for each, is also worthy of serious attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 437.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 16, 1856.

I SEND you herewith a despatch for Mr. Alison, requesting that you will deliver or forward it to him without delay; a copy of it is inclosed for your information. It is needless for me to add that I wish you to consider it as addressed equally to yourself in all that is not personal to him.

During my late discussions respecting the Principalities, I have had the advantage of communicating freely with M. Crezsulesco, and I have treated him with confidence, warranted by your account of his character and conduct. I trust that the corrupt practices to which he has been so honestly opposed will find their grave in the new Constitution. I have endeavoured, with the aid of my colleagues, to obtain the adoption of principles calculated, when fairly carried out, to promote the improvement of the Principalities, and to secure the welfare of their inhabitants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 437.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Mr. Alison.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 16, 1856.

I HAVE received and transmitted in copy to the Earl of Clarendon your several despatches enumerated in the margin.

I have not failed to give my attention to your remarks concerning the union of the two Principalities under a foreign Prince, and am not insensible to the advantages which might accrue, in a political sense, from such an arrangement. I think it unlikely, however, that the objections to that form of settlement should be overruled under the present circumstances; and in fact the propositions adopted by the Turkish Ministers, who have lately deliberated on the subject, in concert with the British, French, and Austrian Representatives, are limited to a radical improvement of the organic system which previously existed.

While waiting for a decision from the Conferences at Paris, I shall be happy to receive from you such further advices regarding the condition of the two Governments and their respective inhabitants, as may complete my information.

It is intended at present to introduce the appreciated changes without any unnecessary delay. In each Province a Provisional Government or Caimacamie, composed of certain members, will be named. A joint Commission, sent to Constantinople from Wallachia and Moldavia, will be entrusted with the duty of organizing a new Constitution on the principles laid down. The work thus constructed will have to be promulgated by the Sultan's authority, and its final

communication to the parties who shall have signed the Treaty of Peace will ensue. A Commissioner appointed by the Porte will reside in each Principality during the existence of the Provisional Administration.

Under these circumstances I am unwilling to fetter you as to the time of your return. You are at liberty either to send me the information you collect, or to bring it yourself to the Embassy, according to your own appreciation of what may prove most conducive to the public service. The points which must of necessity come under notice are as well known to you as to myself.

I should greatly lament to find that materials for establishing a representative legislature, capable of controlling the abuses of authority without endangering the peace of the country, are really deficient.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 438.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 18, 1856.

INCLOSED herewith, in copy for your Lordship's information, are despatches which I have addressed respectively to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy with reference to the emancipation of that class of slaves who pass in the Principalities under the name of Gypsies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 438.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 16, 1856.

THE intention of emancipating the Gypsies in Wallachia, as announced in your despatch No. 1 of this year, does credit to the Local Government, and it is satisfactory to know that the example set by the authorities of Jassy has operated with so fair a promise at Bucharest.

The measure will, no doubt, be incomplete unless a just indemnity be granted to those who are called upon to give up their Gypsies. But there is something so unjust and odious in the pretension of any man to hold his fellow creature in servitude against his will, that I sincerely hope the measure will be carried through, notwithstanding such possible difficulties as may stand in the way of assigning a full compensation to those proprietors who would have to resign their Gypsies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 438.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 21, 1856.

I HAVE noticed with feelings of sincere satisfaction the announcement of measures adopted by the Moldavian Government for the emancipation of that part of the population of the Principality which passes with us under the denomination of Gypsies. It appears to me to be a measure as benevolent as it is just, and I presume that the same praiseworthy sentiments which have led to its adoption will also have suggested the propriety of combining a due regard for the wants of the emancipated peasantry with a reasonable indemnification for their previous owners.

If you are of opinion that my impressions on this very interesting

subject may be agreeable or in any way useful to the Prince's Government, I shall not object to your conveying them in an appropriate and confidential manner to the knowledge either of His Highness or of his Ministers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 439.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(No. 204.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 18, 1856.

THE Sultan's firman, comprising the reforms and privileges concerted between His Majesty's Ministers and the Representatives of England, France, and Austria, was promulgated with great solemnity this morning at the Porte. Mr. Doria, who was present by my desire, informs me that the attendance was very full; that the principal Ministers and functionaries, together with the heads of the several non-Mussulman communities, were assembled on the occasion; and that the Sheik-El-Islam was there, as well as the Chief Rabbi of the Jews.

A copy of the firman, headed with the Sultan's hatti-sherif, or Imperial exequatur, has been sent to me officially by Fuad Pasha. The translation of his Excellency's note is inclosed herewith. A similar communication has been made to my colleagues of Austria and France. To-morrow the firman will be communicated to the other members of the Diplomatic body.

The firman itself is identical with the draft and translation already transmitted to your Lordship. I must reserve for another less hurried occasion any remarks which it may be my duty to offer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 439.

Fuad Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.) 11 *Jumeli-ul-Akhir*, 1272. (*February* 18, 1856.)

AN Imperial firman, containing the supreme commands of His Majesty the Sultan, and which he has recently issued, relative to certain improvements being the effects of His Majesty's benevolent intentions constantly exhibited towards all classes of his subjects, has this day been read and promulgated at the Porte, and I have the honour to send your Excellency a copy herewith. The Porte entertains the conviction that these matters, so calculated to afford advantage and benefit to the Empire of His Majesty, will be viewed with pleasure by the Government of Great Britain, her sincere ally.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MEHEMET FUAD.

No. 440.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris March 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* , 1856.

THE Turkish Government press eagerly for more of the loan money. It appears to be wanted, but if given Porte's assurances must be taken as vouchers for the same. Cannot the remaining proceeds of the loan be sent out with more dispatch?

No. 441.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* , 1856.

IT seems to me that a line from above Akermann across to the Pruth would be preferable to the Austrian proposition, provided it followed the bed of the Dniester up to a point short of Bender and thence across to the Pruth, following the water shed more or less diagonally.

No. 442.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* , 1856.

I HAVE acted on your message of yesterday. Omer Pasha is expected here daily from Trebizond.

Colonel Geils reached Erzeroom on the 8th. He complains of Selim Pasha and is resolved to have no communication with him. I have again demanded the Pasha's immediate recall as the only effective remedy.

No direct notification of the armistice has reached Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, which is awkwardly situated by such omissions.

No. 443.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, February 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 27, 1856.

THE new Imperial firman, great as are the prospects which it opens, will require much steady attention and vigilance to carry it into effect and insure its full results. I have acquainted you that its engagements, though indispensable for the regeneration of this Empire, cannot be left with any degree of confidence to the Turkish Government. Responsibility towards Europe must stimulate their sense of duty in that respect.

The fourth point cannot therefore with or prudence be omitted from treatment. The right of superintendence which Her Majesty's Government refused to Russia, may be given without inconsistency to Europe, if care be taken that no single Power acquire a pretext [for] interference or on light grounds. The fear of joint interference from all can hardly fail to give weight to the representations of those who fought for the Turkish Empire and conquered its best securities.

No. 444.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received at Paris, March 2.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 19, 1856.

I AM informed by Fuad Pasha that the Porte's Ministerial Council in adopting, in principle, the propositions agreed upon between the Turkish Ministers and the three Representatives concerning the Danubian Principalities, have directed some remarks to be forwarded to the Sultan's Plenipotentiary at Paris.

It appears from his Excellency's message, as reported to me by Mr. Pisani, that the following points are recommended by the Council:—

1. The number of troops in the Principalities not to be varied without a previous communication with the Porte.

2. No protection to be given to the natives by foreign Powers.

3. In case of difference between the Prince and his legislature, reference to be made to Constantinople for a decision.

4. The Prince to be deposed in case of mental alienation or other incapacitating disease, as well as in that of high treason.

Your Lordship will probably see no objection to the first and last of these suggestions. If the second apply to individuals or to a foreign protectorate, there can be no ground for demur; but the privileges and tranquillity of the Principalities would be exposed to much hazard, in course of time, if the new arrangements were not to be in some degree sheltered by the consent and participation of the allied Powers.

With respect to the third suggestion, much depends on the mode and extent of its application. An appeal to Constantinople in extreme cases threatening the peace of the country may be desirable in guise of arbitration, but an obligation to refer to the Porte in every case of difference would operate as a premium on dispute, and probably end by compromising the administrative independence as well as the tranquillity of the Provinces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 445.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 5.*)

(No. 213.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 21, 1856.*

INCLOSED herewith in Turkish and French are printed copies of the Sultan's firman and hatti-sherif, on the subject of privileges and reforms.

The French publication is considered as official, and I received the copies in that language from Fuad Pasha. I have had them carefully compared with the Turkish, and I have corrected, in writing, the only passage which has been pointed out to me as at all varying from the original propositions.

Precious, and full of hope, as this Imperial Charter is, it will soon fall in public estimation, and finally become an idle tenant of the Porte's State-Paper Office, unless immediate and assiduous efforts are made to give it effect by adequate measures and corresponding practical arrangements.

Under this impression I have already inquired of the Turkish Ministers in what manner they mean to proceed, and I am happy to say that I have received an answer expressive of sincerity from Fuad Pasha and the Kaimakam.

The copies inclosed herewith of an instruction which I addressed to Mr. Pisani, and of his report, will acquaint your Lordship with the particulars of what passed between us.

My remarks on the ordinary character of the Sultan's hatti-sherif, as compared with what I had been led to expect, were not unfounded; but taking the other forms into consideration, I see no reason to doubt the impressiveness of the promulgation or the sincerity of the Sultan's Government, in meeting so fully the wants of the Empire and the counsels of its friends.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 445.

Firman.

QU'IL soit fait en conformité du contenu.

A vous, mon Grand Vizir, Mehemed Emin Aali Pacha, décoré de mon Ordre Impérial du Medjidiyé de la première classe et de l'Ordre du Mérite Personnel; que Dieu vous accorde la grandeur et double votre pouvoir!

Mon désir le plus cher a toujours été d'assurer le bonheur de toutes les classes des sujets que la Divine Providence a placés sous mon sceptre Impérial, et, depuis mon avènement au Trône, je n'ai cessé de faire tous mes efforts dans ce but.

Grâces en soient rendues au Tout-Puissant, ces efforts incessants ont déjà porté des fruits utiles et nombreux. De jour en jour le bonheur de la nation et la richesse de mes Etats vont en augmentant. Désirant aujourd'hui renouveler et élargir encore les réglements nouveaux institués dans le but d'arriver à obtenir un état de choses conforme à la dignité de mon Empire et à la position qu'il occupe parmi les nations civilisées, et les droits de mon Empire ayant aujourd'hui, par la fidélité et les louables efforts de tous mes sujets et par le concours bienveillant et amical des Grandes Puissances, mes nobles alliées, reçu de l'extérieur une consécration qui doit être le commencement d'une ère nouvelle, je veux en augmenter le bien-être et la prospérité intérieure, obtenir le bonheur de tous mes sujets, qui, à mes yeux, sont tous égaux et me sont également chers, et qui sont unis entre eux par des rapports cordiaux de patriotisme, et assurer les moyens de faire de jour en jour croître la prospérité de mon Empire.

J'ai donc résolu et j'ordonne la mise à exécution des mesures suivantes:

Les garanties promises de notre part à tous les sujets de mon Empire par le Hatt-i-Humaïoun de Gul-Hané et en conformité du Tanzimat, sans distinction de classes ni de culte, pour la sécurité de leurs personnes et de leurs biens et pour la conservation de leur honneur, sont aujourd'hui confirmées et consolidées; et, pour qu'elles reçoivent leur plein et entier effet, des mesures efficaces seront prises.

Tous les privilèges et immunités spirituels accordés *ab antiquo* de la part de mes ancêtres, et à des dates postérieures, à toutes les communautés Chrétiennes ou d'autres rites non-Musulmans établis dans mon Empire sous mon égide protectrice, seront confirmés et maintenus.

Chaque communauté Chrétienne ou d'autre rite non-Musulman, sera tenue, dans un délai fixé et avec le concours d'une Commission formée *ad hoc* dans son sein, de procéder, avec ma haute approbation et sous la surveillance de ma Sublime Porte, à l'examen de ses immunités et priviléges actuels, et d'y discuter et soumettre à ma Sublime Porte les réformes exigées par le progrès des lumières et du temps. Les pouvoirs concédés aux Patriarches et aux Evêques des rites Chrétiens par le Sultan Mahomet II et ses successeurs, seront mis en harmonie avec la position nouvelle que mes intentions généreuses et bienveillantes assurent à ces communautés. Le principe de la nomination à vie des Patriarches, après la révision des réglements d'élection aujourd'hui en vigueur, sera exactement appliqué, conformément à la teneur de leurs firmans d'investiture. Les Patriarches, les Métropolitains, Archevêques, Evêques, et Rabins seront assermentés à leur entrée en fonctions, d'après une formule concertée en commun entre ma Sublime Porte et les chefs spirituels des diverses communautés. Les redevances ecclésiastiques, de quelque forme et nature qu'elles soient, seront supprimées et remplacées par la fixation des revenus des Patriarches et chefs des communautés et par l'allocation de traitements et de salaires équitablement proportionnés à l'importance, au rang et à la dignité des divers membres du clergé.

Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte aux propriétés mobilières et immobilières des divers clergés Chrétiens; toutefois, l'administration temporelle des communautés Chrétiennes ou d'autres rites non-Musulmans, sera placée sous la sauvegarde d'une Assemblée, choisie dans le sein de chacune des dites communautés, parmi les membres du clergé et les laïcs.

Dans les villes, bourgades et villages où la population appartiendra en totalité au même culte, il ne sera apporté aucune entrave à la réparation, d'après leur plan primitif, des édifices destinés au culte, aux écoles, aux hôpitaux et aux cimitières. Les plans de ces divers édifices, en cas d'érection nouvelle, approuvés par les Patriarches ou chefs de communautés, devront être soumis à ma Sublime Porte, qui les approuvera par mon ordre Impérial, ou fera ses observations dans un délai déterminé.

Chaque culte, dans les localités où ne se trouveront pas d'autres confessions religieuses, ne sera soumis à aucune espèce de restriction dans la manifestation publique de sa religion. Dans les villes, bourgades et villages où les cultes sont mélangés, chaque communauté, habitant un quartier distinct, pourra également, en se conformant aux prescriptions ci-dessus indiquées, réparer et consolider ses

églises, ses hôpitaux, ses écoles et ses cimitières. Lorsqu'il s'agira de la construction d'édifices nouveaux, l'autorisation nécessaire sera demandée par l'organe des Patriarches ou chefs des communautés à ma Sublime Porte, qui prendra une décision souveraine, en accordant cette autorisation, à moins d'obstacles administratifs. L'intervention de l'autorité administrative dans tous les actes de cette nature sera entièrement gratuite. Ma Sublime Porte prendra des mesures énergiques pour assurer à chaque culte, quel que soit le nombre de ses adhérens, la pleine liberté de son exercice.

Toute distinction ou appellation tendant à rendre une classe quelconque des sujets de mon Empire inférieure à une autre classe, à raison du culte, de la langue ou de la race, sera à jamais effacée du Protocole Administratif. Les lois séviront contre l'usage, entre particuliers ou de la part des autorités, de toute qualification injurieuse ou blessante.

Vu que tous les cultes sont et seront librement pratiqués dans mes Etats, aucun sujet de mon Empire ne sera gêné dans l'exercice de la religion qu'il professe et ne sera d'aucune manière inquiété à cet égard. Personne ne pourra être contraint à changer de religion.

La nomination et le choix de tous les fonctionnaires et autres employés de mon Empire étant entièrement dépendante de ma volonté souveraine, tous les sujets de mon Empire, sans distinction de nationalité, seront admissibles aux emplois publics et aptes à les occuper, selon leurs capacités et leurs mérites, et conformément à des règles d'une application générale.

Tous les sujets de mon Empire seront indistinctement reçus dans les Ecoles Civiles et Militaires du Gouvernement, s'ils remplissent d'ailleurs les conditions d'âge et d'examen spécifiées dans les Réglements Organiques des dites Ecoles. De plus, chaque communauté est autorisée à établir des Ecoles Publiques de Sciences, d'Arts et d'Industrie. Seulement le mode d'enseignement et le choix des professeurs dans les écoles de cette catégorie, seront sous le contrôle d'un Conseil Mixte d'Instruction Publique, dont les membres seront nommés par un ordre souverain de ma part.

Toutes les affaires commerciales, correctionnelles et criminelles entre des Musulmans et des sujets Chrétiens ou autres non-Musulmans, ou bien des Chrétiens ou autres de rites différents non-Musulmans, seront déférées à des Tribunaux Mixtes.

L'audience de ces tribunaux sera publique; les parties seront mises en présence et produiront leurs témoins, dont les dépositions seront reçues indistinctement, sous un serment prêté selon la loi religieuse de chaque culte.

Les procès ayant trait aux affaires civiles continueront d'être publiquement jugés, d'après les lois et les réglements, par devant les Conseils Mixtes des Provinces, en présence du Gouverneur et du Juge du lieu. Les procès civils spéciaux, comme ceux de succession ou autres de ce genre, entre les sujets d'un même rite Chrétien ou autre non-Musulman, pourront, à leur demande, être envoyés par devant les Conseils des Patriarches ou des communautés.

Les lois pénales, correctionnelles, commerciales et les règles de procédure à appliquer dans les Tribunaux Mixtes seront complétées le plus tôt possible et codifiées. Il en sera publié des traductions dans toutes les langues en usage dans l'Empire.

Il sera procédé, dans le plus bref délai possible, à la réforme du système pénitentiaire, dans son application aux maisons de détention, de punition ou de correction, et autres établissements de même nature, afin de concilier les droits de l'humanité avec ceux de la justice. Aucune peine corporelle, même dans les prisons, ne pourra être appliquée que conformément à des réglements disciplinaires émanés de ma Sublime Porte, et tout ce qui ressemblerait à la torture sera radicalement aboli.

Les infractions à ce sujet seront sévèrement réprimées, et entraineront en outre, de plein droit, la punition, en conformité du Code Criminel, des autorités qui les auraient ordonnées et des agents qui les auraient commises.

L'organisation de la police dans la capitale, dans les villes de province et dans les campagnes, sera révisée de façon à donner à tous les sujets paisibles de mon Empire, les garanties les plus fortes de sécurité quant à leurs personnes et à leurs biens.

L'égalité des impôts entraînant l'égalité des charges, comme celle des devoirs entraine celle des droits, les sujets Chrétiens et des autres rites non-Musulmans devront, ainsi qu'il a été antérieurement résolu, aussi bien que les Musulmans,

satisfaire aux obligations de la Loi de Recrutement. Le principe du remplacement ou du rachat sera admis. Il sera publié, dans le plus bref délai possible, une loi complète sur le mode d'admission et de service des sujets Chrétiens et d'autres rites non-Musulmans dans l'armée.

Il sera procédé à une réforme dans la composition des Conseils Provinciaux et Communaux pour garantir la sincérité des choix des Délégués des communautés Musulmans, Chrétiennes et autres, et la liberté des votes dans les Conseils. Ma Sublime Porte avisera à l'emploi des moyens les plus efficaces de connaître exactement et de contrôler le résultat des délibérations et des décisions prises.

Comme les lois qui régissent l'achat, la vente et la disposition des propriétés immobilières sont communes à tous les sujets de mon Empire, il pourra être permis aux étrangers de posséder des propriétés foncières dans mes Etats, en se conformant aux lois et aux réglements de police, en acquittant les mêmes charges que les indigènes et après que des arrangements auront eu lieu avec les Puissances étrangères.

Les impôts sont exigibles au même titre de tous les sujets de mon Empire, sans distinction de classe ni de culte. On avisera aux moyens les plus prompts et les plus énergiques de corriger les abus dans la perception des impôts et notamment des dîmes. Le système de la perception directe sera, successivement et aussitôt que faire se pourra, substitué au régime des fermes dans toutes les branches des revenus de l'Etat. Tant que ce système demeurera en vigueur, il sera interdit, sous les peines les plus sévères, à tous les agents de l'autorité et à tous les membres des Medjlis de se rendre adjudicataires des fermes, qui seront annoncées avec publicité et concurrence, ou d'avoir une part quelconque d'intérêt dans leur exploitation. Les impositions locales seront, autant que possible, calculées de façon à ne pas affecter les sources de la production, ni à entraver le mouvement du commerce intérieur.

Les travaux d'utilité publique reçevront une dotation convenable, à laquelle concourront les impositions particulières et spéciales des Provinces appelées à jouir de l'établissement des voies de communication par terre et par mer.

Une loi spéciale ayant déjà été rendue, qui ordonne que le Budget des recettes et des dépenses de l'Etat sera fixé et communiqué chaque année, cette loi sera observée de la manière la plus scrupuleuse. On procédera à la révision des traitements affectés à chaque emploi.

Les chefs et un délégué de chaque communauté, désigné par ma Sublime Porte, seront appelés à prendre part aux délibérations du Conseil Suprême de Justice dans toutes les circonstances qui intéresseraient la généralité des sujets de mon Empire. Il seront spécialement convoqués à cet effet par mon Grand Vizir. Le mandat des délégués sera annuel; ils prêteront serment en entrant en charge. Tous les membres du Conseil, dans les réunions ordinaires et extraordinaires, émettront librement leurs avis et leurs votes sans qu'on puisse jamais les inquiéter à ce sujet.

Les lois contre la corruption, la concussion ou la malversation seront appliquées, d'après les formes légales, à tous les sujets de mon Empire, quelle que soit leur classe et la nature de leurs fonctions.

On s'occupera de la création de banques et d'autres institutions semblables pour arriver à la réforme du système monétaire et financier, ainsi que de la création de fonds destinés à augmenter les sources de la richesse matérielle de mon Empire.

On s'occupera également de la création de routes et de canaux qui rendront les communications plus faciles et augmenteront les sources de la richesse du pays. On abolira tout ce que peut entraver le commerce et l'agriculture. Pour arriver à ces buts, on recherchera les moyens de mettre à profit les sciences, les arts et les capitaux de l'Europe et de les mettre ainsi successivement en exécution.

Tels étant mes volontés et mes ordres, vous qui êtes mon Grand Vizir, vous ferez, suivant l'usage, publier, soit dans ma capitale, soit dans toutes les parties de mon Empire, ce firman Impérial, et vous veillerez avec attention et prendrez toutes les mesures nécessaires afin que tous les ordres qu'il contient soient dorénavant exécutés avec la plus rigoureuse ponctualité.

Inclosure 2 in No. 445.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Mr. Pisani.

Pera, February 19, 1856.

Sir,

I AM glad to learn from you that you remarked to Fuad Pasha, after the solemnity of yesterday, the defective character of the Sultan's hatti-sherif, notwithstanding my previous exhortations and his assurances. I am glad also to learn that you lost no time in reminding him of several pending questions, which had been reserved till after the promulgation of the firman. I have now to instruct you on both subjects. You will inform the Secretary of State that I was much disappointed by the ordinary character of the hatt, which, as I understood from him, was to be more comprehensive, and calculated to show a deeper interest than usual in the enforcement of the firman. I have no pretention to prescribe the forms of what is an internal act of the Government, but I regret, on so important and vital an occasion, that anything capable of giving full weight and effect to the Sultan's most gracious intentions should have been omitted or abridged; the more so as I had reason to believe that his Excellency entered into my sentiments, and felt the importance of investing the Sultan's charter with all that might impress respect upon the people and confidence on foreign nations. What is done, is done. I now look to the execution of the measures proclaimed, and to the fulfilment of all the reforms and improvements so solemnly promised. It would be a great satisfaction to know in what manner it is proposed to carry out the firman, and for that purpose what regulations are to be framed, and what auxiliary steps to be taken.

With respect to the pending questions alluded to above, I earnestly solicit attention to the representations which you addressed to Fuad Pasha yesterday with much propriety. There is the Greek Convention on brigandage; the transfer of the Tidjaret; the improvement of the custom-house; the settlement of the harbour dues; the recruitment of the Contingent. There may be others, which do not occur to me at this moment, of less importance indeed, but calling, nevertheless, for early attention.

I have to desire that you will talk these several matters over with the Pasha, so as to ascertain his present state of mind respecting them, and to enable me to put them more completely in train.

I wish also that you would sound him as to the expediency of establishing a Crédit-Mobilier Bank. In the opinion of mercantile people, there are sufficient elements for the creation and progress of such an institution, and I am myself acquainted with a respectable and intelligent individual having command of or access to the necessary amount of capital who might be induced to embark in the enterprise and even to conduct it.

Nothing further remains to be suggested at this moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I wish you to read this instruction to Mehemed Pasha as well as to Fuad.

Inclosure 3 in No. 445.

Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, February 20, 1856.

My Lord,

HAVING read and explained to Fuad Pasha and Mehemed Pasha your Excellency's instruction to me of yesterday's date, respecting the firman containing the Articles of the fourth point, the Convention about brigandage, the transfer of the Tidjaret, and the improvement of the custom-house, &c., I have now the honour to report that both his Excellency and his Highness told me, that you may rest assured that the Sultan's charter, containing the points agreed upon in the Conferences, bears the most authentic and solemn character, invested as it is with His Imperial Majesty's hatti-sherif. It is true, added Fuad Pasha, that he said to your Excellency that the hatt was to be more

comprehensive; but when he said so, there was no question of a preamble which subsequently was thought indispensable to give the firman more weight, and calculated to show a deeper interest than usual. He repeated again that he perfectly enters into your sentiments, and because he and his colleagues felt all the importance of investing the Sultan's charter with all that might impress respect upon the people and confidence on foreign nations as to the sincerity of the Porte's Ministers, they gave such publicity and solemnity to its promulgation.

With reference to the execution of the measures proclaimed, both the Kaimakam Pasha and Fuad Pasha requested me to tell your Excellency that all the measures which can be carried into effect at once will suffer no delay. There are others which require time; for instance, the formation of tribunals of commerce, police, &c. The new Penal Code has already been translated and will soon be printed; that of commerce is before a Mixed Commission, as your Excellency is aware, and immediately the report of that Commission is presented to the Porte, the necessary measures will be adopted.

As regards the pending questions alluded to above, his Excellency said that the Greek Convention on Brigandage will be communicated to his colleagues in the first meeting of the Ministerial Council, most likely on Saturday, or at the latest on Sunday. He gave orders, in my presence, to the Amedgi Effendi to collect all the papers connected with that matter and have them ready for perusal, in the Council, by Saturday. For the transfer of the Tidjaret he is in communication, since yesterday, with the Minister of Commerce. As to the improvement of the custom-house, he spoke already to the Minister of Finance, under whose control that establishment is placed, and expects his answer.

I have sounded his Excellency as to the expedience of establishing a Crédit-Mobilier Bank. I found him very well disposed, and he requests your Excellency to tell the person whom you recommend to present his plan in writing to the Porte; and should what he proposes be acceptable to them, they will talk over the matter with him in order to come to an understanding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 446.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 244.)

Paris, March 4, 1856.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 194 of the 15th instant, I have to state to you that I approve of the course which you propose to pursue, as regards the delay of the Porte in removing Selim Pasha from Erzeroom, and in making preparations for the eventuality of a campaign in Asia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 447.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 246.)

Paris, March 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I approve of the instructions which you addressed to Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun and to Mr. Consul Gardner, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch No. 203 of the 18th ultimo, as to the proposed emancipation of gypsies in the Danubian Provinces.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 448.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 247.) *Paris, March* 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I approve of the instructions as to the affairs of the Principalities which you have addressed to Mr. Alison, and to Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun, and copies of which are inclosed in your despatch No. 202 of the 18th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 449.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 249.) *Paris, March* 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I concur in the remarks contained in your despatch No. 206 of the 19th ultimo, on the points to which the Turkish Council have directed the attention of Aali Pasha as regards the arrangements about the Danubian Principalities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 450.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 251.) *Paris, March* 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I approve of the instruction which you addressed to Mr. Fonblanque on the affairs of Servia, copy of which is inclosed in your despatch No. 216 of the 21st ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 451.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 253.) *Paris, March* 4, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 200 of the 18th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with you in considering that a general amnesty should be granted to the exiles from the Principalities, and that I shall bear this subject in mind.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 452.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received at Paris March* 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 5, 1856.

INTELLIGENCE reaches us from Russia, confirms, more or less, the impression derived from other sources that the war is felt severely in that country, that distress and embarrassment prevail there, and that the desire for peace is universal.

Such, in particular, is the substance of information given secretly to the British Consul at Tehran by the first interpreter of the Persian Embassy at St. Petersburgh, recently arrived there from Russia.

No. 453.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 259.) *Foreign Office, March* 5, 1856.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have had under consideration your Excellency's despatch No. 170 of the 12th ultimo, in which you inclose copy of the official note addressed to you by Fuad Pasha relating to the case of renegades in Turkey.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are satisfied with the reply which the Porte has thus made to the representations of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and they consider that the declarations contained in Fuad Pasha's note may be effectually appealed to hereafter, if any renewal should take place of molestation of converts from Islam to Christianity.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 454.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received at Paris March* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 5, 1856.

FUAD PASHA informs me that he can obtain no answer from M. Thouvenel respecting an arrangement, with French assistance, for exchanging Vassif Pasha and General Williams. Your Lordship being at Paris, will perhaps be able to obtain the required aid. The Turkish Ambassador there is instructed to speak to Count Walewski upon this subject.

It is supposed that the French have Russian prisoners of suitable rank who might be given in exchange.

No. 455.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received at Paris March* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 5, 1856.

THE Porte has telegraphed to Aali Pasha to object to the insertion of the fourth point in the Treaty of Peace. Your Lordship knows my opinion on the subject. If some effective control be not kept in the hands of Europe, the Sultan's reforms will be exposed to an almost certainty of remaining, more or less, a dead letter. The consequences are obvious.

The general character of the opinions communicated by persons in connection with the Danubian Principalities, is strongly favourable to the scheme of uniting Moldavia and Wallacia under a foreign Prince. A Representative Legislature is also claimed as a right.

No. 456.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received at Paris March* 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 5, 1856.

IN case of another campaign, the Porte intends that Omer Pasha shall command, in the spring, an army of 60,000 men at Erzeroom. Ismail Pasha goes in the meantime at once to replace Selim Pasha provisionally, taking up his baggage at Varna on his way to Trebizond. Ismail's instructions are to be so framed as to place Colonel Giels in a more effective position. The Porte refuses, on reasonable grounds, to give the chief command to a foreign General.

No. 457.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 272.)

Paris, March 8, 1856.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of telegraphic correspondence between M. de Thouvenel and his Government, and which has been communicated to me by Count Walewski, as to the objection which the Porte has raised to an allusion in the Treaty to the late hatti-sheriff.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 458.

Mr Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 21.)

Stockholm, February 29, 1856.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18, together with their inclosures, on the night of the 23rd instant, by Mr. Corbett, by whom Mr. Buchanan had forwarded them from Copenhagen. Your Lordship's despatches Nos. 14 and 15, together with your circular of the 12th February, reached me by post on the 22nd instant.

I communicated to Baron Stierneld, on the 25th instant, your Lordship's despatch No. 18 of the 14th, in reply to the despatch which his Excellency had addressed on the 26th ultimo to the Swedish and Norwegian Minister in London, and which Baron Hochschild had placed in your Lordship's hands.

Baron Stierneld admitted that, under present circumstances, it was impossible for your Lordship to state with certainty what course Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with Her Majesty's allies, might be able to adopt at the approaching Conferences with regard to Scandinavian interests; and he expressed himself perfectly satisfied with your Lordship's assurances, that no opportunity should be omitted to promote the welfare and security of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.